Response to Clea Bunch's Review of Engaging Iran

President Ronald Reagan's White House leaned toward Baghdad during the Iran–Iraq War because it sought to prevent an Iraqi defeat. Though the White House deemed Iraqi chemical weapons use abhorrent, it found the implications of an Iranian victory or expanded Soviet influence in the Middle East far more alarming. Newly released documents from the Iraqi state archives now allow an exploration of the chemical weapons controversy from both Iraqi and American perspectives. This evidence, along with sources from American archives, demonstrates that Washington and Baghdad had radically different assessments of the Iran–Iraq War. American officials hoped to mould Iraq into a useful ally, but Saddam interpreted American support as subterfuge. Saddam's hostile view of American intentions indicates that Washington had less influence over Iraqi behaviour during the 1980s than both contemporary American officials and many scholars writing since have realised. To insist that Washington could have deterred Iraqi chemical weapons use overstates American clout.     

中东变局与世界主要大国中东战略的调整——兼论中国的中东外交

中东地区历来是大国战略博弈的重点区域。自阿拉伯国家陷入群体性动荡以来,美国、欧洲、俄罗斯等大国或地区力量围绕中东变局纷纷进行政策与战略调整。美国中东战略调整的根本目标是既要避免类似伊拉克战争的深度卷入,又要保持对中东事务的主导权。欧盟尤其是法、英两国对中东变局的积极干预使欧洲对中东事务的影响明显增强,欧盟正力图确立统一的中东战略,但其内部分歧不容忽视。俄罗斯中东战略的核心特征是原则性与灵活性相结合的实用主义外交,并极力维护其地缘战略利益和能源利益。中国应进一步增强对中东战略地位的认识,冷静客观地认识中东变局对中国国际环境变化的影响,并在坚持原则的同时适度扩大对中东事务的参与。     

The Pleiades Join the Stars: Transatlanticism and Eastern Enlargement

EU enlargement and the inclusion of countries previously under communist domination led many West Europeans as well as Americans to think these countries would play the role of a ‘Trojan Horse’. These new EU members indeed have tended to approach the US with greater understanding, but these attitudes differ little from those of Western Europe after the end of World War II. East European pro-Americanism may turn out, however, to be short-lived. This paper argues that the real tension within Europe comes not from the East Europeans' attitudes toward transatlanticism or the Iraq War but rather from their dramatically different experiences under Soviet rule. Based on their empirical experience with Moscow and vital national interests in the democratisation of the EU's neighbourhood, the new members are unlikely to challenge old members over the US; when it comes to Russia, the prospects are quite different.     

The cost of containment: The Cold War and US international drug control at the UN, 1950-58

This article explores the influence of the Cold War on the formulation and application of US narcotic foreign policy at the UN. Examination of Washington's approach toward drug control in South East Asia and the Middle East reveals how the ideologically rich and longstanding US international crusade against narcotics was often subordinated to the containment of communist expansionism. The article demonstrates how both individual and systemic factors combined to deflect US attention away from the sources of illegal narcotics. This produced a confused and contradictory policy despite increasing fears during the 1950s that drugs from abroad posed a real threat to the American way of life.     

Britain,the United States and the Syrian crisis, 1957

This paper seeks to analyze the Syrian Crisis in 1957 and its impact on the Anglo‐American reconciliation after the dispute over Suez in the previous year. The Middle East remained at the forefront of British and American continued regional instability and led to close allied cooperation over the perceived Soviet threat in Syria. This ensured that by the time of the Washington Conference in October 1957 both Macmillan and Eisenhower agreed that the Middle East required a joint Anglo‐American policy to safeguard vital regional interests.     

German policy in a strategic triangle: Berlin,Paris, Washington … and what about London?

The article presents the German view on the current stand and future perspectives of the transatlantic relationship. It points to the caesuras that have defined the US–German relationship since the end of the Cold War. It also details the German role in both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and highlights the German discussion on its involvement in those wars. The historical strategic triangle of the US, Germany and France might develop into a Euro‐American ellipse to confront current global challenges, but, as of today, many hurdles remain, particularly the lack of a common vision and policy regarding the future political order of Europe. The article finally calls on the German government to continue its policy as a ‘civilian power’ and to repair its relations with the US after the Iraq war. International cooperation in multilateral institutions remains the main pillar of German foreign policy.     

The Future Foretold: Lyndon Baines Johnson’s Congressional Support for Israel

Lyndon B. Johnson became a senator the year of Israel’s creation: 1948. Moral, political, and strategic considerations guided Johnson’s outspoken support for Israel from an early point in his political career. This analysis reveals that Johnson’s advocacy of Israel whilst a senator foreshadowed his policy as president of championing the Israeli-American military-strategic alliance. Beginning with his time in Congress, Johnson had many Jewish American friends supporting the establishment of a Jewish state and, due to the importance of Jewish-American backing of the Democratic Party, Johnson supported Israel for significant political reasons. From a moral and strategic perspective starting in the 1950s, Johnson believed that Israel served as a humanitarian refuge for Jews in the aftermath of the Holocaust and, as a liberal democracy, was well suited to oppose the expansion of Soviet influence and communism in the Cold War Middle East. For these reasons, Johnson supported the initiation of American aid to Israel in the early 1950s, which would presage decisions to arm Israel with the first American tanks and fighter jets as president. As a senator, Johnson staunchly opposed President Dwight Eisenhower’s threat to impose sanctions against Israel if it did not withdraw from Egyptian territories occupied in the 1956 Suez crisis. Johnson’s stance on Suez – that Israel deserved greater security guarantees prior to withdrawal – would starkly parallel his policy following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.     

J.W. Young,Twentieth Century Diplomacy,A Case Study of British Practice, 1963–1976

This article explores the influence of the Cold War on the formulation and application of US narcotic foreign policy at the UN. Examination of Washington's approach toward drug control in South East Asia and the Middle East reveals how the ideologically rich and longstanding US international crusade against narcotics was often subordinated to the containment of communist expansionism. The article demonstrates how both individual and systemic factors combined to deflect US attention away from the sources of illegal narcotics. This produced a confused and contradictory policy despite increasing fears during the 1950s that drugs from abroad posed a real threat to the American way of life.     

Britain, the United States and the Syrian crisis, 1957

This paper seeks to analyze the Syrian Crisis in 1957 and its impact on the Anglo-American reconciliation after the dispute over Suez in the previous year. The Middle East remained at the forefront of British and American continued regional instability and led to close allied cooperation over the perceived Soviet threat in Syria. This ensured that by the time of the Washington Conference in October 1957 both Macmillan and Eisenhower agreed that the Middle East required a joint Anglo-American policy to safeguard vital regional interests.     

Alliance Behaviour,the Absentee Liberator and the Influence of Soft Power: Post-communist State Positions over the Iraq War in 2003

Thirteen post-communist governments gave diplomatic support to the Anglo-American position on Iraq in 2003; many also gave military assistance to the war itself and most contributed to post-war operations. However ‘small states’ may be defined, none of these 13 actors can be considered a major power in international relations. This article assesses the reasons for their support of the United States. It first considers what material gains they expected and gained, and applies their support of the US against expectations of alliance behaviour. It then contrasts the behaviour of those Central and East European states with that of Belarus and of Serbia. The article then argues that an important explanation for post-communist state behaviour over Iraq comes from an expression of existential values that can be understood through the notion of ‘soft power’.     

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Middle East

This article examines the geopolitical and economic implications of the Belt and Road Initiative for the Middle East. It locates the BRI within the region’s politics and examines the opportunities that the initiative offers for the region, as well as its inherent risks and challenges. It argues that the BRI is not merely an economic project as framed by Beijing, but that it represents a new stage in China’s engagement with the region, and—if fully implemented—could have wide geopolitical implications. The Middle East has the potential to contribute immensely to China’s sustained growth by addressing its energy security, supporting China’s role as a ‘megatrader’, and, more importantly, driving China’s efforts to become a global maritime power and monetary power by internationalizing the Renminbi (RMB). Thus, the BRI could have wide implications for the Middle East. Far from being a win-win project for all, the BRI will likely benefit some countries in the region more than others. Iran stands ready to benefit most. The BRI will likely increase the strategic importance of the Suez Canal and could potentially undermine the importance of some logistic hubs in the Middle East in favour of other trade hubs in Central Asia.     

Strategy,Security, and War in Iraq: The United States and the Gulf in the 21st Century

Over the course of events taking place in and around the Persian Gulf over the last three years, the United States has used force to replace a despotic dictator who once served Western interests, placed considerable distance between itself and its erstwhile regional partner Saudi Arabia, and reduced its role as arbiter in the Arab–Israeli dispute. Operation Iraqi Freedom would seem to reveal that the United States has chosen a broader vision for the role that force could play as part of a more aggressive security strategy. The Gulf littoral's forward-deployed footprint, set into place during the first Gulf War, enabled effects-based capabilities to be tested in Iraq that have come online since the 1990s, enabling the US military to begin to operationalise what was initially dubbed the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and now is called ‘Transformation’. As such, the Gulf infrastructure provides the US with a model to emulate around the world as it seeks to realign its forces to better address new threats in the global theatre. The Gulf facilities will become central hubs in the network of bases stretching throughout Central and South Asia and the Horn of Africa which will perform missions associated with the global war on terror. Operation Iraqi Freedom represents only the beginning of this phenomenon in an emerging new global defense strategy that may see forward-deployed forces around the world used with increased frequency to manage an uncertain security environment.     

‘Non-lethal’ weapons and the occupation of Iraq: technology,ethics and law

The occupation of Iraq is a challenging task for the United States (US) military, which is considering resort to options other than lethal force as a possible just response. From the outset, the notion that a weapon can be deemed ‘non-lethal’ is problematic. Some weapons intended to leave their target alive often have lethal consequences and other weapons intended to have lethal effects often do not kill their target. This article explores ethical and legal challenges that arise from the potential use by US forces in Iraq of two classes of so-called ‘non-lethal’ weapons: incapacitating chemical agents and dazzling laser devices. Such challenges are highly relevant to questions about the role of Just War theory in the context of modern warfare. In particular, they beg the question whether the use of non-lethal weapons supports or subverts the jus in bello requirement that war be waged in a discriminate and proportionate fashion.     

Learning to Pull the Strings after Suez: Macmillan’s Management of the Eisenhower Administration during the Intervention in Jordan, 1958

This analysis re-instates the importance of the 1958 British intervention in Jordan within the study of Anglo–American relations and the revisionist literature on Suez. It does so by challenging the idea of British subservience to American foreign policy after the 1956 crisis, and it reveals two key lessons learnt by London: that Britain’s economy, power, and influence were in decline and that Britain could no longer intervene in the Middle East without American support. Having learnt these lessons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proved to be a shrewd political actor who used the opportunity of the Jordan intervention to turn the policy of the Dwight Eisenhower Administration to British ends, regaining Britain’s maximum power and prestige for the minimum loss of resources.     

Analysis: The effects of the Iraq War on the Kurdish issue in Turkey

This article examines the potential repercussions of the Iraq War on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. An introduction to the Kurdish problem and its securitisation in Turkey precedes an analysis of the Gulf War's impact on Turkey's policies towards the Kurds—in both Turkey and Iraq. The article briefly documents the struggle between the EU's pressures on Turkey after 1999 to improve Kurdish rights and the state's reluctance to implement reforms. Impacting reforms is the heightened sense of insecurity in Turkey after the Iraq War and the perceived threat of greater autonomy for the Kurds in Northern Iraq. In response, Turkey has identified the Turkmen minority as a key strategic concern. None the less, increasingly the ruling Justice and Development Party's attitude towards Iraqi Kurdish groups indicates the evolution of a more pragmatic approach. In conclusion, two possible options emerge: the continued desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey or its re-securitisation.     

9/11 and the growing Euro-American Chasm over the Middle East

While Euro-American differences over key issues in the Middle East were notable prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, they widened significantly after the attacks, with respect to how to approach Iraq, Iran, and the Middle East peace process. This article explores these changes and thus offers a snapshot of the effect of 9/11, a snapshot that can also illuminate the backdrop to the transatlantic imbroglio regarding Iraq in 2003.     

Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953-1958

The present article contends that while the United States did not link Iraq to the West in a Northern Tier alliance aimed at containing the Soviet Union, the failure to do so was not principally a result of mistakes made by Washington. American actions in Iraq were constrained by the competing imperial ambitions of the United Kingdom and by the regional political goals of the Iraqi monarchy. The criticism that the Eisenhower administration undermined the stability of the Iraqi monarchy by not supplying it with sufficient aid, and encouraging it to join the unpopular Baghdad Pact ignores the importance that Britain and the Iraqi government itself had on fate of the Iraqi monarchy.     

The US–UK 'Special Relationship' in a world twice transformed

The international politics of recent years have seen a resurgence and refashioning of the US–UK ‘Special Relationship’. Widely seen as likely to expire with the end of the Cold War, the relationship, defined mainly in military terms, revived following the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States. The article considers various possible explanations for the longevity of US–UK ‘special relations’. Such explanations include simple inertia and the subtle effects of shared culture. Particular emphasis in explaining the persistence of the ‘Special Relationship’ in a changed world, however, is placed on conscious decisions of the Blair government, and especially of Prime Minister Tony Blair himself. The article concludes with an assessment of US–UK relations with respect to the conflict in Iraq.     

A New Regional Cold War in the Middle East and North Africa: Regional Security Complex Theory Revisited

Since the 2003 Iraq war, the Middle East and North Africa has entered into a New Regional Cold War, characterised by two competing logics: on the one hand, the politicisation of sectarianism opposing a Saudi-led Sunni bloc against an Iran-led Shia bloc and, on the other, an intra-Sunni cleavage around the mobilisation of political Islam, embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters vs its opponents. Blending Buzan and Weaver’s regional security complex theory with Donnelly’s notion of ‘heterarchy’ and applying it to the cold wars the region has experienced, the similarities and differences between the Arab Cold War of the 1950s/60s and the New Regional Cold War reveal the increasing number of heterarchic features within the regional security complex: multiple and heterogeneous power centres, different power rankings, a more visible and relevant role of non-state and transnational actors, and the fragmentation of regional norms.     

Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953–1958

The present article contends that while the United States did not link Iraq to the West in a Northern Tier alliance aimed at containing the Soviet Union, the failure to do so was not principally a result of mistakes made by Washington. American actions in Iraq were constrained by the competing imperial ambitions of the United Kingdom and by the regional political goals of the Iraqi monarchy. The criticism that the Eisenhower administration undermined the stability of the Iraqi monarchy by not supplying it with sufficient aid, and encouraging it to join the unpopular Baghdad Pact ignores the importance that Britain and the Iraqi government itself had on fate of the Iraqi monarchy.