The failure of a liberal peace: Sri Lanka's counter-insurgency in global perspective

The victory by the Sri Lankan government over the LTTE in 2009 apparently ended over 25 years of civil war. However, the ramifications of the government's counter-insurgency go far beyond Sri Lanka's domestic politics. The military campaign against the LTTE poses a significant challenge to many of the liberal norms that inform contemporary models of international peace-building—the so-called ‘liberal peace’. This article suggests that Sri Lanka's attempts to justify a shift from peaceful conflict resolution to counter-insurgency relied on three main factors: the flawed nature of the peace process, which highlighted wider concerns about the mechanisms and principles of international peace processes; the increased influence of ‘Rising Powers’, particularly China, in global governance mechanisms, and their impact on international norms related to conflict management; and the use by the government of a discourse of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency to limit international censure. The article concludes that the Sri Lankan case may suggest a growing contestation of international peace-building norms, and the emergence of a legitimated ‘illiberal peace’.     

猛虎组织溃败的原因分析

猛虎组织的失败并非偶然,它是一系列原因综合作用的结果。首先,在国际反恐合作的背景下,猛虎组织被许多国家认定为恐怖组织而取缔,而斯里兰卡政府却利用这一背景加强了与西方及周边国家的军事合作。其次,在有效整合国内政治力量的前提下,斯政府在军事上对猛虎组织采取了富有成效的进攻和围剿。再次,猛虎组织内部的分裂削弱了自身的实力,领导人的独断导致了战略决策的失误,而穷兵黩武的暴力恐怖政策则使其最终丧失了国内外的同情和支持。     

Corruption and conflict: connections and consequences in war-torn Sri Lanka

In the transition from war to peace, one key challenge is to ensure that those who gained something from the war can be convinced to support the peace. At the same time, however, it is crucial to avoid reproducing corrupt practices and inequalities that fuelled the conflict. The problem of corruption during post-war peace-building has gained considerable attention recently, academically as well as in policy-making circles. This exploratory case study of Sri Lanka traces and problematises the complex linkages between corruption and conflict at the shift from war to peace, building on field research in Sri Lanka before and after the end of the war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009. The article illustrates how global resource flows and politics have enabled conflict-fuelling corruption in Sri Lanka, and how local experiences of corruption feed into the popular grievances which have both caused and kept the conflict going. The end of the war has not presented a break with the corruption-conflict links of the wartime—and these connections will have implications for reconstruction and reconciliation in the country.     

The Tamil people's right to self-determination

This article provides an overview of the crisis in Sri Lanka and states why an armed conflict has developed in the northern and eastern parts (north-east) of the country. The Tamils' accusations—of discrimination, denial of the right to self-determination, abrogated agreements and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to genocide by successive Sri Lankan governments—are supported by specific evidence given by international human rights and legal experts, international human rights non-governmental organizations and other relevant entities. The democratic parliamentary efforts and the non-violent resistance struggle of the Tamil people prior to the outbreak of war are traced over several decades. The article includes an outline of social and law and order achievements in the north-east under the de facto administration of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and concludes with some current international dimensions of the situation.     

Political violence in Sri Lanka: A diagnostic approach

The main objective of this article is to examine the causes and pattern of political violence waged by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. It is the argument of the article that the origin and development of the JVP and the LTTE relate more closely to the social expansion and the lack of economic and political development in Sri Lanka since the beginning of the 1960s. Basically, both groups are more action‐oriented than ideology‐oriented and dominated by youth with a similar socio‐economic background. Their ideology is a mixture of ethno‐nationalism and various interpretations of Marxism. The strategy of the JVP was based on an objective of launching a short‐term armed insurrection. The LTTE's aim is to overthrow the forces of the Sri Lankan government through a protracted armed struggle. Although the left‐wing insurrection of the JVP was crushed by the government security forces, it is evident that there is a possibility of its re‐emergence in its violent form. The on‐going separatist guerrilla warfare by the LTTE seems to be an unwinnable war. In the presence of youth insurrections in Sri Lanka, the utmost requirement is a sound counter‐insurgency policy accompanied by political reforms.     

Eyes wide shut: persistent conflict and liberal peace-building in Nepal and Sri Lanka

The decisive, albeit different, endings of armed conflict in Sri Lanka and Nepal and subsequent post-war developments challenge key assumptions about conflict that have informed post-Cold War international efforts to produce peace in such conflict zones. International intervention—including in Sri Lanka and Nepal—characterises armed conflict as sustained by specific political economies that can only be stably resolved by establishing liberal democracy and market economics. This paper examines liberal peace engagement in Sri Lanka and Nepal to challenge a crucial assumption of the persistent conflict thesis, namely the separation between political contestation and armed conflict. It argues that the divergent post-conflict outcomes of continuing ethnic polarisation in Sri Lanka and constitutional reform in Nepal reveal strong continuities in the dynamics of pre-war, war and post-war politics. This continuity challenges the presumed separation of politics and violence that drove international engagement to produce liberal peace and suggests that such engagement, far from encouraging reform, may have (inadvertently) sustained conflict in both cases.     

Dynamics of peace and democratization. The Aceh lessons

The viability of the thesis that liberalization and democracy foster peace, security and development is at stake. The main critique is that more liberties and elections lead to more conflict and abuses of power. There are three principal responses to this critique. The liberal argument calls for improving the democratic institutions; the institutions first thesis prioritizes strengthening the rule of law and state capacity over democracy; whilst the transformation argument proposes using fledgling democracy to foster gradually more favourable relations of power and popular capacity towards more substantial democracy. This article analyses the relevance of these theses to the remarkable dynamics of peace-building in Aceh, from the introduction of Indonesian democracy in 1998, the impact of the tsunami in 2004 and the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 to the general elections in 2009. The study concludes that the liberal argument is congruous with the democratic opportunities for peace, while the institutions first and the transformation arguments give prominence to the dynamics that made peace-building possible but also difficult. While the institutions first argument responds to these difficulties by resorting to power sharing, the transformation thesis proposes more citizen participation coupled with interest and issue group representation.     

The cold peace: Russo-Western relations as a mimetic cold war

In 1989–1991 the geo-ideological contestation between two blocs was swept away, together with the ideology of civil war and its concomitant Cold War played out on the larger stage. Paradoxically, while the domestic sources of Cold War confrontation have been transcended, its external manifestations remain in the form of a ‘legacy’ geopolitical contest between the dominant hegemonic power (the United States) and a number of potential rising great powers, of which Russia is one. The post-revolutionary era is thus one of a ‘cold peace’. A cold peace is a mimetic cold war. In other words, while a cold war accepts the logic of conflict in the international system and between certain protagonists in particular, a cold peace reproduces the behavioural patterns of a cold war but suppresses acceptance of the logic of behaviour. A cold peace is accompanied by a singular stress on notions of victimhood for some and undigested and bitter victory for others. The perceived victim status of one set of actors provides the seedbed for renewed conflict, while the ‘victory’ of the others cannot be consolidated in some sort of relatively unchallenged post-conflict order. The ‘universalism’ of the victors is now challenged by Russia's neo-revisionist policy, including not so much the defence of Westphalian notions of sovereignty but the espousal of an international system with room for multiple systems (the Schmittean pluriverse).     

Patterns of Peace

Different strategies are used to conceptualise peace in the literature on International Relations, peace and conflict studies. These have included strategies based upon the notion that peace is geographically contained, and constructed by race, identity, ideology, or power, and has universal qualities, although it is also utopian and unlikely to be fully achieved. What has developed more recently in the relevant literature is a hybrid version of peace—the liberal peace. This is universal, attainable, and dependent upon a specific methodology. The following essay outlines the main discursive characteristics associated with peace, and with the emergence of the concept of the liberal peace. It outlines the patterns of thought prevalent in the conceptualisation of peace, and their ontological and epistemological implications in the context of the liberal peace framework.     

Troublesome Peace Making: How American Views on Terrorism Affected Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka, 2000–2009

Weak mediators normally need to borrow leverage from more powerful players to provide efficient mediation. This situation requires strong co-operation between the weak mediator and more powerful actors or coalitions involved in a peace process. But what if this co-operation fails? This analysis demonstrates how lack of productive co-operation with the United States negatively affected Norway’s 9-year-long attempt to mediate in the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam between 2000 and 2009. More specifically, it explores how the United States views on terrorism in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 limited Norway’s room for diplomatic manoeuvre. Based on a unique set of classified sources from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and interviews with key actors, the analysis demonstrates how diverging perceptions of a conflict can make mediation painfully challenging.     

The Tragedy of Liberalism How Globalization Caused the First World War

The belief that globalization enhances peace, a central tenet of liberal theory, enjoys substantial support in recent scholarship on trade and conflict. To conclude that liberalism is right, however, is premature and wrong. Liberal theory is not sufficiently grounded in international trade theory to show how globalization generates constraints on military force, nor does it adequately link these constraints to strengthened peace. This article uses the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade to connect globalization's economic effects to increased constraints on military force and then explores how, in the nineteenth century, globalization affected European peace. As liberal theory predicts, globalization generated substantial constraints on military force in prewar Europe. Yet there are important flaws in liberalism's logic linking these constraints to strengthened international peace. Contrary to liberal theory, globalization did not strengthen prospects for peace in prewar Europe but was a major cause of the First World War.     

Custom,contestation and co-operation: peace and justice promotion in Somaliland

This article explores alternatives to prevailing state-centric and legalistic approaches to supporting local security and access to justice. It does so through a case study of an initiative developed by an international NGO in partnership with a group of traditional authorities in Somaliland. The initiative aimed at enhancing local security and access to justice, drawing on customary conflict resolution mechanisms and everyday strategies of self-securing. At the same time, the initiative was shaped by international input and liberal notions of human rights and human security. This approach entailed a renegotiation of both local ordering and international discourse. Drawing on our fieldwork, we examine the initiative as it has evolved since 2003, and discuss what it suggests in terms of prospects for international support to ‘non-state’ actors. In particular, the article draws attention to the potential of working with everyday local practices to enable social change rather than focusing narrowly on reforming legal systems (whether state or customary).     

The problem of peace and the meaning of ‘post-war’

The literature on war endings and peace-building pivots on a concept that it in fact continues to struggle with: peace. I argue that we should abandon the conceptualisation of peace as a condition. By implication, we must also abandon the notion of war-to-peace transition and the underlying teleology that projects peace as a deferred and ambiguous end state. Instead, I propose the term post-war transition. Importantly, the prefix post should not be understood as a temporal breakpoint: a definitive after. Rather, it signals an ambition to address and move beyond, analogous to the term post-colonialism. I subsequently draw on the post-colonial literature to further elaborate my conceptualisation of post-war transition with three propositions, respectively concerning: the discursive politics of retrospectivity; the assertion of sovereignty as the foundational referent of law and political order; and the concept of articulation to juxtapose contingent change and constrained agency. I then apply these ideas to the Sri Lankan case to illustrate what angles and insights my conceptualisation of post-war transition could offer.     

Pioneers of peace research VI: Norman Z. Alcock: Apostle of cycles and builder of bridges

From the beginning of his peace research in 1961, Alcock expected some happy combination of disarmament and world government to lead to world peace. By 1971 this happy combination included world development, which involved a world government in redistributing the savings from disarmament. Since no progress resulted from arms control and disarmament talks and treaties by 1978, and since no progress was made in revising the United Nations charter toward an effective world government, Alcock proposed reducing military expenditures instead of arms, since the reduction of military expenditures 10% per year could be verified by fiscal inspection; aid could be transferred from nations with the most money to nations with the most people; and Peace‐keeping forces could be established to operate automatically on the basis of action criteria or tension readings independently of United Nations voting. In this manner, disarmament, aid, and peacekeeping would simultaneously reduce civil, international, and structural violence, leading to a happier, healthier, wealthier, and wiser world at peace. Unfortunately, the United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament in 1978 and 1982 paid little attention to proposals such as these.     

The impact of orthodox terrorism discourses on the liberal peace: internalisation,resistance, or hybridisation?

This article examines the relationship between orthodox terrorism discourses and liberal peacebuilding, particularly where states are being reconstituted after a conflict. Drawing upon fieldwork in Sri Lanka, Palestine, Kashmir, Nepal, and Northern Ireland, our findings suggest that conflicts in which orthodox terrorism theory is deployed to explain violence are those in which there is little interest (by all parties) in dealing with root causes or achieving mutual compromise. This is so even though the liberal peace is commonly a claimed aspiration for most parties, apart from the most radical of non-state actors or authoritarian of states. They effectively reify both terrorism and state securitisation. The aspired to internalisation of the liberal peace framework has instead been supplanted by the politics of state securitisation and violent resistance. Liberal peacebuilding has become a nominal exercise in constructing virtually liberal states in which the security and integrity of core groups are partially maintained by orthodox terrorism praxis. To counter these dynamics, critical positions need to engage with agendas beyond liberal or cosmopolitan frameworks.     

The Liberal Peace Revisited: The Role of Democracy,Dependence, and Development in Militarized Interstate Dispute Initiation, 1950–1999

We test a model of the liberal peace by examining the initiation of militarized interstate disputes at the monadic level of analysis from 1950–1999. Liberal peace theory contends that both economic dependence and democratic political systems reduce conflict propensities. Extant empirical analyses of the monadic liberal peace, however, are under-specified. First, the concept of economic dependence not only includes trade, but also foreign investment. Second, existing models do not control for the influence of economic development. Previous research on the monadic liberal peace has also failed to distinguish between the initiation of conflict and participation in conflict. We find evidence for a liberal peace: trade dependence, foreign investment, and democracy reduce a state’s propensity to initiate militarized disputes.     

Reconstructing post-war Lebanon: A challenge to the liberal peace?

This piece uses the example of reconstruction following the July–August 2006 Israeli–Hezbollah war in Lebanon to reflect on the existence of alternatives to the liberal peace. The term ‘liberal peace’ is used as shorthand for internationally-sponsored peace-support and reconstruction interventions and it is marked by its increasingly formulaic, top–down and ethnocentric nature. Two significant non-western actors were apparent in Lebanon's post-war reconstruction: the Gulf States and Jihad Al Bina (the reconstruction wing of Hezbollah). Using fieldwork, this article examines the extent to which the reconstruction activities of these non-western actors constitute an alternative to the liberal peace. It finds that these activities do not have the critical mass or ambition to form a fully-fledged alternative but argues that they reveal serious limitations in the liberal peace approach to post-war reconstruction.     

缅甸：2012～2013年回顾与展望

2012年,缅甸政府着重推动政府转型,促进经济发展,拓展外交空间,取得了显著成果。4月1日,议会补选成功举行,民盟成为议会最大反对党;政府与多支少数民族武装达成了停火或和平协议;政府领导人频频出访,美国总统奥巴马等西方政要来访。但政府仍然面临着宪法改革、公民维权运动和族群冲突等一系列问题的挑战。     

Legitimate peace in post-civil war states: towards attaining the unattainable

Within the literature on conflict resolution and peace-building, there is a growing awareness about the need to move beyond ‘minimalist’ (absence of war) and ‘maximalist’ (absence of different types of structural violence) notions of peace. While the first concept is too narrow—it conceals much human suffering and does not take into account the root causes of armed conflict—the latter is too inclusive, open-ended and difficult to measure. There is, despite this growing consciousness, a lack of midterm definitions of peace that can help peacemakers assess whether a peace process is on the right track, say 10 or 15 years after a civil war has been terminated. In fact, when operationalising and empirically measuring how ‘peaceful’ post-civil war societies are, many scholars continue to employ indicators based on minimalist or maximalist visions of peace. In this article we introduce the concept of ‘legitimate peace’, which we argue can function as a midterm benchmark for peacemakers, and outline the benefits associated with its use.