美国专利新颖性研究及对企业专利管理的建议

对一项发明新颖性和创造性的评判是决定一件专利申清获得专利的关键因素。中美两国在专利新颖性方面的规定存有差异,由于中国企业对此认识不足,导致申请美国专利时在新颖性方面可能遇到很多问题。这就要求中国企业在理解和把握美国专业法有关新颖性规定的基础上,通过健全制度,强化管理等措施,积极应对。     

外观设计专利授权的实质要件探讨

外观设计专利新颖性有绝对新颖性、相对新颖性和缓和新颖性三种。我国正在修订的专利法宜继续坚持混合新颖性标准,其比较对象原则上应限于产品外观设计.抵触申请也可破坏外观设计专利申请的新颖性。我国外观设计专利应引入创造性标准,对同一申请人同日在相同产品上中请的多个相似外观设计,不宜被认定为重复授权。此外,我国外观设计专利应继续坚持“美感”标准。     

专利新颖性判断标准或将变动

为了给国民的财富寻找合适的投资方向，应当修改专利法，将相对新颖性的专利新颖性判断标准修改为绝对新颖性的专利新颖性判断标准，允许国外已经公开的技术在国内可以由国民自由使用。这对国家经济和股市的发展绝对一个是惊人的利好     

专利

三一重装专利权纠纷案已开庭——本案的进展过程可谓一波三折，在三一重装提起专利侵权之诉后，被告对三一重装专利的新颖性、创造性均提出过质疑，连续10余次向专利复审委申请涉案专利无效，但三一重装坚定维护专利权的决心使其终获阶段性胜利。     

关于专利新颖性宽限期问题的答疑

在《专利法》及《专利法实施细则》修改之际,以及世界专利议程正在进行的情况下,通过对各国的新颖性宽限期的比较以及相关国际条约和国际协调的研究,重点论述了新颖性宽限期的范围和期限问题,并对我国的新颖性宽限期规则提出了一些意见和建议。     

欧洲专利法修订介评

修订后的欧洲专利公约对专利申请语言文本，专利优先权的行使与延长，专利新颖性及专利权利范围更正等内容做了新的规定，公约简化了欧洲专利保护的程序，便利了专利申请人和专利权人，同时保留欧洲专利高质量的审查标准。     

专利文献,检索和审查

首先,我能代表我的国家,应邀参加这次由世界知识产权组织和中国专利局共同举办,并由联合国开发计划署资助的重要讨论会,感到非常高兴。就我个人而言,能够出席这个会议并有机会向各位尊敬的与会者介绍在一个发展中国家中专利文献的作用,以及一些文献检索和专利审查的情况,感到非常荣幸和愉快。专利制度的基本原则是新颖性。尽管还需要其它条件,但新颖性是作为获得专利的首要的必需条件。新颖性可以是“相对的”,也就     

外观设计专利授权标准研究

面对我国外观设计专利申请泛滥、申请水平低下及外观设计专利质量低下的现状,统一外观设计专利授权标准已成为当务之急。本文从比较分析的角度出发,对国外外观设计专利授权标准分析,提出我国外观设计专利授权标准应提高新颖性要求,引入创造性标准等观点。     

论基因专利的法律限制

基因专利是特殊的专利制度。申请时应注重程序的公开性,本着专利的新颖性、实用性、创造性进行实质审查,其范围应包括基因成分专利和用途专利,在专利基因原材料的提供者和基因专利者的利益平衡中要注意原生权利和衍生权利的区别,注意保护基因提供者的利益。     

知识产权战略下的专利实质性授权要件研究

关于专利的三个实质性授权要件,首先,实用性决定可专利主题的外部范围,而新颖性和创造性则决定技术领域中的内部标准;而另外,实用性和新颖性又主要体现为是立法中的客观标准,而创造性则更常表现为是司法实践中的主观把握.三者相互作用,相互牵制,共同构成专利授权的合作与平衡的有机整体.     

专利泛化与专利制度改革

20世纪80年代以来专利权得到了扩张和强化,由此引发了激烈的专利竞赛、专利申请和授权膨胀、问题专利增多、专利丛林等专利泛化现象.对专利权的过度保护打破了原有的专利政策在专利权人与社会公众之间的利益平衡,增加了对创新的阻碍作用,走向了专利制度激励创新的政策目标的反面.虽然经济分析到目前还不能为政策制定者提供专利保护正确与否的基础,但它为专利制度的各种成分是应当更多还是更少提供了牢固的基石.2008年<专利法>第三次修订正是对其中一些问题的回应.     

专利产品的修理与专利侵权问题探讨——从日本再生墨盒案谈起

日本再生墨盒案使人们的学术目光再次聚集在专利产品的修理与专利侵权的问题上。专利产品在被合法投放到市场后,所有权人对专利产品进行的修理行为,到什么程度就成为违法的再造,该案一、二审判决给出了不同的答案。笔者主张:应在全面把握权利用尽、制造等专业术语的法律含义的基础上,综合考量争议行为是否有利于相关产业的自由竞争、保护生态环境等因素,从宽认定修理。     

滥用专利权与滥用专利制度之辨析——从日本“专利滥用”的理论与实践谈起

专利制度的滥用不同于专利权的滥用,前者是专利制度的缺陷导致的,后者是权利人行使合法有效的权利超越了权利的范围或者违反了专利法以及竞争法的强制规定而发生的.因此,规制专利权滥用的法律并不能解决"问题专利"以及专利制度滥用的问题.对专利制度的滥用只能通过完善专利制度本身来解决.     

专利间接侵权与专利侵权判定原则

专利间接侵权包括诱导、怂恿、教唆别人实施他人专利;为他人实施或者准备实施侵权行为提供条件。如果间接行为与直接行为并发,可直接依照《民法通则》和《侵权责任法》的相关规定进行判定。如果间接行为单独存在,尚处于侵权的准备状态,完全可以按照专利侵权判定规则,依照《专利法》和《最高人民法院关于审理侵犯专利权纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的解释》等确定的“全面覆盖原则”来判定。因此,现有法律框架足以解决专利间接侵权问题,我国目前不宜将准备行为定性为专利侵权。     

《专利法》的修改和专利司法

在我国,<专利法>的修改往往不都是回应专利司法实践中提出的问题,其中另有原因.但专利法修改会吸收一些成熟的司法经验,会给司法带来一些挑战,也会带来一些未预的后果.     

Universities and Patent Demands

Research universities have made enormous contributions to the field of medicine and the treatment of human disease. Alone or in collaboration with pharmaceutical companies, academic researchers have added to the store of knowledge that has led to numerous life science breakthroughs. A new chapter may be opening for academic researchers, however, that could lead to a darker tale. ‘The mouse that trolled: the long and tortuous history of a gene mutation patent that became an expensive impediment to Alzheimer''s research, by Bubela et al., chronicles one such tale.’ The authors do an excellent job of bringing to life the twisting saga that engulfed numerous academic and non-profit Alzheimer''s researchers over many years. The authors note that the story is an outlier, but sadly, that may not be the case. There are increasing signs that academic researchers and their institutions are being caught up in the rush for gold that is accompanying the proliferation of the non-practicing entity business model. As I have noted before, academic institutions have a dual role, as keepers of the academic flame and guardians of the public monies entrusted to them through state and federal research funding. The specter of taxpayer money being used, not to advance research and for the betterment of society, but as part of schemes to extract money from productive companies may not sit well with voters, and ultimately, with legislators. In that case, researchers and institutions themselves may have much to lose.‘The Mouse that Trolled: The Long and Tortuous History of A Gene Mutation Patent That Became an Expensive Impediment to Alzheimer''s Research’ describes an important case in which a gene mutation patent, owned by a non-practicing entity, was asserted against researchers studying the causes and effects of Alzheimer''s disease. Non-practicing entities (NPEs) are parties whose core activity involves licensing or litigating patents, rather than making products. The article details nearly two decades of litigation—targeted at universities, foundations, and non-profits—and illustrates the immeasurable damage to disease research caused by the battle. Although the authors examine a single example of an NPE targeting biopharmaceutical research, observational evidence suggests that such cases will be neither rare nor uncommon across time, raising concerns about the way in which the public interest may be lost along the way. Particularly troubling is the possibility that universities themselves may increasingly partner with NPEs, in an effort to join the patent gold rush.Universities play a dual role in society, serving both as keepers of the academic flame and as guardians of society''s money. State and federal governments entrust universities with substantial amounts of research funding in the hope that academic minds can contribute to the store of knowledge that will lead to societal improvements in human health, technology, and other fields. And universities have, indeed, made profound contributions to knowledge and innovation, from which all of society has benefitted. In fact, in an effort to facilitate the translation of academic research into products for society, Congress adopted the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act.¹ Prior to Bayh-Dole, commentators had complained that the ‘return on investment’ from public research funding for universities failed to justify the dollars spent.² Bayh-Dole attempted to rectify that problem by allowing universities to control patenting and licensing of inventions created with federal money.³ The goal was to facilitate the creation of actual products from the storehouse of knowledge resulting from public funding of university research. In keeping with the idea that universities are trustees of public resources, Bayh-Dole created an environment in which universities would foster innovation through the commercial application of its patents.Bayh-Dole flowed from the basic principle that patents are granted, not solely to reward the inventor, but rather to incentivize activity that benefits society as a whole.⁴ In granting patents, we temporarily remove items from the store of what would otherwise be free to all and reserved to none in the hopes that this will redound to the benefit of society at large.⁵ Thus, patents are not the natural right of an inventor, but rather are rights created by the sovereign in the United States for limited societal purposes.⁶The federal government itself recently explored this concept in arguments before the Federal Circuit—the appeals court that hears cases related to patents—in Astornet Technologies Inc. v. BAE Systems, Inc. In Astornet, the patent holder claimed that three government contractors had violated its patent with their equipment to authenticate boarding passes at airports.⁷ The court dismissed the claims under 28 U.S.C. §1498, which stipulates that when the government uses a patented invention, any patent infringement action must be taken against the United States and not the individuals of companies with whom it contracts.⁸The government''s amicus curiae noted that the US does not ‘infringe’ when it uses a patented invention without authorization, and commentators have pointed out that according to this characterization, one must never think of the US as an ‘infringer,’ but rather as a sovereign that has simply chosen to offer compensation.⁹ According to the brief, the court cannot interpret the U.S. government''s actions as patent infringement. Rather, 28 U.S.C. §1498 stipulates that the only remedy for damages caused by the government''s use of a patent is just compensation after a complaint has been raised in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. In other words, the government can always use a patent without permission, as long as it provides compensation at a later date if and only if a court rules in favor of a complaint raised by a patent grantee. Therefore, the government may force compulsory licensing and is never actually a patent infringer. This is not to say that the patent grantee has no remedy against the government. Rather, 28 U.S.C. §1498 waives sovereign immunity and establishes the process by which an inventor can claim royalties. At the end of the day, however, the government''s brief reminds us that patents are not granted for inventors to aggrandize their wealth but rather in the interest of society as represented by the sovereign.Bayh-Dole, of course, is a manifestation of this principle. Having entrusted universities with public funds for research, the sovereign then gives universities the right to patent and license the fruits of that research. The intent is not to further fill the university''s coffers with more money but to fill society''s coffers with new products. In other words, under Bayh-Dole, universities are given control over the licensing system specifically to foster the creation of new commercial products for the benefit of society. NPEs, however, muddy the waters.NPEs are individuals or businesses whose core activity involves licensing or litigating patents, rather than making products. NPEs make no products of their own but generate a return by asserting patents against companies that make products.¹⁰ Over the last few years, at least half of all the patent infringement suits filed in the United States have been filed by NPEs.¹¹ Often referred to as patent trolls, many scholars and commentators have argued that NPEs simply create a tax on production—the production of companies already making products. Although one could conceivably argue that they play some role in the innovation system,¹² whatever role they play, NPEs certainly do not make new products. They also do not appear to connect inventors with others who make new products out of their inventions.¹³Traditionally, universities have avoided engaging in widespread patent litigation. For example, a study of 15,000 patent lawsuits filed across four years in the United States found that NPEs filed a majority of those suits.¹⁴ Universities accounted for only one half of one percent of all first-named plaintiffs, making them almost invisible in the dataset.¹⁵Universities have also traditionally avoided partnering with NPEs. In fact, the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) released a public interest statement on ethical technology transfer principles in 2007, which universities could sign. The statement is advisory, not mandatory—setting out guidelines for best practices, rather than requirements. For those universities that signed the statement, the code specified that universities should not operate under a business model that is predicated on infringement litigation rather than commercialization to create products. AUTM, which includes some members who are already licensing technology to NPEs, has decided to reexamine the code.¹⁶ Even if AUTM upholds its original statement, however, it is possible that universities increasingly will license technology to the highest bidder, regardless of whether any new commercial products will result.Money is tempting, and the lure for universities to monetize their patents is becoming irresistible. For example, Intellectual Ventures, one of the largest patent holding companies in the United States and a notorious NPE, claims that it has handled patent licensing for 60 American universities but acknowledges that only two of which (Duke and Caltech) have led to commercial products.¹⁷ Notably, both Duke and Caltech had signed the 2007 AUTM Statement opposing transferring patents to NPEs.¹⁸ In addition, press reports have identified examples of patents funded by federal programs that have been transferred to NPEs.¹⁹ Faced with the incentive to profit from research, at least some universities appear to be shifting away from the policy of avoiding NPEs. As the practice spreads, there is a significant risk that more and more universities will be rushing into the waiting arms of NPEs. In this case, universities may end up fueling the type of litigation that hindered Alzheimer''s researchers, as chronicled in ‘The Mouse that Trolled’.Moreover, these new university commercialization methods may have particularly serious consequences for the life science industry. Many people wrongly believe that biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry are immune to NPE litigation. However, a study of the patent holdings in the fiscal year 2011 of five universities (the University of California system, MIT, the University of Texas system, Caltech, and the University of South Florida) identified numerous patents that could be deployed with the same techniques that patent trolls have used in the technology sector. These included patents on active ingredients of existing drugs, methods of treatment, screening methods to identify new drugs, manufacturing methods, dosage forms, as well as related technologies.²⁰If universities continue to move toward interactions with NPEs, such portfolios will provide tempting morsels to feed the patent trolling appetite, and could help drive patent trolling more toward the life sciences, a result that cannot be good for life science innovation. It would be troubling if taxpayer money that flows to universities ends up fueling patent trolling, rather than encouraging the creation of new products. In that case, the implicit agreement between the public and the research it funds would be disrupted.‘The Mouse that Trolled: The Long and Tortuous History of A Gene Mutation Patent That Became an Expensive Impediment to Alzheimer''s Research’ tells the cautionary tale of the ways in which NPEs, through patent assertion, hinder progress that affects the public. It is clear, however, that there will be similar examples in the future. The authors’ tale not only casts doubt on the NPE model; it should also make us think deeply about the role that the public expects universities to play in society. The public interest requires that universities act responsibly with public funding and remain dedicated to society''s benefit. University patent monetization via NPEs both fails the spirit of Bayh-Dole and damages the public''s trust.     

Human Genome and Patent

The first phase of the Human Genome Project came to an end by the summer of 2000. We have a fairly complete and accurate listing of all the genes in a typical human being. Apart from the tremendous impact that this knowledge will have on health care, it also represents a patent rush where both private and public institutions are trying to gain temporary control, through patents, over the use and reproduction of genetic information. This paper introduces the reader to issues involving the patent ability of genes, the tests used by patent offices to award patents. The ownership of the human genome--and the access to the tools and databases necessary to make sense out of the millions of bits of information that make up the estimated 100,000 human genes--constitutes one of the hottest debates in the public policy arena not just in the field of science but sociology, politics, law and ethics.     

专利制度与自由主义

专利制度表面上看与自由主义是背道而驰的,事实上专利制度基于对市场的信赖而战胜政府奖励制度,最终成为激励科技发展的优选制度,是与自由主义理论密不可分的.这给我们的启示是,如果过分依赖政府规划来主导科技发展,必然无法感知市场所传导的最生动的创造需求而落后于人.     

LED专利池及专利联盟建设策略与方法

我国LED行业的专利保护工作开展较晚,行业内企业对知识产权诉讼特别是专利池的性质和作用认识不足,缺乏有效应对的知识产权策略。结合对LED国内外知识产权状况的分析评价,研究提出LED行业专利联盟及专利池的组建方案和运作机制,以充分发挥专利池在技术推广应用、降低交易成本、促进产业发展和提高企业创新能力等方面的作用。