From protectionism towards neoliberalism: Ecuador across four administrations (1981–1996)

Ecuador since 1980 illustrates many features of Latin America’s neoliberal transsition. Ecuador shifted from a state-oriented development model and towards a neoliberal approach across four ideologically-diverse administrations. Although the four presidents implemented reforms inconsistently, they have reoriented the country’s development strategy towards neoliberalism. Four contextual factors explain this sustained transition: (1) financial problems, (2) global ideological factors, (3) a perceived lack of alternatives, and (4) weakness of popular opposition. These factors are mutually reinforcing and each need not bear directly on each decision for neoliberal reforms to be chosen. Their combined force sustains the neoliberal transition despite considerable negative social and economic effects. [There is a] change in ideas, a change in reality, an ideological change produced in the world… that discredits socialism, that discredits statism, that discredits interventionism that discredits formal economic planning, and as a consequence liquidates the Latin American model of economic growth, which while not socialist, has had many of [socialism’s] elements. And [this change] legitimizes the conservative revolution of Reagan and Thatcher, and legitimizes another economic model that is based on market force —Osvaldo Hurtado, Ecuadoran President 1981–1984, founder of the left-of-center Democracia Popular party, and founding member of Socialist International; speaking in 1994     

Luring,learning, and lobbying: The limits to capital mobility in the Dominican Republic

While Third World governments are advised and expected to establish their export processing zones (EPZs) near low-cost labor markets and modern transportation centers, the Dominican Republic’s oldest and most successful zones are located in the country’s relatively remote, high-cost interior. In this article I use qualitative and quantitative data: first, to explain the seemingly irrational EPZ location decision; second, to account for the seemingly paradoxical success of the country’s relatively high-cost secondary city EPZs; and third, to explore the puzzle’s implications for debates on industrial location, globalization, and the political economy of development policy. Andrew Schrank is an assistant professor of sociology at Yale University. He is currently completing a book on export diversification in the Dominican Republic. He is also collaborating on projects on the software industry in Mexico and a study of intellectual property rights in cross-national perspective. I would like to thank Stephen Bunker, Lawrence King, Marcus Kurtz, Denis O’Hearn, Kenneth Shadlen, members of the University of Chicago’s “Organizations and State-Building” workshop, participants in the Social Science Research Council’s “Rethinking Social Science Research on the Developing World” conference, and SCID’s reviewers for helpful comments. The research was undertaken with the assistance of the Institute of International Education.     

Varieties of Authoritarianism: The Organization of the Military State and its Effects on Federalism in Argentina and Brazil

While much has been written about democracy and democratization, far less attention has been paid to the institutional organization of authoritarian regimes. Scholars have focused on the causes, economic policies, societal support, intra-elite conflicts, or human-rights violations of authoritarian regimes. More recently, political scientists have also studied the role of elections and legislatures on the survival of authoritarian regimes. However, the very different ways in which authoritarian regimes, and military regimes in particular, organize the government, occupy the state apparatus, and modify the country’s political institutions have largely gone under-theorized. This essay contributes to fill in this void by analyzing how the last military regimes of Argentina (1976–1983) and Brazil (1964–1985) organized power within the state and the legacies of such organization on the institutions of federalism. The essay argues that variation in the organization of the state under the military regimes accounts for the divergent origins of post-developmental decentralization, which in turn explains the contrasting evolution of intergovernmental relations in each country. The article contributes to the recent literature on electoral authoritarian regimes by showing that elections and legislatures matter not only to regime survival but also to policy outcomes.     

Exchange Rate Regime,Central Bank Independence,and Political Business Cycles in Brazil

This article examines policy consequences of electoral cycles and exchange rate regime choices in Brazil. The literature on opportunistic political business cycles maintains that governments adopt expansionary economic policies before elections to mobilize voters’ support. However, research findings in Latin America based on the theory has been inconclusive. I argue that the lack of conclusive evidence in Latin America stems from measurement errors common in the use of cross-national aggregate data. Using Brazil’s monthly data from 1985 to 2006, this article shows that there are electorally induced fiscal cycles under fixed and crawling peg exchange rate regimes and electorally induced monetary cycles under floating exchange rates only when the nation’s central bank is not independent. Indeed, accounting for Brazil’s unique economic contingencies and longitudinal variations in the de facto central bank independence, its public policy behavior remarkably resembles that of the more affluent, economically stable OECD countries.

Dominance and change in the global computer industry: Military, bureaucratic, and network state developmentalisms

This article examines the conditions under which firms in different economies were able to emerge as significant actors in the global computer industry during different time periods. To achieve this, the article divides into three periods the history of the industry in terms of the three major policy regimes that have supported the dominant firms and regions. It argues that these policy regimes can be thought of as state developmentalisms that take significantly different forms across the history of the industry. U.S. firms’ dominance over their European counterparts in the 1950s and 1960s was underpinned by a system of “military developmentalism” where military agencies funded research, provided a market and developed infrastructure, but also demanded high quality products. The “Asian Tigers”—Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea—in the 1970s and 1980s were able to eclipse their Latin American and Indian rivals due in large part to the significant advantages offered by a highly effective system of “bureaucratic developmentalism,” where bureaucratic elites in key state agencies and leading business groups negotiated supports for export performance. The 1990s saw the emergence of a system of “network developmentalism” where countries such as Ireland and Israel were able to emerge as new nodes in the computer industry by careful economic and political negotiation of relations to the United States, reestablished at the center of the industry, and by more decentralized forms of provision of state support for high-tech development. Finally, the conditions under which new regimes can emerge are a consequence of the unanticipated global consequences of previous regimes. While state developmentalisms have been shaped by existing global regimes, they have promoted further and different rounds of industry globalization. Seán ó Riain is professor of sociology at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. His research has been primarily on the political economy of high-tech growth in Ireland and elsewhere, and on work and class politics among software developers. He is the author ofThe Politics of High Tech Growth: Developmental Network, States in the Global Economy (Cambridge, 2004).     

Citizenship,equality, and urban property rights in Latin America: The Peruvian case

Research on liberal democracy in newly developing countries has been hampered by the view of civil society as a bounded realm; by insufficient attention to power, class, and legal-juridical institutions; and by too limited a conception of social movements with democratic potential. In this study of urban migrants’ struggle for property rights, the migrants’ political action is found to be associated with a capitalist social movement. The legal changes that the movement helped institute and the means that it employed have enhanced democracy by extending property rights to the poor and by opening up policy processes to public debate and input. Insofar as liberal reform involves the law and its administration, it requires a positive, facilitative state, in spite of liberalism’s broadly antistatist commitments. The study also reveals that liberal reform can have a popular content even if supported by elites. The findings suggest that the realization of full citizenship rights is, for now, at least as crucial to the future of Latin American democracy as the narrowing of economic inequalities. David G. Becker is associate professor of government at Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755. He is the author ofThe New Bourgeoisie and the Limits of Dependency (Princeton University Press, 1982); a counthor ofPostimperialism (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987); and the author of “Beyond Dependency: Development and Democracy in the Era of International Capitalism,” in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth P. Erickson (ededs.),Comparative Political Dynamic (HarperCollis, 1991), in addition to many other articles on aspects of political development. Becker’s current research centers of the nature of constitutionalism and democracy in Latin America. He is preparing a book-length treatment of the rule of law in Latin America, along with an edited book on postimperialism that will present new case studies of a variety of countries and world regions.     

Transnationalization,Social Integration,and Capitalist Diversity in the East and the South

This article analyzes the deep and shallow modes of international integration, semicore, semiperipheral, and peripheral profiles of global insertion, and the presence and absence of transformative state capacity and social cohesion, as interacting dimensions of capitalist diversity in post-socialist Eastern Europe and Latin America. On these grounds, it is argued that Cardoso and Faletto’s dependent development paradigm maintains validity. When adapted to the new conditions, their approach is able to capture the overlapping and divergent aspects of capitalist development in both regions. Recent patterns of development demonstrate that although dependency, stemming from the unequal distribution of resources, roles, and opportunities, continues to be an important aspect of the international division of labor, it ceases to contradict even complex forms of industrialization. Similarly, notwithstanding the asymmetrical power relationships characterizing them, the new transnational integration regimes allow and sometimes help formation of new nation states with improved regulatory capacities. Finally, dependency does not necessarily undermine domestic social inclusion. Rather, it is up to the democratic competition to strike a balance between the requirements of promising international and socially acceptable domestic integration.     

Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise

Policy experimentation is frequently highlighted as a potent means to facilitate institutional innovation, and avoid reformist leaps in the dark by injecting bottom-up initiative and local knowledge into the national policy process. Yet experimentation remains a surprisingly vague concept in the debate over variants of economic governance. This article contributes to the study of experiment-based policymaking by examining the distinctive tools, processes, and effects of experimental programs in major domains of China’s economic reform. China’s experience attests to the potency of experimentation in bringing about transformative change, even in a rigid authoritarian, bureaucratic environment, and regardless of strong political opposition. Large-scale experimentation stimulated policy learning and economic expansion effectively in those sectors in which political elites could benefit from supporting new types of private and transnational entrepreneurial activity. Conversely, experimental programs largely failed in generating an effective provision of social goods which would require a combination of active societal supervision and strict central government enforcement to make it work. Though the impact of reform experiments varies between policy domains, China’s experimentation-based policy process has been essential to redefining basic policy parameters. At the heart of this process, we find a pattern of central–local interaction in generating policy—“experimentation under hierarchy”—which constitutes a notable addition to the repertoires of governance that have been tried for achieving economic transformation. The research for this article was supported by the German National Research Foundation and the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University. The author is especially indebted to Elizabeth Perry, Steven Goldstein, Rolf Langhammer, Dani Rodrik, Victor Shih, Ezra Vogel, and Rudolf Wagner for their encouragement and comments. Nancy Hearst made a crucial contribution by bringing precious sources from the Fairbank Center’s library to my attention that I otherwise would have overlooked.

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Democracy and Development in a Globalized World: Thinking About Latin America from Within

The choice among paths that countries should follow has been a staple of political debates in Latin America and, over the past 40 years, Fernando Cardoso has brought his analysis to bear on these debates. This article summarizes and then assesses Cardoso’s argument about the choice of paths faced by Latin American countries, the consequences for democracy and development of following different paths, and the political position that is supported by this analysis of choices and their consequences. Though Cardoso explicitly supports the path of globalized social democracy over an anti-globalization option in the current period, I suggest that the current state of knowledge does not offer unequivocal support for the argument that choosing to follow the path of globalized social democracy—or that of anti-globalization—is the best political option for all countries in Latin America. Different countries might very well be doing what is best for them, given their circumstances, by following different paths.     

Democratization without Development: Benin 1989–2009

In contrast to a widely held view that sees Benin’s democratic transition in 1989 primarily as the fall-out of global tendencies, this paper focuses specifically on the internal causes of this historical event, which it locates in the context of the history of Dahomey/Benin since 1960 and the country’s political economy. It argues that, while the Renouveau Démocratique doubtlessly represented a significant step towards democracy, it did little to change the country’s deep-rooted political-economic structures. Since Dahomey gained independence in 1960, it has been a structurally deficient rent-based economy. None of the regime changes of the past 50 years—independence in 1960, the adoption of Marxist-Leninism in 1974 or the Renouveau Démocratique of 1989/90—have succeeded in changing anything in relation to this fundamental fact. Thus, the crisis of 1989 was primarily a crisis of a particular pattern of political-economic regulation. None of the regime changes of the last 50 years, however, succeeded in resolving the country’s basic development problem, i.e. how to transform a structurally deficient rent-based economy into a productive one. Likewise, throughout the entire period from 1960 to 2009, basic elements of the political culture of the country remained unchanged. Neopatrimonialism, personalization, authoritarianism, regionalism and generationalism became, at best, more subtly differentiated as a result of the democratic renewal. To this extent, the Beninese democratic renewal of 1989/90 highlights the problematic connection between democracy and economic development.     

Political parties,party systems,and economic reforms: The Turkish case

Turkey’s experience with economic reforms and democratization since the early 1980s underscores the importance of the political parties and the party systems in the interactions between these two processes. The country’s experience with democratic politics and a multiparty system made a significant contribution to the resumption of electoral politics and redemocratization following three years of military rule in the early 1980s. However, the opening up of the political space and the reemergence of competitive party politics ultimately created problems for the successful completion of the economic reforms, as one-party dominance and majority-party governments gave way to fragmentation in the party system with weak coalition governments. The Turkish case is instructive of the difficulties facing countries that seek to simultaneously consolidate their democracies and liberalize their economies. Sabri Sayari is executive director of the Institute of Turkish Studies and research professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He has written extensively on Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy, and on issues related to political development, parties and party systems, and democratization.     

Modern dependency: A “crucial case” study of Brazilian government policy in the minicomputer industry

Conclusion Brazil’s minicomputer industry has become dependent on government import policy, government financing and domestic private business. The growth in the domestic component of this industry between 1974 and 1981 suggests that incremental government policies (short of a transformation to socialism) can alter Brazil’s level of dependency on MNCs, concerning at least one industry–the minicomputer industry. Therefore, the Brazilian minicomputer model advances the dependency question from “what is dependency and why does it exist?” to “how can one improve its position in a dependency situation?” Relative success in the minicomputer industry cannot be construed as victory over Brazil’s dependency on MNCs, which may alter its economic and political relationship with other countries. Instead, it illustrates a viable model for improving a developing country’s dependency situation. This infant industry strategy is given more credence due to the rekindling of protectionism by all nations. A definitive evaluation of Brazil’s minicomputer policies cannot be rendered until this industry has progressed in its growth cycle. As indicated earlier, signs of both success and failure are evident. In addition, several events may restrict growth in Brazilian minicomputer firms: (1) restriction of funds due to the enormous foreign debt, (2) corrupt or inappropriate management, (3) unsuccessful transfer of technology, or (4) intrusion of smaller and less expensive microcomputers into uses now served by minicomputers. Thus, how effectively Brazil can get out of its overall dependency trap will depend not only on how well it can apply the minicomputer industry model to other industries, of course, given that the model does succeed in the long–run. But it will also depend on how well Brazil can deal with the problems listed above. 0259 0255 V 2     

Privatization in Asia and Latin America

This article analyzes the political and economic predictors of privatization in 17 developing countries in Asia and Latin America, using an OLS regression model with panel-corrected standard errors and data from 1988 to 1999. The regression results show that two factors, which, have hitherto been either neglected or underemphasized in the privatization literature, play a crucial role in the pace and scope of, privatization. The first is a government’s revenue needs (defined in terms of interest payments on public debt as a percentage of a government’s total budget expenditures). An unsustainable interest burden leads to a significant reduction in the social and public spending of a government. This, in turn, impels incumbents to raise revenues through the sale of, state assets. The second factor that explains privatization patterns is the extant degree of, political opportunity (defined in terms of the governing politicians’ legislative strength and their security to remain in office). In addition, the results show that privatization is associated, with declining inflation and economic growth rates.     

How policy agendas change when autocracies liberalize: The case of Hong Kong, 1975–2016

This article considers how autocrats decide to expand or narrow the issue diversity of their policy agenda during a period of political liberalization. Prior studies have two competing perspectives. First, political liberalization increases the social and political freedom that enhances information exchange, and thus expands issue diversity. Second, political liberalization decreases government's control of the legislature and thus narrows the issue diversity. This article offers a novel theoretical perspective by combining these two countervailing theories. Specifically, it predicts a diminishing marginal benefit of information exchange and an increasing marginal bargaining cost. As such, this article argues that issue diversity follows a negative quadratic (inverted‐U) relationship as the regimes liberalize. The analysis of a new and unique dataset of Hong Kong's legislative agenda (1975 to 2016) offers support for this theory. This study sheds light on policy‐making in authoritarian regimes and democracies, and advances the theory of information processing.     

Resistance and Creativity in Social Interaction: For and Against Memory in Poland, Israel–Palestine, and the United States

In this paper, I present an analysis of Adam Michnik’s notion of “Amnesty without Amnesia”. His was a wise political judgment presented at a critical moment in the struggle to constitute a democratic polity in Poland. Mine is an appreciation of his political position, along with a sociological analysis that highlights the empirical difficulties of its realization in practical action. I will show how at critical moments of social change creative political action works to erase memories of the relevant past, which act as a repressive force, while “re-remembering” (to use Toni Morrison’s formulation). Three cases will be compared, Michnik’s, after the fall of the communist regime in east central Europe, and cases drawn from the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and the American presidential campaign. A paper prepared for presentation at Cerisy, France, Summer, 2008.     

Limitations of rational-choice institutionalism for the study of Latin American politics

This article analyzes the analytical limitations of rational-choice institutionalism for the study of Latin American politics. Adherents of this approach have made important contributions by analyzing topics that Latin Americanists traditionally neglected, such as the political impact of electoral rules and the processes of legislative decision-making. But rational-choice institutionalism has difficulty explaining the complicated, variegated, and fluid patterns of Latin American politics. It overemphasizes the electoral and legislative arenas and—in general—the input side of politics; it overestimates the importance and causal impact of formal rules and institutions; it does not explain the origins of political change and often suggests a static image of political development; it offers an incomplete analysis of institutional creation by neglecting the importance of political beliefs; it cannot fully account for crisis politics; and it puts excessive, analytically arbitrary emphasis on “microfoundations.” The article questions whether these limitations can successfully be overcome, arguing that rational-choice institutionalism—while an important addition to the debate—is not inherently superior to other approaches applied in Latin American Studies. Kurt Weyland is associate professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of two books—Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh, 1996) andThe Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela (Princeton, 2002)—and of numerous journal articles on democratization, market reform, social policy, and populism in Latin America. His current research focuses on the diffusion of policy innovations across countries. I would like to thank Barry Ames, James Booth, Ruth Collier, Marcelo Costa Ferriera, Wendy Hunter, Mark Jones, Fabrice Lehoucq, Scott Mainwaring, Gerardo Munck, Anthony Pereira, Tim Power, Ken Roberts, Charles Shipan, Richard Snyder, Donna van Cott, and two anonymous reviewers for excellent comments.     

How does ethnic diversity shape the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations? Evidence from China

This study examines how ethnic diversity shapes the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations in regimes such as China, where local accountability and resident mobility are largely absent. We argue that in these regimes, ethnic diversity largely captures potential social conflicts and instability, consequently requiring a higher level of fiscal centralization and regional equalization from upper-level governments to preserve social stability. Using provincial and sub-provincial level panel data from China for 1995–2019, we find strong supporting evidence that an increase in a province's ethnic diversity significantly increases fiscal centralization and the provincial government's fiscal equalization efforts. We also show that these effects tend to be stronger in provinces whose leaders have closer ties with the central authority and where local capture is less serious. Our study contributes to a better understanding of ethnic diversity's consequences on the policy choices governments make.     

Oil,Coalitions, and Regime Durability: the Origins and Persistence of Popular Rentierism in Kuwait

While the canonical literature on oil wealth suggests that hydrocarbon windfalls encourage repressive despotism, Kuwait provides a case of an oil-rich autocracy governing instead through popular rentierism—that is, through a broad coalition of social forces, one that furnishes enduring loyalty from below while constraining abuses of state power from above. This paper provides a theoretically guided explanation for this exceptional outcome. I argue that the Kuwaiti regime’s coalitional bargains originated in the pre-oil era, when domestic opposition and geopolitical constrictions compelled it to forge new social alliances at the dawn of modern statehood. This inclusionary strategy mediated the subsequent effect of oil rents, which the regime used to institutionalize its mass base with costly material and symbolic side payments. Such popular incorporation bound large constituent classes to the regime’s survival, precluding the need for widespread repression. After 50 years, these coalitional bargains have also proven remarkably resilient, as social actors have continued to endorse the autocratic leadership despite economic crisis and wartime defeat.