China and Major Power Relations in East Asia

Tremendous changes have taken place in East Asia in the post-Cold War era, which have a great impact on Chinese foreign policy and its relations with major powers in East Asia. This new power configuration is related to as 'two ups' and 'two downs', which have become apparent since the early 1990s. The 'two ups' concern the rise of the United States and China. The United States' rise to sole superpower status has given Washington a dominant role in all four dimensions of world affairs: political, strategic, economic, and technological/cultural. Meanwhile, China has achieved a spectacular economic performance for the past two decades, sustaining high growth rates, and escaping, so far, the Asian economic crisis of 1997‐98. This expansion has greatly increased China's influence in regional and global affairs. The 'two downs' refer to the downturns of Russia and Japan. This article provides a detailed analysis of China's international environment in the context of the changing dynamics of major-power relations in East Asia. Special attention is paid to the crucial Beijing‐Tokyo‐Washington triangle. The examination focuses upon political, economic, and strategic dimensions.     

A Crisis is Looming: China's energy challenge in the eyes of university students

This paper uses a survey at six universities in China to analyze university students' views on China's energy problems. It finds that gender, the nature and location of a student's original community, and their level of education affects students' views about China's energy problems, as well as the types of solutions that are deemed to be most appropriate to manage this looming crisis. University students are quite concerned about China's energy situation. For them, it is already a crisis. They fear China will be controlled due to resource dependency, see the US as China's primary energy competitor, all the while advocating a more hawkish attitude towards Japan in the East China Sea. But, they look foremost to domestic solutions to this crisis, such as enhanced conservation, more efficient use of energy, new technologies, enhancing China's strategic reserve, and increased government taxation, particularly of large enterprises. When they look abroad, they support diversifying energy sources, increasing energy cooperation, particularly with Russia and Central Asia (but not with Japan), and some increase of the navy's role in enhancing sea lane and energy security.     

The Tenacious Tributary System

Recently, some writers on Chinese foreign relations have argued that the tributary system is a useful concept for describing imperial China's relations with its neighbors, and that it can even serve as a model for the future of international relations in East Asia. An examination of China's historical practice of foreign relations shows that there was no systematic tributary system, but instead multiple relationships of trade, military force, diplomacy and ritual. Furthermore, China's neighbors did not accept the imperial center's definition of hierarchy and subordination, but interpreted ritual relationships in their own way. Even in the 1930s, when scholars invoked Chinese history to advocate peaceful relations, they recognized the importance of military force, colonial settlement and domination in East Asian state relationships. The current myth of the tributary system ignores historical reality and misleads us about China's true position in East Asia and the world.     

Constructing Cooperation in Northeast Asia: historical Northeast Asian dyadic cultures and the potential for greater regional cooperation

What are the obstacles to greater cooperation in Northeast Asia and why have the nations of the region not been entirely successful in moving beyond history, toward greater cooperation? Conducting a brief survey of Northeast Asian IR and power alignment patterns from the Imperial/Dynastic era to the present, this essay utilizes the constructivist approach to assess regional alignment patterns in Northeast Asian history corresponding to six historical time periods, ranging from Ming China to the present. It does so by employing Wendt's system-level cultures of anarchy (Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures) at the dyadic/second level of analysis and the regional level of analysis (level 2.5), rating the various eras as to levels of cooperation vs enmity, with an eye to identifying the reasons for today's tension points. It concludes that despite such tension points and unresolved historical issues, anarchy in Northeast Asia today is not Hobbesian (enmity), but rather Lockean (rivalry). Consequently and first, war, nuclear proliferation and security spirals may be avoidable with proper sensitivity to the issues that continue to pose as obstacles to regional cooperation, including historical grievances, uncertainties over China's rise and the US role in the region, the North Korean nuclear issue and others. Second, attention to improving the dyadic cultures (China–Japan, South Korea–North Korea, etc.) that together comprise the region's relational culture (either Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian) make greater regional cooperation possible and even more likely.     

China's Approaches toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia: motivations and calculations

This paper explores how China's strategic motivations and calculations have both motivated and constrained its participation in East Asian regional cooperation. It argues that China's participation in regional economic and security cooperation is motivated first of all by the calculation of China's domestic interests to create a peaceful peripheral environment for its economic growth and political stability, particularly its frontier security and prosperity. The realist interests to enhance China's position in power competition with other major players in the region, particularly Japan and US, also play an important part in China's strategic calculation. These interest calculations, however, also set limits on China's participation in regional cooperation. These interest calculations have also shaped China's preference for an informal approach, emphasizing voluntarism and consensus building rather than legally binding resolutions, toward regional cooperation. This soft approach is a major barrier for many regional institutions to move beyond the stage of talking shops to effectively resolve conflicts in the region.     

China's Global Search for Energy Security: cooperation and competition in Asia–Pacific

China has adopted a state-centered approach towards energy security to deepen political and commercial relationships with all energy producing nations and to aggressively invest in oil fields and pipelines around the world. Applying this approach to its relations with its Asia–Pacific neighbors has produced mixed results. While China's energy diplomacy has brought about opportunities for cooperation with some of its neighbors, notably some countries in Central Asia and continental Southeast Asia, it has become a source of conflict with some other neighbors, especially those with border disputes over maritime territories which may have rich natural resources. This paper examines China's state-led search for energy security and its implications for China's relations with Asia–Pacific countries.     

River Politics: China's policies in the Mekong and the Brahmaputra in comparative perspective

China manages its transboundary rivers as a subset of its broader relations with other riparian states. This results in discernible differences in the way China approaches its international river systems. Although there is a limit to the extent of Chinese cooperation, in relative terms China is more cooperative in the Mekong than in the Brahmaputra. To China, Southeast Asian states are part of a hierarchical system where it stands at the apex. While problems exist, there are deep linkages between them, which help foster collaboration in the Mekong. India, which has greater power parity with China, is not part of China's hierarchical worldview. The territorial disputes and security dilemmas that characterize South Asian geopolitics further impede cooperation. Domestic considerations also impact on China's river policies. There is greater consensus among Chinese policymakers in managing the Mekong than the Brahmaputra, which explains the higher degree of clarity in Chinese policies towards the former compared to the latter.     

China's good neighbor policy and its implications for Taiwan

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes moderation and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China's prevailing ‘good neighbor’ policy approach—backed by improvement in US–China relations—provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. It clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder‐line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China's recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China's policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan's leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan's advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross‐Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan's future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan's future as an entity independent of PRC control. Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan's remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China's good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan's long range prospects.     

The Rise of China and the Vision for an East Asian Community

This article seeks to explore how stable regional order under the possible community formation can be created in East Asia in moves towards China's ascendancy. For this objective, it takes advantage of a framework assuming that the development of an East Asian community would be possible under conditions that the states in the region develop common identity and norms, as well as multilateral institutions that guarantee the long-term interest. Moreover, the society needs to be involved in identity formation and institution-building. This article argues that China has been gradually embedded into formal multilateral institutions and less formal policy networks formed by state and non-state actors, which have been conducive to the creation of a regional community. However, both collective norms at the governmental level and shared cultural consciousness at the public level have not developed enough to have significant influences on directing China firmly to the formation of a regional community.     

Locating Transition: the prospect for a US–China transition in Asia

In charting the water of the post-Cold War world, one of the most prominent questions touches upon the likely effects of China's rise. Echoing more or less explicitly power transition theory's assumptions, the rapid and multifaceted ascent of China has popularized the idea of a likely overtaking of the American dominant power by the rising challenger. Sceptics have, however, pointed out that by most standards China remains far from being on a par with the United States. This paper argues that though a global power transition lies far beyond the horizon, the relevant level at which the transition should be considered is the East Asian region, or the Asian ‘super-region’.     

China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea

China's new assertiveness in the South China Sea has arisen from the growth of its military power, its ‘triumphalism’ in the wake of the Western financial crisis and its heightened nationalism. The other littoral states of the South China Sea have been troubled by the opacity of Chinese politics and of the process of military decision-making amid a proliferation of apparently separately controlled maritime forces. The more active role being played by the United States in the region, in part as a response to Chinese activism, has troubled Beijing. While most of the ASEAN states have welcomed America as a hedge against growing Chinese power, their economies have become increasingly dependent upon China and they don't want to be a party to any potential conflict between these two giants. The problem is that there is no apparent resolution to what the Chinese call, in effect, these ‘indisputable disputes’.     

Beijing's new thinking on security strategy

Beijing is refocusing its foreign strategy in the Asian Pacific region. This article examines Beijing's new thinking on security strategy in the post‐Cold War Asian‐Pacific region. Drawing from the recent strategic debate in China, the author discusses three defining areas in the new security strategy: military strategy, defense development strategy, and foreign policy and security strategy. It is argued that thinking in security strategy has become more regional oriented, sophisticated and compatible with foreign policy. The implication of China's defense modernization for regional security is controversial. In the short run, China's military posture will not change balance of power at the regional level, but it will significantly affect outcomes of future territorial conflicts on China's periphery. In the long run, Beijing's role in Asian‐Pacific security remains uncertain.     

How East Asians View the Rise of China

Its newly acquired status as the world's second largest economy has entitled China to a more prominent role in global affairs, and increasingly, its behavior has drawn scrutiny from the world in ways that the country is ill-prepared for. The attention to China's rise, however, focuses not only on its economy but also on other aspects, including its military, diplomatic moves, domestic politics and its ‘soft power’, namely, its own image or self-projection and the world's perception or attitudes toward China. And yet, there has been no systematic investigation to evaluate how the world views a rising China. In this article, the authors applied the latest dataset from the Asian Barometer Survey to investigate whether East Asians recognize and welcome the rise of China. The findings suggest that geographical and cultural proximity have a great impact on people's perception of China. Countries which are territorially adjacent or culturally close to China tend to regard China as the most influential country in Asia. With the exception of Japan and Mongolia, most Asian countries hold positive views about the impact of China on the region. However, such benign evaluations are weaker in countries which have potential security conflicts with China, such as Taiwan and South Korea, when only the bilateral impact is considered. The overall picture shows that the rise of China has been largely recognized and welcomed by East Asians, despite some apprehension about China's strategic intentions to its neighboring countries.     

China's Rise in Southeast Asia: implications for the United States

During the past few decades, China's economic success has permitted it to pursue a greater role on the international stage. China is recognized both as a regional and aspiring global power. Nowhere is this more evident than within Southeast Asia, where China's more active diplomacy is reflected in growing trade relations, proposals for stronger security ties, and the signing of numerous cooperative agreements on issues as varied as environmental protection, drug trafficking, and public health. As a whole, the region has received China's activism with both enthusiasm and trepidation. China has expended significant effort to assuage the fears of its neighbors by adopting a foreign policy approach that is active, non-threatening, and generally aligned with the economic and security interests of the region. This positive diplomacy has clearly yielded some success, most notably in the trade realm, where China is rapidly emerging as an engine of regional economic growth and integration that may well challenge Japanese and American dominance in the next three to five years. In the security realm, China's diplomacy, while rhetorically appealing to regional actors, has yet to make significant inroads in a regional security structure dominated by the United States and its bilateral security relationships. Most significantly, however, if China is to emerge as a real leader within Southeast Asia, it will also need to assume more of the social and political burden that leadership entails. As China continues to advance itself as a regional leader, its policies on issues such as health, drugs, the environment and human rights will face additional scrutiny not only for their impact on the region but also for the more profound question they raise concerning the potential of China's moral leadership. For the United States, China's greater presence and activism suggest at the very least that it cannot remain complacent about the status quo that has governed political, economic and security relations for the past few decades. Shared leadership within Southeast Asia will likely include China in the near future, with all the potential benefits and challenges that such leadership will entail.     

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): the Chinese perspective

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was accepted by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as one among other pathfinders, for a comprehensive Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). Though the TPP negotiations do not include China at the moment, she has declared her interest in the TPP and is paying close attention to it. In fact, many question the likely success of the TPP with China's exclusion from it, given her prominence in the region. To provide insights for leveraging trade opportunities with the TPP economies, China's export potentials with the TPP are empirically tested and compared with those of alternative economic configurations in East Asia which China is a party to, namely the ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6. The empirical findings suggest that China's participation in the TPP will offer better market access for final goods, an important trade opportunity that is somewhat limited in partnerships through regional initiatives. Even then, the paper contends that the payoffs to China following the TPP deal remain intangible and at best speculative given the coverage (or substance) and depth of the agreement.     

Assessing China's Rise and US Leadership in Asia—growing maturity and balance

The common prediction in media and specialist commentary during much of the past decade was that Asia was adjusting to an emerging China-centered order and US influence was in decline. Over time, it became clearer that developments in the region showed a more complex reality. A growing contingent of scholars and specialists looked beyond accounts that inventoried China's strengths and US weaknesses and carefully considered other factors, including Chinese limitations and US strengths, before making their overall judgments. These more comprehensive and balanced assessments tempered sometimes alarming implications of earlier predictions of China's rise and decline in US leadership. This article reviews the evolution over the past decade of media and specialist assessments of China's rise and its implications for US leadership in Asia in order to draw lessons from this evolution in analysis and what the lessons might mean for future assessments of China's increasing role in Asian and world affairs.     

Discussion of 'Four Contradictions Constraining China's Foreign Policy Behavior'

Chinese foreign policy behavior is constrained by different sets of contradictions, but at the same time these contradictions serve to inspire and focus Chinese foreign policy, both in negative and positive ways. As China transitions to a developed country that is fully integrated into regional and global economic, political and security regimes, these contradictions may become less salient, however. With the growth of China's comprehensive national power, the Chinese will come to view their country less as a poor nation and more as a great power and thus this dual-identity syndrome should diminish in importance as a factor constraining China's foreign policy behavior over time. The contradictory impetus behind Chinese foreign policy that derives from the desire to benefit from pursuit of 'open-door' policies and the compulsion to protect state sovereignty will similarly likely become less important as China's power grows, but only if there is mutually acceptable settlement to the Taiwan problem and Beijing's confidence in its ability to secure its territorial integrity is enhanced. A stronger, more confident China will also likely become more actively involved in regional and global issues on a pragmatic, rather than principled basis. Finally, while bilateral ties will remain important to Beijing, its participation in multilateral fora will no doubt increase, including in the security sphere, as it becomes more experienced and self-assured in multilateral interaction. Ultimately, bilateral and multilateralism may take on the role of parallel tracks in Chinese diplomacy with little tension between them.     

Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn

This paper revisits the debate about foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism in the context of China's increasingly confrontational and assertive behavior in recent years. It argues that while the Chinese government made effective efforts to control popular nationalism and Chinese foreign policy was therefore not dictated by emotional nationalistic rhetoric before 2008, it has become more willing to follow the popular nationalist calls to take a confrontational position against the Western powers and to adopt tougher measures in maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors. This strident turn is partially because the government is increasingly responsive to public opinion, but more importantly because of the convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy. Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment supported by its new quotient of wealth and military capacities, and terrified of an uncertain future due to increasing social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play to the popular nationalist gallery in pursuing the so-called core national interests. These developments have complicated China's diplomacy, creating a heated political environment to harden China's foreign policy.     

Chinese Perceptions of US Return to Southeast Asia and the Prospect of China's Peaceful Rise

This article systematically examines the perceptual dimension of US–China–ASEAN relations. It specifically focuses on Chinese perceptions of American intentions in Southeast Asia, Chinese perceptions of the impact on China of the US's return to Southeast Asia, and suggestions of the Chinese scholarly community as to how China should respond to the US's return. Chinese scholars believe that the US returns to Southeast Asia for a variety of reasons and one of the most important is to manage the rise of China, and that the US's return has both positive and negative impacts on China's interests and the negative impact outweighs the positive. Overall, Chinese perceptions of the US return, especially Chinese scholars’ suggested response, indicate that Chinese scholars have internalized the strategy of peaceful rise which would give us added confidence that China is seriously committed to this strategy. If both the US and China stick to their relevant commitments, the rise of China, unlike that of most great powers in the past, would quite likely be peaceful.     

America in the Eyes of America Watchers: survey research in Beijing in 2012

Based on an original survey conducted in the summer of 2012 in Beijing, we examine how China's America watchers—IR scholars who work on US-China relations—have viewed China's power status in the international system, US-China relations and some specific US policies in Asia. Our survey shows that almost half of the survey participants thought that America would remain the global hegemon in the next ten years. Meanwhile, a large majority was also optimistic that China is a rising great power, especially in the economic sense, in the world. More than half of the respondents saw Asian military issues, such as the South China Sea issue, as the most difficult problem between China and the US.