The Uncertainties in the Rule in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Re Hasting</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Bass</Emphasis>

Writing extra-judicially, Sir Robert Walker once commented that ‘the decision in Re Hastings-Bass must be seen in its judicial context. It cannot be regarded as giving a “carte blanche” excuse to every body of trustees who have made a mistake. The law on the issue now stands in a state of some uncertainty’ (Walker, The limits of the principle in Re Hastings-Bass, P.C.B 226, 2002). There is no doubt in the minds of most commentators and, indeed those persons seeking to invoke the rule in Re Hastings-Bass on behalf of their clients, that much clarification is needed as to the proper scope of the rule. Recent judicial trends suggest that, not only is the rule in Hastings-Bass being applied at such an unprecedented rate with very little scrutiny from a court beyond that of the High Court, it is also showing signs of plaguing the wider fiduciary community. As the opportunity for the Court of Appeal, and indeed the Supreme Court, to exercise some judicial scrutiny of the rule may not be that far away, this article highlights some of the present uncertainties with the rule in Re Hastings-Bass.     

Marr v Collie: The Ballooning of the Common Intention Constructive Trust

The decision in Marr v Collie represents a significant expansion of the common intention constructive trust doctrine. Unsupported by authority, it relaxes the requirement that the property be acquired for a ‘domestic’ purpose, and widens the doctrine to encompass all property, whether real or personal. The decision's abrogation of the ‘purpose’ restriction redraws the line between the common intention constructive trust doctrine and the presumed resulting trust doctrine and expands the former to the greatest possible extent. This exacerbates a doctrine already apt to adversely affect both individual litigants and the justice system as a whole, and which creates incongruous theoretical divisions within the law of intentionally created trusts. As the doctrine is reliant on the proposition, unsupported by authority or legislation, that conveyance of a title to land into joint names necessarily gives rise to a trust, it is hoped that a future apex court will reconsider the doctrine's proper scope.     

The Argument of Rightness as an Element of the Discretionary Power of the Administrative Judge

The article concerns the situation of the judicial application of the law where the entity applying the law refers in a decision-making process to moral principles. The decision should be based on the directives of interpretation, which indicate the need for such a determination of the meaning of the applicable norms so that it remains in harmony with commonly accepted moral rules of the society. The equity (understood as rightness) has one more purpose; namely, it allows for the process of decision-making—and not just for the process of unifying the decisions—since the mere rule does not specify the algorithm of undertaking them. This rule thus assumes that it will be further specified by phronesis judge who in a given situation will determine—for the purposes of a particular decision—a hierarchy between the criteria of substantive justice “embedded” in this rule. The reference to equity (rightness) stands for the concretization of an unspecified general rule. We deal here with an indefinite general rule, the application of which is facilitated by a reference to rightness.

     

THE APPRENDI‐BLAKELY CASES: SENTENCING REFORM COUNTER REVOLUTION?

Recent Supreme Court decisions have extended jury trial rights and beyond‐reasonable‐doubt proof standards to certain sentence‐enhancement facts. The first two cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona, were narrow in scope and relatively uncontroversial. But Blakely v. Washington marked a substantial expansion of the rationale and scope of Apprendi, and threatened to invalidate entire sentencing reform systems, both legally‐binding guidelines of the type at issue in Blakely and it's sequel, Booker v. United States, and statutory determinate sentence systems like the one invalidated in Cunningham v. California. Each of these decisions has potential effects not only on sentencing severity and disparity in the cases controlled by that decision, but also on prosecutorial, legislative, and sentencing commission measures designed to comply with the decision, avoid it, and/or mitigate its impact. Field resistance and avoidance measures are likely to be stronger in jurisdictions where the existing sentencing system enjoyed broad support; in such jurisdictions, resistance may be particularly strong to the more controversial Blakely ruling. Impact assessments must therefore carefully distinguish the separate impacts of Apprendi and Blakely in each jurisdiction being studied, and the extent of support for the existing sentencing system. Such assessments should also examine pre‐existing trends and other independent sources of change; leadership by sentencing commissions or other officials in crafting responsive measures; structural and other features of the sentencing system which render compliance more or less difficult; and second‐stage effects, on sentencing, prosecutorial, or sentencing policy decisions, that reflect the prior compliance, avoidance, and mitigation measures adopted in that jurisdiction. The greatest long‐term effects may be on prosecutorial, legislative, and commission decisions, rather than on sentencing outcomes.     

A Riddle Whose Answer is ‘Tort’: A Reassessment of International News Service v Associated Press

The decision of the US Supreme Court in International News Service v Associated Press (1918) has variously been interpreted as recognising a ‘quasi‐property’ right in ‘valuable intangibles’, such as hot news; as turning on unjust enrichment; or as creating a novel tort of unfair competition by misappropriation. It is suggested that the case is more authentically understood as an incidental result of a process by which the Supreme Court extended the boundaries of tort liability, and the corresponding scope of property protection, in a series of decisions against organised labour. The argument is pursued with reference to the prima facie tort theory of Oliver Wendell Holmes, the American ‘labour injunction’, and the labour law record of the author of the majority opinion in International News, Justice Mahlon Pitney.     

Attainability of International Environmental Agreements as a Social Situation

This paper applies the theory of social situations to study whether international environmental agreements (IEAs), mainly those on greenhouse gas emission reductions, can be attained. A game theoretic model is generally a black box for decision makers, where the mechanisms, which lead to solution(s) of the game, are not explicitly pointed out. This paper opens this black box by making the (institutional) move rules explicit. The usual pessimistic outcome with an ineffective and small size of stable coalitions among world regions is countered. Our model challenges conventional wisdom in the sense that large coalitions are possible outcomes of the cartel game, namely by incorporating: (1) farsightedness, and (2) coalitional moves with commitment as an alternative to myopic and individual moves which characterise the cartel game. We show that even if the international negotiations on climate change mitigation are modelled as an n-person prisoner's dilemma, one cannot rule out cooperation among world regions as a solution of the game. Indeed, in most analysed situations the grand coalition is among the solutions of the game. This shows that predictions based on cartel stability may be too pessimistic if it comes to analysing incentives to cooperate in implementing international environmental policy. Moreover, in an empirically calibrated model, we find three out of six instances where Russia (with or without the US) has an incentive to sign the Kyoto protocol.     

Disputes about corporate expression absorption and their legal remedies

Corporate expression is the expression that a company gives to the outside in its capacity as a legal entity. Often referring to resolutions made by shareholder meetings and the board of directors, based on good faith and bound by contractual spirit, a company must be held liable for its expression. Corporate expression absorption refers to the corporate behaviors and situations wherein the majority voting shareholders and directors replace the will of the minority voting shareholders and directors within their own will. Among them, the majority voting shareholders at a shareholders’ meeting (shareholders’ general meeting) are decision-making shareholders, and directors, managers and other senior management staff that decide corporate affairs are called decision-making members. Corporate expression absorption consists of two sorts: absorption by shareholders’ meeting and absorption by the board of directors. Shareholders’ meeting is a company’s authoritative organization; when the voting rights of some shareholders exceed the statutory limit, they will be able to manipulate the expression of shareholders’ meetings and replace the will of other shareholders with that of their own. The expression absorption by the board of directors refers to the practice wherein the majority directors decide on important corporate matters in accordance with the majority rule. Thus, it can be seen that the corporate expression absorption is a double-edged sword, not only capable of uplifting operational efficiency but also likely to help decision-making shareholders achieve personal gains and transfer corporate interests. As for the disputes of corporate expression absorption, the following legal remedies might be adopted: (1) Limit the voting rights of decision-making shareholders. (2) Provide shareholders with veto power over specific events. (3) Ask the chambers of commerce (industry associations) to arbitrate specific events. (4) Preserve the market value of shares held by dissenting directors. (5) Expand cumulative voting; (6) Provide shareholders the right to exit. (7) Legal remedies for corporate deadlock. (8) Shareholders’ derivative lawsuits. __________ Translated from China Law, No. 4, 2005     

The Irreducible Core of the Duty of Care,Skill and Diligence of Company Directors: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey

The decision in ASIC v Healey raises hitherto unexplored questions about the standard of care of non‐executive directors in monitoring the production of financial statements. More particularly, it considers the power of directors to delegate areas of responsibility requiring specialist knowledge and the degree of permissible reliance on professional advisers. The reasoning of the judge will doubtless prove helpful to the English courts not only in relation to duty of care issues under section 174 of the Companies Act 2006, but also when considering the duty to exercise independent judgment which is now restated in section 173.     

Attribution in Company Law

In Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) v Nazir (No 2), the Court of Appeal held that the ex turpi causa defence was inapplicable by refusing to attribute the fraud of the directors and the sole shareholder to the company in connection with the company's claim against them and third party co‐conspirators. It is significant that the court has not only clarified the law in relation to attribution, but it did so by rejecting the majority's reasoning and endorsing the dissenting judgment in the House of Lords decision in Stone & Rolls (in liquidation) v Moore Stephens (a firm). This article evaluates the decision in Bilta by critically examining the fundamental principles and policies that apply to the three distinct circumstances under which corporate attribution should or should not take place.     

Puzzles on Defending others from Aggression

We all agree on the justification of defending ourselves or others in some situations, but we do not often agree on why. Two main views compete: subjectivism and objectivism. The discussion has mainly been held in normative terms. But every theory must pass a previous test: logical consistency. It has recently been held that, at least in the case of defending others from aggression, objective theories lead, in some situations, to normative contradiction. My aim is to challenge the idea that only objective theories have this uncomfortable feature. In fact, any plausible theory justifying the defense of others, whether subjectively or objectively, can lead to situations of normative inconsistency. Therefore, the logical test is not the most fitting one for choosing between different theories of private defense.     

Out on a Limb: Appointing a Parenting Coordinator with Decision‐Making Authority in the Absence of a Statute or Rule

This Article addresses the issue of whether a court may appoint a Parenting Coordinator (PC) with decision‐making authority in the absence of a statute or court rule. The Article identifies possible sources of authority for the appointment of a PC with decision‐making authority in a state with no authorizing statute or court rule. It also provides a paradigm for constructing an appointment that allows for the benefits of Parenting Coordination but does not delegate decision‐making authority to an extent that it would constitute an impermissible delegation of judicial authority.

Key Points for the Family Court Community:
• Where a court seeks to appoint a PC with decision‐making authority in the absence of an authorizing statute or court rule, the court may find some authority allowing the appointment in (1) its equitable authority over child custody and visitation, (2) its authority to enforce its own orders, or (3) its authority to appoint other extrajudicial assistants such as a special master or mediator.
• Where a court seeks to appoint a PC with decision‐making authority in the absence of an authorizing statute or court rule, the court must craft an appointment that delegates enough decision‐making authority to the PC for parenting coordination to be effective yet, at the same time, not so much decision‐making authority as to render the appointment an impermissible delegation of a judicial function, specifically:
  • The PC's role should be limited to assisting the parties in implementing custody and visitation terms already decreed by the trial court.
  • A PC should be appointed only if the parties to the divorce consent to the appointment or if the trial court makes a finding that the case is a high‐conflict case.
  • The parties must have the opportunity for the trial court to meaningfully review any decision of the PC so that the trial court retains ultimate decision‐making authority.

     

Trust Parties’ Uniquely Easy Access to Rescission: Analysis,Critique and Reform

Parties to trusts currently enjoy easier access to judicial avoidance of voluntary dispositions resulting from mistakes and inadequate decision‐making than other persons. The principal doctrinal basis for this advantage has shifted from the rule in Re Hastings‐Bass to rescission in equity. The article argues that this advantage is normatively unjustified, and recommends a uniform legal framework to govern the avoidance of voluntary dispositions resulting from mistakes or inadequate decision‐making, whether or not a trust was involved. Under this framework, dispositions resulting from laypersons’ mistakes and inadequate decision‐making should be avoided, subject to appropriate defences, whenever that causative nexus is present, while dispositions resulting from professionals’ mistakes and inadequate decision‐making should only be avoided where the mistake or deliberative flaw was so serious as to render the transferee's retention of property transferred unjust.     

Case Comment: The Legality of ‘Kettling’ after Austin

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14. Austin claimed, unsuccessfully, that police kettling at a public protest in London amounted to a violation of her right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This case comment suggests that the court took an unexpected and unorthodox approach to the issue of ‘deprivation’ within Article 5. This decision may come to undermine the protections afforded by Article 5 and extend the current exceptions to Article 5 to an indefinite range of situations.     

Designating the official opposition in a Westminster parliamentary system

Of all Westminster‐type representative assemblies, Canada's presents an unusually high number of cases where parties rank equal in second place, disputing the role of official opposition, both in the aftermath of an election or during a parliamentary session when party fortunes change. Although exceptional, the phenomenon is not at all uncommon; however, the uncertainty that characterises each of its occurrences indicates that no general rule has ever been drawn from doctrine or jurisprudence, as attested by the latest (1999) decision rendered by Speaker Scott in Nova Scotia. Thus, speculation persists whenever the situation presents itself. This paper attempts some rulings based on the distinction of context proper to 12 historical cases studied. It may help remove the uncertainty that plagues democratic systems in Canada as well as in any other Westminster‐type legislatures around the world.     

Attribution and the Illegality Defence

In Jetivia SA v Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) all seven judges of the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal by holding that the illegality defence could not be raised as a defence against the claim made by the company because the wrongdoing of the directors and shareholder cannot be attributed to the company. Although all the judges unanimously agreed on the outcome of the case, their reasoning concerning the approach to attribution and the different circumstances under which attribution should or should not take place differed. Further, the Supreme Court was divided on the issue of the correct approach to the illegality defence.     

Medicare, Medicaid and CLIA programs; extension of certain effective dates for clinical laboratory requirements and personnel requirements for cytologists--HCFA. Final rule with comment period

This final rule extends certain effective dates for clinical laboratory requirements in regulations published on February 28, 1992, which implemented provisions of the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) and announces our approval of a certifying organization for qualifying cytotechnologists. This rule extends the date by which an individual must enroll in an HCFA-approved cytology proficiency testing (PT) program and the date by which an individual with a doctoral degree must possess board certification to qualify as a director of a laboratory that performs high complexity testing. In addition, we are extending the phase-in of the quality control requirements applicable to unmodified, moderate complexity tests cleared for commercial distribution by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). We are extending the date to meet applicable CLIA QC requirements for laboratories using commercial, nonmodified tests to fulfill certain quality control (QC) requirements. These effective date extensions do not reduce the current requirements for quality test performance. The date extensions are necessary due to the limited number and scope of currently operating cytology PT programs, resource constraints that have prevented commencement of the substantial number of quality control reviews, and inability of many laboratory directors to complete certification requirements within the time period originally specified.     

Enhancing Rescue in Chapter 11: Lessons from Reform Efforts in the United Kingdom

This is a dynamic time for insolvency law. Many jurisdictions have made or are considering reforms to their insolvency regimes. The United Kingdom has proposed a new standalone restructuring mechanism that incorporates many attributes of Chapter 11, including a cross-class cram down and the absolute priority rule. A distinctive feature of the UK proposal is the infusion of judicial discretion permitting courts to deviate from the absolute priority rule. This discretion is not permitted in the United States. This judicial discretion addresses a key problem with the application of the absolute priority rule in the United States—it may serve as an impediment to reorganization. This impediment is exacerbated by the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., which impacts the effective use of Chapter 11 rescue tools. This article explores the absolute priority rule, the problems associated with it, and the effect of Jevic in the United States. Drawing on the UK reform proposal, I argue that the United States should implement reforms that infuse judicial discretion into the application of the absolute priority rule. Doing so will facilitate the underlying policy goal of rescuing the company in Chapter 11 and also promote a broader policy goal of rescuing the business.     

CTS Corporation v. Waldburger: Tempest in a Teapot or the End of Toxic Torts As We Know It?

42 USC § 9658 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act imposes a “discovery rule” on state law actions for personal injuries and property damage caused or contributed to by exposure to a hazardous substance, pollutants, or contaminants. In CTS Corporation v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2181 (2014), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that section 9658 does not preempt statutes of repose, which establish absolute limits on the rights of plaintiffs to bring civil actions, notwithstanding any “discovery rule.” This article explores the potential impact of the Court's decision in Waldburger.     

Medicare,Medicaid, and CLIA programs; laboratory requirements relating to quality systems and certain personnel qualifications. Final rule

This final rule revises and responds to comments on certain laboratory requirements issued pursuant to the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), Pub. L. 100-578. Specifically, this final rule sets forth requirements for certain quality control (QC) provisions and personnel qualifications; consolidates and reorganizes the requirements for patient test management, QC, and quality assurance; and changes the consensus required for grading proficiency testing challenges. To ensure a smooth transition to the new provisions for directors of high complexity testing who are not board certified (but who have doctoral degrees), we will not be holding facilities out of compliance with the provisions of the rule concerning directors who are not board certified until the effective date of this new rule, to the extent the facilities are otherwise in compliance with the requirements for laboratory directors.