习近平总书记信息安全观探讨

<正>当今时代,互联网的兴起使整个世界犹如一个地球村,各国的信息安全已成为新时期国家安全的重要环节,信息安全已成为事关国家安全和国家发展、事关广大人民群众工作生活的重大战略问题。习近平总书记从国际国内大势出发,着眼于国家信息安全所面临的严峻形势,主持召开了中央网络安全和信息化领导小组第一次会议,并成立了中央网络安全和信息化领导小组,充分体现出党中央对信息安全的重视。深入研究和探讨习近平总书记信息安     

网络时代国家信息安全战略分析

全球信息技术的发展,使国家安全面临巨大的挑战,信息领域里防止计算机病毒、黑客和网络恐怖主义的袭击已成为世界各国政府普遍关注的国际问题。应以全球化视野中的信息安全为出发点,控制和防范影响国家信息安全的各种因素,加强国家信息安全的战略对策研究。     

美国网络地理信息安全监管及其对我国的启示

互联网的发展为社会带来便利的同时,也给地理信息的安全带来了隐患。包括地理信息在内的信息安全问题逐渐受到美国等各国政府的高度重视。美国网络地理信息安全战略演变经过萌芽、"安全保密"、"发展强化"、"控制优先"、"保密与公开"等五个阶段,取得了法律、策略、组织机制等各个层面的地理信息安全管理经验。借鉴美国的先进经验,对我国网络地理信息安全的监管建设可以有相当的启示。     

美国推行新的亚太安全战略

5月22日,美国国防部长佩里在太平洋地区经济理事会会议讲话中首次明确提出,美国将推行新的亚太安全战略——“预防性防务战略”。这一战略的提出和推行,标志美国亚太安全战略的又一次重大调整;而这一调整又是美国总体国家安全战略和军事战略调整的一个有机组成部分。本文试就美国新战略     

力拓间谍案与我国的经济信息安全

经济信息安全是国家安全的重要组成部分.席卷全球的金融危机使得各国对经济信息的争夺日益激烈.力拓间谍案折射出令人堪忧的我国经济信息安全现状.在改革开放不断深入的新世纪,必须全面检讨国家经济信息安全现状,冷静分析制约我国经济信息安全的原因,从战略高度构建与完善我国经济信息安全体系,以应对全球化格局下全新的经济竞争.     

我国网络信息安全的法律保护现状研究

在当前网络信息安全形势日益受到关注、并极大融入与影响社会生活的形势下,文章对当前我国有关网络信息安全的现状与立法状况作了分析,并就如何加强网络信息安全立法及对民众网络信息安全的保护提出了建议。     

美国亚太战略调整及其对我国安全环境的影响

近几年来,美国对其亚太战略不断作出调整,将其全球战略重点从欧洲转移到亚太地区,不断加大对亚太地区的投入力度.军事上,加强同亚太盟国和大国的军事合作,构筑美国主导的亚太多边安全机制.政治上,美增强对亚太国家的外交攻势,企图建立多层次多种形式的对话与协调机制,确保美国在亚太安全格局中的主导地位.本文在分析美国亚太战略调整动向和原因的基础上,指出了此次美国调整亚太战略给我国安全环境带来的不利影响.     

风险社会视阈下的《刑法修正案(七)》——以信息安全为视角

随着科学技术日新月异的发展,当今社会已经进入"风险社会",信息的不安全成为风险社会的风险来源之一,信息安全问题也就成为风险社会的重要议题.我国<刑法修正案(七)>根据现实发展的境况,对风险社会作出了及时的回应,对保护国家安全和社会稳定具有重大的历史意义.但是,<刑法修正案(七)>并非十全十美,无论是从社会现实状况还是从立法技术角度,都给我们留下了一些不足的遗憾.     

微博时代的执政风险及其应对

今天,我们进入微博时代。微博的影响已超出传统媒体传播的层面,它对政治、经济、文化和社会等各个领域的全面渗透,既推进了中国社会的进步,也对执政党的执政安全带来冲击和挑战,主要体现在削弱国家主权安全、危害国家政权安全、威胁意识形态安全、破坏国家政治稳定、影响国家信息安全等方面。为了有效应对微博时代的执政风险,必须实施微博信息安全战略、加强微博舆论阵地建设、加强网络伦理道德和制度建设、提高微博的管理和引导水平、构建微博危机处置机制和应急管理体系等。     

加强我国网络信息立法

信息技术的迅猛发展,带来了信息生产、处理和传播方式的网络化发展,互联网时代和网络社会已经来临,人类的生活方式、思维方式等已经发生了改变,还可能发生更大的改变。自1994年我国正式接入国际互联网以来,我国信息网络快速发展,同时,我国的网络信息法制建设也取得了长足进步。一、我国网络信息立法的现状与存在的不足（一）我国网络信息立法的现状目前,     

Offensive for defensive: the belt and road initiative and China's new grand strategy

China's Belt and Road initiative came from the combined pressure of slowing down of Chinese economy, US pivot to Asia and deterioration of the relations with neighboring countries after weathering the storm of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. It also symbolizes a more proactive approach of Chinese new leader Xi Jinping in meeting the expectation on China's international obligation and leadership. Aimed to link Asia, Europe, Africa and Oceania, the initiative provides tremendous opportunities of international economic cooperation. The paper argues that as China's contribution to international public goods, it is in the line of economic liberalism; as China's grand strategy, it is more of defensive than offensive by nature. Despite risks and uncertainties exist, the enforcement will boost China's influence and position in regional and international institutions. US should consider making more strategic space to the rising China, and a better coordinated China–US relations will make Asia Pacific a safer and more promising region.     

The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian strategy

This paper analyses the development of the US approach to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), from 1991 onwards. It examines theories of why a superpower would participate in a multilateral security institution, and investigates the motivations for the attitudes and extent of participation of the George H. Bush, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations towards the ARF. It argues that, in the post-Cold War period and in the face of a rising China, US East Asia strategy has been geared towards retaining the American preponderance of power. Thus, the US has pursued a strategy of containment and deterrence centred upon the regional bilateral alliance structure. Multilateral institutions have been treated as a supplementary means of supporting the secondary strategy of engaging with China. However, the ARF is not viewed as one of the important institutions through which to fulfil this supplementary aim. Because it cannot deal with the key regional security issues, the ARF is seen as a low-stakes arena by Washington. But the paper concludes that US participation in the ARF may nevertheless be crucial in boosting the legitimacy of American security interests in the region, thus helping to safeguard US preponderance.     

Examining the immanent dilemma of small states in the Asia-Pacific: the strategic triangle between New Zealand,the US and China

ABSTRACT

Small states throughout the Asia-Pacific are confronted by a growing dilemma over how to balance their traditional security ties with the US and rapidly growing trade with China. This gives Washington and Beijing potential leverage over small states to use within their competition with one another. This article explores the implications of this for New Zealand – a small South Pacific state that prides itself on maintaining an independent foreign policy. Situated within the small state literature, it utilises a material-based strategic triangle to illustrate the fundamental facets of New Zealand's position. Relatedly, the article examines how Wellington has managed its burgeoning relations with China and the US over the past decade and critically considers New Zealand's independent foreign policy. It finds that New Zealand has adopted a mixed set of strategies to manage its position between the US and China, closely aligning itself with Washington while remaining nonaligned on some key security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. New Zealand has certainly not opted for neutrality. The article concludes that New Zealand and other small states must remain vigilant, may want to consider alternative strategies of alignment, and outlines a number of areas where additional research could prove fruitful.     

Escaping the merchant/missionary dilemma: an imperial policy for the Asia-Pacific

The Asia policy of the Bush administration follows from two principles: its preference for ‘hub-and-spoke relationships’ led from Washington, and the restored priority of security issues over the mixture of trade interests and human rights that was the hallmark of the Clinton presidency. The initial focus of the administration on the restoration of political and strategic ties with old allies such as Japan, and on strategic competition, has been mitigated by another realistic approach: the need to seek new allies and partnerships. This policy was already evident towards India before September 11, 2001, but has been magnified with the onset of a coalition against terrorism, and almost as importantly, against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resumption of strategic and military ties with China, the priority of anti-terrorist cooperation over human rights issues with Southeast Asia, the increased support for India that is of more strategic value than America's tactical involvement with Pakistan, are developments that overshadow the US relationship with traditional allies such as Japan or the European Union. The major weakness of the Bush Asia policy, however, is its relative neglect of major economic and social issues in the region. Although support for some weakened ASEAN economies has increased, there is neither a more intense coordination of economic policies with Japan, in spite of initially declared intentions, nor a major economic and social strategy for Southeast and South Asia that would support the fight against terrorism.     

Reappraising the debate and practice of US strategic ambiguity/clarity in cross-strait relations

Abstract

China's influence in the South Pacific appears to be growing rapidly. Some analysts are concerned that China is on its way to replacing the West as the dominant power and China's rise in the region poses a major threat to the West. However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific is a calculated strategic move for its military security. The move can be strategic mainly in the sense that it has strong implications for China's reunification strategy and it serves China's long-term development strategy. The strategic value of the South Pacific to China's national security is limited at present and will remain so in the foreseeable future. China also lacks the military capability to challenge the US-led West in the region in the years to come. Chinese influence in the region is not deep-rooted and is largely based on its ‘no-strings-attached’ aid and its increasing economic interactions with the region. China has serious image problems in the region and these problems are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. China thus has neither the hard power nor the soft power to become a genuine hegemon in the region.     

China and Europe: engagement,multipolarity and strategy

Abstract

Ever closer relations between China and Europe over the last decade have sparked speculation about an emerging axis or balance of power vis-à-vis the United States. China, the European Union and its key member states have expressed a preference for a more balanced international order based on multilateral institutions. Despite a rapid and extensive expansion in economic and political relations between China and the European Union, there is no evidence for balancing against the United States in strategic areas. Rather, the variations in the positions of China, the European Union and the United States can more accurately be seen as policy or interest bargaining. Because the European Union does not share US security interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the European Union and its key member states can seem at variance with the US position on China. Bargaining over the failed attempt to lift the European Union's arms embargo against China shows that the European Union and the United States are not so far apart on strategic issues in the Asia-Pacific.     

China's engagement-oriented strategy towards North Korea: achievements and limitations

In response to the challenge of unstable North Korea (weak economy, weapons of mass destruction [WMD] development), China has followed an engagement-oriented strategy based on diplomatic persuasion, economic interaction and moderate economic sanctions. Intensified engagement (2009–2012) facilitated North Korean convergence with China in respect of economic reform but divergence has persisted over WMD development. Despite the widening of divergence since 2013, China has refrained from applying crippling sanctions. This article seeks to explain these diverging results and their implications for China's strategy towards North Korea. Reviewing recent literature and data, it will argue that Chinese economic input reinforced the trend of economic reform that formed the basis of political consolidation under the new hereditary regime. On the other hand, the prospect of stable dependence on China ran counter to that regime's pursuit of WMDs as the basis of security and diplomatic diversification. These mixed results reveal the limits of China's strategy: its economic input involuntarily reinforces North Korea's WMD potential but it is not prepared to accept the risks of enforcing WMD restraint by crippling sanctions either. With limited room for manoeuvre, the attainment of China's strategic objectives ultimately depends upon policy change from the US or South Korea.     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

To Engage or Not to Engage? Explaining the Logic of the US’s China Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era

The United States’ (US) changing policy towards China has become one of the most attractive issues in contemporary international politics. To explore the reasons underlying these changes, existing studies adopt four schools of explanation, i.e., status competition, institutional competition, failure of engagement, and domestic factors. Each school provides valuable theoretical insights. However, existing studies have obvious problems with single attribution and, thus, fail to formulate a causal mechanism explaining the long-term trajectory of the US’s China strategy. By recategorizing America’s unilateral perception of China as reformist, revolutionary, status quo and positionalist, which extends beyond the revisionist-status quo dichotomy, this article develops a systemic explanatory model and process tracing of the transition of US’s China policy during the post-Cold War period to explain the theoretical logic underlying the changes. This article argues that the positional change and the US’s unilateral perception of China are the two main factors triggering changes in the US’s China strategy. China’s foreign behavior, as the intervening variable, strengthens or weakens the government’s perception of China and, thus, determines the US’s strategic choices, i.e., whether to pursue a policy of containment, competition, precaution, congagement, engagement, or accommodation. Four comparative case studies are presented to demonstrate how this article’s explanatory model can be applied.

     

The United States,Japan, and the European Union: comparing political economy approaches to China

Abstract

This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US–Japan and US–EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US–Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe.