The Effects of Limiting Punitive Damage Awards

In response to concerns that jury awards in tort cases are excessive and unpredictable, nearly every state legislature has enacted some version of tort reform that is intended to curb extravagant damage awards. One of the most important and controversial reforms involves capping (or limiting) the maximum punitive damage award. We conducted a jury analogue study to assess the impact of this reform. In particular, we examined the possibility that capping punitive awards would cause jurors to inflate their compensatory awards to satisfy their desires to punish the defendant, particularly in situations where the defendant's conduct was highly reprehensible. Relative to a condition in which punitive damages were unlimited, caps on punitive damages did not result in inflation of compensatory awards. However, jurors who had no option to award punitive damages assessed compensatory damages at a significantly higher level than did jurors who had the opportunity to do so. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.     

Compensating Plaintiffs and Punishing Defendants: Is Bifurcation Necessary?

Critics of the civil jury have proposed several procedural reforms to address the concern that damage awards are capricious and unpredictable. One such reform is the bifurcation or separation of various phases of a trial that involves multiple claims for damages. The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of bifurcating the compensatory and punitive damages phases of a civil tort trial. We manipulated the wealth of the defendant and the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct (both sets of evidence theoretically related to punitive but not to compensatory damages) across three cases in a jury analog study. We wondered whether jurors would misuse the punitive damages evidence in fixing compensatory damages and whether bifurcation would effectively undo this practice. Our findings indicated that mock jurors did not improperly consider punitive damages evidence in their decisions about compensation. Moreover, bifurcation had the unexpected effect of augmenting punitive damage awards. These findings raise questions about the merits of bifurcation in cases that involve multiple claims for damages.     

Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff's Requests and Plaintiff's Identity on Punitive Damage Awards

Two experiments were conducted to study the manner in which civil jurors assess punitive damage awards. Jury-eligible citizens were shown a videotaped summary of an environmental damage lawsuit and told that the defendant had already paid compensatory damages. They were asked to judge liability for punitive damages and, if damages were to be assessed, to assign a dollar award. Three independent variables were manipulated in the case materials: the dollar amounts that were explicitly requested by the plaintiffs in their closing arguments to the jury, the geographical location of the defendant corporation, and the location of the lead plaintiff. Consistent with prior findings of anchor effects on judgments, we found that the plaintiffs requested award values had a dramatic effect on awards: the higher the request, the higher the awards. We also found that local plaintiffs were awarded more than were geographically remote plaintiffs, while the location of the defendant company did not have reliable effects on the awards. The implications of these results for procedures in civil trials and for theories of juror decision making are discussed.     

Plaintiff injury and defendant reprehensibility: Implications for compensatory and punitive damage awards

A criticism of the civil jury is that jurors' decisions about damages are capricious and arbitrary. In particular, critics point to the skyrocketing nature of punitive damage assessments as evidence of a system run amok. The purpose of this study was to examine the factors that influence jurors' decisions about compensatory and punitive awards. We assess whether, as the law intends, jurors' decisions about compensation are influenced by the severity of the plaintiff's injury but not by the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, and whether assessments of punitive damages are related to the defendant's conduct but not to the plaintiff's injury. Across three cases, mock jurors generally utilized relevant information and ignored irrelevant factors in their decisions about damages. Results are discussed in terms of the extent to which juror decision making comports with legal doctrine.     

Separating Compensatory and Punitive Damage Award Decisions by Trial Bifurcation

In a simulated products liability trial, we tested the effects of bifurcating decisions regarding compensatory and punitive damage awards. Fifty-nine groups of 5-7 jurors heard evidence in a unitary or bifurcated format, deliberated about the case to a unanimous decision, and awarded damages. Trial bifurcation decreased variability in compensatory damage awards across juries hearing the same case, and also decreased the tendency for juries to award extremely high compensatory damages. In addition, deliberation led to lower compensatory awards in the low injury severity condition and higher awards in the high injury severity condition. Jurors reported that they were using evidence more appropriately when the decisions were bifurcated. Implications of evidence bifurcation in civil trials are discussed.     

The Effects of Injury Severity on Jury Negligence Decisions

According to the laws of negligence, jurors' liability decisions are to be influenced by the defendant's conduct, but not by the severity of the plaintiff's injuries. We conducted a jury simulation study to assess whether jurors reason in this manner. We manipulated the conduct of the defendant (reasonable, careless) and the severity of injuries to the plaintiff (mild, severe) in a simulated automobile negligence case. Jurors completed predeliberation questionnaires, deliberated to a verdict, and answered postdeliberation questionnaires. The defendant's conduct had a strong impact on liability judgments, but evidence related to injury severity also had an effect, albeit smaller. We analyze these findings in the context of various cognitive and motivational theories.     

Conduct and its Consequences: Attempts at Debiasing Jury Judgments

Jurors in negligence cases are supposed to judge a defendant by the reasonableness of his or her conduct and not by the consequences of that conduct. But several studies have shown that a cognitive heuristic known as hindsight bias can skew post hoc judgments of some prior behavior. Thus, jurors who must evaluate the actions of a defendant may be influenced inappropriately by the consequences of those actions. A complementary problem arises when jurors must evaluate the injuries incurred by the plaintiff. Here, jurors' knowledge about the defendant's allegedly negligent conduct can proactively influence their assessment of the plaintiff's injuries and determination of damages. The purpose of the present study was to examine the effectiveness of two procedural techniques intended to reduce or eliminate the impact of hindsight bias in negligence cases—multiple admonitions from a judge about the proper use of evidence—and bifurcation (actually withholding irrelevant evidence from jurors). We presented a re-enacted automobile negligence trial to 355 jury-eligible adults drawn from the community, varied the evidence and instructions that they heard, and measured liability judgments and damage awards from individual jurors both before and after deliberating, and from juries. Results showed that admonitions were generally ineffective in guiding jurors to the proper use of evidence but that bifurcation was relatively more effective. Deliberations had no curative effect on jurors' misapplication of evidence.     

Punitive Damage Decision Making: The Decisions of Citizens and Trial Court Judges

Some states have allocated the authority to determine the amount of punitive damages to judges rather than to juries. This study explored the determination of damages by jury-eligible citizens and trial court judges. The punitive damage awards of both groups were of similar magnitude and variability. The compensatory damages of jurors were marginally lower but, in some conditions, were more variable than the compensatory damage awards of judges. Both groups appropriately utilized information about both the actual and potential severity of the harm to the plaintiff in determining punitive damages and used only the actual severity of the injury in determining compensatory damages. The punitive damage awards of both groups were influenced by the wealth of the defendant, but the compensatory damage awards of judges were marginally more influenced by defendant wealth than those of citizens. The results are discussed in the context of proposals for punitive damages reform.     

PUNITIVE DAMAGES,CHINESE TORT LAW,AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

In a country such as China, with abundant consumer products and the inevitability of product defects, claims for punitive damages are sure to arise under Article 47 of the new Chinese Tort Law. Article 47 provides that “(w)hereany producer or seller knowingly produces or sells defective products, causing death or serious damage to the health of others, the injured party may request appropriate punitive damages.” As Chinese jurists and scholars interpret Article 47, they may wish to consider whether lessons can be drawn from the American experience. During the past two decades, few areas of American law have changed more radically than the law on punitive damages. While there were once few restraints on the ability of a judge or jury to impose punitive damages in a case involving egregious conduct, today there are a host of limitations embodied in American state and federal law. In many American states, statutes or judicial decisions restrict the ability of a court to award punitive damages by narrowly defining the types of conduct that will justify a punitive award, raising the standard of proof, capping the amount of punitive damages, requiring a portion of a punitive award to be forfeited to the state, or limiting vicarious liability for punitive damages. In addition, under federal constitutional law, the principle of due process limits the imposition of punitive damages by scrutinizing the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages and prohibiting an award to be based on harm to persons other than the plaintiff. An examination of these developments from a comparative law perspective may prove useful to the implementation of Article 47.     

Construing Motive in Videotaped Killings: The Role of Jurors' Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty

Death-qualified jurors are generally able to impose the death penalty, whereas excludable jurors are generally either unable or unwilling to do so. A long line of research studies has shown that the former are more likely than the latter to convict criminal defendants. Ellsworth (1993) argues that jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty predict verdicts because they are embedded in a cluster of beliefs and theories about the criminal justice system. Her studies show that jurors interpret ambiguous conduct based on these belief structures. The present study examines the possibility that death penalty attitudes also influence jurors' conceptions of criminal intent. We showed mock jurors the filmed murder of a convenience store clerk and examined the inferences they drew from this evidence. Jurors who favored the death penalty tended to read criminal intent into the defendant's actions and jurors who opposed the death penalty were less likely to do so. These data provide further explanation of the conviction-proneness of death-qualified jurors.     

The Impact of Psychological Injuries on Sexual Harassment Determinations

Although a plethora of studies focus on jury decision making in sexual harassment cases, few studies examine damage award assessments in such suits, and even fewer explore the impact of psychological injury on jurors’ liability and damage award assessments. In the present study, 342 undergraduates read a hostile environment sexual harassment case that manipulated the plaintiff’s psychological injury level (severe vs. mild vs. control) to investigate whether males and females made different damage decisions. Males using a reasonable person standard found more liability as the severity of the plaintiff’s psychological injury increased. However, males using a reasonable woman standard found less liability with the addition of any psychological injury information. Similarly, for mild and severe injuries, males using the reasonable woman standard awarded lower damages than males using the reasonable person standard. Females tended to find more harassment than males, but psychological injury and legal standard had little impact on females’ legal decisions. We discuss these findings in light of the positive relationship often observed between the plaintiff’s injury severity level and pro-plaintiff verdicts.     

Juror decision making for juveniles tried as adults: the effects of defendant age,crime type,and crime outcome

This study examined the influences of the crime type (person or property) and the crime outcome (mild or severe) on mock jurors’ verdict and sentencing decisions for adult defendants and juvenile defendants tried as adults. Jurors read a trial summary depicting a defendant charged with aggravated robbery or second-degree burglary. The crimes had either mild or severe damage inflicted on the person or property, and the defendant's age was presented as 14 or 24. Neither the defendant age nor the crime outcome affected jurors’ verdicts; however, jurors were more likely to convict a defendant charged with a crime against a person. Jurors recommended longer sentences for an adult defendant, a defendant charged with a crime against a person, and a defendant charged with a crime with a severe outcome. The discussion explored these outcomes and the role of bias in jurors’ perceptions of defendants.     

Empathy and Jurors' Decisions in Patricide Trials Involving Child Sexual Assault Allegations

In a mock-trial paradigm, 205 participants considered a patricide trial in which a child defendant claimed the patricide was done in self-defense after years of sexual abuse. Participants in an empathy-induction condition were asked to take the perspective of the defendant and to detail how they would be thinking and feeling if they were the defendant. Control condition participants received no such instructions. Results indicated that, compared to jurors in the control condition, jurors who were asked to take the defendant's perspective had more empathy for the defendant (without feeling more similar to or more sympathy for the defendant), found the defendant less guilty and less responsible for the murder, and were more likely to consider abuse to be a mitigating factor in the killing. Overall, compared to men, women were more likely to believe the defendant's abuse allegations, find the defendant credible, and consider the defendant to be less responsible for the murder. Women in the empathy condition found the defendant less guilty than did all other jurors. Finally, child defendant gender was also varied, but this had few effects on case judgments overall. Jurors, however, were more likely to believe that the girl defendant was sexually abused than the boy defendant. We discuss theoretical implications for understanding the social psychological construct of empathy as well as implications for understanding jurors' decisions in cases involving child sexual assault allegations.     

Religious fundamentalism,religiosity, and priming: effects on attitudes,perceptions, and mock jurors’ decisions in an insanity defense case

Jurors are asked to use their personal knowledge and experience to make verdict decisions; thus, it is no surprise that their religious beliefs might influence their decisions. During legal insanity trials, jurors might also be exposed to religious stimuli (e.g. crucifix, prayer, Bible, etc.), which could evoke (prime) religious beliefs and thus influence decisions. Two studies examined whether dimensions of religiosity and religious beliefs relate to attitudes and decisions concerning mental health defenses, testing social identity theory against Allport and Ross’s religiosity hypothesis. In Study 1 (attitudes survey) and Study 2 (mock juror decision-making paradigm), religious fundamentalist beliefs consistently predicted punitive attitudes and decisions related to mental health defenses and verdicts, and this was moderated by intrinsic religiosity, such that religious fundamentalist beliefs only predicted punitiveness for individuals low in intrinsic religiosity. Also, priming fundamentalist beliefs increased punitiveness in both verdict and sentencing decisions. Combined, these results suggest that religious beliefs play a role in jurors’ verdict decisions in an insanity case, and that priming fundamentalist beliefs increases jurors’ punitiveness. Allport and Ross’s religiosity hypothesis was supported, but social identity theory was not.     

Harmless error analysis: How do judges respond to confession errors?

In Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court opened the door for appellate judges to conduct a harmless error analysis of erroneously admitted, coerced confessions. In this study, 132 judges from three states read a murder case summary, evaluated the defendant's guilt, assessed the voluntariness of his confession, and responded to implicit and explicit measures of harmless error. Results indicated that judges found a high-pressure confession to be coerced and hence improperly admitted into evidence. As in studies with mock jurors, however, the improper confession significantly increased their conviction rate in the absence of other evidence. On the harmless error measures, judges successfully overruled the confession when required to do so, indicating that they are capable of this analysis.     

Statistical Inference and Forensic Evidence: Evaluating a Bullet Lead Match

This experiment tested the ability of undergraduate mock jurors (N=295) to draw appropriate conclusions from statistical data on the diagnostic value of forensic evidence. Jurors read a summary of a homicide trial in which the key evidence was a bullet lead "match" that was either highly diagnostic, non-diagnostic, or of unknown diagnostic value. There was also a control condition in which the forensic "match" was not presented. The results indicate that jurors as a group used the statistics appropriately to distinguish diagnostic from non-diagnostic forensic evidence, giving considerable weight to the former and little or no weight to the latter. However, this effect was attributable to responses of a subset of jurors who expressed confidence in their ability to use statistical data. Jurors who lacked confidence in their statistical ability failed to distinguish highly diagnostic from non-diagnostic forensic evidence; they gave no weight to the forensic evidence regardless of its diagnostic value. Confident jurors also gave more weight to evidence of unknown diagnostic value. Theoretical and legal implications are discussed.