The evolution of the European Union’s failed approach to Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

This article provides a genealogical account of European actorness in Afghanistan. It argues that European agreement towards facilitating modernisation and development in Afghanistan was initiated with aid and trade, evolving into humanitarianism in the 1990s, and reconstruction and democratisation in the 2000s. The European Union has had a positive impact on Afghanistan, focusing on humanitarianism, but its multilateral and programme level approach to reconstruction and democratisation has failed to meet the EU’s stated objectives. By promoting the flawed “Bonn Model”, the EU is proportionally culpable for failed international attempts to reconstruct Afghanistan; even though the United States has been the primary international actor. Drawing a series of broader lessons, such as tensions between Atlantic solidarity and European integration, and the limitations of the European crisis management, the article demonstrates how European policy has been shaped by crises inside Afghanistan and the larger geopolitical crises these have generated. These have contemporary importance as history suggests that as the US withdraws its commitment to Afghanistan, the EU will have a very significant role in attempting to fill a humanitarian vacuum.     

Let's talk Turkey! US influence on EU–Turkey relations

Turkey is of paramount importance to the United States and to the European Union. The United States is not only the first and foremost partner of both the EU and Turkey. It is also amongst the most committed supporters of Turkey's European integration. In support of Turkey's EU membership bid, Washington has set forth a variety of arguments and has attempted to influence EU decisions at different points in time. US advocacy throughout the 1990s was key to kick-starting Turkey's accession process. By contrast, US influence on Turkey's EU accession decreased visibly in the twenty-first century. The style of US advocacy goes some way towards explaining why this has been the case. When American advocacy has prioritized quiet, behind-closed-doors diplomacy it has tended to be more effective. When instead US officials have relied on loud public diplomacy, European reactions have been generally negative. More importantly however, it is the content of American arguments that has affected their relative impact on European perceptions of Turkey. Depending on whether the US has spoken to the rights-, the interest- or the identity-based logic of enlargement, the influence of the United States on Turkey's EU membership prospects has varied. On the grounds of this analysis, this article concludes by outlining broad policy suggestions regarding how the United States could contribute more effectively to Turkey's European integration.     

Italy and the community after thirty years of experience

Convincing the Pakistani military to focus its attention on the Afghan Taliban and associated groups has so far proved unsuccessful. The Obama administration's reliance on economic incentives and regional peace initiatives, such as a dialogue with India on Kashmir, has failed to deliver tangible results. Instead, India's footprint within Afghanistan has expanded, leaving Pakistani elites ever more anxious. Balancing Indian and Pakistani interests in South Asia remains a top priority for Western governments, and most importantly the US. In the current milieu this will require shifting Western bureaucratic focus from the age old and seemingly intractable Kashmir dispute to maintaining the peace within Afghanistan. This article outlines why this shift should be considered, and how the India--Pakistan trust deficit might be bridged.     

Indian and Chinese foreign policy imperatives and strategies vis-à-vis Afghanistan

In this article, the authors conduct a comparative review of the strategic imperatives driving Sino-Indian policy on Afghanistan in the post-2014 scenario. The article argues that divergent strategic imperatives make cooperation difficult and/or unlikely. This analysis is based on a broader consideration of both contemporary history and geopolitical dynamics shaping the foreign policy considerations of these two countries, and an assessment of the impact of ongoing bi-lateral and regional aspirations. The authors begin by highlighting the salient dynamics that have historically characterized and driven Indian and Chinese foreign policy in general and on Afghanistan. They find that Afghanistan, although not a primary focus of either state’s foreign or security policy, historically, is increasing in importance for both; India and China compete on a range of economic and security issues.     

Soft power,strategic narratives,and state identity: Re-assessing India-Afghanistan relations post-2011

In 2011, India and Afghanistan signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement that delimited cooperation in economic, social, political, and cultural areas. It depicted the rise of Indian soft power influence. However, the extent to which India garners strategic influence in Afghanistan through soft power remains contentious. This article contends that India’s soft power effectiveness in Afghanistan post-2011 can be fully grasped only via the construction and reception of India’s regional power identity negotiated at the sites of: “civilization,” “democracy,” and “economic-military” enabling India to provide a regional leadership that can forward both India and Afghanistan’s mutual interests. Examining soft power via the constructivist-discursive framework of collective identity strategic narrative, this article compares India-Afghanistan relations in periods 2011–14 and 2014–17. The former formalized strategic partnership agreement and the latter marked continuation of the agreement albeit through domestic political transitions in both countries. This article demonstrates that the Indian soft power influence in Afghanistan between 2014 and 2017 has increased markedly.     

Military professionalism in post‐communist Hungary and Poland: An analysis and assessment

Abstract

This article discusses Russian perceptions of and attitudes toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia has historically disliked and mistrusted NATO, seeing it as the primary threat to its international aspirations; in practice Russia pursues a dual policy. Its harsh condemnation of NATO has not stopped it from cooperating in selected areas of mutual interest. The most important among them is support for NATO's military operations in Afghanistan. The recent rejuvenation of relations between the west and Moscow is known as the strategic ‘reset’, meaning a return to diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation regardless of disagreements over the invasion of Georgia and Moscow's other recent international transgressions. The reset in NATO–Russia relations has only tactical significance, however. Cooperation will take place on a limited basis, but a genuine reset in mutual relations must wait for a reset in Russia's political and strategic priorities.     

Sixty years of Sino-Afghan relations

Afghanistan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) established diplomatic relations in 1955. Since that time, the changing relationship of China with Afghanistan has mirrored those of the PRC with other nation states. What began as an attempt by the PRC to establish international legitimacy for its new government and to offer third-world nations a socialist-communist path other than following the Soviet Union turned into a quest for natural resources. Using a variety of primary sources, including recently declassified intelligence files, secondary sources and open source material, this article traces the development of this changing relationship, demonstrating how it has complemented or complicated the United States' relationship with Afghanistan. It also shows how changing world events have affected the Chinese perception of the role Afghanistan can play in its foreign policy. The article concludes with a presentation of what role China is playing and can play in Afghanistan today, ending with a discussion of the dangers that the PRC faces in its current relations with Afghanistan, especially with regard to its ever-changing relationship with the United States.     

The Bundeswehr and the Kunduz air strike 4 September 2009: Germany's post-heroic moment?

The article sets out to investigate Germany's involvement in the controversial 2009 Kunduz air strike in Afghanistan. Utilizing a theoretical framework derived from existing literature on postheroic warfare, it employs a detailed case study of this particular military engagement to highlight the operational, strategic, and cultural dimensions of Germany's operations in Afghanistan. Through an analysis of primary documents and field interviews, this paper concludes that German public opinion, politicians, soldiers and media reacted in ways that mirror closely theories of postheroic warfare. These included widespread condemnation of the air strike, increasing doubts about the Afghan mission, and emphasis on low-risk stand-off precision weapons, which paradoxically resulted in higher civilian casualties. Germans still have a long way to go to accept the brutal realities of military engagements that the Bundeswehr increasingly confronts during its expanded scope of post-cold war military operations.     

Landpower,Time, and Terrorism: A Strategy of Lightness in the Counter-ISIS Campaign

The range of strategic ends and contingencies that could require seizing, securing, and controlling territory on land is not diminishing. But the means of employing landpower have repeatedly exhausted the domestic basis and political will to sustain it over time, as in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A way of applying landpower that allows for the essential element of time, sustainable over protracted periods in the court of public opinion, would offer immeasurable strategic value. Drawing on the author's work and observations while deployed to the U.S./coalition headquarters in command of military operations against ISIS, this article suggests that the answer to the dilemma of landpower, however preliminary, lies at the nexus of strategy and cost.     

Can Europe Fill the Void in U.S. Military Leadership?

This article lays out the case for why Washington's European allies are incapable, both now and in the foreseeable future, of replacing American military leadership. Despite recent substantial force contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan and small-scale interventions in Africa, European military capabilities are limited, declining, and unlikely to rebound, regardless of whether the United States is in strategic retreat. As a result, the United States faces a bleak choice: not whether to trade American global leadership for an equally benevolent European world order, but whether to give up its mantle of leadership and thereby create a void that may be filled by unfriendly, if not overtly hostile, actors.     

The United States,the Israeli Nuclear Program,and Nonproliferation, 1961–69

As was evident from the intense reaction to Donald Trump’s comments during the 2016 presidential campaign about nuclear proliferation, many analysts believe that the United States has consistently given the goal of nonproliferation a top priority since the beginning of the nuclear age. That conviction, in turn, plays a major role in policy debates among experts in this area. In this article, I show that nonproliferation does not necessarily take precedence over other important US geopolitical interests through a close examination of American policy toward the Israeli nuclear program during the 1960s. Although nonproliferation goals certainly came into play, US officials repeatedly gave priority to other key objectives and, to a real extent, even believed that Israel’s nuclearization could hold certain strategic advantages. This finding, of course, has important theoretical implications for the basic question of whether international politics still works essentially as it did in the pre-nuclear era, as well as for policy debates over nuclear proliferation.     

Drone Warfare in Counterterrorism and Normative Change: US Policy and the Politics of International Law

The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones in counterterrorism has changed the face of warfare and is challenging international law on a number of levels. This article assesses some of those challenges in the context of the Obama administration’s justifications to use drones for targeted killing. It focuses on the US as a norm entrepreneur that purposefully works to alter prevalent norms related to the use of drones in counterterrorism efforts. The article analyses normative developments and the meaning-in-use of existing legal provisions that are invoked to justify US policy in this area. By focusing on norm entrepreneurs, this article moves away from purely structural accounts of normative change towards a stronger emphasis on actors and the role of agency. Rather than understanding US drone policy as violating international law, this article argues that the Obama administration was acting as a norm entrepreneur in its counterterrorism efforts, aiming to change the meaning of a number of international legal concepts to justify its policy decisions.     

Not quite the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’: Japan's security,the US–Japan alliance and the ‘war on terror’ in East Asia

Japan, in responding to US expectations for support in the ‘war on terror’, has displayed a degree of strategic convergence on global security objectives, thus prompting policy-makers and observers to dub it the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’. This article argues, however, that Japan is far from assuming this role. For Japan, the ‘war on terror’ serves more as a political pretext for legitimating long-planned changes in military security policy that are often only marginally related to the US's anti-terrorism agenda. Instead, Japan has focused much more on using the terror threat rationale as a means to push forward its response to the regional and traditional security challenges of North Korea and China, even if at times it attempts to depict both as ‘new security challenges’ or as involving elements of counterterrorism. The final conclusion is that US military hegemony may be weakened by Japan's and the Asia-Pacific's potential divergence from the US global security agenda.     

A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration

This article assesses the scope and nature of the current terrorist threat to the United States and suggests a strategy to counter it. Al-Qaeda continues to pose the most serious terrorist threat to the U.S. today. If the September 11, 2001 attacks have taught us anything, it is that al-Qaeda is most dangerous when it has a sanctuary or safe haven from which to plan and plot attacks. Al-Qaeda has acquired such a sanctuary in Pakistan's Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and its North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and surrounding environs. Accordingly, the highest priority for the new American presidential administration must be to refocus our—and our allies'—attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al-Qaeda began to collapse after 2001, but has now re-grouped. This will entail understanding that al-Qaeda and its local militant jihadi allies cannot be defeated by military means alone. Success will require a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities—that is, continuing to kill and capture al-Qaeda commanders and operatives—along with breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment among radicalized “bunches of guys” as well as more effectively countering al-Qaeda's effective information operations. The U.S. thus requires a strategy that harnesses the overwhelming kinetic force of the American military as part of a comprehensive vision to transform other, non-kinetic instruments of national power in order to deal more effectively with irregular and unconventional threats. This article first discusses the scope and details of the terrorist threat today and then proposes a counterterrorism strategy for the new presidential administration. It focuses first on creating a micro approach to address the deteriorating situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It then considers the requirements of a broader macro strategy to counter terrorism and insurgency.     

High Hopes and Limited Prospects: Washington's Security and Nation-Building Aims in Afghanistan

Four years have passed since the United States and allied governments toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan and began security and nation-building operations. Despite the continuing deployment of thousands of Western troops and the expenditure of billions of dollars in foreign aid, current conditions in Afghanistan are perilous. Poverty is rampant, the drug trade has shown no sign of decline, warlords remain in power, and the Taliban continues to confront US and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces. With the US preparing to reduce its troop presence in 2006 and NATO poised to deploy forces into Afghanistan's dangerous southern provinces, Western security and nation-building efforts are at risk of failure.     

‘Unlawful Combatants’: The West's Treatment of Irregular Fighters in the ‘War on Terror’

The West's treatment of irregular fighters in the “war on terror” was highly problematic. This article contends that we must look beyond the assumption that political and strategic considerations compromised the law and led to the “invention” of the category of the “unlawful combatant.” Rather, the law of armed conflict itself includes strong exclusionary mechanisms towards irregular fighters. These exclusionary strands in the law came to dominate the West's strategic decision-making on the treatment of irregular fighters. Moreover, the fact that irregular fighters became such a vital issue post-9/11 was not a result of the war on terror being a new kind of war, as has often been argued. Rather, this article suggests that it reflects an identity crisis of the West's regular armed forces at the start of the twenty-first century.     

Beyond the American Century: Walter Lippmann and American Grand Strategy, 1943–1950

As the United States became a world Power, journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann feared that it would become its own worst enemy. During and after the Second World War, he tried to steer the country towards coherent statecraft, to define the national interest and the limits of power, and give geopolitical expression to the role of the United States as the core of an Atlantic strategic system. But in response to world war, the Truman Doctrine, and the Korean War, he became pessimistic about the country's ability to conduct strategy effectively. In the prophetic tradition, he believed that a fatal symbiosis between America's growing strength and domestic politics led it towards crisis. Though at times ahistorical, Lippmann's concept of strategy deserves attention for its dialogue between power and identity, for its questioning of “ends” as well as means, and for its focus on the danger of self-defeating behaviour.     

A Broken National Security Council Process and America’s Inability to Prioritize Security Interests

Recent US security policy failures in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect a flawed National Security Council (NSC) process and capacity to identify and prioritize security interests and goals. Failure to recognize and adjust NSC analytical procedures is particularly problematic given growing security challenges, disturbing trends in America, and the fragile state of our Republic. President Joe Biden’s long-awaited national security strategy fails to correct this and is predictably flawed in the same fundamental ways as past NSC efforts. The document voices broad, aspirational goals describing what the administration wants to achieve, but is very ambiguous on the fundamental purpose of a strategy, describing how their goals will be achieved. Specifically, the document’s lofty yet ambiguous language articulates more policy than strategy, reemphasizing a fundamental NSC misunderstanding of strategy. This disconnect has direct implications to successful implementation. Ambiguous goals mean defining intent and formulation of supporting objectives are left to departmental and interagency interpretation. This invariably assures poor implementation towards disparate ends, and recently in abject failure.     

Development and political legitimacy: the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan

Development's policies are based on a set of premises: state‐building, state of law, democratisation, accountability and privatisation. The idea is that the Western concept of democracy could be implemented through the development of a ‘civil society’ of the building from scratch of new institutions. Such a model works when there is political will from the local political authorities and the society to adopt such a model (as was the case in Poland and Hungary after the collapse of the Soviet Union). But in any case a policy of development should be based on political legitimacy. In Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, political legitimacy means abiding with nationalism, Islam and local political culture (often based on clan‐ism and networks). In Iraq, the US policy has deliberately ignored the issue of legitimacy. In Afghanistan, because the US intervention was not part of a great design, it relied more on local constraints and thus has been more effective, or at least, less disruptive. The issue is not opposing a Western model of democracy to a national authoritarian political culture, but to root democracy into the local political culture. If not the policy of strengthening civil society, through political and military pressure as well as NGO's, has a disruptive effect and may lead to a conservative, nationalist and religious backlash.     

奥巴马政府对外战略调整:评估与展望

奥巴马入主白宫一年来,美国对外战略迅速进入调整期。为摆脱布什时期的战略困境而寻求在伊拉克、阿富汗脱身的战略选择;由强硬转为软硬兼施对待"失败国家"和"潜在对手";战略重心东移;缓和美俄因俄格战争导致的紧张关系;加强多边主义在外交与战略行动的运用。美国对外战略调整已经显现出不同于布什时期"美国领导世界"的内涵,在恢复西方社会对美国的好感和信心方面取得一定的成效。随着这种调整的深化,未来伊朗、巴基斯坦局势有可能取代阿富汗成为美国的首要关注。对中国依然实行结构性矛盾的政策,售台武器、西藏问题、贸易保护主义有可能成为中美关系陷入低谷的三大因素。