Missing the nuclear boat? British policy and French military nuclear ambitions during the EURATOM foundation negotiations, 1955-56

This paper examines the neglected nuclear dimension of the 'relaunch' of Europe at Messina. France favoured British membership of EURATOM and some interests in Britain saw the commercial and diplomatic advantages of Britain's leadership of the European nuclear industry. However, the possibility of a French military nuclear programme and European nuclear proliferation compounded Britain's established reluctance either to participate in European integration or to jeopardize the prospect of Anglo-American nuclear weapons cooperation. Britain's aversion to using the hypothetical 'nuclear card' is a recurrent theme in Anglo-French diplomacy.     

The Sincerity of the British Commitment to the Maintenance of the Balance of Power 1714-1763

'A nation interested in the preservation of a certain distribution of power tries to make its interest appear to be the outgrowth of the fundamental, universally accepted principle of the modern state system, and hence, to be identical with an interest common to all nations. The nation itself, far from defending a selfish, particular concern, poses as the guardian of that general principle; that is, as the agent of the international community.'¹

The balance of power can be seen as one of the guiding principles of European diplomacy over the past three centuries. Yet the subject remains controversial, with critics arguing that states have never routinely or sincerely pursued it. The study examines British policies towards pursuing and maintaining a balance of power in Europe between 1714 and 1763, through an analysis of the pamphlet literature and diplomatic correspondence of the period, as well as the foreign policy record. The policy was debated at length in Britain, with criticism of it mounted on a variety of grounds. But that this was indeed Britain's policy was never doubted. The conclusion is that while British policy was far from altruistic, support for the balance was perceived in Whitehall as dovetailing with national self-interest, and while many factors contributed to British support for the maintenance of the equilibrium, her commitment to maintaining it was sincere.     

British power and stability: the historical record

This article provides an overview of British foreign policy and the European balance of power from the late nineteenth century to the early Cold War. British attitudes towards the Continent, like those of the continental Powers toward Britain, are bound to remain ambivalent. When looking back to the history of these complex relations, two main readings stand out. The first is that Britain's attempts to underwrite European stability from Waterloo to the present day left the country exhausted and stripped of its Empire. The other reading perceives in these costly efforts a successful preservation of British integrity and independence. What allowed, for many years, the country to have the luxury of choices with regard to its relations with Europe was the underlying security of the home islands and the existence of a vast Empire overseas. Examining in broad brush strokes the idea and practice of the balance as Britain's international position altered in the half century or so before 1950, the case is made that whatever the reading of these complex relations, the British were always 'reluctant Europeans'.     

British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis 1922-24

This article provides an overview of British policy during a defining episode in the interwar period — the Ruhr crisis of 1923-4. The author assesses the external considerations influencing Britain's policy (especially the roles of France, Germany, and the United States), and also explores the processes of foreign policy making within Britain's complex bureaucratic system. In particular, the relationship between the Foreign Office and the Treasury is analyzed and its impact on European policy assessed. The article challenges traditional views of British policy at this time, concluding that it was far more complex, but also far more limited and constrained, than previous studies would suggest.     

Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958-1967

The British and French held divergent views from the late 1940s on relations with the United States and on the development of European integration. Differences between the two countries caused particular strain once General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The clash that ensued between British and French policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe during his presidency is the subject of this article. It suggests that while the British were unable to overcome de Gaulle's resistance to their membership of the EEC, Britain's fortunes in Europe were nevertheless improved by the Wilson government's response to de Gaulle's actions in the Atlantic Alliance.     

Alan Bullock, 1914-2004: “I Only Write Enormous Books”

Alan Bullock (1914-2004) was one of Britain's most distinguished scholars and the author of several extremely important books on recent and modern European civilization, history and culture. His enormous contribution to British, European, and Anglo-Saxon culture and historiography is easily discernible in his many books and essays. Chief among them his biography of Hitler, parallel study of Hitler and Stalin, three volume biography of Ernest Bevin, and the Fontana dictionaries of modern thought. One of Bullock's greatest achievements was the establishment of St. Catherine's College in Oxford University, at which he served as the Founding Master for more than a generation (1962-1990). Prior to WW II, recent European history was not considered a respectable research field worthy of serious academic work, nor was it thought that there existed the necessary distance from recent events for historians to deal with such history in a proper fashion. However, Alan Bullock's books turned the study of modern and recent European history into the mainstream of postgraduate studies at Oxford. Lord Bullock contributed tremendously (together with Hugh Seton-Watson, Bill Deakin, Hugh Trevor-Roper and A. J. P. Taylor) to the breakthrough which turned contemporary history into a focus for academic research and teaching.     

Britain's power and influence: Dealing with three roles and the Wilson government's defence debate at Chequers in November 1964

Prior to the advent of the Wilson government, there existed a large number of official memoranda and reports on Britain's power and influence in the world. Central to Whitehall's concern was the discovery of some means of reducing the cost of maintaining Britain's three main strategic roles - nuclear deterrence, the defence of western Europe and East of Suez. It was clear that Britain should not, and could not, maintain these three roles indefinitely, a view which was shared by Labour ministers at the Chequers meeting. This article examines the evolution of Whitehall's thinking on Britain's long-term world role during the period before and after Labour came into power in October 1964, and concludes that British ministers and officials began to consider Britain's eventual disengagement from bases East of Suez, a disengagement which was finally announced by the Wilson government in July 1967.     

Agonizing Reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and the Crisis of European Defence, 1953-54

In 1953, the US government threatened to undertake an 'agonizing reappraisal' of its commitment to European security if the rearmament of West Germany through the European Defence Community (EDC) came to nothing. Although many in Europe dismissed the threat as a bluff, the British government, and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in particular, took it extremely seriously. In September 1954, following the demise of the EDC, the British broke with long-standing tradition and pledged to retain military forces in Germany at a set level for as long as their European allies so desired. This was Britain's own 'agonizing reappraisal', undertaken at Eden's prompting to neutralise the danger of the United States implementing its own version.     

Diplomacy and intelligence

'Intelligence' as a discrete institution is part of twentieth-century government. It combines the skills of covert collection with expertise on certain subjects. Its differentiation from legitimate diplomacy is on the whole clear: intelligence provides information by special methods, diplomacy uses it. Nevertheless, there are numerous operational overlaps. Intelligence's overseas liaisons interact with diplomacy and foreign policy. Embassies act as intelligence bases and are targets for local intelligence attacks. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office plays a leading part in intelligence assessment. Some distancing between diplomacy and covert intelligence is desirable, but Western intelligence is less of a rival to diplomacy than has sometimes been portrayed. In Britain, in particular, intelligence's knowledge has not meant power.     

Introduction

Even before 1865, it was an axiom that British foreign policy was designed and pursued to ensure international stability. Stability not only gave security to the British Isles and to its global Empire; it minimized disruptions to trade and commerce - the life-blood of 'Great' Britain. In the century after 1865, the pursuit of international stability remained at the heart of diplomatic initiatives supported by capable armed forces and a strong economy. The grand strategy by which successive British governments endeavoured to achieve these national and imperial ends involved the maintenance of a balance of power - both in Europe and in the wider world where the protection of British interests in the form of prestige, markets, strategic outposts, and lines of communication preoccupied cabinets, the Foreign Office, the service ministries, other departments of state, and, sometimes, public opinion. In one sense, there were a number of individual balances of power - in Western Europe, in the western and eastern Mediterranean, in the Western Hemisphere, in South Asia, and in the Far East and Pacific Ocean. In the British diplomatic parlance of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these balances were represented as 'questions', like the 'Eastern Question'; and the answers to these questions combined in the minds of those responsible for British foreign policy as representing a global balance of power. In this context, the European balance of power had decided importance because any continental disequilibrium could imperil the security of the home islands, the centre of the Empire, and the well-being of Britain's people and economy.     

Binding Prometheus: How the 19th Century Expansion of Trade Impeded Britain's Ability to Raise an Army

This article explores how the dramatic expansion of British trade in the decades prior to World War I affected Britain's ability to raise an army. We first develop a simple institutionally based model of British army recruiting which we then perturb by expanding trade while holding all other variables constant. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the expansion of trade would impede Britain's ability to raise an army, a prediction that finds substantial support in the historical record using both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that trade enhances a state's military power, we find that the expansion of trade did not ease Britain's resource constraints by making labor more freely available for military purposes. Rather, by raising the civilian demand for labor, the expansion of trade made labor more expensive and difficult to mobilize, even as a more effective army became more important to British strategy.     

Britain, France, and America's Year of Europe, 1973

Britain's entry into the European Community in 1973 coincided with an American initiative aimed at redefining relations between the United States and Western Europe. This confronted British diplomats with a serious dilemma. They wished to maintain close collaboration with Washington and, for the sake of European unity, to expand on their recently achieved reconciliation with France, a country whose Gaullist elite rejected any further institutionalization of transatlantic relations. French reluctance to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Americans resulted in a fractious debate over the drafting of two seemingly innocuous declarations, and this was exacerbated by the mixed response of the Europeans to the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli war and the ensuing energy crisis. Finally, at the Washington energy conference of February 1974, the British chose to work with the Americans, rather than the French, in seeking to mitigate the economic impact of OPEC's oil policies.     

Germany’s Ocean Greyhounds and the Royal Navy’s First Battle Cruisers: An Historiographical Problem

Recently some revisionist historians have contested the evidential basis for the argument put forward by their post-revisionist colleagues that the growth of the German mercantile marine, most particularly ships capable of being transformed into armed commerce raiders, was viewed with alarm in the British Admiralty and played a significant part in shaping British naval policy before 1914. Looking in detail at their reasoning, this assessment demonstrates that the rejection of this argument is based upon a faulty and incomplete understanding of the documentary record. Moreover, it is driven by a desire to defend the thesis that they have previously articulated that the expansion of German maritime power played a limited role in British defence policy before 1914. However, their objections do not withstand detailed scrutiny. Whatever might have been the British view of the long-term threat posed by Russia and France, Germany’s growing strength, including in merchant shipping, loomed large as a security problem in the decade and a half before 1914. The wartime activities of German commerce raiders, notably the Kronprinz Wilhelm, suggest that fears of a German commerce war were entirely rational.     

'Not Proficient in Table-Thumping': Sir Ernest Satow at Peking, 1900-1906

Satow's diplomatic career was more multifaceted than the older, often Japan-centred, assessments of his work suggest. His period as minister to China especially has not been given the attention it deserves. His appointment to the Peking legation coincided with one of the most momentous periods in Sino-Western relations in the aftermath of the Boxer crisis of 1900. Satow exercised significant influence on the negotiations which led to the Boxer settlement of September 1901; and he proved to be a shrewd and skilful player in the Great Power competition for influence in China. The last two years of his term at the head of the Peking legation were taken up with steering British diplomacy through the turbulences caused by the Russo-Japanese War.     

Britain and the Kuwaiti crisis, 1961

The Kuwaiti crisis of 1961 has conventionally been accorded little attention in histories of Britain's role in the Middle East. In fact, the crisis was an important defining moment, focusing the minds of policymakers on British interests in the Gulf, and the question of the best means of preserving them. It was also the largest scale mobilization of British forces in the Middle East in the post-Suez era. This article sets the crisis in the context of longer term British relations with Kuwait, internal developments in the Emirate, the evolution of British strategy in the region since Suez and Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations in order to understand the significance of the episode.     

Change and Stasis: The Institutionalisation of Developing Country Mitigation in the International Climate Regime

Diplomacy is an institution that has undergone tremendous change over the last century—not least in relation to the new, supranational institutions of the European Community/European Union. Nonetheless, it is only very recently that political scientists and historians have taken an interest in the changes brought about by European integration processes for diplomatic norms, roles, and practices. This article investigates the background for this late and limited interest. It does so by comparing and contrasting dominant theoretical trends that have shaped research on European diplomacy in the two disciplines since the Second World War. Against this background it briefly evaluates the recent surge in research on diplomacy and the European Union within political science, and it points to possible avenues for further, joint, research combining the transnational and sociological approaches adopted by political scientists with the attention to temporality and national specificities characteristic of historians' dealings with European diplomacy.     

试析安倍“有主见的外交”及面临的挑战

"有主见的外交"的新理念是安倍首相面对小泉内阁外交的困境和僵局寻求突破的产物,既是对小泉内阁外交路线的一种修正,也是安倍首相个人风格特点的一种彰显。其基本内涵包括:加强亚洲外交改善睦邻关系,提升欧洲外交拓宽战略空间,维持日美同盟提高自身地位,扩大国际影响加大"争常"力度。这一理念对新内阁以来的日本外交已经产生了一定的积极影响,但受制于国内国际诸多因素,也面临着严峻的挑战。     

Keeping a Foot in the Door: Britain's China Policy, 1945-50

Based on Britain and China 1945-1950 (DBPO, 2002), this article examines four major themes in Britain's China policy between 1945 and 1950: British attitudes towards Chinese communism and China's civil war, Anglo-American relations over China, attempts to restore and sustain British commerce in China, and the future of Hong Kong. The central feature of policy was to 'keep a foot in the door', even under a communist government, to protect British interests. Only modest success was achieved. British officials were divided over the issue of Chinese communism and Britain miscalculated the timescale in the ending of the civil war. The US administration proved largely uncooperative over China, and British commerce was eventually squeezed out. Hong Kong survived as a British colony. Amidst the considerable thought given to the future of Hong Kong, and to Britain's ability to defend it, intelligence reported that the communists had no plans to seize the colony.     

"The Quest": The Strange Life of W. J. Garnett

This article investigates the career of a British diplomat, William Garnett, whose unusual life has until know been neglected by historians. Garnett's papers, held at Lancashire Record Office, are a particularly rich source for historians of British diplomacy, the British Foreign Office, and overseas travel in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Garnett was often outspoken and indiscreet in his private correspondence and his archive, on which this article draws, provides valuable insights into British representation and British policy in the countries to which he was posted in the period 1902-1919.