Targeted Versus Conventional Economic Sanctions: What Is at Stake for Human Rights?

ABSTRACT

The adverse impact of economic sanctions on human rights is well documented in the literature (Peksen 2009; Wood 2008) and so are the consequences of sanctions for democracy (Peksen and Drury 2009, 2010) and for the survival of leaders (Escribà-Folch & Wright 2010; Marinov 2005). Using data from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (Biersteker, Eckert, Tourinho, and Hudákóva 2013), we analyze whether sanctions that target segmented groups within the leadership fare any better with respect to human rights protection. The analysis focuses on the universe of targeted sanctions against African countries, between 1992 and 2008, and finds that the adverse impact of this coercive instrument—though unintended—is not statistically distinguishable from the adverse consequences already identified by the literature with respect to conventional sanctions. All else equal, the protection of rights to physical integrity (the right to life and the prohibition of torture) in the targeted country is 1.74 times more likely to worsen under an episode of targeted sanction when compared to a situation where there is no sanction. We propose a signaling model wherein a targeted leader is perceived by the opposition as weakened by the sanctions, which leads to more protest and repression. Higher levels of human rights violations follow.     

An effective sanctioning actor? Merging effectiveness and EU actorness criteria to explain evolutions in (in)effective coercion towards Iran

EU sanctions invoked in response to the Iranian nuclear crisis (2006–2016) were long considered to be of limited effectiveness in halting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Recently, however, sanctions seem to have contributed to a breakthrough in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme. This article aims at explaining this evolution. It, therefore, designs a framework that explains why sanctions (fail to) change targets’ behaviour. Since the sanctions effectiveness literature lacks an integrated framework to explain evolutions in effective coercion, this article merges sanctions effectiveness variables and Bretherton and Vogler’s actorness criteria. Applying the resulting framework to two broad episodes of the Iranian case (2006–2013 and 2013–2016), this article provides a first test of the framework’s added value. It concludes that a full understanding of sanctions effectiveness requires consideration of external, internal, and in-between factors.     

Hitting the right target: EU and Security Council pursuit of terrorist financing

This article analyses one specific instance of the use of targeted sanctions to combat the financing of terrorism by the European Union on behalf of the United Nations Security Council. The case raised a number of issues involving the use of sanctions against non-state actors and provoked a legal challenge at the European Court of Justice. These European court cases have been portrayed as a challenge to the use of targeted sanctions by the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. The fundamental critique here is that targeted sanctions must adhere to due process and the rule of law in order to protect individual human rights.     

National democratization theory and global governance: civil society and the liberalization of the Asian Development Bank

Contributing to a growing literature on democracy beyond the nation-state, this article draws on aspects of national democratization theory in order to analyse empirical processes of democracy. By combining insights from transition theory and the theory of political opportunity structures, the article examines the case of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). While the ADB for a long time has been described as a closed, unresponsive and unaccountable international organization, a recent evaluation praised the Bank for its good practices concerning transparency, participation and accountability. The article uses the analytical framework to highlight the interaction between hard-liners and soft-liners within the ADB and explores the role of different transnational civil society actors in the processes that seem to have strengthened the democratic credentials of the ADB. While finding significant divisions within the ADB as well as amongst civil society actors targeting the bank, overall the article argues that transnational civil society actors, interacting with soft-liners within the ADB, have contributed to the implementation of reforms, which in turn create political opportunities for further civil society activism. The reform processes, however, are best described as processes of liberalization – rather than democratization.     

Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy

This article seeks to analyze the impact that sanctions have on democracy. We argue that economic sanctions worsen the level of democracy because the economic hardship caused by sanctions can be used as a strategic tool by the targeted regime to consolidate authoritarian rule and weaken the opposition. Furthermore, we argue that economic sanctions create new incentives for the political leadership to restrict political liberties, to undermine the challenge of sanctions as an external threat to their authority. Using time-series cross-national data (1972–2000), the findings show that both the immediate and longer‐term effects of economic sanctions significantly reduce the level of democratic freedoms in the target. The findings also demonstrate that comprehensive economic sanctions have greater negative impact than limited sanctions. These findings suggest that sanctions can create negative externalities by reducing the political rights and civil liberties in the targeted state.     

United Nations sanctions: Lessons of experience

Despite the apparent virtues of UN sanctions in terms of legitimacy and universality, attention in recent years has focused on their questionable achievements and adverse consequences. In particular, the cost of imposing sanctions is unevenly spread, while comprehensive measures harm the civilian population in the target and spare those responsible for the offending policies. This article discusses the merits of UN sanctions in the context of the membership and practice of the Security Council and looks closely at flaws in sanctions programmes and in their administration. Experience suggests careful review of alternative means of pressure as well as reform of existing procedures.     

Notes on contributors

Despite the apparent virtues of UN sanctions in terms of legitimacy and universality, attention in recent years has focused on their questionable achievements and adverse consequences. In particular, the cost of imposing sanctions is unevenly spread, while comprehensive measures harm the civilian population in the target and spare those responsible for the offending policies. This article discusses the merits of UN sanctions in the context of the membership and practice of the Security Council and looks closely at flaws in sanctions programmes and in their administration. Experience suggests careful review of alternative means of pressure as well as reform of existing procedures.     

Deterring the terrorist: A psychological evaluation of different strategies for deterring terrorism

This article seeks to evaluate different anti‐terrorism strategies from a psychological perspective. Two major deterrent strategies are identified: the Denial Strategy and the Reintegrative Strategy. It is the contention of this article that both these strategies may be thought of as practical applications of different theories of crime deterrence. The Denial Strategy effectively mirrors early theories of crime deterrence, which concentrate on minimising the benefits, and increasing the costs, of crime through legal sanctions. By way of contrast, the Reintegrative Punishment Strategy represents a modern and more sophisticated theory of deterrence, which recognises the cost of non‐legal sanctions to the terrorist and the need to reintegrate the terrorist back into society. This article discusses the relative psychological merits of both these strategies, focusing on the normal psychology of the terrorist. In the course of this examination two major defects of the Denial Strategy are established and it is argued that the Reintegrative Punishment Strategy of deterring terrorism has greater psychological validity because it confronts the issues of the alienation and reintegration of the terrorist. These findings highlight the dangers of policy‐makers neglecting the psychology of the terrorist.     

The impact of human rights INGO activities on economic sanctions

What impact do human rights international non-governmental organizations (hereafter HROs) have on the initiation of economic sanctions? The extant literatures on sanctions and transnational non-state groups have largely overlooked the role, if any, the activities of these transnational non-state actors have on the use of economic coercion as a popular policy tool. In this study, we argue that HROs could affect sanction decisions through two distinct mechanisms: information production (“shaming and blaming”) and local empowerment (local presence). By bringing poor human rights performers into the international spotlight, we argue that this effect should hold even after accounting for human rights practices in the targeted countries. Using dyadic data on HROs and economic sanctions, we find robust support for our basic argument that HRO activities increase the likelihood of sanction events against repressive regimes. Additionally, much of the empirical support highlights the role of information production, as opposed to local empowerment, in leading to sanction onset. Overall, our findings indicate that HROs are powerful actors in influencing foreign policy decisions between states.     

The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure

In this article, we consider the puzzle of whether unilateral or multilateral sanctions are more likely to be successful in changing a targeted state's behavior. Policymakers maintain that multilateral sanctioning efforts will be more likely to succeed, while the majority of empirical academic research suggests otherwise. We present an argument, based on multidimensional spatial models, to explain why multilateral sanctions may not be more effective than unilateral sanctions. We present the basic model and show that they can explain why, in general, multilateral sanctions fail more often than do unilateral sanctions. We also show that the model leads to additional, testable hypotheses. We conduct a simple empirical test of the major hypothesis produced by the spatial application and show that it is consistent with the historical record.     

Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance

This is the golden age of economic statecraft—and the study of economic statecraft. This is in large part due to the evolution of economic coercion from trade embargoes to targeted financial sanctions. Targeted financial sanctions are attractive because they can generate economic costs similar to those of more comprehensive sanctions, with fewer negative externalities. Over time, however, the intersection of economic sanctions with globalized capital markets will provoke three interesting research questions. First, do financial sanctions spare a target country’s population from negative humanitarian and human rights outcomes? Second, to what extent are financial sanctions an exercise in learning by both targets and senders? Third, will the United States’ use of financial sanctions trigger blowback against US primacy in the international financial system? These last two questions offer the prospect to linking research on economic statecraft with larger questions of international security and global political economy.     

The Road from Dayton to Brussels? The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Politics of War Crimes in Bosnia

Abstract

The tenth anniversary of the massacre of 7–8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995 set in stark relief the continuing salience of war crimes in the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the country now firmly on a path ‘from Dayton to Brussels’, dealing with the war crimes legacy is critical to its future development. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is a non-negotiable condition for further progress toward membership of the European Union and NATO's Partnership for Peace, while in the long-term, dealing with the legacy of war crimes is crucial to establishing lasting peace in Bosnia and in the region. This article examines the potential contribution of the ICTY to the restoration of peace in Bosnia in the context of debates about the role of post-conflict justice in societies in transition from war to peace and in the context of the international community's use of the war crimes issues as a political bargaining tool. It will be argued that the two are inextricably linked as short-term pragmatic advantages brought by cooperation work in tandem with longer-term goals of peace and reconciliation.     

Humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Iran and Syria

International sanctions against Iran and Syria have been tightened to unprecedented levels since 2012, particularly in the case of the European Union's (EU's) restrictions on the countries' energy and finance sectors. Marking a departure from the EU's carefully targeted sanctions policies of recent decades, they represent de facto comprehensive measures widely associated with negative humanitarian impacts. This paper analyses semi-structured interviews, official discourse and case studies to explore early reports of negative impacts on the health of ordinary citizens in Iran and Syria and examines associated policy responses, particularly in the EU context. The author outlines why a shift towards broader-based sanctions could be problematic for the EU and outlines constraints currently preventing more efficient risk mitigation. This paper suggests ways that sanctions, representing an increasingly vital, albeit contested, tool of EU foreign and security policy, could be used in a more prudent manner if a worsening humanitarian situation is to be avoided.     

Constructing sanctions: rallying around the target in Zimbabwe*

Targeted’ sanctions seek to circumvent a target state’s citizens in general from the adverse economic impact of coercion. Arguably, this would remedy some of the population’s incentives to engage in the well-known “rallying-around-the-flag”. Yet occasionally, targeted sanctions still seem to produce such an effect. This paper explores sanctions conflicts as social constructs. It purports that rally-around-the-flag is all but one part of the discursive dimension of sanctions conflicts. Sanctions are intricately connected with the conflict setting they occur in. The study suggests a dialectical relation between how opponents perceive conflicts and the meaning of sanctions therein. This nexus of different constructions of sanctions moreover extends to “targeted” sanctions as well: As restrictive measures against Zimbabwe demonstrate, they are not the kind of minimally-invasive operations with clinical precision as such reasoning would suggest. Whether sanctions are really “targeted”, sparing the economy and concentrating on the culprits, is as much a question of discourse in the target state.     

Either with us or against us? Third-country alignment with EU sanctions against Russia/Ukraine

Since the mid-1990s, selected neighbours have in impressive numbers aligned with European Union (EU) foreign policy sanctions. However, much more than for any other sanctions case, neighbours have declined joining recent measures against Russia/Ukraine. This article uses freshly gathered data from the entire period of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to analyse how the practice of alignment influences international relations in Europe. Thereby, the article demonstrates that: (1) sanctions are not a two-party game, but an instrument that impacts broadly on relations with third countries; (2) alignment with sanctions not only articulates similarity, but contributes to normative polarization in wider Europe; (3) for a high-salience case such as Russia sanctions, neighbours are reluctant to be instrumentalized for EU foreign policy purposes.     

A New U.S.-Colombian Relationship: Transnational Crime and U.S. National Security

To fight transnational crime, the United States needs to strengthen its cooperation with Colombia. This initiative, according to the authors, will not only be cost-effective for the United States, it will also signal U.S. willingness to work “by, with and through” other states, and may make possible an expanded regional framework to act against the criminal cartels.     

Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective

Multilateral economic sanctions can be expected to impose greaterterms-of-trade effects on a target nation than unilateral sanctions. Yet despite their potential for greater economic damage, multilateral sanctions often are less effective in bringing about desired political results in the target. An interest-group model of endogenous policy suggests that multilateral sanctions can undermine the political effectiveness of opposition groups in the targetcountry, or strengthen those groups supporting the objectionable policy of the ruling regime. Such perverse effects are due in part to the inability of multilateral coalitions to enforce cooperation among members, and to the appropriation of sanctions rents in the target country. Unilateral sanctions, however, imposed by a country with close ties to the target, are ofteneffective in achieving their intended political objectives.     

More Flies with Honey: Positive Economic Linkage in German Ostpolitik from Bismarck to Kohl

The existing literature on economic sanctions has rarely addressed the key question of comparing the effectiveness of positive and negative sanctions. It is the contention of this study that positive sanctions can potentially be more effective, even in cases where contentious "high politics" issues are being negotiated, relations between the states concerned are tense and militarized, and the state being targeted with sanctions has substantial military power. This assertion will be tested in a set of case studies drawn from German-Polish and German-Russian/Soviet relations from the nineteenth century to the present. It will be shown that positive sanctions can be used effectively, both as "specific" sanctions to influence a target state on one particular issue, and as "general" sanctions, which aim to change the state's behavior as a whole in a more slow and subtle process.     

中俄毗邻地区跨国犯罪问题及中俄警务司法合作

中国与俄罗斯山水相连。随着两国各领域关系的发展,经贸合作和人员相互往来愈来愈密切,跨国犯罪问题也严重困扰两国的警察和司法部门,尤其是在两国毗邻地区,跨国犯罪问题更显突出。近年来,中俄毗邻地区开展了跨国警务司法合作,预防和打击跨国犯罪,通过联合侦查、协助办案、共同办案、相互配合调查取证、越境追捕、快速遣返等措施,有效地预防和控制了跨国犯罪,维护了双方的共同利益。     

Are democratic sanctions really counterproductive?

Previous research has shown that sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. This runs counter to substantive comparative literature on democratization which finds that economic stress is connected with regime collapse and democratic liberalization. To solve this puzzle, we focus on the effects of “democratic sanctions” (those that explicitly aim to promote democracy) which have become the most common type of sanction issued against authoritarian states. We introduce a new data set of imposed sanctions in the period 1990–2010 that clearly separates sanctions according to the explicit goal of the sender. Our cross-sectional time-series analysis demonstrates that although sanctions as a whole do not generally increase the level of democracy, there is in fact a significant correlation between democratic sanctions and increased levels of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. A fundamental mechanism leading to this outcome is the increased instability of authoritarian rule as democratic sanctions are significantly associated with a higher probability of regime and leadership change.