Sino-Japanese Energy Relations: Processes and Constraints

Abstract

Economic growth and a resultant rise in energy demand in China and other East Asian countries have attracted academic interests in energy security and energy cooperation. This article examines the nuanced development of institutions to realise Sino-Japanese energy cooperation at the bilateral and regional levels. It highlights the objective and process of cooperative engagements in terms of relative gain concern and the involvement of non-state actors. The arguments that this article advances are three-fold. First, the Japanese government has pushed forwards multilateral energy cooperation in East Asia and bilateral cooperation for energy conservation with China, which would produce both economic and political gains. Second, the Chinese government has adopted a cautious approach to Japan's energy engagements largely because it took into account the relative political gains of committing to such engagements in addition to the economic gains produced by them. Third, the involvement of non-state actors in cooperative projects and their meaningful roles in forging cross-border linkages could play a catalytic role in advancing cooperative processes.     

ASEAN and evolving power relations in East Asia: strategies and constraints

This article seeks to examine constraints and challenges that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states are confronted with in formulating and implementing their strategies in response to evolving regional environments represented by the rise of China. It argues that China's southern neighbours have adopted purposeful strategies in order to mitigate potentially negative effects from China's growing capabilities in East Asia. These strategies led to the expansion of membership in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and positive involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, encouraging America's substantial commitments to the Asia-Pacific. However, ASEAN has failed to form the unified front on the EAS and TPP because its members have adopted diverse stances on and policies towards the two institutions. Moreover, an identity issue constitutes a crucial impediment to promoting cooperation between ASEAN members and the USA. While Washington has intensified diplomatic linkages with ASEAN, the US identity shown in its adherence to the results-oriented approach still provokes some concerns among the ASEAN members.     

In Search of Regional Governance in East Asia: Processes and Outcomes

Abstract

This article employs the concept of ‘regional governance’ to analyze both the processes and outcomes of the emerging regional institutional arrangements in East Asia. It argues that while ASEAN has played a significant role in creating and sustaining the ‘processes’ of wider East Asian regional governance efforts, the level of achievement in translating these processes into tangible ‘outcomes’ remains severely constrained by great power rivalry, especially between Japan and China. By focusing on the areas of trade and finance, this article argues that the varying levels of outcomes between these two issue areas can be explained primarily by the degree of convergence between Japanese and Chinese interests. In particular, while Japan and China have a shared interest in contributing to the promotion of regional financial stability, they strongly disagree over the appropriate form and contours of a trade governance system.     

RCEP:特点、问题与前景

作为世界最大的自由贸易安排,RCEP所取得的突破不仅有利于改善区域贸易与投资环境、增强区域供应链、推动经济复苏,还为区域经济一体化、全球贸易自由化、基于规则的多边贸易体制注入了前行的动力。同时,它对中国贸易和投资的可持续发展、高水平制度型开放、实施自由贸易区提升战略、构建国内国际双循环相互促进的新发展格局也可以发挥积极作用。RCEP以市场准入、规则、合作为支柱,具有开放包容、全面、高质量、互惠等诸多特点,并突出东盟方式与东盟中心地位。RCEP的后续生效实施与适时升级,将面临成员差异性与利益诉求复杂性、外部因素牵制、既有FTA规则的多样性与整合的难度、区域身份认同与大国协调等现实问题的挑战,仍需要以渐进灵活的方式,不断推动其深化和拓展。中国应一如既往支持东盟的主导地位,推动RCEP尽快生效。既要助力东盟提升凝聚力、加强大国协调,也要加速推进中日韩FTA谈判、加快与东盟成员的FTA构建。应不断提高规则利用率,充分发挥FTA本应具有的效应,以制度型开放营造良好营商环境,持续推动区域制度性经济一体化。     

Trading in Paranoia: Exploring Singapore's Security-Trade Linkages in the Twenty-first Century

Singapore's rude awakening to independence has led to the creation of one of the most important and strategic entrepôts in the Asia-Pacific. The country's limited territorial lands and natural resources, combined with huge per capita income, high population density and sensitive racial mix, make Singapore the quintessential pragmatic trading state of the twenty-first century. This paper examines how Singapore has embedded itself at the centre of regional and global trade systems by exploiting various forms of free trade activities including multilateral, regional and bilateral FTAs that underpin its security and survival. It argues that in order to maintain the city-state's geo-economic and geo-political viability, the Singaporean government has progressively linked its security interests with its multilevel free trade activities. Given the ‘vulnerability fetish’ and siege mentality that confront Singaporean leaders and policymakers, the pursuit of economic development via free trade has become the heart of its national security policy and strategy. The paper concludes by arguing that the enhancement and preservation of Singapore's survival as a sovereign nation-state demands a strategic utilization of FTAs with different trade partners, especially with regional and trans-regional powers such as the United States and China.     

Human Rights and the Renminbi

The solidarity of the G‐20 nations in staving off global financial crisis two years ago has deteriorated into a brawl over currency valuations, trade imbalances and sovereign debt, reflecting the great powershift from the West to the East and the emerging economies. In this section, we invited comments from historians, a former head of state who successfully navigated the Asian financial crisis and a prominent Chinese dissident.     

The Mother of All Solutions for the Global Crisis

The solidarity of the G‐20 nations in staving off global financial crisis two years ago has deteriorated into a brawl over currency valuations, trade imbalances and sovereign debt, reflecting the great powershift from the West to the East and the emerging economies. In this section, we invited comments from historians, a former head of state who successfully navigated the Asian financial crisis and a prominent Chinese dissident.     

The Splintering of the G‐20

The solidarity of the G‐20 nations in staving off global financial crisis two years ago has deteriorated into a brawl over currency valuations, trade imbalances and sovereign debt, reflecting the great powershift from the West to the East and the emerging economies. In this section, we invited comments from historians, a former head of state who successfully navigated the Asian financial crisis and a prominent Chinese dissident.     

The Next 40 Years Will Be the Most Important in History

The solidarity of the G‐20 nations in staving off global financial crisis two years ago has deteriorated into a brawl over currency valuations, trade imbalances and sovereign debt, reflecting the great powershift from the West to the East and the emerging economies. In this section, we invited comments from historians, a former head of state who successfully navigated the Asian financial crisis and a prominent Chinese dissident.     

Globalization and economic disparities in East and Southeast Asia: New dilemmas

The once high-performing East Asian economies were suddenly rocked by the 1997 financial crisis. This raised the question of whether the crisis signals the end of the 'Asian development model' and provides further evidence of the 'globalization of poverty'. This article attempts to answer this question by examining the connection between liberalization (and deregulation) and the pattern of poverty reduction and income inequalities in four East and Southeast Asian economies severly affected by the late 1990s crisis. Based on the findings, it contests the view that globalization means the end of the role of the state. Instead, it is argued that, while some states are playing the role of promoters of the globalization process, others are redefining and resisting globalization. The crisis also has drawn attention to a possible third policy option, which would involve the revitalization of the regulatory role of the state, greater attention to social issues and a more national approach to economic management.     

东亚生产网络中的两岸产业合作

两岸产业合作目前的形态与模式形成的根本原因，除了两岸间密切的经贸关系外，更是由两岸共同处于的东亚生产网络所驱动的。在全球金融危机之后，两岸间产业合作开始共同面对亚太区域经济整合、全球价值链重新布局的外部压力，同时由于两岸经济实力和比较优势的变迁，两岸间产业开始逐渐由互补走向竞争。当外部与内部经济环境同时发生变化时，两岸产业合作的传统模式面临挑战和选择。     

The Long‐term Solution for Europe

The solidarity of the G‐20 nations in staving off global financial crisis two years ago has deteriorated into a brawl over currency valuations, trade imbalances and sovereign debt, reflecting the great powershift from the West to the East and the emerging economies. In this section, we invited comments from historians, a former head of state who successfully navigated the Asian financial crisis and a prominent Chinese dissident.     

American declinism and the impact of petro-socialism

Irrespective of self-inflicted setbacks, the United States is and will be the ‘indispensable nation’ for the foreseeable future – not merely as the world's largest market, military power and source of technological innovation but also as trendsetter. Doubtless, the United States has fallen back during the G.W. Bush presidency – preoccupied with events in Iraq and an economic slowdown and financial crisis that are now reflected in waning neo-conservative influence. In this policy vacuum, Chávez of Venezuela is building a regional coalition critical of the ‘Washington consensus’ and traditional US hegemony, and he is backed by abundant oil supplies. Petro-socialism needs examination. Meanwhile Barack Obama speaks of change, implying a more consensual foreign policy of rebuilding alliances and opening doors long closed.     

The post-cold war predicament: A conclusion

The 1997 Asian economic crisis discredited the international discussion about ‘Asian values’ in Pacific Asia, replacing it with a globalised ‘good governance’ discourse. The financial breakdown undermined claims by Asian autocrats that government should be based on authoritarian ‘Asian values’, not ‘Western democracy’. Yet, seven years later, authoritarian regimes in the region are flourishing while the new democracies flounder. Why have dictatorships, not democracies, prospered politically since the Asian financial crisis? Pacific Asia began as an ‘imagined community’ of developmental dictatorships, making authoritarian development the ‘original position’ against which democratic governance is judged. While the demise of ‘Asian values’ contributed to the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, it did less harm to authoritarian regimes in more economically developed Malaysia and Singapore. The US‐led anti‐terror coalition provided several authoritarian rulers in Pacific Asia with welcome support from the West, while allowing them to weaken internal opposition. The new democracies, by contrast, faced international pressures to combat terrorism, often arousing local protest. Finally, middle class‐based reformist movements have risked destabilising the region's new democracies in the name of good governance.     

Watching from the sidelines? The decline of the IMF's crisis management role

This article compares the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s crisis management role during the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 with the role it has played during the ‘credit crunch’ which emerged in the wake of the subprime crisis in the United States. With prominent calls for the construction of new forms of global financial governance to prevent a recurrence of the subprime crisis in the future, we explore how the designated guardian of the international financial system has responded to the credit crunch in order to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the existing system. Our comparison of the US subprime crisis and the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s indicates that the IMF has lost credibility with its members, and particularly with its principal sponsor, the United States, which has curbed its capacity to develop multilateral solutions to major financial crises.     

The ASEAN free trade area and the construction of a Southeast Asian economic community in East Asia

In October 2003, ASEAN leaders decided to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2020. An AEC is presented by advocates as a logical step following the completion of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by ASEAN6 in 2003. Adopting a critical political economy approach inspired by the work of Mitchell Bernard and Robert W. Cox, this article argues that the decision to launch AFTA and an AEC are motivated primarily by the desire to transform Southeast Asia into an investment site and a production base for the world market within East Asia, in competition with China. AFTA and a future AEC are decisions taken within the structural context of an East Asian region characterised, among others, by the organisation of Japanese production and the developmental state.     

FDI,AGOA and Manufactured Exports by a Landlocked,Least Developed African Economy: Lesotho

Lesotho, a resource-poor country located inside South Africa, is now Africa's largest exporter of apparel to the US. Its performance, very unusual for Africa, relies heavily on Asian investors and trade privileges. This article traces the origins of FDI in Lesotho and the determinants of its export competitiveness, showing that apparel production suffers from low productivity, poor skills and weak local links. Its prospects after AGOA (the African Growth and Opportunities Act) remain uncertain unless the government addresses these structural problems. Lesotho holds important lessons for industrial development in Africa, going beyond creating a good investment environment.     

Financial crises as catalysts for regional cooperation? Chances and obstacles for financial integration in ASEAN+3, MERCOSUR and the eurozone

This article compares and analyses the different answers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations+3 (ASEAN+3), Mercado Común del Dur (MERCOSUR) and the eurozone on financial crises in their respective regions. All three regions were hit by economic turmoil between 1997 and 2012, but whereas ASEAN+3 and the eurozone answered with establishing regional liquidity arrangements (RLAs) in order to fight future crises, financial cooperation did not take off in MERCOSUR. Thus, the paper asks why some regions establish RLAs in cases of crisis and others do not. It argues that the variance of regional financial integration in different world regions is due to different interests of regional powers in their respective regions. The regional powers of ASEAN+3 and the eurozone are institutionally and/or economically highly embedded within their respective regions, but this is not the case for Brazil in MERCOSUR. China and Japan suffered from negative externalities of the Asian crisis, and, consequently, have had an interest to stabilize their neighbours’ economies after the crisis. In contrast, Brazil was able to follow a beggar-thy-neighbour strategy at the turn of the millennium, which externalized some of the costs of Brazil's own economic crisis towards Argentina. As a result, Brazil has had no interest in providing liquidity for its regional neighbours after the crisis. France and Germany are not only economically but also institutionally highly embedded in the eurozone because they share a common currency with their regional neighbours. Thus, the stability of the eurozone is a vital interest for Europe's regional powers, and they devote significant resources to stabilize the economies of the eurozone's periphery.     

A comparative analysis of the impact of the 1997 Asian crisis and the contemporary global economic crisis on the Korean political economy

The 1997 Asian crisis created a political space for neo-liberal reformers within the Korean state to advance a set of policies that had previously been frustrated. This agenda is widely seen to have stalled following an initial burst of neo-liberal reform in the post-crisis period. Several scholars have argued that a partial reconstruction of an economy dominated by a closed nexus between the state and leading domestic firms is taking place in contemporary Korea. Compared to the 1997 crisis the macroeconomic impact of the contemporary crisis on Korea has been limited. However, Korea initiated the largest fiscal stimulus (in relation to GDP) in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In terms of the policy environment the impact of the contemporary crisis has been considerable. This paper argues that key aspects of the Korean state's response to the crisis represent a selective limited retreat from neo-liberalism, the significance of which should not be overstated.     

Structural change and neoliberalism in Mexico: 'Passive revolution' in the global political economy

This article examines an enduring context of 'passive revolution' in the making of modern Mexico by developing an account of the rise of neoliberalism during a period of structural change since the 1970s. It does so by analysing and understanding both the unfolding accumulation strategy and the hegemonic project of neoliberalism in Mexico since the 1970s as emblematic of the survival and reorganisation of capitalism through a period of state crisis. This is recognised as a strategy of 'passive revolution', the effects of which still leave an imprint on present development initiatives in Mexico. Therefore, through the notion of 'passive revolution', the article not only focuses on the recent past circumstances, but also on the present unfolding consequences, of neoliberal capitalist development in Mexico. This approach also leaves open the question of 'anti-passive revolution' strategies of resistance to neoliberalism.