International democracy promotion: a role for public goods theory?

The state of international democracy promotion is in flux. After more than fifteen years of increasing activity and with more organisations and resources devoted to promoting democracy than ever before, a mood of uncertainty surrounds democracy support's current performance and future prospects. The last decade has also seen the emergence of a new literature on global public goods theory, offering fresh analytical perspectives on pressing issues in international affairs like peace, security, development, and environmental sustainability. The future of democracy promotion will be determined chiefly by the realities of the political market place, in societies on both sides of the relationship. But could recent theorising about the market for global public goods offer some analytical support for making sense of its current condition and, by identifying the democratic peace as a global public good strengthen the case for greater international cooperation in promoting democracy as means to achieve that end?     

Post-Conflict State Building: the debate on institutional choice

A significant theoretical and empirical question underlying much of the literature on post-conflict state building is which institutions offer the best prospect for peace and democracy in divided societies recovering from conflict. This debate is highly relevant for many developing countries. With much invested by third parties in post-conflict reconstruction and a mixed track record of success at best, the question explored by this article is whether consociational institutional designs—widely applied in policy practice and severely criticised in academic discourse—can accomplish the twin goals of peace and democracy in divided post-conflict societies. Examining the claims of supporters and detractors of consociationalism, the article finds substantial conceptual and empirical evidence that consociational institutions hold significant promise for building democratic states after conflict in divided societies.     

After Apartheid: Consensus, Contention, and Gender in South Africa’s Public Sphere

The South African transition from apartheid to democracy is one of the iconic developments of the late twentieth century coming soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The country, led by a universally admired Nelson Mandela, seemed to embody the world’s hopes for peace and democracy. In the aftermath of the first inclusive elections in 1994, South Africans adopted one of the world’s finest constitutions and set up a modern and representative system of governance. However, the euphoria was not sustained. Economic inequality rose; poverty appears intractable, and an increasingly angry citizenry seems less willing to adhere to the liberal norms of tolerance and respect for difference. This article lays out some dimensions of the new conflicts detailing the intolerance for outsiders and violence against women and gay and lesbian people. I argue that the quality of democracy is not measured by its formal institutions important they may be. Rather, it is in the interactions between citizens in the public sphere that we are able to ascertain the extent to which democratic values have become normalized. Viewed from this perspective, it is evident that the legacies of distrust and antagonism continue to shape the possibilities of democratic deliberation in the public sphere.     

Multiple democracies: political cultures and democratic variety in post-enlargement Europe

Democratization studies endorses a liberal view of democracy and political culture. Insufficient notice is taken of alternative models of democracy. I argue that a ‘multiple democracies’ approach that takes potential variety in democratic political cultures into account has three advantages over the conventional approach: it is sensitive to the historical and contextual nature of democratic regimes, it takes a dual imaginary into account, and it is able to conceptualize the emergence of innovative forms of political culture. Instead of a ‘model approach’, I suggest a multiple democracies approach that identifies political cultures by means of available patterns of cultural repertoires or ethics of democracy.     

Development strategy and regime type: Why doesn’t democracy matter?

The development strategy literature argues that autonomous bureaucrats in authoritarian Asian NICs followed successful export-led growth strategies while Latin American policymakers were pressured by mobilized sectors to maintain doomed import substitution industrialization. What is more, this ISI strategy made the consolidation of democracy impossible. However, my research on Venezuela indicates that ISI and democracy can be made compatible—the democratic state was penetrated by business and labor, those avenues for penetration were protected from electoral politics, and the relative participation of business and labor remained fluid. How are recently established democracies being made compatible with a new market-oriented development strategy? Evidence from East Asia and Latin America indicates that the transition to market-oriented economies and the institutionalization of participation by key sectors have not gone together. Policymakers are trying to isolate bureaucrats from public pressure and centralize power away from bodies vulnerable to electoral oversight. The “deinstitutionalization” of democratic politics may make the relationship between regime type and development strategy unstable.     

Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia

This article examines how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) seeks to undermine democratisation in Central Asia. Prior studies of the interplay between international organisations and democracy have tended to examine only one half of this relationship: whether, how, and under what circumstances do international organisations promote democracy? However, the opposite has been largely ignored: how do international organisations sustain autocracy? Authoritarian governments are increasingly adopting policies aimed at preserving their political power and the SCO represents an additional strategy in this regard: utilising multilateral cooperation to defend themselves against regional or global democratic trends. As such, the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ may be a sign of things to come as autocratic leaders become more bold in their rejection of democratic norms.     

Democracy,Governance, and Emigration Intentions in Latin America and the Caribbean

It is now clear that the global shift toward democracy in recent decades has resulted in a highly uneven democratic landscape in which the quality and performance of democracies around the world vary greatly. In an era characterized by increasingly open borders to goods, services, information, and, at times, labor, we argue that poorly performing, uneven democracies have become an important, yet underexplored, component in one’s emigration calculus. We test this argument through analysis of survey data across 22 Latin American countries and find strong and consistent evidence that both the quality of a democratic system and its ability to fulfill basic governance responsibilities influence the degree to which an individual considers emigration as a viable life strategy. These findings in turn have implications for the subsequent impact emigration may have on the democratic development of high migration communities.     

Active resistance to democratic diffusion

Recent research on the international diffusion of democracy has focused on demonstrating how diffusion can change regime outcomes. Although there is still debate within the field of democratization over how important democratic diffusion is relative to domestic factors, autocratic leaders believe that democratic diffusion can be a threat to their rule. It is clear that some countries, such as North Korea, prevent diffusion by severely restricting interactions with foreigners and forbidding access to external sources of information. The more intriguing question is how the states that have economic, diplomatic, and social linkages with democratic states prevent democratic diffusion. In other words, what methods do globally-engaged, autocratic governments use to limit exposure to and reduce receptivity to democratic diffusion?In addition to using coercion and economic patronage, autocratic states utilize two non-material mechanisms to prevent democratic diffusion: 1) restricting exposure to democratic ideas and 2) developing alternative narratives about democracy to reduce local receptivity to democratic diffusion. Sophisticated autocratic leaders can limit receptivity to democratic diffusion if they convince citizens that those ideas are “foreign,” will cause “chaos,” or if they believe they already have their own form of democracy. I explore these methods of establishing firewalls to prevent diffusion by examining the cases of China and Kazakhstan, two countries where a high level of economic linkage coincides with a successful continuation of autocratic rule, despite the global spread of democratic norms. China has developed extensive methods to restrict access to foreign ideas about democracy while Kazakhstan has mainly focused on developing an alternative narrative about democracy. This article contributes to the literature on authoritarian persistence and democratic diffusion by investigating the internal methods autocratic leaders adopt to ensure that democratic diffusion does not threaten their rule.     

Can non-democracies support international democracy? Turkey as a case study

Abstract

In recent years, there has been a rise of interest in the concept of autocracy promotion, with scholars questioning whether the efforts by authoritarian governments to influence political transitions beyond their borders are necessarily pro-authoritarian. An extension of this question is whether some authoritarian governments may at times find it in their interest to support democracy abroad. This article aims to answer this question by focusing on the case of Turkey. It argues that, despite its rapidly deteriorating democracy since the late 2000s, Turkey has undertaken democracy support policies with the explicit goal of democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region during the Arab Spring and, while not bearing the intention of democratic transition, has employed democracy support instruments in the form of state-building in sub-Saharan Africa since 2005 to the present day. Based on original fieldwork, the article finds that non-democracies can turn out as democracy supporters, if and when opportunities for strategic gains from democratisation abroad arise. The article further suggests that even in those cases where strategic interests do not necessitate regime change, a non-democracy may still deploy democracy support instruments to pursue its narrow interests, without adhering to an agenda for democratic transition.     

Ideals Without Institutions: Understandings of Democracy and Democratic Participation Among Ecuadorian Youth

Many scholars of democratization have identified citizen support for democracy as an important determinant of democratic consolidation and deepening. Fewer have explored in depth what everyday citizens actually understand democracy to mean. If mass values shape democratic prospects, what specific notion of “democracy” are the masses inclined to support? This study addresses this question through focus groups conducted with 186 young people in Ecuador, a country that has epitomized challenges of democratic discontent and instability in Latin America. As compared to the dominant survey-based literature, interactive focus group conversations offer a more complex and complete picture of youth democratic perspectives, thus sharpening our analysis of the link between citizen attitudes and democratic performance. Findings have relevance for contemporary debates about “authoritarian drift” in the region, showing youth as strongly invested in democratic freedoms, though highly skeptical of the institutions that allegedly guarantee them. More broadly, the analysis provides a window into how youth conceive of and practice democracy in contexts of unstable democratization.     

Myanmar's Electoral System: Reviewing the 2010 and 2012 Elections and Looking Ahead to the 2015 General Elections

Myanmar's 2010 multi-party election was the nation's first in two decades, signaling a manufactured transition from nearly half a century of military dictatorship toward parliamentary democracy. The current single-member district, plurality voting electoral system limits the parliamentary representation of smaller, ethnic political parties, and inflates the influence of larger, enfranchised parties, jeopardizing peaceful national reconciliation between various factions and the country's inchoate democratic institutions. Myanmar's Union Electoral Commission should consider electoral reforms that: (a) maximize proportional representation; (b) guarantee peace and political stability; and (c) guarantee a sufficient parliamentary majority that can govern the nascent democracy. The ideal system for the upcoming 2015 general elections is a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) one, with one parliamentary house electing ministers by plurality in regional districts and the other with proportional representation by party list. This paper considers alternative electoral systems in light of the status quo and argues that MMP would produce the most stable and representative results for all parties concerned.     

When the center can hold: The primacy of politics in shaping Russian democracy

Violations of rights, a weak Duma, political parties dominated by bureaucrats, and corrupt privatization are ordinarily taken as signs or even causes of the failure of democracy in Russia or at best as normal traits of electoral politics in a middle-income state. Yet all of these are natural consequences of introducing democracy in a country with the Russian electorate’s distinctive recent experience of a loss of a third of the state’s territory and half its population. In such a democracy only a centrist, not a liberal, strategy can block a return to authoritarianism, and such a strategy in Russia will subordinate rights to the task of privatization that a Duma weakened by ideological, demographic and geographic impediments to party development cannot conduct. Consequently what are taken as signs or causes of democratic failure in Russia are instead necessary effects of introducing democracy in Russia’s special circumstances.     

Emancipative values and democracy: Response to Hadenius and Teorell

This article demonstrates that Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell’s attempt to disprove a causal effect of emancipative mass orientations on democracy is flawed in each of its three lines of reasoning. First, contrary to Hadenius and Teorell’s claim that measures of “effective democracy” end up in meaningless confusion of democracy and minor aspects of its quality, we illustrate that additional qualifications of democracy illuminate meaningful differences in the effective practice of democracy. Second, Hadenius and Teorell’s finding that emancipative orientations have no significant effect on subsequent measures of democracy from Freedom House is highly unstable: using only a slightly later measure of the dependent variable, the effect turns out to be highly signficant. Third, we illustrate that these authors’ analytical strategy is irrelevant to the study of democratization because the temporal specification they use misses almost all cases of democratization. We present a more conclusive model of democratization, analyzing how much a country moved toward or away from democracy as the dependent variable. The model shows that emancipative orientations had a strong effect on democratization during the most massive wave of democratization ever—stronger than any indicator of economic development. Finally, we illustrate a reason why this is so: emancipative orientations motivate emancipative social movements that aim at the attainment, sustenance, and extension of democratic freedoms.     

Moderate Islam and secularist opposition in Turkey: implications for the world,Muslims and secular democracy

Developing an argument based in theories of democratic consolidation and religious competition, and discussing the reasons for the secularist opposition to the government, this article analyses how government by a party rooted in moderate Islamism may affect Turkey's peculiar secular democracy, development and external relations and how Muslims in the world relate to modernization and democracy. Arguing that secularism in advanced democracies may be a product of democracy as much as it is the other way around, the article maintains that democratic consolidation may secure further consolidation of Turkish secularism and sustainable moderation of Turkish political Islam. Besides democratic Islamic – conservative actors and other factors, democratic consolidation requires strong democratic – secularist political parties so that secularist and moderate Islamist civilian actors check and balance each other. Otherwise, middle class value divisions and mistrust in areas like education and social regulation may jeopardise democratisation and economic modernisation and continuing reconciliation of Islamism with secular democracy and modernity.     

Democracy and Empowerment

The article argues that institutions of parliamentary democracy are currently being undermined and calls for the development of new means of democratic empowerment. The meaning of 'democratic empowerment' differs sharply depending on whether one refers to a predominantly aggregative, or a predominantly integrative strategy of empowerment. The article seeks to clarify the phrase. For a predominantly aggregative strategy of empowerment, as proposed by Paul Hirst, the primary means of empowerment is exist. For a predominantly integrative strategy of empowerment, proposed by David Burns, Robin Hambleton and Paul Hoggett the primary means of empowerment is voice. The article concludes that a democratic strategy of empowerment must aim to balance exit and voice options. An example of how balance could be institutionalized is found in Denmark.     

Is Mexican democracy consolidated?

In the wake of Mexico's electoral watershed of 2 July 2000, many scholars are willing to classify the country as an electoral democracy, yet debate persists over whether Mexican democracy is consolidated. This article seeks to advance this debate by clarifying the meaning of the term democratic ‘consolidation’ and how it should be operationalised. It argues that the concept should refer exclusively to a regime with a low probability of democratic breakdown. This avoids the conceptual confusion created by viewing consolidation as any change that improves the quality of democracy. In terms of measuring consolidation, it maintains the importance of placing greater weight on the proximate cause of regime instability, anti‐democratic behaviour, and discounting more remote causes of democratic breakdown, including economic performance, institution building, and attitudinal support. Based on this understanding, the article explains why Mexican democracy is fully consolidated.     

(Re)conceptualising democracy: the limitations of benchmarks based on neoliberal democracy and the need for alternatives

The 21st century has witnessed increasing dissatisfaction with existing democratic institutions and processes and the growth of alternatives to representative democracy. At the same time arguments are emerging that conventional standards for evaluating democracy are ‘out of touch’ with current realities; in particular, with popular understandings, experiences and aspirations of what democracy should look like. This paper draws on empirical research in Caracas, Venezuela into how Venezuelan people understand democracy, in order to build a case that current evaluatory benchmarks are inadequate for understanding complex processes of social change based on more direct and participatory forms of democratic engagement.     

Engaging Insurgency: The Impact of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement on FARC's Political Participation

The 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (the FARC-EP or FARC) commits to reforming political participation, especially of traditionally marginalized sectors throughout the country to consolidate Colombian democracy. While the Peace Agreement provides implementation mechanisms that support the insurgency's transition from armed group to political party, it also complements the FARC's political strategy that has traditionally maintained consistency. This article argues that the 2016 Peace Agreement has the potential to enhance democratic, political, and societal participation by engaging with FARC in two key ways—by attempting to reconcile key FARC grievances and containing specific mechanisms that increase participation of traditionally marginalized groups in Colombia. This article argues that the Agreement has impacted positively on FARC's political participation and given it incentives to pursue its political strategy democratically. Likewise, the Agreement has provided a positive-sum outcome for the Colombian government to strengthen its democratic legitimacy by placing emphasis on structural reform.     

Reconciling public administration and democracy: the role of the responsible administrator

This article considers whether the individual responsibilities of bureaucratic officials provide a useful means for reconciling the tension between democracy and bureaucracy. Three questions central to the proper definition of bureaucratic responsibility are examined: (1) What is the relation of bureaucratic responsibility to the view that proper bureaucratic conduct is essentially a matter of ethics and morality? (2) If the appeal to moral values does not ordinarily offer an acceptable guide to proper bureaucratic conduct, upon what principles does a theory of bureaucratic responsibility rest? (3) What issues arise in putting responsibility into practice within a complex organizational setting? The article concludes that a democratic, process-based conception offers the most useful way of thinking about the responsibilities of bureaucratic officials.

The tension between democracy and bureaucracy has bedeviled public administration. However one defines democracy, its core demand for responsiveness (to higher political authorities, the public, client groups, or whatever the presumed agent of democratic rule) does not neatly square with notions of effective organization of the policy process and efficient delivery of goods and services, which are central to the definition of bureaucracy. Responsiveness need not guarantee efficiency, while bureaucratic effectiveness and efficiency often belie democratic control.

This tension between democracy and bureaucracy persists, but that it is the individual administrator who directly experiences the tension is especially important as a guide toward a resolution of this conflict. Since divergence is central to this tension between democracy and bureaucracy, speculation about the responsibilities of bureaucratic officials—their individual places within the bureaucracy, particularly the administrator's thoughts, choices, and actions—provides fruitful terrain for resolving the question of bureaucracy's place within a democratic system of rule.

Three questions need to be addressed if one accepts the premise that individual responsibility is central to locating the place of bureaucracy in a democratic order. First, what is unique about bureaucratic responsibility, especially in contrast to the view that these are largely ethical problems that can be resolved by appeal to moral values? Second, if dilemmas of bureaucratic conduct are by and large not resolvable through appeal to moral values, upon what other principles does a theory of bureaucratic responsibility rest? Third, what issues arise in putting responsibility into practice, especially within a complex organizational setting? This list of questions is not meant to be exhaustive but only a starting point for discussion.     

On the Danger and Necessity of Democratisation: trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term peace in post-genocide Rwanda

This paper argues that the Rwandan government's reconciliation strategy will need to be accompanied by a process of democratisation if it is to achieve its objective of fostering long-term peace. If the discourse of national unity is not reflected in an effective sharing of political power and economic resources, it is likely to be perceived with suspicion or even rejection by the country's largely Hutu population, and could contribute to aggravating ethnic tensions. Last time Rwanda—under pressure from the international community—undertook a democratisation process, however, this contributed to exacerbating the ethnic tensions that led to the genocide. Today Rwanda and its international donors thus face a stark trade-off between short-term stability and long-term peace: the longer the country puts off necessary democratic reform for fear of upsetting stability, the greater the risk of a rejection of government policies by the population and of a renewed manipulation of ethnicity in the future.