Anti-corruption or accountability? International efforts in post-conflict Liberia

This paper analyses anti-corruption efforts in post-conflict Liberia. It highlights citizens’ views on the definition of corruption and argues that, in the past, anti-corruption efforts have often focused on institution building and formal justice mechanisms without sufficient understanding of accountability dynamics on the ground. Anti-corruption approaches in Liberia have only nominally examined whether there is a shared understanding of what ‘corruption’ is and why it is regarded as a problem. The paper examines the social norms and perceptions that underlie understandings of the term corruption. It argues that the international community may have overlooked the fact that ‘corruption’ has become an all-encompassing term that masks a myriad of differing priorities and concerns. The authors posit that ‘accountability’ may be a more useful lens for those actors hoping to improve governance in these contexts.     

Comparative grand corruption and protection pacts among elites: the cases of Ao Man Long in Macao and Hui Si-Yan in Hong Kong

Although Transparency International has consistently ranked the governments of both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR), both under the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), much higher on the clean governance scale than the PRC itself, the reality is that the two special administrative regions witnessed two prominent cases of political corruption comparable to the mainland corruption. These were the Ao Man Long case in Macao and the Rafael Hui Si-yan scandal in Hong Kong. This paper examines the two cases of political corruption in both Macao and Hong Kong and makes comparisons and contrasts between them. It argues that individual greed contributed to the two cases of high-level bureaucratic (grand) corruption in Macao and Hong Kong, implying that institutional safeguards against corruption, such as the establishment of anti-corruption commissions, and the scrutiny of the mass media, are by no means adequate. In other words, institutional mechanisms against corruption in the HKSAR and MSAR do have loopholes that need to be plugged. Moreover, protection pacts between a minority of government officials and the business elites can be formed because of their close personal connections, strengthening the possibility of grand corruption.     

The neoliberal discourse on corruption as a means of consent building: reflections from post-crisis Turkey

This article draws attention to the ideological role that the neoliberal discourse on corruption has fulfilled in the promotion of the second generation reforms in Southern countries since the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. This discourse is ahistoric insofar as it fails to recognise corruption as a problem of modernity; biased insofar as it associates corruption with Southern countries' historical and cultural specificities only; contradictory in terms of its counter-productive anti-corruption strategies; and politicised as it has redefined ‘corruption’ as ‘rent-seeking’. In the absence of alternative radical conceptualisations, this essentially competition-induced neoliberal orthodoxy on corruption has been easily articulated within morality-based popular concerns in domestic politics and hence acquired a hegemonic capability. The article substantiates these arguments by examining the trajectory of the neoliberal anti-corruption agenda in Turkey with a particular focus on the developments of the post-2001 financial crisis period.     

The Politics of Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Putin’s Russia: Power,Opposition, and the All-Russia People’s Front

Abstract

The beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third term was characterised by the politicisation of corruption. Opposition forces focused on corruption and criticised the regime for tolerating it. This article explores how the regime reacted to opposition criticism. The regime encountered a dilemma: it could not ignore the opposition but promoting anti-corruption reforms was risky for the regime. This study focuses on the regime’s use of the All-Russia People’s Front (Obshcherossiiskii Narodnyi Front—ONF) and concludes that it functioned as a ‘parastatal’ anti-corruption movement, enabling the regime to deflect the blame without directly involving itself in the process.     

One size does not fit all: an analysis of the corruption preventative approach of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in Bangladesh

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the global citizens’ engagement movement against corruption does not always succeed in developing countries, such as Bangladesh. Drawing on the case of the preventative strategies of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in Bangladesh, this paper shows that government-driven citizens’ engagement processes through community-based organisations (CBOs) are a ceremonial adaptation in response to isomorphic pressure from the donors. The outcomes from isomorphic pressure suggest that such donor-funded actions produce ‘isomorphic mimicry’ of successful corruption prevention programmes from other countries that do not succeed in the recipient country. A micro-level analysis based on interviews with stakeholders in Bangladesh demonstrates why isomorphic mimicry has failed to produce a robust anti-corruption prevention approach in Bangladesh.     

FUBAI: differing Chinese views of corruption since Tiananmen: does a road paved with corruption lead to socialism?

Corruption, particularly in the public official based definition which is dominant in reform China, involves the violation of administrative ethics and responsibilities for private gain. Corruption has long been a key factor in analyzing and understanding modernization in Communist and Third World countries. Corruption has the potential to undermine a regime's legitimacy and power as well as a nation's economy. Moreover, by contributing to both economic and political polarization, it also has the potential to significantly influence the social stratification and overall social structure of societies in the midst of significant political, economic and social transformation; in other words, how they ‘modernize’. While the majority of Chinese analyses of corruption recognize the threat posed by corruption, they disagree on the sources and consequences of such corruption, and thus on the means for controlling and/or eliminating it.

The success of any anti-corruption process is determined by a) the causes and consequences of corruption and the ways in which they are perceived or blocked out by the regime's analytical framework; b) regime goals, including the degree to which, by promoting the transformation of the forms of legitimate economic intercourse, it encourages changing what is defined as corruption and c) the degree to which it is capable of accomplishing its goals once set. However, inasmuch as the dominant Chinese analysis tend2 to exclude certain key factors, frequently including the regime's goals in ‘modernizing’ Chinese society, the present anti-corruption policies are not likely to be successful.     

Flexibility versus Inflexibility: discursive discrepancy in US democracy promotion and anti-corruption policies

This article analyses US discourses on democracy promotion and anti-corruption strategies. The analysis shows that there is a cosmetic agreement in these discourses on notions of the good society that identify democracy as a good thing and corruption as a bad thing. However, despite this agreement, there are differences in the discourses on the measures recommended to promote democracy and fight corruption that may lead to policies and processes pulling in opposite directions. This discrepancy arises, on the one hand, from a mode of operation of democracy promotion that is flexible and adaptable to various contexts and, on the other hand, from the uncompromising and inflexible language of anti-corruption policies that threatens to ‘undo’ what US democracy promotion's rhetoric aims to achieve: ownership and sustainability of democratic reforms through re-empowering the state.     

Donors,State Building and Corruption: lessons from Afghanistan and the implications for aid policy

This article critically analyses the state-building agenda from a governance and aid policy perspective, and from an anti-corruption viewpoint in particular, highlighting potential problems with both theoretical and practical applications of state building in a development context. Inconsistencies and contradictions between the state building and anti-corruption work have not been adequately explored or reconciled. In particular, the article explores these tensions using the example of the Performance-Based Governors' Fund (pbgf) in Afghanistan, where some donors are looking to reduce corruption in local government, encouraging often ‘warlord’ governors to run their administrative offices with integrity. The article argues that the pbgf approach—with its themes of being realistic, going for indirect strategies over the long term and building integrity rather than fighting corruption, provide important lessons for the anti-corruption community as a whole, both at the level of theory and practice.     

Corruption and anti-corruption in reform China

During the transition period, the extent of corruption in China is higher than before. Meanwhile the forms and characters of Chinese corruption are also different in many important aspects from those of its past and of other countries. This paper explores the causes, consequences of corruption and anti-corruption campaigns of the Chinese government. The major conclusion of this paper is that further political reform toward democracy should be the direction of future anti-corruption efforts.     

A failure of governmentality: why Transparency International underestimated corruption in Ben Ali’s Tunisia

This article critiques the Foucauldian approach to governance indicators. Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) underestimated Tunisian corruption levels under President Ben Ali: his regime was highly corrupt but foreign investors were less affected. CPI methodology meant it reflected primarily the needs of foreign investors. The Foucauldian approach specifically excludes analysis of governance indicators’ methodologies. It thus fails to demonstrate the effectiveness of governance indicators as a technology of government, and it fails to show how the production of the CPI is embedded in a wider global political economy.     

Corruption in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: a deal among friends

Since the late 1990s international state builders have paid increasing attention to fighting corruption in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. On the surface this effort has brought significant results, since both countries have adopted legal frameworks modelled on the best practices of Western democracies. In practice, however, corruption remains rampant. This disappointing outcome has several explanations: in reviewing the empirical evidence we consider the two countries as cases involving heavily assisted transition from both socialism and war, highlighting how collusive practices between political and criminal interests have played a role in establishing formally liberal but substantively ‘hybrid’ institutions. We argue that the spread of corruption has been implicitly legitimised by international actors, who have pressured local parties to accept the formal architecture of good governance, including anti-corruption legislation, while turning a blind eye to those extra-legal structures and practices perceived as functional to political stability.     

Curbing Corruption in India: An Impossible Dream?

This article analyses the serious problem of corruption in India by examining its causes and the various anti-corruption measures employed by the government from the formation in 1941 of the first anti-corruption agency, the Delhi Special Police Establishment, which was expanded to form the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in April 1963. India's ineffective anti-corruption strategy can be attributed to the lack of political will of its leaders and its unfavourable policy context, which has hindered the enforcement of the anti-corruption laws. The lack of political will in fighting corruption is manifested in the lowest per capita expenditure and least favourable staff-population ratio of the CBI when compared to those of its counterparts in Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Thailand. To enhance the CBI's effectiveness, it should be removed from the jurisdiction of the police and be established as an independent agency dedicated solely to curbing corruption. The Constitution of India should also be amended to empower the CBI to investigate corruption cases at the state level without obtaining the consent of the chief minister of the state. In view of the lack of political will, this article concludes that curbing corruption in India remains an impossible dream in the foreseeable future.     

Unintended Consequences of Vigilance Activities in Two Project Settings in India

Anti-corruption agencies that are independent and vested with the authority to enforce laws can be a potent force in combating corruption. However, overzealous anti-corruption agencies acting in the absence of an effective institutional environment could paralyse the public sector's decision-making apparatus by instilling a sense of hesitancy into the officials’ minds. Through ethnographic studies of two infrastructure projects in India, I investigate how anti-corruption agencies contributed to project delays. This research supplements the existing discourse on factors contributing to the efficiency of anti-corruption agencies, given the constraints of project settings, and provides insights towards policy making in this domain.     

Corruption and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Abstract

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has received much attention as a scheme that can help reduce corruption in mineral-rich developing economies. To our knowledge, this paper provides the first empirical attempt (using panel data) to explore how EITI membership links to changes in corruption levels. We also examine whether the different stages in EITI implementation (initial commitment, candidature, full compliance) influence the pace of changes in corruption. We find that EITI membership offers, on the whole, a shielding mechanism against the general tendency of mineral-rich countries to experience increases in corruption over time.     

Natural resources and corruption in post-war transitions: matters of trust

Many ‘post-conflict’ countries face difficulties in reaping the full benefits of their natural resource wealth for reconstruction and development purposes. This is a major issue given these countries’ needs and the risk of seeing ‘mismanaged’ primary sectors undermine a transition to peace. Bringing together debates about the ‘inequality-mistrust-corruption’ trap and relationships between natural resources and corruption, this paper suggest that some resource sectors may be more likely to foster inequalities, and thereby increase corruption and distrust, while others are less likely to do so. Reviewing arguments and empirical evidence, I point to the relative importance of transition contexts, stakeholder incentives and resource sector characteristics, and suggest how resource-related corruption may be better understood in relation to trust-building and reconciliation processes.     

Comparative anti-corruption policy: the american,soviet and russian cases

In light of significant conceptual and methodological difficulties that face comparative corruption research, we propose to treat comparative anti-corruption policy as worthy of study in its own right. By using measures of enforcement activity as evidence of anti-corruption, rather than flawed proxy measures of corruption, we endeavor to surmount some of obstacles to comparing radically different political systems. We compare anti-corruption activity in the US and the USSR and elaborate three theoretical perspectives-emphasizing political, institutional, and symbolic factors--and show how each might improve our understanding of anti-corruption policy in the two nations. By applying these three frameworks to the Russian republic, we assess anti-corruption policy in an unsettled, emerging political system and suggest that the dynamics that underlie Russia's anti-corruption policy will more closely resemble US policy than was the case in the USSR.     

Making Plans for Liberia—a Trusteeship Approach to Good Governance?

Abstract

Since the end of the Liberian civil war in August 2003 the international community has been ‘making plans’ for Liberia. However, it rarely questioned whether these plans were in accordance with the political and economic logic of the peace agreement and the subsequent transitional government. The consequence was that corruption continued and a much more intrusive economic management plan was established. The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (gemap) is supposed to combat corruption and facilitate good governance, but it also limits the range of policy options for the new democratically elected government of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. The irony is that the best and most legitimate government that Liberia has ever had is subject to stronger external control than any of its predecessors. The probability that this scheme will remain sustainable when donor interest shifts elsewhere is low, and what is needed is a more pragmatic approach that draws a wider segment of Liberian society into anti-corruption management and creates checks and balances between them.     

Administrative Cohesion and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Georgia and Ukraine

Previous studies of former communist countries have linked decentralisation of power to a greater likelihood of reform. An analysis of the anti-corruption drives in Georgia and Ukraine after their respective ‘colour revolutions’, however, suggests that Georgia’s greater centralisation was integral to its success in enacting anti-corruption measures. In explaining why this contradictory result happened, this article argues that a centralised government can be more effective at implementing reforms than a decentralised one as long as the background and preferences of the ruling administration are conducive to change.     

How can emerging powers speak? On theorists,native informants and quasi-officials in International Relations discourse

Emerging powers like China, India and Brazil are receiving growing attention as objects in International Relations (IR) discourse. Scholars from these emerging powers are rarely present as subjects in mainstream IR discourse, however. This paper interrogates the conditions for scholars in emerging powers to speak back to the mainstream discipline. It argues, first, that ‘theory speak’ is rare from scholars based in periphery countries perceived to be ‘emerging powers’. Despite increasing efforts to create a ‘home-grown’ theoretical discourse in China, India and Brazil, few articles in mainstream journals present novel theoretical frameworks or arguments framed as non-Western/Southern theory or even as a ‘Chinese school’ or ‘Brazilian concepts’. Second, scholars from emerging powers tend to speak as ‘native informants’ about their own country, not about general aspects of ‘the international’. Third, some scholars even speak as ‘quasi-officials’, that is, they speak for their country.     

The Changing Faces of Europeanisation: How Did the European Union Influence Corruption in Slovakia Before and After Accession?

The paper looks at the European Union's impact on corruption in Slovakia, both before and after the country's accession to the European Union. It shows that even though pre-accession channels of influence diminish or disappear, membership brings new means of influence. Our methodology looks beyond institutional changes and explicit anti-corruption mechanisms. Before 1999, the European Union's influence on corruption was close to zero, and between 1999 and 2004, its influence was strong and positive. Post-accession developments are more ambiguous, but despite an apparent worsening of corruption after 2004, we observe a transformation rather than a loss of European Union influence.