Jihadist Highway to Jihadist Haven: Turkey's Jihadi Policies and Western Security

Turkish support to jihadists is not merely a tactic aimed at removing Assad from power. It stems from a strategic decision on the part of Turkish authorities to influence Middle East affairs through non-state actors, much as Iran has been doing for some time. Turkey's support of jihadists transiting into Syria and its establishment of close ties with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are joint aspects of this strategy. Turkish authorities have permitted Al Qaeda sympathizers to use pro-government media to promote their beliefs. The authorities have adopted a new political language that fuels anti-American and anti-Western sentiments. Prosecutors who have attempted to prevent shipments of weapons to Al Qaeda–affiliated groups in Syria have been fired and in some cases incarcerated. Indeed, by now Turkish prosecutors and the Turkish National Police are thoroughly intimidated. Not a single counterterror operation has been launched to disrupt Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’s networks or recruitment activities. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization has been given full responsibility to deal with jihadist activities, without any active oversight, and the police are loath to venture into their territory. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey's jihadi policies have direct and indirect impact on Western security. This article examines Turkey's jihadi policies by examining official statements, media reports, interviews, and fieldwork.     

Online as the New Frontline: Affect,Gender, and ISIS-Take-Down on Social Media

ABSTRACT

Using a dataset of more than 80 accounts during 2015, this article explores the gendered ways in which self-proclaiming Twitter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) supporters construct community around “suspension.” The article argues that suspension is an integral event in the online lives of ISIS supporters, which is reproduced in online identities. The highly gendered roles of ISIS males and females frame responses to suspension, enforcing norms that benefit the group: the shaming of men into battle and policing of women into modesty. Both male and female members of “Wilayat Twitter” regard online as a frontline, with suspension an act of war against the “baqiya family.” The findings have implications for broader repressive measures against ISIS online.     

Driving Factors behind Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq

With the rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the phenomenon of foreign fighters became a significant security concern. Governments around the world have become preoccupied with the possibility of their citizens leaving for combat zones and then coming back with training and experience. While previously foreign fighters participated in such conflicts as Afghanistan, Bosnia, or Chechnya, today ISIS has attracted record numbers of individuals from various backgrounds. This article examines factors that might be connected with the outflow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. The analysis is based on 190 countries with 103 of them serving as countries of origin for 33,815 foreign fighters. Negative binomial regression is used to evaluate the connection of political, economic, demographic, and social factors to numbers of foreign fighters. The findings indicate that more foreign fighters come from countries with higher Human Development Index levels, unemployment rates, percentages of youth, population size, percentages of Muslim population, emigration levels, Internet penetration, and the presence of Al Qaeda cells. However, the findings further indicate that the effect of these variables is not uniform across majority Muslim and majority non-Muslim countries.     

Foreign Fighters and Transnational Jihad in Syria

Foreign fighters arrive in Syria from across the Muslim world, yet the configuration of their countries of origin remains a puzzle. Examining alternative explanations for joining transnational jihad, the article draws insights from the cases of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, two major countries of foreign fighters' origin, compared with Egypt, from where limited figures of volunteers have joined the Syrian war. The article shows that the sources of volunteering fighters may be well understood in combined terms of religious sentiments and national politics. Foreign fighters come largely from Muslim countries where restrained state–Islamists relations channel Islamic grievances to transnational arenas.     

Now the Elected Islamists Must Deliver

The revolutions of the Arab Spring are twisting and turning on a troubled course. After an uprising overthrew Mubarak last year, elections were held in June in which the Muslim Brotherhood dominated—only to have the military once again assert its authority over any new parliament and constitution. What is at stake is whether Egypt will remain a secular state like Turkey, or take on a moretheocratic bent if ruled by Islamists. In this section, the Arab world's only Nobel laureate in science offers his views about Egypt's future. The Turkish president argues for a secularism that tolerates all religions in Egypt. The CIA's former top analyst on the Muslim world questions whether Islamist parties can deliver once in power instead of opposition.     

The Islamic State's Evolving Chemical Arsenal

This article examines the growing chemical weapon capabilities of the Islamic State from the crude poisons and toxins of its founding father Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi to the current battlefield use of indigenously produced mustard gas in Iraq and Syria. By examining this evolution as a phenomenon separate from Al Qaeda, a clearer picture emerges of a dedicated and increasingly successful chemical weapons program that threatens military forces and civilian populations around the world.     

Jihadi-Salafism in Jordan and the Syrian Conflict: Divisions Overcome Unity

Over the last decade, a rift has emerged among Jihadi-salafis in Jordan between the “Zarqawiyyun”—who see Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi as their model and concentrate on combat—and the “Maqdisiyyun”—who want more scholarly guidance, emphasize the establishment of an Islamic State and follow Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The conflict in Syria, however, offered options for both: a jihad against a reviled regime and the possibility to set up an Islamic state. It thus had the potential to unite the “Zarqawiyyun” and the “Maqdisiyyun.” This article analyzes why this did not happen.     

Nationalist Jāhiliyyah and the Flag of the Two Crusaders,or: ISIS,Sovereignty, and the “Owl of Minerva”

This article argues that by understanding Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) state-building processes we are able to understand how ISIS has developed while also developing a united citizenship body built from people in Iraq and Syria and those making hijra. The fragmentation of Iraq and Syria resulted in conditions that would prove conducive to the group's expansion and identifying these conditions is imperative to understanding Sunni extremism in the Middle East. The article argues that ISIS builds citizenship in two ways: first, by developing asabiyya—group feeling—among Sunni and second, by securitizing the Shi'a threat. Identifying and engaging with the concepts of sovereignty and citizenship helps to develop much stronger policy responses.     

Iran and Turkey: not quite enemies but less than friends

The rise and subsequent erosion of friendly relations between Iran and Turkey was a result of their regional ambitions. While Turkey had long seen its secular system as presenting an alternative to Iran’s Islamic ideology, the alignment of their regional interests facilitated a rapport between the two states in the first decade of the twenty-first century. However, the Arab Spring proved divisive for this relationship as each state sought to advocate its model of government and secure a leadership role in the Arab world. The war in Syria widened the divide, as Iran’s long-standing support for the Bashar al-Assad regime could not be reconciled with Turkey’s desire to see President Assad out of office. Using a close reading of Persian and Turkish sources, the authors will analyse the Iran–Turkey divide, focusing specifically on how the Iranians have portrayed it as a clash of civilisations, citing Turkey’s so-called ‘neo-Ottoman’ ambitions as the primary cause.     

A Global Convergence Against Globalization?

The Iranian revolution—the political realization of the "Great Refusal" of Western modernization—was a direct consequence a half century later of the forced secularization of the Ottoman Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk. With the superstructure of the Muslim ummah dismantled and replaced by the Turkish nation state, insurgent religious movements, from the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the Shiite imams of Qum and Najaf, moved into the vacuum to reclaim Islam from the shadow of Western dominance.
Now, history is turning again. Iran has been seized by violent turmoil as it seeks to reconcile democracy and religious rule. Secular Turkey is governed by an Islamist-rooted party. As they struggle to regain their balance, the global economic meltdown threatens a convergence against globalization that joins the Islamist resistance with populist backlashes elsewhere.
Two legendary intelligence agents, a Hezbollah leader, an Iranian dissident philosopher and Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate, examine this historical turn.     

Hezbollah: Islamist Resistance Comes of Age

The Iranian revolution—the political realization of the "Great Refusal" of Western modernization—was a direct consequence a half century later of the forced secularization of the Ottoman Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk. With the superstructure of the Muslim ummah dismantled and replaced by the Turkish nation state, insurgent religious movements, from the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the Shiite imams of Qum and Najaf, moved into the vacuum to reclaim Islam from the shadow of Western dominance.
Now, history is turning again. Iran has been seized by violent turmoil as it seeks to reconcile democracy and religious rule. Secular Turkey is governed by an Islamist-rooted party. As they struggle to regain their balance, the global economic meltdown threatens a convergence against globalization that joins the Islamist resistance with populist backlashes elsewhere.
Two legendary intelligence agents, a Hezbollah leader, an Iranian dissident philosopher and Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate, examine this historical turn.     

The New Egypt: Don't Give Up Hope

The revolutions of the Arab Spring are twisting and turning on a troubled course. After an uprising overthrew Mubarak last year, elections were held in June in which the Muslim Brotherhood dominated—only to have the military once again assert its authority over any new parliament and constitution. What is at stake is whether Egypt will remain a secular state like Turkey, or take on a moretheocratic bent if ruled by Islamists. In this section, the Arab world's only Nobel laureate in science offers his views about Egypt's future. The Turkish president argues for a secularism that tolerates all religions in Egypt. The CIA's former top analyst on the Muslim world questions whether Islamist parties can deliver once in power instead of opposition.     

Egyptian Muslims Should Embrace Secularism

The revolutions of the Arab Spring are twisting and turning on a troubled course. After an uprising overthrew Mubarak last year, elections were held in June in which the Muslim Brotherhood dominated—only to have the military once again assert its authority over any new parliament and constitution. What is at stake is whether Egypt will remain a secular state like Turkey, or take on a moretheocratic bent if ruled by Islamists. In this section, the Arab world's only Nobel laureate in science offers his views about Egypt's future. The Turkish president argues for a secularism that tolerates all religions in Egypt. The CIA's former top analyst on the Muslim world questions whether Islamist parties can deliver once in power instead of opposition.     

Social Identity Group and Human (In)Security: The Case of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

The article uses social identity group theory and human insecurity to examine the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). After first defining social group identity and its characteristics, the article reviews the Al Qaeda ideology that serves as the foundation of ISIL, before turning attention to the message and legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and their profound influence on ISIL. The article concludes by arguing that only by ending the marketplace of identities can stability be restored to Iraq and Syria.     

Iran's Crisis of Legitimacy

The Iranian revolution—the political realization of the "Great Refusal" of Western modernization—was a direct consequence a half century later of the forced secularization of the Ottoman Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk. With the superstructure of the Muslim ummah dismantled and replaced by the Turkish nation state, insurgent religious movements, from the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the Shiite imams of Qum and Najaf, moved into the vacuum to reclaim Islam from the shadow of Western dominance.
Now, history is turning again. Iran has been seized by violent turmoil as it seeks to reconcile democracy and religious rule. Secular Turkey is governed by an Islamist-rooted party. As they struggle to regain their balance, the global economic meltdown threatens a convergence against globalization that joins the Islamist resistance with populist backlashes elsewhere.
Two legendary intelligence agents, a Hezbollah leader, an Iranian dissident philosopher and Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate, examine this historical turn.     

Democratic Refusal in Iran

The Iranian revolution—the political realization of the "Great Refusal" of Western modernization—was a direct consequence a half century later of the forced secularization of the Ottoman Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk. With the superstructure of the Muslim ummah dismantled and replaced by the Turkish nation state, insurgent religious movements, from the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the Shiite imams of Qum and Najaf, moved into the vacuum to reclaim Islam from the shadow of Western dominance.
Now, history is turning again. Iran has been seized by violent turmoil as it seeks to reconcile democracy and religious rule. Secular Turkey is governed by an Islamist-rooted party. As they struggle to regain their balance, the global economic meltdown threatens a convergence against globalization that joins the Islamist resistance with populist backlashes elsewhere.
Two legendary intelligence agents, a Hezbollah leader, an Iranian dissident philosopher and Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate, examine this historical turn.     

The Essence of Islamist Resistance: A Different View of Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas

The Iranian revolution—the political realization of the "Great Refusal" of Western modernization—was a direct consequence a half century later of the forced secularization of the Ottoman Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk. With the superstructure of the Muslim ummah dismantled and replaced by the Turkish nation state, insurgent religious movements, from the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the Shiite imams of Qum and Najaf, moved into the vacuum to reclaim Islam from the shadow of Western dominance.
Now, history is turning again. Iran has been seized by violent turmoil as it seeks to reconcile democracy and religious rule. Secular Turkey is governed by an Islamist-rooted party. As they struggle to regain their balance, the global economic meltdown threatens a convergence against globalization that joins the Islamist resistance with populist backlashes elsewhere.
Two legendary intelligence agents, a Hezbollah leader, an Iranian dissident philosopher and Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate, examine this historical turn.     

Israel Should Get Used to the New Turkey

To the shock of the world, the mild‐mannered Swiss have acted the most radically of any European country out of fear of Muslim immigrants by banning minarets. Was this a blow against tolerance, or for it? Is Islam a European religion, or is Europe a Christian club? Meanwhile, as Turkey becomes more confident in its regional power and Muslim identity it is shaking up some old friends. In this section, two of Europe's most prominent Muslim voices, the foreign minister of Sweden and a top Turkish official try to sort it out.     

Grading the Quality of ISIS Videos: A Metric for Assessing the Technical Sophistication of Digital Video Propaganda

Abstract

This article offers a method for systematically grading the quality of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) videos based on technical production criteria. Using this method revealed moments when ISIS production capacity was severely debilitated (Fall 2015) and when they began to rebuild (Spring 2016), which the article details. Uses for this method include evaluating propaganda video output across time and across groups, and the ability to assess kinetic actions against propaganda organizations. This capacity will be critical as Islamic State media production teams will be pushed out of its territory as the State collapses.