The Girl Who Knew Her Brother Would Be Coming Home: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ārṣajñāna</Emphasis> in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Praśastapādabhāṣya</Emphasis>, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Nyāyakandalī</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vyomavatī</Emphasis>

Although seldom mentioned in the secondary literature on Vai?e?ika, the cognitive category of ār?ajñāna (??i cognition) is accepted as a distinct category of vidyā (knowledge) within both early and later Vai?e?ika texts. This article deals with how ār?ajñāna is conceptualized in Pra?astapādabhā?ya (PBh), ?rīdhara’s Nyāyakandalī (NK), and Vyoma?iva’s Vyomavatī (Vy). The main focus lies on how ??i cognition is treated in these texts and what terms are used in the process. I aim to clarify the analysis of ??i cognition apparent in the above sources and outline the implications this might have for the somewhat grander objective of a mapping of the semantic landscape of cognition and knowledge in Vai?e?ika texts. The categories of yogic perception (yogipratyak?a) and siddhic vision (siddhadar?ana) are also treated since they are included within a shared discourse.     

Is <Emphasis Type="Italic">Viveka</Emphasis> a Unique <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pramāṇa</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Vivekacūḍāmaṇi</Emphasis>?

This is an enquiry based on the Vivekacū?āma?i (VC), the primary focus of which is to present viveka (discrimination) along with its three catalysts, namely, ?ruti, tarka, and anubhava as the unique pramā?a of Ultimate Knowledge. This paper discusses the significance of the six popular pramā?as of Advaita Vedānta (AV) and reiterates that as far as AV is concerned epistemologically those pramā?as have merely a provisional value (vyāvahārika). In accordance with the purport of VC this paper argues that ?ruti and tarka, culminating in anubhava (trans-empirical insight sans experience) are blind in themselves and are enthusiastically carried forward by viveka (discrimination) for the attainment of the final realisation. This paper concludes that viveka, along with its three catalysts namely, ?ruti, tarka, and anubhava is the sole pramā?a of the trans-empirical experiential knowledge of Brahman.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣa</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dharma</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mokṣadharma</Emphasis>

This essay asks what the terms mok?a and dharma mean in the anomalous and apparently Mahābhārata-coined compound mok?adharma, which provides the title for the ?āntiparvan’s third and most philosophical anthology; and it further asks what that title itself means. Its route to answering those questions is to look at the last four units of the Mok?adharmaparvan and their three topics—the story of ?uka, the Nārāya?īya, and a gleaner’s subtale—as marking an “artful curvature” that shapes the outcome of King Yudhi??hira’s philosophical inquiries of Bhī?ma into a ”return” to this world to take up the topic of the fourth anthology, a King’s generous giving, in the Anu?āsanaparvan’s Dānadharmaparvan. Usages of the term mok?a in the narratives in these units are considered in the light of The Laws of Manu’s usage of mok?a to define the “renunciatory asceticism of a wandering mendicant” after the fulfillment of one’s debts (Olivelle et al., in Life of the Buddha by A?vagho?a, 2008). Usages of mok?adharma are discussed in conjunction with its overlapping term niv?ittidharma. With the term dharma itself, it is a matter of finding the best contextual translation. A pitch is made that these four units, and particularly the Nārāya?īya, should no longer be thought of as “late” additions.     

Some Reflections on the Term <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sautrāntika</Emphasis> in Vinaya Context: <Emphasis Type="Italic">vinayadharaḥ sautrāntikaḥ</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra</Emphasis>

The word sautrāntika is known to designate one of the philosophical schools in later documents, but its earlier phase remains uncertain. The discovery of this term in the Mahāparinirvā?a-mahāsūtra thus brings forward new evidence essential for solving the problem of sautrāntika. In this paper, I will attempt to establish the interpretation of the context, in which the phrase vinayadhara? sautrāntika? appears.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Anyathākhyāti</Emphasis>: A Critique by Appaya Dīkṣita in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Parimala</Emphasis>

In this paper, the problem of illusory perception, as approached by the Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta schools of philosophy, is discussed from the standpoint of the Parimala. This seminal work belonging to the Bhāmatī tradition of Advaita Vedānta was composed in the sixteenth century by the polymath Appaya Dīk?ita. In the context of discussing various theories of illusion, Dīk?ita dwells upon the Nyāya theory of anyathākhyāti, and its connection with jñānalak?a?apratyāsatti as a causal factor for perception, and closely examines if such an extraordinary (alaukika) perception is tenable to explain illusory perception. He then proceeds to point out the deficiencies of this model and thereby brings to the fore the anirvacanīyakhyāti of Advaitins as the only theory which stands scrutiny.     

Self-Awareness (<Emphasis Type="Italic">svasaṃvedana</Emphasis>) in Dignāga’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pramāṇasamuccaya</Emphasis> and -<Emphasis Type="Italic">vṛtti</Emphasis>: A Close Reading

The concept of “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means of valid cognition and its result (pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of selfawareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s own mental states and factors.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahābhārata</Emphasis> and the Revival of Brahmanism

There are good reasons to think that Brahmanism initially belonged to a geographically limited area, with its heartland in the middle and western parts of the Gangetic plain. It was in this region that Brahmanism was at that time the culture of a largely hereditary class of priests, the brahmins, who derived their livelihood and special position in society from their close association with the local rulers. This situation changed. The most plausible hypothesis as to the reasons of this change sees a link with the political unification of northern India, begun by the Nandas and continued by the Mauryas. Both the Nandas and the Mauryas had their home base in the region called Magadha and had no particular interest in brahmins and their sacrificial tradition. As a result Brahmanism as an institution was under threat; it either had to face disappearance, or reinvent itself. It did the latter. Brahmanism underwent a transformation that enabled it to survive and ultimately flourish in changed circumstances. This paper will argue that the Mahābhārata can be looked upon as an element in this Brahminical project. Far from being a mere collection of stories and general good advice, it was an instrument in the hands of a group of people who were determined to change the world in ways that suited them, and who to a considerable extent succeeded in doing so during the centuries that lay ahead.     

Reading Non-Dualism in Śivādvaita Vedānta: An Argument from the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Śivādvaitanirṇaya</Emphasis> in Light of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Śivārkamaṇidīpikā</Emphasis>

This article examines Appaya Dīk?ita’s intellectual affiliation to ?ivādvaita Vedānta in light of his well-known commitment to Advaita Vedānta. Attention will be given to his ?ivādvaitanir?aya, a short work expounding the nature of the ?ivādvaita doctrine taught by ?rīka??ha in his ?aiva-leaning commentary on the Brahmasūtra. It will be shown how Appaya strategically interprets ?rīka??ha’s views on the relationship between ?iva (i.e., Brahman), its power of consciousness (cicchakti) and the individual self (jīva), along the lines of pure non-dualism (?uddhādvaita). In this context, the hermeneutical role of the daharavidyā doctrine will be considered with reference to Appaya’s ?ivādvaita magnum opus, the ?ivārkama?idīpikā.     

Studies in Dhāraṇī Literature I: Revisiting the Meaning of the Term <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dhāraṇī</Emphasis>

The Mahāyāna Buddhist term dhāraṇī has been understood to be problematic since the mid-nineteenth century, when it was often translated as “magical phrase” or “magical formula” and was considered to be emblematic of tantric Buddhism. The situation improved in contributions by Bernhard, Lamotte and Braarvig, and the latter two suggested the translation be “memory,” but this remained difficult in many environments. This paper argues that dhāraṇī is a function term denoting “codes/coding,” so that the category dhāraṇī is polysemic and context-sensitive. After reviewing Western scholarship, the article discusses dhāraṇī semantic values and issues of synonymy, the early applications of mantras, the sonic/graphic background of coding in India extended into Buddhist applications, and the soteriological ideology of dhāraṇīs along with some of its many varieties.     

Philosophy in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahābhārata</Emphasis> and the History of Indian Philosophy

The study of philosophical terms and doctrines in the Mahābhārata touches not only on important aspects of the contents, composition and the historical contexts of the epic, but also on the historiography of Indian philosophy. General ideas about the textual history of the epic and the distinction between “didactic” and “narrative” parts have influenced the study of epic philosophy no less than academic discussions about what is philosophy in India and how it developed. This results in different evaluations of the place of philosophical texts in the epic and their relationship to the history of Indian philosophy. While some scholars have suggested that there is a “philosophy of the epic” its composers wished to propagate, others have argued that “philosophy” is included in the epic either in a “proto” form or in a variety of doctrines (often presented is “mixed” or “unsystematic” ways) they deemed relevant. The article discusses these views and some of the heuristic assumptions on which they are based. It proposes to widen the scope of analysis by paying more attention to the interplay of narrative and didactic passages, the various ways in which philosophy is presented in the epic, and its connection to a larger spectrum of the reception of philosophy in textual genres and by audiences outside the expert circles of the philosophical schools.     

“<Emphasis Type="Italic">Peer effects</Emphasis>” or “<Emphasis Type="Italic">quasi</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">peer effects</Emphasis>” in Spanish labour court rulings

The current work seeks to ascertain whether rulings on dismissal cases issued by incumbent judges in Spanish labour courts are influenced by whether they are acting alone in their own court or sharing duties with other judges such as replacement judges, support judges or incumbent judges from other courts. We consider that a court is treated when more than one judge rules in it. Then, an analysis is conducted so as to determine the effect of such a treatment on the percentage of cases ruled in favour of the dismissed worker. The data used in the research are taken from the information recorded at court level provided by the statistics kept by the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary. A total of 2888 observations were available, corresponding to the period spanning 2004 to 2012. As regards the findings, it may be concluded that there is a significant positive impact on the number of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers when incumbent judges are not acting alone in their court, particularly when the incumbent judge solves cases together with another professional judge.     

His Dark Legalities: Intellectual Property’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Psychomachia</Emphasis> in Philip Pullman’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">His Dark Materials</Emphasis> Trilogy

This article will explore the vastest, most terminal, and—at least in the natural law tradition–most legal of spaces: namely, the home of the divine sovereign, Heaven. Specifically, I am interested in the contemporary (re)depiction of heavenly space as a ‘Miltonic’ theatre of war, as represented in Philip Pullman’s fantasy trilogy, His Dark Materials. This spatial mise-en-scene, as spectacular as it is, is a peculiar choice for an avowed atheist and anticlerical like Pullman. For it would seem to confirm than confront the verities of theology and the very structures of belief that Pullman seeks not only to critique but to overthrow. Namely, that Heaven exists, though as an absolute monarchy rather than (as Pullman plugs for) a republic. I will argue, however, that Pullman’s neo-Blakean vision of Heaven-as-Hell (ruled over by the tyrannical Metatron, as regent for a senescent ‘Authority’, i.e. God) is a metaphor: a metaphor for legal rather than theological space. And the legal space that Pullman metaphorises, I will argue, is nothing less than the imaginary of millennial intellectual property rights, an ideo-juridical inner space more and more projected upon and underpinning spatial notions like the ‘Commons’. The war in Heaven, then, is an elaborate allegory for struggles over the contol of knowledge under the conditions of Global Capital, with Lord Asriel, Lyra and Will functioning as Lessig-style activists, colonizing the new technologies (anachronised here as ‘amber spyglasses’, ‘subtle knives’, ‘alethiometers’ etc.) to topple ‘The Authority’ of intellectual property law and institute a democracy of digitality in which ideas are free to circulate in that most unreal and Real of spaces, the internet.     

Advayavajra’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Tattvaratnāvalī</Emphasis>: A Newly Revised Critical Edition

The following article presents a fully revised critical edition of Advayavajra’s Tattvaratnāvalī, one of the earliest and most influential texts that can be accredited to the genre of Buddhist siddhānta literature. In this text Advayavajra not only reveals his own overall perception of the Indian Buddhist schools of the eleventh century, but also supplies manifold insights into the various tenets of Buddhist philosophy (Vaibhā?ika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika), providing the first key for anyone interested in entering the vast spheres of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Studies. This newly revised edition takes into account new textual material which to this day has never been taken into consideration. Further parallels to other texts have been identified. And thus, it was possible to improve upon several passages in the previous editions.     

Narrating Sāṃkhya Philosophy: Bhīṣma,Janaka and Pañcaśikha at <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahābhārata</Emphasis> 12.211–12

The account of the conversation between King Janaka and the ??i Pañca?ikha on the fate of the individual after death is one of the philosophical texts that are included in the Mok?adharmaparvan of the Mahābhārata. There are different scholarly views on the history and composition of the text as well as the philosophical teachings propagated by Pañca?ikha. In contrast to earlier studies this paper not only analyzes the whole text, but also pays attention to the narrative framework in which the philosophical discourse is embedded. In the text Bhī?ma functions as an external narrator, who relates and interprets the conversation as well as characterizes the protagonists and thereby influences the ways in which text is received by the audience. It is argued that it is important to deal with the interplay between the narrative and the philosophical discourse that is narrated, when analysing the philosophical positions that are either refuted or accepted in the text. 12.211–12 is not only a philosophical text, but also a tale about philosophical discourse in general and about how Sā?khya philosophy is taught to a non-expert audience. Seen from this perspective the text is significant for the way in which philosophical terms and issues are dealt with in the epic and adjacent non-expert texts, such as the Purā?as.     

Does Early Yogācāra Have a Theory of Meaning? Sthiramati’s Arguments on Metaphor in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Triṃśikā-bhāṣya</Emphasis>

Can the early Yogācāra be said to present a systematic theory of meaning? The paper argues that Sthiramati’s bhā?ya on Vasubandhu’s Tri??ikā (Treatise in Thirty Verses), in which he argues that all language-use is metaphorical, indeed amounts to such a theory, both because of the text’s engagement with the wider Indian philosophical conversation about reference and meaning and by virtue of the questions it addresses and its motivations. Through a translation and analysis of key sections of Sthiramati’s commentary I present the main features of this theory of meaning and discuss the ways in which it is distinct from Vasubandhu’s ideas. I demonstrate how this theory of meaning enabled Sthiramati to present a unique understanding of discourse that distinguishes between varying levels of truth within the conventional realm. This understanding sat well with the Yogācāra soteriological and theoretical needs, and most importantly, enabled him to establish the meaningfulness of the school’s own metaphysical discourse. Securing this meaningfulness was especially important to Sthiramati in meeting the challenge posed by the radical conventionalism of the Madhyamaka, and his response as I interpret it suggests that one of the main disputes between the early Yogācāra with the Mādhyamika, at least as reflected in the Tri??ikā-bhā?ya, in fact turns on linguistic rather than ontological issues.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ālayavijñāna</Emphasis> from a Practical Point of View

In 1987, Lambert Schmithausen published an important extensive monograph on the origin of ālayavijñāna (ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy). In his opinion, the introduction of ālayavijñāna was closely linked to nirodhasamāpatti, but it was not meditative experience itself that directly lead to the introduction of this new concept. Rather, according to Schmithausen, it was dogmatic speculation on a sūtra passage about nirodhasamāpatti. My own hypothesis is that the introduction of ālayavijñāna was more directly based on meditative experiences. Focusing on the “Proof Portion” of the Vini?cayasa?graha?ī of the Yogācārabhūmi, the present paper examines this hypothesis. My examination reveals that ālayavijñāna is the physiological basis of the body, and as such it is correlated to the state of the body and mind. When one’s body and mind are transformed from an inert to a well-functioning state through meditative practice, the transformation seems to hinge on the transformation of ālayavijñāna itself. It appears that Yogācāra meditators intuitively realized this mechanism at the stage of dar?anamārga. This paper also responds to some points raised by Schmithausen on my hypothesis in his recent monograph on early Yogācāra (The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda: Responses and Reflections, 2014). Through these discussions, this paper sheds light on the importance of the correlation between body and mind in meditative contexts and proposes that this was the key issue in the introduction of the ālayavijñāna theory.     

Linking <Emphasis Type="Italic">Signifié</Emphasis> with <Emphasis Type="Italic">Signifiant:</Emphasis> The Court of Justice of European Union as a Product-Defining Authority

Saussurean concept of signifie-signifiant agnation can be used to explain the EU law product-nomenclature referrals. The CJEU has an especially important role in developing detailed rules of product nomenclature interpretation in cases where ambiguities emerge. In its jurisprudence, the CJ pursues preservation of the predominant intuitive model of that interpretation even in cases involving composite products. Only in cases where the composition can easily be identified, the Court relies on the concept of the defining element—i.e. it takes the dominant element of the product as a product nomenclature determining one. With respect to novel products, the CJ applies the same general penchant. Therefore, with respect to such products, the Court attempts to establish their signifié-signifiant match by referring to analogous features and characteristics of already existing products. Such an approach is an evidence of the CJ’s self-constraint of its otherwise Demiurgic power concerning the product nomenclature. This argumentation implies that even the CN classification offers a catalogue of relatively rigid designators and that their rigidity is respected by the CJ. The CN designators are not perfectly rigid because the CJ takes into account not only the logical values of respective CN positions, but also the practical aspects (including transactional costs) of the CN classification, as well as the general objectives of EU rules underlying the CN position identification.