Some Remarks on the Genesis of Central Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Concepts

The present paper is a kind of selective summary of my book The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (2014). [1.–2.] It deals with questions of origin and early development of three basic concepts of this school, viz., the ‘idealist’ thesis that the whole world is mind only (cittamātra) or manifestation only (vijñaptimātra), the assumption of a subliminal layer of the mind (ālayavijñāna), and the analysis of phenomena in terms of the “Three Natures” (svabhāvatraya). [3.] It has been asserted (H. Buescher) that these three basic concepts are logically inseparable and therefore must have been introduced conjointly. [4.] Still, from Vasubandhu onward treatises have been written in which only one of the three concepts is advocated or demonstrated to be indispensable, without any reference to the other two being made. Likewise, in most of the earlier Yogācāra treatises, the three concepts occur in different sections or contexts, or are even entirely absent, as vijñaptimātra in the Yogācārabhūmi (except for the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra quotation) and ālayavijñāna in the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra and Madhyāntavibhāga. [5.] It is therefore probable that the three concepts were introduced separately and for different reasons. [5.1.] As regards the concept of the “Three Natures”, I very hypothetically suggest that it was stimulated by the Tattvārthapa?ala of the Bodhisatvabhūmi. [5.2.1.] In the case of ālayavijñāna, I still think that my hypothesis that the concept (term + idea) originated from a problem emerging in connection with the “attainment of cessation” (nirodhasamāpatti) holds good and has not been conclusively refuted, but I admit that Prof. Yamabe?s hypothesis is a serious alternative. [5.2.2.] An important point is that in the Yogācārabhūmi we come across two fundamentally different concepts of ālayavijñāna, the starting point for the change being, probably, the fifth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra. [5.3.] As for ‘idealism’, we may have to distinguish two strands, which, however, tend to merge. [5.3.1.] The earlier one uses the concept cittamātra and emerges as early as in the Pratyutpanna-buddha-sa?mukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra in connection with an interpretation of visions of the Buddha Amitāyus. [5.3.2.] The later strand introduces the concept vijñaptimātra and seems to have originated in the eighth chapter of the Sa?dhinirmocanasūtra in connection with a reflection on the images perceived in insight meditation. [5.3.3.] In texts like the Mahāyānasūtrāla?kāra, concepts from other Mahāyānasūtra strands (like abhūtaparikalpa) become prominent in this connection, and it is only in the Mahāyānasa?graha that the use of vijñaptimātra is finally established.     

How Do We Understand the Meaning of a Sentence Under the Yogācāra Model of the Mind? On Disputes Among East Asian Yogācāra Thinkers of the Seventh Century

Understanding the meaning of a sentence is crucial for Buddhists because they put so much emphasis on understanding the verbal expressions of the Buddha. But this can be problematic under their metaphysical framework of momentariness, and their epistemological framework of multiple consciousnesses. This paper starts by reviewing the theory of five states of mind in the Yogācārabhūmi, and then investigates debates among medieval East Asian Yogācāra thinkers about how various consciousnesses work together to understand the meaning of a sentence. The major differences between the various explanations proffered lie in the minimum number of types of consciousnesses involved, and the minimum linguistic marks (sound, syllable, term, sentence and meaning) cognized, in order for one to understand a sentence consisting of four Chinese characters. I show that in these disputes, two points are key: First, the role played by the mental consciousness that arises simultaneously with a sensory consciousness: that is to say, whether a sensory consciousness should still be regarded as essential for understanding, if the simultaneous mental consciousness also cognizes the same mark. Second, whether the syntactic structure of a sentence is taken into consideration: that is to say, whether there is a separate determination of understanding regarding each character, or there is no determination until one has heard two or more characters and takes them as a syntactically meaningful unit.     

The nature of the Mādhyamika trick

This paper evaluates several recent efforts to interpret the work of Nāgārjuna through the lens of modern symbolic logic. An attempt is made to uncover the premises that justify the use of symbolic logic for this purpose. This is accomplished through a discussion of (1) the historical origins of those premises in the Indian and Tibetan traditions, and (2) how such assumptions prejudice our understanding of Nāgā rjuna’s insistence that he has no “proposition” (pratijñā). Finally, the paper sets forth an alternative interpretation that takes into account the literary dimensions of Nāgārjuna’s writing.     

Classical Sāṁkhya on the Authorship of the Vedas

The question as to whether the Vedas have an author is the topic of vivid polemics in Indian philosophy. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the classical Sāṁkhya view on the authorship of the Vedas. The research is based chiefly on the commentaries to the Sāṁkhyakārikā definition of authoritative verbal testimony given by the classical Sāṁkhya writers, for these fragments provide the main evidence (both direct and indirect) for the reconstruction of this view. The textual analysis presented in this paper leads to the following conclusion. According to most classical Sāṁkhya commentaries, the Vedas have no author. Two commentators state directly that the Vedas have no author, and four commentators allude to the authorlessness of the Vedas. Only one commentator seems to hold the opposite view, stating that all the authoritative utterances are based on perception or inference of imperceptible objects by authoritative persons, from which it follows that the Vedas too have an author or authors.     

Two Investigations on the Madhyamakakārikās and the Vigrahavyāvartanī

Purpose of the article is to provide support for the contention that two fundamental treatises representing the teaching of Madhyamaka, viz. the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās and the Vigrahavyāvartanī, were designed to establish and justify a metaphysical tenet claiming that no particulars of any kind can exist on some level of final analysis and that this was the only primary concern of those works. Whereas the former text is in the first place dedicated to providing proofs of the central metaphysical thesis the major objective of the second treatise lies in a defense of the claim against possible objections. A correlate of this view regarding the content of those two works is on the one hand that the philosophy of the founder of the Madhyamaka-school essentially consists in a metaphysical teaching implying a radical rejection of a stance propagated in earlier Buddhist schools according to which objects of ordinary experience could be reduced to or explained by the existence of other sorts of particulars that can be theoretically postulated. On the other hand the exegesis advocated in the article implies that theorems pertaining to the nature of language or the relationship between language and non-linguistic reality are not at all a predominant issue in the pertinent texts and presumably were not a major matter of concern of early Madhyamaka in general. Accordingly matters pertaining to questions of semantics attain relevance at best in the form of objective consequences which the metaphysical doctrine might entail. The paper focuses on the second chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās as well as the segment of the Vigrahavyāvartanī which deals with the first major problem, represented by the verses 1–4 and 21–29. The reason is that a detailed and thoroughgoing investigation of these two textual passages is suited to disprove a contention voiced by Western scholars who suppose that the teaching of the founder of Madhyamaka embodies a particular claim pertaining to the relationship between language and non-linguistic reality.     

Nirvāṇa and Tathatā in the Early Yogācāra Texts: The Bodhisattva’s Adaptation of the Śrāvaka-Path

Indian and Chinese commentaries on the Bodhisattva-path assign to it a path of seeing analogous to that of the ?rāvaka-path. Consequently, the non- discursive insight of the bodhisattva is usually taken to be equivalent to the insight of the ?rāvaka when s/he experiences the unconditioned. Yet a matter of concern for the bodhisattva in the Prajñāpāramitā literatures and many other earlier Mahāyāna texts is that s/he should not realize the unconditioned (=nirvā?a) in the practice of the path before s/he attains Buddhahood. Because the bodhisattva has to accumulate immeasurable kalpas of merits in order to attain Buddhahood, s/he does not want to end the circle of existence by realizing the unconditioned. Ending the circle of existence would deprive her/him of the chance to attain Buddhahood. An early extant system of the Bodhisattva-path delineated in the Yogācārabhūmi (YBh), especially in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BoBh) follows these early Mahāyāna sūtras in the treatment of the unconditioned. However, according to BoBh, the bodhisattva beginning from the first level can take rebirths at will and at the eighth level s/he enters into Suchness (tathatā) with non-discursive knowledge (nirvikalpajñāna). On the other hand, the bodhisattva has no esteem for the unconditioned and abstains from the abandonment of all defilements and the realization of nirvā?a. By comparing the Bodhisattva-path in BoBh with the ?rāvaka-path delineated especially in the ?rāvakabhūmi (SrBh) of the same YBh system this paper tests whether the insight of the bodhisattva or the insight of Suchness is endowed with properties equivalent to the transcendental status of nirvā?a or whether the insight of Suchness is a mundane insight, which still falls short of nirvā?a.     

Rāmānuja's theory of Karman

Conclusion Performance of duty [dharma], without attachment to results, eradicates evil action [karman] and thus promotes the growth ofbhakti, which is the sole means of attainingmoksa. Although associated with such internal (mental or intellectual) activity asdhyna, jñna, vedana andvidy, bhakti nevertheless demands the external practice of daily and occasional activity —karman — prescribed by Scripture. If one neglects to perform thekarman enjoined for one's caste and stage of life, one's mind will be corrupted and will be incapable of attaining knowledge (meditation) of the personalbrahman. If one'skarman is associated withbhakti, one can attain the Lord through His grace. In Rmnuja's scheme,karman is thus not only a prerequisite for the origination of meditation on the Lord, but also for acquisition of perfect knowledge (para-bhakti) of Him. Obviously,karman, unlikebhakti, is not a direct means of salvation: it is only an auxiliary. Rmnuja, however, emphasizes thatkarman should be continued as long as one lives. Rmnuja's discussion ofkarman thus provides a theoretical foundation to his position that the karma-mmmsa — the philosophical study and interpretation of ritual activity — is indispensable to the inquiry intobrahman.     

Remarks on the Visuddhimagga,and on its treatment of the Memory of Former Dwelling(s) (pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa)

Journal of Indian Philosophy -     

A Śaiva Interpretation of the Satkāryavāda: The Sāṃkhya Notion of Abhivyakti and Its Transformation in the Pratyabhijñā Treatise

It is a well-known fact that the ?aiva nondualistic philosopher Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) adopted the Sā?khya principle according to which the effect must exist in some way before the operation of its cause (satkāryavāda). Johannes Bronkhorst has highlighted the paradox inherent in this appropriation: Utpaladeva is a staunch supporter of the satkāryavāda, but whereas Sā?khya authors consider it as a means of proving the existence of an unconscious matter, the ?aiva exploits it so as to establish his monistic idealism, in perfect contradiction with the Sā?khya dualism of matter and consciousness. How does Utpaladeva achieve this complete reversal of meaning of the satkāryavāda? The present article argues that the elliptical verses of the ī?varapratyabhijñākārikā dealing with this issue have been partly misunderstood so far due to the loss of Utpaladeva’s own detailed commentary (Vivr?ti) on this passage: Abhinavagupta’s two commentaries, however terse in this respect, clearly show that a crucial part of Utpaladeva’s reasoning remains implicit in the verses. The article therefore attempts to reconstruct the gist of Utpaladeva’s strategy by having recourse to various other ?aiva sources, including Somānanda’s ?ivadr???i and Utpaladeva’s own commentary thereon. This examination shows that Utpaladeva’s appropriation of the satkāryavāda rests on a profound transformation of the Sā?khya notions of manifestation (abhivyakti) and potentiality (?akti), and that his criticism of the Sā?khya understanding of causality might target the ?aiva dualists as well as Sā?khya authors.     

Svabhāvavāda and the Cārvāka/Lokāyata: A Historical Overview

svabh??va (own being) and yad?chh?? (chance, accident) are named as two different claimants among others as the first cause (jagatk??ra?a) in the ?vUp. But in later works, such as A?vagho?a??s poems, svabh??va is synonymous with yad?chh?? and entails a passive attitude to life. Later still, svabh??va is said to be inhering in the Lok??yata materialist system, although in which sense??cosmic order or accident??is not always clearly mentioned. Svabh??va is also a part of the S???khya doctrine and is mentioned in the medical compilations. It is proposed that the idea of svabh??va as cosmic order became a part of Lok??yata between the sixth and the eighth century ce and got widely accepted by the tenth century, so much so that in the fourteenth century S??ya?a-M??dhava aka Vidy??ra?ya could categorically declare that the C??rv??ka/Lok??yata upheld causality, not chance. But the other meaning of svabh??va, identical with yad?chh??, continued to circulate along with k??la, time, which was originally another claimant for the title of the first cause and similarly had acquired several significations in course of time. Both significations of svabh??va continued to be employed by later writers, and came to be used in another domain, that of daiva (fate) vis-à-vis puru?ak??ra (manliness or human endeavour).     

Naming the Seventh Consciousness in Yogācāra

Journal of Indian Philosophy - The Yogācāra School presents the seventh consciousness as the internal mental faculty of the sixth consciousness. According to the Hīnayāna...     

Some Further Comments on the First Section of the Vigrahavyāvartanī

The publication deals with topics concerning the interpretation of the Vigrahavyāvartanī in as much as they are relevant for the understanding of (early) Madhyamaka-philosophy in general. A major part of the article is dedicated to a critical assessment of a number of views which have been propagated recently in a paper by Sharma (In: Nagoya studies in Indian culture and Buddhism, Saṃbhāṣā, 2011). A primary goal of the present investigation consists in substantiating the claim that early Madhyamaka represents a metaphysical teaching which stands in sharp contrast not only to stances of common sense but also to tenets propagated in Buddhist dogmatics.