George W. Bush, the Party System, and American Federalism

George W. Bush's presidency presents two major puzzles. TheRepublican Party has traditionally stood for "limited government,"but Bush's principal legacy for federalism is centralizationof power in the federal government and the executive branch.Most modern presidents have neglected their partisan duties,but Bush has been a uniquely vigorous party leader. Here, weshow that Bush's puzzling lack of attention to federalism issuesis in large part the result of his efforts to strengthen theRepublican Party to cope with the political and electoral challengescharacteristic of the contemporary political context. We explainwhy the Bush administration's strategy for redressing the Republicanparty's shortcomings has presupposed the deprecation of federalism,and consider the implications of our argument for the developmentof federal arrangements.     

The State of U.S. Federalism, 2000-2001: Continuity in Crisis

Despite the 2000 presidential-election crisis, basic continuityprevailed in American federalism, including survival of theelectoral college and furtherance of the more recent shift offederal policymaking from places to persons during today's eraof coercive or regulatory federalism. The year revealed theenduring salience of political parties and the prominent roleof interest groups in the politics of federalism, as well asthe ways in which the federal system shapes, and is shaped by,policy debates. The U.S. Supreme Court continued its state-friendlydecision-making while Congress continued to preempt state authority,attach new conditions to federal aid, federalize criminal law,and nationalize power even while giving state and local governmentsmore administrative discretion. The year also illustrated thedeclining impact of federal aid on state-local revenues comparedto the increasing fiscal impact of the federal government'ssubstantive, monetary, and fiscal policies.     

How Bush bungled Asia: militarism,economic indifference and unilateralism have weakened the United States across Asia

Abstract

Criticism of the Bush administration's policies in East Asia is hardly common fare. Roseate colors certainly pervade the picture painted by defenders of Bush's policies toward Asia who argue that relations between the US and that region have never been better. This paper shows to the contrary that the Bush administration politicized wide swaths of public policy, including foreign relations, in an effort to create a permanent Republican electoral majority. That effort created a host of failures in America's Asian relations. The article focuses on three central problems: excessive militarization of American foreign policy; economic mismanagement; and a unilateralism that distanced the US from the rising Asian regionalism. The failures are not irreversible however and a change in administration has the potential to revitalize cross Pacific ties.     

The State of American Federalism, 2004: Is Federalism Still a Core Value?

Federalism as a political issue was conspicuously absent fromthe 2004 presidential contest. Unlike many previous campaigns,neither party's candidate made much mention of problems besettingstates and localities. The war against global terrorism andthe changing situation in Iraq shaped the election. Progresswas made on homeland security, but intergovernmental wranglingover federal grants continued unabated. Federal-state feudswere common in several policy areas, including education, environmentalprotection, and health care. State finances received a revenueboost as economic growth picked up, but rising costs for Medicaid,education, employee pensions, and prisons clouded states' financialforecasts. The U.S. Supreme Court decided several cases witha federalism dimension, and these decisions plus those of thepast several years suggest the Court has moved not so much togrant more power to the states but to prune back the power ofCongress. Much of what has happened during the first Bush administrationmust be seen against the larger background of changes in theAmerican political party system. Changes in party organizationand policy control, especially during the first Bush administration,reaffirm David Walker's assessment that over the past quartercentury American federalism has become more nationalized.     

Political Parties and Intergovernmental Relations in 1984: The Consequences of Party Renewal for Territorial Constituencies

Democratic and Republican efforts at party renewal have differedin approach, but both can be recognized as intergovernmentalphenomena having significant implications for American federalism.The Democratic Party's national charter and delegate selectionrules, for instance, have federalized the governing structureof the party. The national Republican Party organization hasdeveloped such a large base of financial resources andcampaignservices that state Republican parties and candidate committeeshave begun to accept national party authority along with itsmoney. Moreover, as national, state, and local parties and candidatesincreasingly coordinate their delegate selection, finance, andother campaigh activities, they may transform the decentralizedparty system that has been a protector of state and local influencewithin the federal government. National ideological constituencieswithin both party organizations may rival territorial and functionalconstituencies for the attention of federal elected officials.     

Federalism and Social Policy: The Case of Domestic Violence

This paper challenges long standing critiques of federalism that suggest it stymies the development of progressive social policies. Through a case study of national domestic violence policies in Australia, this paper argues that not only can the curses of federalism – especially conservatism, duplication and overlap – be surmounted, but even more positively, under the right condition, federalism can enhance opportunities for the development of progressive social policy. While the Howard government has adopted a conservative approach to domestic violence, federal structures have made it possible to maintain an alternative discourse at the state level. Moreover, national policy coordination machinery has opened the path for policy learning and innovation between governments in this social policy area.     

Women,Federalism and Women Friendly Policies

Australian women activists have never been enthusiastic about federalism because of its reputation as a system that restricts the scope of government and obstructs the path of progressive social change. Like their sisters in other countries, women's groups have sought collectivist solutions to economic and social problems. In the last couple of decades, however, orthodox ideas about the restrictive impact of federalism have been questioned. A revisionist view has emerged, which holds that the system sometimes facilitates the adoption of innovative policies and may lead to an expansion of the role of government. The revisionist perspective raises the question of whether women's groups have been wise to oppose federalism. This article examines relevant Canadian and Australian studies in order to test the validity of orthodox and revisionist perspectives and to draw conclusions about appropriate feminist approaches to federalism. The evidence is mixed. The main argument of this article is that, to the extent that we can distinguish its independent effect, federalism sometimes obstructs policy development and sometimes facilitates it. There are serious methodological problems involved in trying to isolate the impact of the federal variable from the many factors that influence policy, making generalisations precarious. Experience, therefore, offers little guidance to women's groups seeking to decide whether to support centralised or decentralised decision‐making structures. However, this study concludes that in the context of present Australian federal arrangements, women are more likely to achieve their aims when the Commonwealth government takes action, either alone or in cooperation with sub‐national jurisdictions.     

The Politics of Regulatory Change: National Forest Management Planning under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush

This paper examines regulatory change from the William J. Clinton administration through the presidency of George W. Bush by focusing on their respective efforts to alter national forest planning procedures mandated by the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA). While rule making has become an important alternative pathway for making policy, the strategies used to develop a new rule may vary among presidents because of differing values and management styles. Both presidents were adept at framing the planning regulation to reflect dominant values such as preserving ecosystems (Clinton) or administrative efficiency (Bush). Between‐administration differences in regulatory tactics also tended to alter the relative importance of institutional venues and, by extension, the influence exercised by differing political constituencies.     

Pretexts and US foreign policy: the war on terrorism in historical perspective

This article analyzes the way that US foreign policy élites have used pretexts to manage public opinion. Policymakers, it is argued, often seize upon threatening external events, and use these events to create a favorable political climate in which to “sell” policies of militarization and external expansion to the public. The article argues that the Bush administration has used the threat of terrorism as a pretext to implement a wide range of policies that had been decided upon in advance of the 9/11 attacks. It also argues that the recent uses of pretexts by the Bush administration have strong historical precedents: extended case studies of pretexts are presented for the events surrounding the Korea crisis of 1950 and the Afghanistan crisis of 1979–1980, as well as the more recent War on Terrorism.     

The Economics of Nigerian Federalism: Selected Issues in Economic Management

Nigeria's economic difficulties are due primarily to public-sectormismanagement exacerbated by the dynamics of federalism andstate creation and by the growth in centralized federal power.Monetary policy has been inadequate, fiscal policy has rewardedstate governments but not brought their spending policies inline with their own resources and with national economic objectives,and resources have been consistently misallocated, largely becauseof the principle of "federal character." Recent efforts to deregulateand privatize the economy show promise, but the success of economicdevelopment will depend greatly on the future civilian or militarygovernance of Nigeria.     

Administration and Governance in a Compound Republic: Martha Derthick’s Contributions to the Study of American Federalism

Martha Derthick is among the most influential scholars of American federalism, administrative behavior, and domestic policy making. Her work over a half century has pioneered the study of policy implementation, administrative and political relationships in federal grant programs, intergovernmental policy making, as well as the evolution of the federal system. This essay reviews her major intellectual contributions to the fields of federalism, public administration, and intergovernmental relations.     

Exploring Regionalism in the Federal District Courts

This study explores regionalism in the appointment and decisionmakingpatterns of federal district judges. We begin with an examinationof the general appointment strategies of Ronald Reagan, JimmyCarter, and other recent presidents. The role of local constraintsin this process is emphasized. Next, the behavior of federaldistrict judges appointed by recent presidents is analyzed bycomparing levels of support for civil rights and civil libertiesclaims in cases decided during the 1977–1985 period. TheReagan appointees' support scores are compared with those ofjudges appointed by Carter and other recent Democratic and Republicanpresidents. Comparisons are made in the nation as a whole andalso across circuits and states. Our findings indicate thatthe Reagan appointees are less supportive of civil rights andliberties claims than judges named to the bench by Carter orother recent Democratic and Republican presidents.     

Forecast dispersion,dissenting votes,and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects

Using data from 1992 to 2001, we study the impact of members’ economic forecasts on the probability of casting dissenting votes in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Employing standard ordered probit techniques, we find that higher individual inflation and real GDP growth forecasts (relative to the committee’s median) significantly increase the probability of dissenting in favor of tighter monetary policy, whereas higher individual unemployment rate forecasts significantly decrease it. Using interaction models, we find that FOMC members with longer careers in government, industry, academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or on the staff of the Board of Governors are more focused on output stabilization, while FOMC members with longer careers in the financial sector or on the staffs of regional Federal Reserve Banks are more focused on inflation stabilization. We also find evidence that politics matters, with Republican appointees being much more focused on inflation stabilization than Democratic appointees. Moreover, during the entire Clinton administration ‘natural’ monetary policy preferences of Bank presidents and Board members for inflation and output stabilization were more pronounced than under periods covering the administrations of both George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, respectively.     

Pragmatic Federalism: Australian Federalism from Hawke to Howard

The article explores the nature of Australian federalism by examining four major themes in the period from Hawke to Howard. The investigation of these themes – Australian conceptions of federalism; the role of party in shaping federalism; the way problems and politics have influenced policy‐making and thereby federalism; and the nature of federal judicial review – suggests that Australian federalism can most accurately be characterised as pragmatic. It appears as a federalism shaped by pressing problems, specific policy agendas and the prevailing political dynamic, rather than by overarching conceptions of federalism derived from political theory or articulated in party ideology. This pragmatic federalism explains important aspects of Australian federalism, especially the trend towards centralisation of authority.     

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING POLICY AND FEDERALISM

There are widespread misperceptions about the way in which American federalism has worked in the past and is working now. One is the belief that since the 1930s, the federal government has engaged in many new activities. Another misperception is that liberals support centralization and conservatives, decentralization. Actually, most Americans tend to be pragmatic. The vitality of this American pragmatism is seen in state economic development policies. States have provided leadership in initiating new economic development programs in such areas as foreign trade and enterprise zones. Four major patterns in American federalism characterize the emergence and development of most of these programs: responsiveness, elitism, pluralism, and experimentation. Implications for employment and training policy are examined.     

Federalism and suitable housing for the frail elderly: A comparison of policies in Canada and the United States

Abstract

The frail elderly have special multidimensional housing needs beyond affordability, including shelter that is more adaptive to reduced function and offers supportive services. Suitable housing for this population comprises three policy areas—housing, health care, and social services. In a federal system, development and implementation of policies in these areas involves participation of several levels of government and the nongovernmental sector. This paper uses federalism as a conceptual framework to examine and compare these policy areas in Canada and the United States.

In both countries, general national housing policies—relying heavily on the nongovernmental sector and characterized by joint federal‐provincial programs in Canada and by important local government roles and age‐specific programs in the United States‐have benefited the elderly. The effects of such policies on the frail elderly, however, have been less positive because of the general lack of essential human services and, to a lesser degree, health care that enables them to live outside institutions. This is especially true in the United States, where health care policy is fragmented and is dominated by a private insurance system, partial federal financing of health insurance for the elderly, and tense federal‐state relations in financing health care for the poor. Although Canadian policies and programs operate autonomously and more uniformly within a national health plan, neither country has a universal, comprehensive long‐term care system. Geographically diverse patterns of social services, funded by grants to states and provinces and the nonprofit sector, are common to both countries. However, the United States has inadequately funded age‐specific programs and has relied on a growing commercial service provision. Housing outcomes for frail elders are moving in the right direction in both countries; however, Canada seems to be better positioned, largely because of its health care system. As increased decentralization continues to characterize the three policy areas that affect suitable housing for frail elders, the United States can learn from Canada's negotiated federalism approach to more uniform solutions to merging housing and long‐term care.     

Origin, Operation, and Significance: The Federalism of William H. Riker

William Riker transformed the study of federalism by advancingboth a methodological approach and numerous substantive propositions.Methodologically, he introduced students of federalism to thescientific approach of positive political science, illustratingthe development of "testable and tested generalizations." Substantively,he explained the origins of federal systems as a bargain amongpolitical leaders with expansionist and militaristic concerns.He argued that the United States was a politically centralizedfederal system from its founding. He linked the degree of centralizationin federal systems to the degree of centralization among theirpolitical parties. Despite all his work, though, Riker ultimatelydismissed federalism as a minor institution having little impacton policy outcomes.     

When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy

U.S. cities are limited in their ability to set policy. Can these constraints mute the impact of mayors’ partisanship on policy outcomes? We hypothesize that mayoral partisanship will more strongly affect outcomes in policy areas where there is less shared authority between local, state, and federal governments. To test this hypothesis, we create a novel dataset combining U.S. mayoral election returns from 1990 to 2006 with city fiscal data. Using regression discontinuity design, we find that cities that elect a Democratic mayor spend a smaller share of their budget on public safety, a policy area where local discretion is high, than otherwise similar cities that elect a Republican or an Independent. We find no differences on tax policy, social policy, and other areas that are characterized by significant overlapping authority. These results suggest that models of national policymaking are only partially applicable to U.S. cities. They also have implications for political accountability: mayors may not be able to influence the full range of policies that are nominally local responsibilities.     

How to not speak the ‘F‐word’: Federalism between mirage and imperative in the euro crisis

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.