Independence of the Court of Justice of the European Union: Unchecked Member States power after the Sharpston Affair

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the apex of the EU legal order, and is the supreme arbiter of EU law. For decades, it has delivered judgments, collectively shaping European integration and ‘integration through law’. It has undoubtedly been an authoritative leader in entrenching a European judicial culture, and has benefited from the cardinal principle of judicial independence enshrined in the EU Treaties, which in turn, it has insisted on being upheld as regards national courts. Questions have rarely arisen, however, about judicial independence of the CJEU. The Sharpston Affair of 2020–2021 opened the door to questioning such judicial independence. Is the CJEU at the mercy of the Member States? If so, what are the consequences for the EU legal order? This article reflects on the judicial independence of the CJEU, and offers reflections on how it can be preserved in the future.     

Who is steering the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice? The influence of Member State submissions on copyright law

The juridification of the European policy process is increasingly fragile, and little understood. This study develops a novel methodology to investigate the influence of Member States on the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The focus is on the domain of copyright law which has seen a dramatic escalation of preliminary references to the Court, indicating a normative void. Examining 170 documents relating to 42 cases registered between 1998 and 2015, we measure empirically the impact of submissions by Member States and the European Commission on the interpretation of copyright concepts. We show that France is the most influential country by some distance, both in terms of the number of interventions (an ‘investment’ in policy) and in terms of persuasive power (arguments adopted by the Court). The evidence also suggests that the departure of the UK from EU litigation will disturb the delicate balance of CJEU jurisprudence.     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.     

The Limitations of a Multilingual Legal System

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the way in which it works can be seen as a microcosm of how a multilingual, multicultural supranationalisation process and legal order can be constructed—the Court is a microcosm of the EU as a whole and in particular of EU law. The multilingual jurisprudence produced by the CJEU is necessarily shaped by the dynamics within that institution and by the ‘cultural compromises’ at play in the production process. The resultant texts, which make up that jurisprudence, are hybrid in nature and inherently approximate. On the one hand, that approximation can lead to discrepancies between language versions of the Court’s case law and thus jeopardise the uniform application of EU law. On the other hand, that approximation and hybridity define EU law as a distinct, supranational legal order. This paper analyses the operation of the CJEU and considers whether a linguistic cultural compromise exists within that institution which exercises a formative influence on the character of its ‘output’—i.e. its jurisprudence—and what that may mean for our understanding of the development of EU law.     

Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals?

While European Union (EU) citizenship has traditionally been key to limiting criminalisation at national level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in its case‐law, where crimes show the offender's disregard for the societal values of the host Member States, and deny his/her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serves to legitimate criminal law. The Court outlines two—counterposing—types of human being: the law‐abiding citizen and the criminal. The article shows the legal unsoundness of the Court's approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case‐law over a crime–citizenship spectrum, marked at its opposing ends by Duff's communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one hand, and Jakobs' criminal law of the enemy, on the other.     

Rules for Rights: European Law,Health Care and Social Citizenship

Social citizenship is about equality. The obvious problem for European social citizenship in a very diverse Union is that Member States will not be able or willing to bear the cost of establishing equal rights to health care and similar aspects of social citizenship. Health care is a particularly good case of this tension between EU citizenship and Member State diversity. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) strengthened the right to health care in other Member States, but this cannot create an equal right to health care when Member States are so different. In its efforts to balance a European right, the Court has formulated ‘rules for rights’—not so much European social citizenship rights, as a set of legal principles by which it judges the decisions of the Member States.     

Towards a common standard of protection of the right to housing in Europe through the charter of fundamental rights

The trend towards the financialisation of housing since the 1980s and the global financial crisis exposed a dramatic lacuna in the legal protection of the right to housing. Yet, the right to housing features not only in national and international human rights instruments, but also in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Charter rights are increasingly finding expression in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In particular, drawing on the Charter, the CJEU's interpretation of EU consumer law is moving towards a recognition of housing rights as inherent components of consumer protection. On the basis of such developments, this article examines whether there is scope to extend this human rights approach to new areas – namely, to the Mortgage Credit Directive (2014) – a major EU harmonising measure – and to the work of EU institutions now responsible for banking supervision. The article concludes that, if guided by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the case law of the CJEU and the practice of supranational banking supervision could significantly enhance the protection of the right to housing, both at EU and Member State level.     

El principio de reconocimiento mutuo en el derecho de la unión europea según la cláusula de “plena fe y crédito” de la constitución de estados unidos

The paper shows a comparative analysis of the law of the united states of america (US) and the european union (EU) focusing on the principle of mutual recognition, which has served as a basis in order to achieve the enforcement of judicial decisions by the authorities of the different Member States. It illustrates the origins and evolution of this principle within the US legal system, as well as its recent implementation within the European integration system with the aim of creating a common space of freedom, security and justice. The paper lists and analizes a substancial number of legal acts adopted so far in the area of civil and criminal law. Furthermore, it highlights the influence the case-law of the US Supreme Court and the Court of Justice of the EU has had on the development of this principle. Moreover, it elaborates on the function of this principle as a nation-building element, raising the question whether this concept could be possibly transposed to a regional integration system with clear federal traits such as the EU.     

EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Autonomy and Adaptation

After the European Union's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights the EU will become subject to legally binding judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and participate in statutory bodies of the Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly; Committee of Ministers) when they act under the Convention. Convention rights and their interpretation by the ECtHR will be directly enforceable against the EU institutions and against Member States when acting within the scope of EU law. This will vest the ECHR with additional force in a number of Member States, including Germany and the UK. All Member States will further be subject to additional constraints when acting under the Convention system. The article considers the reasons for, and consequences of the EU's primus inter pares position under the Convention and within the Council of Europe, and the likely practical effect of the EU's accession for its Member States.     

Of Values and Legitimacy – Discourse Analytical Insights on the Copyright Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) increasingly faces societal value‐conflicts in EU law disputes. For example, in EU copyright law, in the digital age, diverse fundamental values, as well as cultural and societal developments, are at stake. This article discusses the role of the CJEU in the European value discourse, using copyright law as a case study. The methodological approach used, critical discourse analysis, is seldom applied in jurisprudential studies, but is well suited for teasing out value‐related aspects of case law. Exploratory research of seminal copyright cases suggests that the CJEU's discourse of the various values seems unnecessarily one‐sided and shallow. A lack of discursiveness in the jurisprudence would diminish the legitimacy of the Court's decisions, and would not offer adequate guidance to national courts or private decision‐makers, to whom the Court at the same time may be leaving more of the task of value reconciliation.     

Competing Supremacies and Clashing Institutional Rationalities: the Danish Supreme Court's Decision in the Ajos Case and the National Limits of Judicial Cooperation

On 6 December 2016, the Supreme Court of Denmark (SCDK) ruled on the grounds of Ajos case. The ruling concerned the scope of the principle of non‐discrimination on the grounds of age and whether a national court could weigh the principle of non‐discrimination on grounds of age against the principles of legal controversy, as the protection of legitimate expectations. The ruling has caused a great deal of controversy as the SCDK defied clear guidelines from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the ruling. Moreover, the case has been seen by some as an example of a new ‘sovereigntism’ in Danish law that is at odds with the project of European integration through law. This article explains the case from both an EU law and Danish constitutional law perspective. It concludes by providing a set of explanations of the new course of the SCDK in its relationship with the EU.     

Protecting wild land from wind farms in a post-EU Scotland

Scotland is one of the places in Europe to have experienced significant wind farm development over recent years. Concern about impacts on wild land has resulted in legal challenges based on European Union (EU) law. This article analyses whether wild land can be protected from wind farms and the differences that the United Kingdom departure from the EU will make. It considers the concept of ‘wild land’ compared with ‘wilderness’, analyses the legal basis (if any) for wild land protection and examines potential impacts from wind farms. It highlights the significance of EU environmental law, particularly nature conservation and environmental assessment law, and analyses recent Scottish jurisprudence that has applied this. The role of the European Commission and Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) is emphasised as a key part of EU environmental law. The article asks whether relevant global and regional environmental agreements can effectively replace the content of the substantive law and context of the Commission and CJEU. Four environmental agreements and two related compliance procedures are briefly evaluated. The conclusion is that while EU law does not directly provide protection for wild land, it is considerably stronger than the international environmental agreements that may replace it.     

Bridging the gap between facts and norms: mutual trust,the European Arrest Warrant and the rule of law in an interdisciplinary context

The rule-of-law-backsliding in some Member States has subverted not only one of the EU fundamental values but also trust among national authorities when implementing European Arrest Warrants (EAW). However, when evaluating the execution of EAWs issued by countries experiencing rule-of-law crises, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) sought to preserve judicial cooperation and imposed a rather “top-down” view on mutual trust among Member States. This approach seemingly disregards the (dis)trust which has emerged in the EU due to rule-of-law-backsliding and fails to acknowledge the psycho-sociological nature of trust. Drawing on the trust literature, the paper offers novel conceptual elements to rethink mutual trust in the EAW framework. Notably, it critically assesses some of the gaps in the CJEU's interpretation of mutual trust and advances suggestions to embed empirical considerations in the conceptualisation of this principle to bridge the gap between trust in practice and in principle.     

Holding to Account a Possible European Public Prosecutor Supranational Governance and Accountability Across Diverse Legal Traditions

The Lisbon Treaty provides a legal basis for the Member States of the European Union (EU) to establish a European Public Prosecutor (EPP) with competence to prosecute, in the courts of the Member States, crimes against the financial interests of the Union. Article 86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, provides that the Member States may unanimously, or through flexible cooperation where nine Member States agree, establish such a European-level prosecution body, with the possibility for its powers to be extended by unanimity to include serious crime having a cross border dimension or affecting more than one Member State. Within the legal traditions of the Member States, means of holding prosecution authorities to account vary considerably. Probably the strongest form of accountability exists in the civil law tradition of Member States that permit appeals to judicial bodies for decisions not to prosecute, which contrasts with the traditional common law reluctance to even give reasons for not prosecuting. Similarly, the ways in which prosecution authorities interact or overlap with police functions, and thus with general mechanisms of police and/or bureaucratic accountability, differ. Some of the particular features of EU cooperation suggest additional accountability issues, notably, questions concerning competence spill-over and problems of remoteness. This paper seeks to address how to conceptualise governance and accountability of a possible EPP outside of the context of a trial (the latter entailing a type of open legal accountability that can be studied in its own right) and including the question of the definition of competences.     

Private Damages Actions Under EU Competition Policy: An Exploration of the Ongoing Sea Change in Respect of Such Actions Concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU Infringements

The EU has an established history of public enforcement concerning antitrust infringements under what are now Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Yet, until recently, this has not been true in respect of private compensatory damages actions in relation to the said articles. Hence, these actions are now seen as reinforcing the existing deterrent provided by pubic enforcement fines. This paper focuses upon the ongoing sea change that aims to enable and encourage compensatory damages claims in relation to harm caused by breaches of 101 and 102 TFEU. It reveals that both the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Commission have played pioneering roles in advancing this sea change. It further asserts that, although the rulings of the CJEU have created a hybrid architecture that makes possible private actions in relation to the said breaches under Member state procedural laws before national courts, the architecture itself is problematic as it fails to guarantee that Member states’ procedural rules have a high degree of uniformity, thereby failing to guarantee a regulatory level playing field across the Union concerning the said damages actions. Moreover, not only is the architecture problematic, but it needed further development in respect of rules and requirements in several key areas, such as the right of evidential disclosure, the limitation period issue, collective redress and the quantification of harm, so as to facilitate and encourage claims. The Commission was aware of these concerns, and this paper explores its response. The issues could have been addressed by the establishment of a set of EU procedural rules which national courts would apply in the said actions but the Commission decided upon a different way forward. Working with the said hybrid architecture, and through the vehicle of the 2014 Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, the Commission has amended and created rules and requirements which will form part of Member states’ domestic procedural law—and therefore will be applied by national courts—in order to establish a more level regulatory playing field across the Union which should facilitate and encourage private compensatory damages actions for harm caused by EU antitrust breaches. Of course, a more level playing field means that differences will still remain. Moreover, it will be some time before the success of the Directive can be gauged, and further measures may be required in the future.     

The joined cases of Dwyer,SpaceNet and VD and SR before the European Court of Justice: The judgments of the Grand Chamber about data retention continue falling on deaf ears in Member States

On 5 April and 20 September 2022, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice rendered three judgments in the cases of Dwyer, SpaceNet and VD and SR. It mainly reiterated its own applicable case law on the retention of and access to traffic and location data. In the VD and SR judgment, the Grand Chamber however expanded its scope to the area of market abuse.Legislation adopted by Member States and decisions rendered by most domestic courts, tribunals and judges do not fully comply with the case law of the Grand Chamber on the retention of and access to traffic and location data. In this particular context, the EU legislature should urgently adopt EU secondary legislation on the retention of personal data to provide legal clarity to all players involved.     

Foreign Investors in the EU—Which ‘Best Treatment’? Interactions Between Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law

Abstract: This article discusses the main interactions between bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and EU law. The European Commission identified a number of incompatibilities in BITs signed by eight recent Member States with the USA, proposing solutions for their adjustment in conformity with EU law, but was this step sufficient? The risk of disputes remains, as long as the proposed adjustments do not achieve legal force and as long as other BITs still need to be harmonised with EU law. Moreover, provisions in BITs that are not in conflict with EU law could still be challenged if the application of certain EU requirements by Member States interferes with foreign investors' rights. To avoid such risks, coherence between different commitments and practices of the Member States is needed and coordination at the EU level is highly desirable.     

Variations in Member States’ Preliminary References to the Court of Justice—Are Structural Factors (Part of) the Explanation?

The preliminary reference procedure in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which enables national courts to request the Court of Justice to provide a ruling on the interpretation or validity of an EU legal act, is widely considered to be the jewel in the crown of EU law. When considering the number of references from different Member States, it will become immediately apparent that there are considerable variations. This article examines to what extent these variations may be explained by three structural factors, namely (1) population size, (2) willingness to litigate and (3) Member State compliance with EU law. It is concluded that some—but not all—of the variations in number of references from Member State judiciaries may be attributed to structural factors rather than being merely a reflection of different Member State courts’ willingness to make use of Article 267 TFEU on such references (the so‐called behavioural factors).     

The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship and Free Movement in an Enlarged Union

Abstract The concept of citizenship is analysed on three seemingly contradictory levels: its integration by the recent case law of the European Court of Justice into the existing free movement acquis, its restriction in the accession treaties with new Member States concerning free movement of workers, and its redefinition by new Member States themselves. The result is a somewhat blurred picture: While the European Court of Justices uses citizenship to fill gaps left by primary and secondary law mostly with regard to non‐discrimination, the accession treaties have allowed a ‘re‐nationalisation’ of free movement, against the promises of equality inherent in the citizenship concept, which also includes nationals from new Member countries. The concept of citizenship itself in new Member countries, as the examples of Latvia and Estonia on the one hand, and Hungary on the other demonstrate, is very much related to the (somewhat sad) lessons of the past and therefore highly politicised; it has not been shaped with regard to free movement in the EU. The author suggests a gradual ‘communitarisation’ of citizenship itself even though the EU seems to miss competence in this area, for example, by paying greater attention to residence as basis for Community rights.     

The Troika: The Interlocking Roles of Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium,Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL in the Creation of the European Legal Order

Through comparisons with dispute resolution procedures in the North American Free Trade Area's Side Agreements, and with the debate over the direct effect of World Trade Organization obligations in the European legal order, this paper demonstrates that three of the European Court of Justice's most important decisions—Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium, Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL—should be understood as combining to reorganise general international law's relationship between the EU Member States by substituting national court application of European obligations for the use of interstate retaliation as an enforcement mechanism, and thus providing the foundations for the EU's distinctive legal order.