The Emergence of Penal Extremism in California: A Dynamic View of Institutional Structures and Political Processes

This article examines legal and political developments in California in the 1970s and early 1980s that led to extreme changes in the state's use of imprisonment. It uses historical research methods to illustrate how institutional and political processes interacted in dynamic ways that continuously unsettled and reshaped the crime policy field. It examines crime policy developments before and after the passage of the state's determinate sentencing law to highlight the law's long‐term political implications and to illustrate how it benefited interest groups pushing for harsher punishment. It emphasizes the role executives played in shaping these changes, and how the law's significance was as much political as legal because it transformed the institutional logics that structured criminal lawmaking. These changes, long sought by the law enforcement lobby, facilitated crime's politicization and ushered in a new era of frenetic and punitive changes in criminal law and punishment. This new context benefited politicians who supported extreme responses to crime and exposed the crime policy process to heightened degrees of popular scrutiny. The result was a political obsession with crime that eschewed moderation and prioritized prison expansion above all else.     

Time in Law's Domain

Law bends the past of a community's common life towards its future. 1 Precedent is one of law's favored tools for doing the bending, and legal systems that assign precedent a starring role seem especially mindful of time. Yet, mindfulness of time goes far deeper into law's DNA. It is not limited to the doctrine of precedent or unique to common‐law jurisdictions. Recognizing that time is an elemental dimension of human experience and basic ordering principle of practical agency, law utilizes and orders time. Temporality is essential to law's distinctive mode of governance and guidance.     

Practical‐Political Jurisprudence and the Dual Nature of Law

Law contains many dualities, though most, if not all, of these dualities resolve into one complex puzzle: To what extent is law a matter of pure social facts, or moral value untethered to social facts? I argue that each concept of law reconciles this duality in a different way on the basis of certain beneficial consequences that might result. Instead of pitting concepts against one another universally, we should accept that the balance between law's social fact and moral value dimensions is context‐specific in relation to particular legal puzzles. This balance can be achieved only by considering both political theory and empirical data.     

Employment Discrimination Law and Industrial Psychology: Social Science as Social Authority and the Co‐Production of Law and Science

This article combines Monahan and Walker's classification of social facts, social authority, and social frameworks with political‐institutionalism's view of law and science as competing institutional logics to explain how, and with what consequences, employment discrimination law and industrial‐organizational (I‐O) psychology became co‐produced. When social science is incorporated into enforcement of legislative law as social authority—rationale for judicial rule making—law's institutional logic of relying on precedent and reasoning by analogy ensures that social science will have ongoing influence on law's development. By helping set research agendas and providing new professional opportunities, institutionalized legal doctrine shapes social science knowledge. But because of differences in institutional logic, wherein legal cumulation is backward looking whereas scientific cumulation is forward looking, co‐production of law and science may produce institutional mismatch between legal doctrine and scientific knowledge.     

“Legality with a Vengeance”: Reclaiming Distribution for Sociolegal Studies

The law and society community has argued for decades for an expansive understanding of what counts as “law.” But a content analysis of articles published in the Law & Society Review from its 1966 founding to the present finds that since the 1970s, the law and society community has focused its attention on laws in which the state regulates behavior, and largely ignored laws in which the state distributes resources, goods, and services. Why did socio‐legal scholars avoid studying how laws determine access to such things as health, wealth, housing, education, and food? We find that socio‐legal scholarship has always used “law on the books” as a starting point for analyses (often to identify departures in “law in action”) without ever offering a programmatic vision for how law might ameliorate economic inequality. As a result, when social welfare laws on the books began disappearing, socio‐legal scholarship drifted away from studying law's role in creating, sustaining, and reinforcing economic inequality. We argue that socio‐legal scholarship offers a wide range of analytical tools that could make important contributions to our understanding of social welfare provision.     

The History of Genres: Reaching for Reality in Law and Literature

Genres are historical formations; their ability to generate knowledge depends on their interrelationships within a culture. Since law, too, can be viewed as a genre, studies of specific historical relationalities between law and other genres are necessary for law's own history and theory. This essay discusses differentiations between Victorian law and literature, starting out from the recent publication of Ayelet Ben‐Yishai's Common Precedents: The Presentness of the Past in Victorian Law and Fiction (2013), which reveals some of that history. I examine two points: differentiations in legal and literary approaches to probabilistic knowledge, and differentiations in the author functions in law and literature. These differentiations bear multiple implications. I discuss implications for evidence‐law debates about probabilistic evidence, for contract‐law debates about the centrality of autonomy and self‐authorship, and for understandings of legal reasoning itself—the elusive notion of “thinking like a lawyer.”     

Bilateral Investment Treaties,Credible Commitment,and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?

A long line of research, beginning with Macaulay's (1963) well‐known study of “Non‐Contractual Relations in Business,” suggests that the formal trappings of domestic law often have effects on private behavior that are, at best, “indirect, subtle, and ambiguous” ( Macaulay 1984 :155). Law and society scholars have spent somewhat less time exploring whether international law's effects on behavior are similarly attenuated. In this article I examine whether foreign investors take the presence of strong formal international legal protections into account when deciding where to invest. I focus on whether the presence of bilateral investment treaties, or BITs, meaningfully influences investment decisions. I present results from a statistical analysis that examines whether the formally strongest BITs—those that guarantee investors access to international arbitration to enforce investors' international legal rights—are associated with greater investment flows. I find no clear link between treaty protections and investment, a finding consistent with past law and society research but in tension with claims common in the BIT literature that the treaties should have dramatic effects on investor behavior.     

The Evolutionary Game‐Theoretic Foundations of Law

Interdisciplinary work in the law often starts and stops with the social sciences. To produce a complete understanding of how law, evolutionary game‐theoretic insights must, however, supplement these more standard social scientific methods. To illustrate, this article critically examines The Force of Law by Frederick Schauer and The Expressive Powers of Law by Richard McAdams. Combining the methods of analytic jurisprudence and social psychology, Schauer clarifies the need for a philosophically respectable and empirically well‐grounded account of the ubiquity of legal sanctions. Drawing primarily on economic and social psychological paradigms, McAdams highlights law's potential to alter human behavior through expressions that coordinate. Still, these contributions generate further puzzles about how law works, which can be addressed using evolutionary game‐theoretic resources. Drawing on these resources, this article argues that legal sanctions are ubiquitous to law not only because they can motivate legal compliance, as Schauer suggests, but also because they provide the general evolutionary stability conditions for intrinsic legal motivation. In reaction to McAdams, this article argues that law's expressive powers can function to coordinate human behavior only because humans are naturally and culturally evolved to share a prior background agreement in forms of life. Evolutionary game‐theoretic resources can thus be used to develop a unified framework from within which to understand some of the complex interrelationships between legal sanctions, intrinsic legal motivation, and law's coordinating power. Going forward, interdisciplinary studies of how law works should include greater syntheses of contemporary insights from evolutionary game theory.     

What Is Transnational Law?

Is it important to conceptualize transnational law and “map” it as a new legal field? This article suggests that to do so might help both juristic practice and sociolegal scholarship in organizing, linking, and comparing disparate but increasingly significant types of regulation. To explore the idea of transnational law is to raise basic questions about the nature of both “law” and “society” (taken as the realm law regulates). This involves radically rethinking relationships between the public and the private, between law and state, and between different sources of law and legal authority. Taking as its focus Von Daniels's The Concept of Law from a Transnational Perspective and Calliess and Zumbansen's Rough Consensus and Running Code (both 2010), the article considers what approaches may be most productive, and what key issues need to be addressed, to make sense of broad trends in law's extension beyond the boundaries of nation‐states.     

Seeking Shelter in Personal Insolvency Law: Recession,Eviction, and Bankruptcy's Social Safety Net

Many legal systems understand consumer insolvency laws as social insurance, providing relief and a ‘fresh start’ to over‐indebted households who fall through gaps in the social safety net. Personal insolvency law in England and Wales in practice functions similarly, but in terms of legal principle and policy is ambivalent – sometimes emphasizing household debt relief, other times creditor wealth maximization. This article assesses, in the context of novel debt problems brought to prominence by recession and austerity, the extent to which the law has embraced personal insolvency's social insurance function. The discussion is framed particularly by the escalating United Kingdom housing crisis and the case of Places for People v. Sharples concerning consumer bankruptcy's (non)protection of debtors from eviction. The analysis illustrates how tensions between conceptual understandings and personal insolvency law's practical operation undermine the law's ability to fulfil its potential to produce positive policy responses to contemporary socio‐economic challenges.     

“Kind of Natural,Kind of Wrong”: Young People's Beliefs about the Morality,Legality, and Normalcy of Sexual Aggression in Public Drinking Settings

Unwelcome touching, groping, and kissing are illegal, but widely tolerated in public drinking settings. This contingency in the law's response means that patrons routinely negotiate the moral boundaries of nonconsensual sexual contact. We use 197 interviews with college‐age individuals to examine the discursive strategies young people employ when negotiating those boundaries. We find that most interviewees have experiences with sexual aggression, do not categorize it as aggression, but advocate for stronger legal punishments against offenders. In accounting for this paradox, they draw on contradictory legal and cultural narratives that both normalize and condemn men's sexual aggression. We build on legal consciousness theories and gender theories by highlighting the complex ways that gender stereotypes enshrined in law are implicated in the construction of a social problem. We also contribute to the sociology of culture by explicating the often unconscious link between culture and action revealed in young people's narratives about sexual aggression.     

Symbol and Substance: Effects of California's Three Strikes Law on Felony Sentencing

California's “three strikes and you're out” law is the most notorious example of the wave of mandatory sentencing policies that many states enacted beginning in the late 1970s. While advocates and critics predicted the law would have profound effects on aggregate punishment trends and individual case outcomes, Feeley and Kamin's analysis of previous sentencing reforms suggested the law's impact would be mainly symbolic because local officials would ignore, subvert, or nullify its major provisions. While aggregate analyses have tended to confirm this argument, so far there has been no systematic test of the law's effect on individual cases. This analysis uses multilevel models applied to case‐level data from 12 urban California counties to test hypotheses about shifts in average punitiveness, the relative influence of legal and extralegal factors on sentencing, and the uncertainty of sentencing outcomes. Results mostly support Feeley and Kamin's symbolic interpretation, but also reveal important substantive impacts: since Three Strikes, sentences have become harsher, particularly in politically conservative counties, and black felons receive longer prison sentences.     

Child Protection Law as an Independent Variable

Child protection professionals work in a multidisciplinary system in which the law and the family court play central roles and which collects an increasing amount of data. Yet we know little about what impact the law has on whether a child is removed by child protective services, is deemed neglected by a family court, or reunifies with a parent. Do state‐to‐state variations in child protection laws, or changes by individual states to their laws, lead to different outcomes for children and families? The dramatic variations in child welfare practice from one state to another suggest that legal variations do matter. Yet empirical research on these questions is scarce both because we collect too little data to measure all such issues, and, because we have failed to study the data we do have. This article is a plea for researchers to rectify that problem and for policymakers to improve data collection. Doing so would facilitate a more clear understanding of the law's effect on child protection outcomes and aid policymakers and advocates in identifying both promising and problematic practices and legal reforms.     

Legal Theory for Legal Empiricists

There is a widespread view that one does either theory or empirical work, and that theory and empiricism represent distant concerns, opposing worldviews, and perhaps distinct mentalities or personalities. This prevalent view has deep roots and is also the result of pragmatic and understandable tendencies toward division of intellectual labor. Against this view, this essay suggests that the relations between theory and empirical study ought to be understood as more intimate and that making legal theory an explicit focus can improve empirical scholarship. We pursue this claim by articulating a basis for legal theory and by showing how that basis illuminates both the application and design of empirical research on law. Legal theory, we argue, follows jurisprudence in interrogating the law as a set of coercive normative institutions. The upshot of this approach is a recognition that an interdisciplinary analysis of law must rely on both a theory (explicit or implicit) of the way law's power and its normativity align and an account of the way in which this discursive cohabitation manifests itself institutionally. We thus argue that legal theory is necessary in order to draw fruitfully on empirical research and further claim that legal theory provides guidance both for setting up an empirical research agenda on law and for designing research into specific topics.     

Between the Law: The Unmaking of Empire and Law's Imperial Amnesia

Asian victims of Japanese imperialism have filed lawsuits against the Japanese government and corporations since the 1990s, which became prime sites for redress decades after Japan's defeat in World War II. As this ethnography demonstrates, this process paradoxically exposes a legal lacuna within this emergent transnational legal space, with plaintiffs effectively caught between the law, instead of standing before the law. Exploring this absence of law, I map out a post‐imperial legal space, created through the erasure of imperial and colonial subjects in the legal framework after empire. Between the law is an optic that makes visible uneven legal terrains that embody temporal and spatial disjuncture, rupture, and asymmetry. The role of law in post‐imperial transitions remains underexplored in literatures on transnational law, legal imperialism, postcolonialism, and transitional justice. I demonstrate how, at the intersection of law and economy, post‐imperial reckoning is emerging as a new legal frontier, putting at stake law's imperial amnesia.     

The Reconstitution of Law in Local Settings: Agency Discretion, Ambiguity, and a Surplus of Law in the Policing of Hate Crime

An important yet poorly understood function of law enforcement organizations is the role they play in distilling and transmitting the meaning of legal rules to frontline law enforcement officers and their local communities. In this study, we examine how police and sheriff's agencies in California collectively make sense of state hate crime laws. To do so, we gathered formal policy documents called “hate crime general orders” from all 397 police and sheriff's departments in the state and conducted interviews with law enforcement officials to determine the aggregate patterns of local agencies' responses to higher law. We also construct a “genealogy of law” to locate the sources of the definitions of hate crime used in agency policies. Despite a common set of state criminal laws, we find significant variation in how hate crime is defined in these documents, which we attribute to the discretion local law enforcement agencies possess, the ambiguity of law, and the surplus of legal definitions of hate crime available in the larger environment to which law enforcement must respond. Some law enforcement agencies take their cue from other agencies, some follow statewide guidelines, and others are oriented toward gaining legitimacy from national professional bodies or groups within their own community. The social mechanisms that produce the observed clustering patterns in terms of approach to hate crime law are mimetic (copying another department), normative (driven by professional standards about training and community social movement pressure), and actuarial (affected by the demands of the crime data collection system). Together these findings paint a picture of policing organizations as mediators between law‐on‐the‐books and law‐in‐action that are embedded in interorganizational networks with other departments, state and federal agencies, professional bodies, national social movement organizations, and local community groups. The implications of an interorganizational field perspective on law enforcement and implementation are discussed in relation to existing sociolegal research on policing, regulation, and recent neo‐institutional scholarship on law.     

Who are Law's Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects

What is it to be a legal person? A review of the jurisprudence of persons reveals considerable confusion about this central legal question, as well as deep intellectual divisions. To certain jurists, law's person should and does approximate a metaphysical person. Depending on the metaphysics of the jurist, the legal person is thus variously defined by his uniquely human nature, by his possession of a soul, or by his capacity for reason, and therefore his moral and legal responsibility. To other jurists, law's person is not a metaphysical person but rather a pure legal abstraction; he is no more than a formal, abstract, but nonetheless highly convenient device of law. This paper endeavours to bring some order and clarity to these scholarly debates about the nature of legal personality. It also considers their implications for feminist legal theorists, with their enduring interest in the character of law's subject.     

Law's Strange Allure: The Power of Legal Lore beyond the Law-Politics Divide

American political culture is both seduced and repulsed by legal power, and this essay reviews Gordon Silverstein's contribution to understanding the causes and consequences of “law's allure.” Using interbranch analysis, Silverstein argues that law is dangerously alluring as a political shortcut, but ultimately he concludes that law offers no exit from “normal politics” and the hard work of “changing minds.” This essay suggests that Silverstein's framework—his dyadic focus on courts and Congress, constructive and deconstructive patterns, legal formality and normal politics—strips law from its animating context of interests, inequality, and ideology. Without consideration of these larger forces of power, Silverstein's framework misplaces law's ability to “change minds” in perverse and unexpected ways.     

Consequences of Tit‐for‐Tat Enforcement: Toward a Hippocratic Principle of Regulatory Implementation

The article discusses when tit‐for‐tat enforcement, an important strategy in responsive regulation theory, may generate intended reactions in communities of regulatees. Combining insights from compliance motivation theory, responsive regulation theory, and ethnographic studies of compliance, I hypothesize that tit‐for‐tat enforcement's probability of success depends on regulators’ institutionalized capacity to promote law–morality correspondence. Building such institutionalized capacity—so‐called “embeddedness”—simultaneously increases requirements for inspectorates’ competence. This article addresses three forms of law–morality correspondence: moral support for the law's content, the legislator's authority, and harmony between legal and moral guilt criteria.