Community Safety and Social Policy

This article examines community safety policy. In many countries community safety has become a replacement discourse for situational crime prevention, although in some countries such as the UK, it too is threatened with replacement by the narrower concerns of crime reduction. Community safety represents the apparent merging of the concerns of criminal justice and social policy, specifically over questions of social inclusion and exclusion. Focusing in the main upon UK policy, but also drawing upon experience elsewhere, this article scrutinises the policy of community safety, arguing that while it offers an inclusionary vision of crime control, its practice may be something rather different. More specifically, and in common with the trajectory of much advanced liberal social policy, in practice community safety may have an exclusionary effect. Thus, while community safety may represent the convergence of social and criminal justice policies, it does so on neoliberal rather than welfare liberal terms. It also means that community safety has a closer connection to policies of punitive sovereignty – particularly sentencing policies of mass incarceration – than might often be assumed.     

追溯与寻明:国际法视角下的碳排放权单位研究

自以《京都议定书》为基础的市场化机制建立以来,经过近20年的发展,全球碳金融市场呈现蓬勃发展的态势,交易量大幅提升,成交金额不断攀升,市场化机制在夯实中不断完善和发展。同时,争端与纠纷日益增加,国际多边环境公约调整下的碳排放权机制部分地在WTO体制下进行规制,成为众多学者的憧憬。碳排放权单位体现的既不是GATT框架下的"产品",也不是GATS框架下的"服务",而是在经济上反映出特殊的金融衍生产品的属性。然而,碳排放权单位交易商提供服务的行为契合GATS金融服务要求,因此交易商可依据GATS享受跨国服务领域中的最惠国待遇,并可将与WTO规则相关的争端诉诸WTO争端解决机制,实现环境争端解决的规范化、法制化。     

The Role of Flexibility Mechanisms in EU Climate Strategy: Lessons Learned and Future Challenges?

The main objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of European Union (EU) climate strategy, scrutinising in particular developments in EU's views on the so-called flexibility or Kyoto mechanisms. In brief, the paper argues that there has been a gradual change in EU's views, from the role of a sceptic in the run-up to Kyoto towards becoming more of a frontrunner on emissions trading in recent years. The need to 'save Kyoto' and the protracted development of EU climate policy are highlighted as two of the most important drivers behind this process of change. This paper also discusses some of the lessons learned from international negotiations and the development of EU climate policy. Finally, and drawing upon the lessons learned, the paper explores key future challenges for the further development of EU climate strategy.     

On the methodical relationship between jurisprudence and theology

Translated by Neil Duxbury. This article was originally published as Über das methodische Verhältnis der Jurisprudenz zur Theologie,Revue internationale de la théorie du droit 3 (1928–29), 52–56. The translator is indebted to Martin Loughlin, Neil MacCormick and Dagmar Rudolph for their help with an earlier draft.     

Challenges and Outcomes at the Ninth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

From 1 to 12 December 2003, the Ninth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention took place in Milan, Italy. This conference continued the laborious effort of developing an international climate regime by preparing for the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force. Some two dozen decisions were adopted on a wide range of options for responding to climate change. This paper assesses the progress achieved at the conference on a number of issues. Among these were operational details for implementing forestry projects under the Convention’s Clean Development Mechanism, and guidelines for reporting on greenhouse gas emissions and removals from agriculture, forestry and land-use change. Parties also decided on rules with respect to two funds, the Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Country Fund. With respect to developing countries, Parties continued discussions on rules for building response capacity in light of the expected adverse effects of climate change and transferring environmentally sound technology. They also discussed how to incorporate scientific advice from the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change into the negotiations. Although Russia did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol prior to the conference, Milan demonstrated momentum and interest among Parties to support the climate regime. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the detailed discussions were able to contribute to preparing for the long term. To this end, this paper concludes that more discussion and leadership is required to bridge the North/South gap if a post-2012 climate regime is to stand.     

In what format and under what timeframe would China take on climate commitments? A roadmap to 2050

Balancing China’s energy needs to fuel its rapid economic growth with the resulting potential impacts of climate change presents an enormous climate policy dilemma, not simply for China but for the entire world. This is the major reason why the role of China is an issue of perennial concerns at international climate change negotiations. In response to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, this paper maps out a realistic roadmap for China’s specific climate commitments toward 2050. Taking many factors into consideration, the paper argues that China needs to take on absolute emissions caps around 2030. However, it is hard to imagine how China could apply the brakes so sharply as to switch from rapid emissions growth to immediate emissions cuts, without passing through several intermediate phases. To that end, the paper envisions that China needs the following three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before taking on absolute emissions caps that will lead to the global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050: First, further credible energy conservation commitments starting in 2013 and aimed at cutting China’s carbon intensity by 46–50% by 2020; second, voluntary “no lose” emission targets starting in 2018; and third, binding carbon intensity targets as its international commitment starting in 2023. Overall, this proposal is a balanced reflection of respecting China’s rights to grow and recognizing China’s growing responsibility for increasing greenhouse gas emissions as China is on its way to becoming the world’s largest economy.     

Kyoto Mechanisms: Key Issues for Policy-makers for COP-6

This article provides an assessment of the "Kyoto mechanisms" – joint implementation, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and emissions trading established pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. It focuses on significant policy issues raised by supplementarity, liability, equity and the design considerations relevant to operationalizing the mechanisms nationally and internationally.     

Criteria for Evaluation of Burden-sharing Rules in International Climate Policy

This article presents nine criteria for assessing, comparing, and ranking burden-sharing rules and conceptual frameworks used in climate policy negotiations and agreements. Three of the criteria are concerned with fairness principles and six criteria are operational requirements. The application of these criteria is illustrated in the context of six different burden-sharing schemes. The Multi-sector Convergence approach and the Triptych approach received highest average score of the six schemes. The Brazilian proposal received a similar total score, but unevenly distributed with a high score on fairness principles and low score on operational requirements. The European Union member countries employed the Triptych approach when they differentiated their national abatement targets prior to the 1997 Kyoto meeting. The Multi-sector Convergence approach was developed in a joint ECN (Netherlands Energy Research Foundation) and CICERO (Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo) project. It is a sector-based, global approach that comprises convergence of per capita emissions at the same level in all countries. Sector-based approaches have a distinct advantage compared to other approaches because they reflect the economic structure of countries rather well. Such approaches could play a useful role in future climate policy negotiations, not the least in discussions on binding climate targets for developing countries.     

Improving Cost-effectiveness and Facilitating Participation of Developing Countries in International Emissions Trading

This paper discusses ways in which the next climate agreement – a renegotiated Kyoto Protocol or a second-period agreement – can be made more cost-effective. The discussion focuses on the design of international emissions trading to facilitate early participation by developing countries. Four aspects are highlighted: the design of compensation rules, the need to regulate the use of the CDM, the effect of allowing borrowing and the implications of a Commitment Period Reserve.     

The Clean Development Mechanism: A Bane or a Boon for Developing Countries?

We analyse the gains to developing countries from the participation in the CDM during the Kyoto period (until 2010) in the event an emissions trading (ET) regime exists in the post-Kyoto period (2010–20). We show that the developing countries will always be better-off participating in the CDM if the emissions quota they get in the post-Kyoto period is not linked to their baseline emissions. However if their quota equals (or is related to) their baseline emissions, CDM participation strategy may be a preferred alternative only if the CDM price is high enough to off-set the losses of the post-Kyoto period (during ET regime) due to participation in the CDM. We simulate the CDM and ET in the Kyoto and post-Kyoto period and show that with the reduction targets given in the Kyoto Protocol for Annex B countries, participation in the CDM is beneficial to non-Annex B (developing) countries, even if their emissions quota in the post-Kyoto period (during ET regime) is determined by their baseline emissions. Abatement supply price in the post-Kyoto period however turns out to be crucial factor in this case.     

Graduation and Deepening: An Ambitious Post-2012 Climate Policy Scenario

In the second commitment period 2013–2017, the Kyoto Protocol structure is strengthened considerably. The current Annex B countries agree to reduction targets averaging 23% reductions from 1990 level. This induces non-Annex B countries to take up emissions targets according to a multi-tiered graduation system. Graduation is undertaken according to thresholds defined by per capita GDP and emissions. Compared to the current Annex B, coverage of emissions by absolute caps would increase by about 25%; large low-income countries such as India and China do not graduate. Therefore, large emitters above 50 million t. p.a. can utilise a policy-based Clean Development Mechanism. Sinks of all types – terrestrial, marine and geological can be used. To achieve this policy scenario, voter pressure due to extreme meteorological events and a coordination of all progressive forces in the international climate negotiations are necessary. Moreover, a judicious combination of carrots and sticks has to be developed to entice Non-Annex B countries to graduate.     

Will International Investment Rules Obstruct Climate Protection Policies? An Examination of the Clean Development Mechanism

Rules governing the global environment and the international economy are currently decided in separate arenas. Yet, environmental agreements can have strong economic implications, particularly with the growing use of market mechanisms. Economic liberalization rules, meanwhile, may limit the effectiveness of environmental agreements. This paper assesses the potential interaction between one important market-based environmental mechanism – the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change – and the framework of international investment law.     

The effectiveness of Kyoto Protocol and the legal institution for international technology transfer

Kyoto Protocol has certain provisions concerning environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) transfer, primarily including the direct provisions, the clean development mechanism and the fund mechanism, which are supposed to favor technology transfer for reducing the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the world. However, mainly due to the flaws of these provisions, ESTs have not been transferred as smoothly as possible to realize the Kyoto Protocol’s objectives. Therefore, the international community shall take the effectiveness of Kyoto Protocol as a fresh impetus to consummate the legal system of international technology transfer, that is, to develop a uniform technology transfer agreement under the WTO with a focus on promoting ESTs transfer, which may make the developing countries to acquire the technologies they need under the fair terms and help them build their capacities for sustainable development. China does not need to perform the obligation of reducing GHG emissions until 2013 according to Kyoto Protocol, but precautions shall be taken to improve its legal systems on technology transfer to make preparations for implementing the policy of scientific development and playing significant roles in related international legislation.     

‘US, China and the Economics of Climate Negotiations’

Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B_?US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.     

Genesis of the CDM: the original policymaking goals of the 1997 Brazilian proposal and their evolution in the Kyoto protocol negotiations into the CDM

A body of literature is emerging applying critical consideration to the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism’s (‘CDM’) achievement of policy goals regarding sustainable development, geographical distribution of projects and related matters. This article places this literature in the context of the policymaking goals of the CDM’s Brazilian architects. The CDM arose from the Brazilian Proposal’s Clean Development Fund, and was negotiated between Brazil and the United States in the weeks preceding the Kyoto Conference of Parties. The CDM’s Brazilian architects continued to pursue their underlying policy goals by taking a leadership position in the Marrakesh Accords negotiations. During this period Brazil’s primary policy objectives comprised achieving meaningful mitigation of GHG emissions to avoid dangerous interference with the climate system, derailing a perceived US/IPCC initiative to allocate emissions cap obligations in the Kyoto Protocol on the basis of current emissions, and taking a leadership position both among the G-77 and China and in the multilateral climate negotiations as a whole. The CDM arose in this context from the G-77 and China’s desire to coerce the North’s compliance with the North’s emissions cap obligations through an alternative means of compliance. As a result, there was no focus on broad conceptions of sustainable development, or on broad distribution of CDM projects throughout the South. Instead, the CDM’s Brazilian architects envisioned that CDM-related sustainable development would arise exclusively from the presence of the CDM projects. Similarly, the Brazilian Proposal advocated allocation of the Clean Development Fund on a basis proportionate to each non-Annex I countries projected 1990–2010 greenhouse gas emissions. These views persisted through the evolution of the Clean Development Fund into the CDM and through Marrakesh Accords negotiations. This article argues that the CDM has largely met the policy goals of its Brazilian architects and that the pursuit of different, additional, refined or more nuanced policy goals necessitates corresponding refinements to the CDM, or any successor mechanism, specifically targeting those different, additional, refined or more nuanced policy objectives, lending support to the emerging literature proposing changes to the CDM to pursue corresponding policy objectives.     

Implications of EU Enlargement on the EU Greenhouse Gas 'Bubble' and Internal Burden Sharing

Currently, the EU-15 forms the only 'bubble' under the Kyoto Protocol and has negotiated an internal burden sharing. A strategic EU climate policy should include accession countries. Thus, even in the case of early ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by 2002, it would be sensible to form a bubble with all countries that are certain to be EU members during the commitment period 2008–2012. Of course due to Art. 4.4 of the Protocol the EU-15 has to stick to its own bubble. However, nothing prevents it from forming an implicit bubble including all first wave countries by inducing them to form a bubble on their own and transfer the surplus to the EU-15. Similarly, second wave countries should form a bubble of their own to co-ordinate JI and permit transfers to the EU. This would reduce the gap between business-as-usual and the target by about 50%. If ratification is delayed to a point where it is clear which second wave countries will be members by 2008, the bubble should be extended by those countries. When in 2005 target negotiations start for the second commitment period, the EU should negotiate a bubble consisting of all states being certain to be members by 2013.     

Beyond Kyoto: The EU's Contribution to a More Sustainable World Economy

The EU has been leading the world fight against climate change since the late 1990s. This activism on the international scene has served as a stimulus for a common action against global warming that has, in the last 10 years, become a world referent and the central issue in the EU environmental policy. The most relevant initiative is the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme (ETS), adopted in fulfilment of the Kyoto Protocol. In 2008, the EU adopted a new set of measures on climate and energy for the post‐Kyoto period (2013–2020). This new legal framework, coupled with the provisions introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy, represents the EU's commitment to promote a more sustainable European and world economic model.     

Will the Truth Come Out? The Effect of Deception,Age, Status,Coaching, and Social Skills on CBCA Scores

The impact of Veracity, Age, Status (witness or suspect), Coaching (informed or uninformed regarding CBCA), and Social Skills (social anxiety, social adroitness, and self-monitoring) on Criteria-Based Content Analysis scores was examined. Participants (aged 5–6, 10–11, 14–15, and undergraduates) participated in a rubbing the blackboard event. In a subsequent interview they told the truth or lied about the event. They were accused of having rubbed the blackboard themselves (suspect condition) or were thought to have witnessed the event (witness condition), and were or were not taught some CBCA criteria prior to the interview. CBCA scores discriminated between liars and truth tellers in children, adults, witnesses, and suspects. However, truth tellers obtained higher CBCA scores than liars only when the liars were uninformed about CBCA. CBCA scores were correlated with social skills. It is argued that these findings should caution those who believe that the validity of CBCA has been conclusively demonstrated.     

Emissions trading in the European Union

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. Key points

• The EU ETS will undergo a number of changes consequentupon the commencement of the first Kyoto Commitment Period on1 January 2008.
• This article considers the existing EU ETSframework and also the key developments that are anticipatedin the European emissions market for 2008–2012.
• A secondarymarket for trading EUAs has already developed and this market,together with the standard-form documentation used, is discussed.
• Inconclusion, the article questions the future of emissions tradingin Europe—particularly after the current Kyoto targetsexpire in 2012.

  European businesses entered a carbon-constrained economic environmenton 1 January 2005. For some, the impacts were immediate anddirect in the form of caps on their emissions. The majorityfelt it indirectly and more slowly through increased energycosts as the perceived cost of compliance was passed on by generators.The full impacts are not yet clear, but a quiet revolution is. . . [Full Text of this Article]