Lord Ponsonby and the Churchill affair of 1836: An episode in the eastern question

William Churchill, a British merchant in Turkey, accidentally wounded an Ottoman boy and, after being savagely beaten, was imprisoned in the notorious bagnio by the Reis Effendi and Achmet Pasha. Lord Ponsonby, the British ambassador, sought dismissal of these ministers. His tactics and threats of demands that his government would make, couched in extravagant language, provoked Russian intervention and alarmed the other powers. Before the British government could react, the Sultan dismissed the Reis Effendi, but Britain's failure to demand dismissal of Achmet left Russian influence supreme. Ponsonby, however, emerged from defeat with credit, and Churchill received compensation.     

太平洋战争期间英国对缅甸政策出台始末

战前 ,缅甸的民族独立运动已使英殖民当局难以招架 ,英国政府不得不向民族主义者许诺 ,在条件成熟时 ,英国将给缅甸自治 ,但这个许诺不过是一个遥遥无期的长把伞。欧战爆发 ,使英国政府无力顾及它在远东的殖民地 ,缅甸民族主义者再次看到独立的希望 ,但是 ,英国政府逆历史潮流而行 ,仍然采用欧战爆发前的殖民政策来对付缅甸的民族主义 ,特别是在太平洋战争爆发后 ,缅甸民族主义提出联英抗日 ,促进缅甸独立的政治主张遭到英殖民当局的拒绝 ,英国不顾已经变化了的国际形势 ,采取高压政策 ,大肆逮捕民族主义领袖 ,使缅甸民族主义者转向日本 ,以…     

The Soviet Union and Churchill's appeals for high-level talks, 1953-54: New evidence from the Russian archives

New evidence from the Russian archives offers proof that Winston Churchill's calls for top-level talks, 1953-54, were greeted with mistrust and scepticism by Moscow. Soviet policy makers realized that Churchill was weak, entirely dependent on American policy and unable to act as mediator between East and West. They were also sceptical as to whether any real progress could be made during an Anglo-Soviet summit meeting and, instead, pressed for four-power talks at Foreign Minister level. Finally, the Soviet records shed light on the impact of the power struggle within the Kremlin on its responses to Churchill's initiative, with Vyacheslav Molotov preventing Georgi Malenkov from meeting the British Prime Minister.     

The Soviet Union and Churchill's appeals for high‐level talks, 1953–54: New evidence from the Russian archives

New evidence from the Russian archives offers proof that Winston Churchill's calls for top‐level talks, 1953–54, were greeted with mistrust and scepticism by Moscow. Soviet policy makers realized that Churchill was weak, entirely dependent on American policy and unable to act as mediator between East and West. They were also sceptical as to whether any real progress could be made during an Anglo‐Soviet summit meeting and, instead, pressed for four‐power talks at Foreign Minister level. Finally, the Soviet records shed light on the impact of the power struggle within the Kremlin on its responses to Churchill's initiative, with Vyacheslav Molotov preventing Georgi Malenkov from meeting the British Prime Minister.     

Diplomatic intercepts in peace and war: Chanak 1922

Recent Public Record Office releases of British Foreign Office documents include diciphered diplomatic messages from several European capitals intercepted from 1919 onwards by a department of the Foreign Office called the Government Code and Cipher School (GCCS). These intercepts were called 'bjs' - 'blue jackets', from the blue folders in which they were regularly delivered to a very few top government officials. This paper is based on bjs mainly from French, Italian, American and Turkish capitals and embassies during the autumn of 1922 when a genocidal war was being fought along the Black Sea southern coast between Greece and Kemalist Turkish forces under the future President, Ismet Inonu. What became known as 'the Chanak Affair' led the Powers perilously close to renewing hostilities terminated at the Armistice of 1919. Despite the attention given by Lloyd George, Curzon and Churchill to the implications of the bjs as to Turkish, French and Italian intentions, peace was established on the ground before the end of the year by Inonu and the British C-in-C, General Harington.     

Diplomatic intercepts in peace and war: Chanak 1922

Recent Public Record Office releases of British Foreign Office documents include diciphered diplomatic messages from several European capitals intercepted from 1919 onwards by a department of the Foreign Office called the Government Code and Cipher School (GCCS). These intercepts were called ‘bjs’ ‐ ‘blue jackets’, from the blue folders in which they were regularly delivered to a very few top government officials. This paper is based on bjs mainly from French, Italian, American and Turkish capitals and embassies during the autumn of 1922 when a genocidal war was being fought along the Black Sea southern coast between Greece and Kemalist Turkish forces under the future President, Ismet Inonu. What became known as ‘the Chanak Affair’ led the Powers perilously close to renewing hostilities terminated at the Armistice of 1919. Despite the attention given by Lloyd George, Curzon and Churchill to the implications of the bjs as to Turkish, French and Italian intentions, peace was established on the ground before the end of the year by Inonu and the British C‐in‐C, General Harington.     

From local government to local governance: Re‐casting British local democracy

The traditional debate about local government and local democracy has focused almost exclusively upon elected local authorities. The advent of local governance (the division of decision‐making authority and service provision between local authorities and a range of non‐elected organizations) necessitates a move away from this obsession with elections. It requires an evaluation of the diversity of local organizations; the elected element is but one part of a complex mosaic of bodies operating locally. Partnerships, networks and contracts have become integral features of the local political scene. Studies of local democracy can no longer simply dismiss the non‐elected elements as non‐democratic and unaccountable; their diverse patterns of accountability require scrutiny not blanket dismissal. This article explores contemporary local democracy in Britain and argues that the complexities of governance necessitate a re‐casting of British local democracy and its limits.     

In Pursuit of a Pacific Strategy:British Planning for the Defeat of Japan, 1943–45

This article seeks to explain why the British pushed for a role in Pacific operations during the Second World War when it faced other strategic priorities in Southeast Asia, as well as a powerful American military that maintained tight control over operational decision-making. Although several quarters in Whitehall, including the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had doubts about the necessity of a Pacific strategy, there were sensible reasons behind pursuing such a course. It would illustrate to an “anti-imperialist” America that Britain was not only interested in recovering its colonial possessions but also prepared to fight the Japanese on their homeland. More importantly, taking part in the main operations would allow the British to claim a voice at the peace table while helping to encourage the Americans to cement their close working relationship with Britain in the postwar period.     

In Pursuit of a Pacific Strategy:British Planning for the Defeat of Japan, 1943-45

This article seeks to explain why the British pushed for a role in Pacific operations during the Second World War when it faced other strategic priorities in Southeast Asia, as well as a powerful American military that maintained tight control over operational decision-making. Although several quarters in Whitehall, including the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had doubts about the necessity of a Pacific strategy, there were sensible reasons behind pursuing such a course. It would illustrate to an “anti-imperialist” America that Britain was not only interested in recovering its colonial possessions but also prepared to fight the Japanese on their homeland. More importantly, taking part in the main operations would allow the British to claim a voice at the peace table while helping to encourage the Americans to cement their close working relationship with Britain in the postwar period.     

Language Contact and Globalisation: The camouflaged influence of English on the world's languages--with special attention to Israeli (sic) and Mandarin

This paper discusses the camouflaged influence of Modern English (mainly American) on Israeli (a.k.a. 'Modern Hebrew') and Mandarin Chinese (especially Modern Standard Chinese) within the broader context of linguistic and cultural globalisation. Among the questions it attempts to answer are the following: What is the extent of phono-semantic matching (PSM) of Anglicisms in Israeli and Mandarin? What are the terminological and lexicopoietic types of PSM? What is the sociolinguistics of word-formation and neologisation in those languages? The author would like to thank Churchill College, Cambridge; the British Academy and the National University of Singapore.     

Bringing in the rogues: political violence,the British government and Sinn Fein

The article explores the relationship between the British government and the Irish Republican movement. In contrast to the established view, it argues that the British government had never had any objection to the inclusion of Republicans into a political settlement, and that – therefore – there was no need for any significant changes in government policy during the 1990s. Far from being an obstacle to inclusion, the British government's political strategy not only provided an incentive for the IRA to cease its military campaign, but also the opportunity to follow it up with an equitable political process, resulting in the Belfast Agreement.     

Red Star Ascending,Flagging Union Jack: Soviet Views on the Handover of Hong Kong

On 22 September 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, where they discussed the future of Hong Kong. The meeting did not go well. Deng made it clear that, with or without British cooperation, China would resume full sovereignty and administration over the tiny colony when the lease on Hong Kong expired on 30 June 1997. This article is based on two recently released documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive (AVP RF) and reveals the hitherto unknown Soviet attitude toward these talks and the handover itself. Soviet leaders were very concerned that the Chinese should not consider Soviet control over vast territories in the Far East as based on unequal, hence illegitimate, nineteenth century treaties, as they did British control over Hong Kong. If those Russian treaties were unequal, then Soviet rule would be in grave danger. The Soviets sought to distinguish their treaties from the British ones. Seeking normal relations, the Chinese agreed not to challenge this interpretation.     

Red Star Ascending, Flagging Union Jack: Soviet Views on the Handover of Hong Kong

On 22 September 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, where they discussed the future of Hong Kong. The meeting did not go well. Deng made it clear that, with or without British cooperation, China would resume full sovereignty and administration over the tiny colony when the lease on Hong Kong expired on 30 June 1997. This article is based on two recently released documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive (AVP RF) and reveals the hitherto unknown Soviet attitude toward these talks and the handover itself. Soviet leaders were very concerned that the Chinese should not consider Soviet control over vast territories in the Far East as based on unequal, hence illegitimate, nineteenth century treaties, as they did British control over Hong Kong. If those Russian treaties were unequal, then Soviet rule would be in grave danger. The Soviets sought to distinguish their treaties from the British ones. Seeking normal relations, the Chinese agreed not to challenge this interpretation.     

Is the Russian federation becoming more democratic? Moscow‐regional relations and the development of the post‐Soviet Russian State

This article addresses the condition of Russian democracy by focusing on the developing political relations between the central government and regional governments. A situation of profound ambivalence and ambiguity has evolved since ratification of the Russian Federation Constitution in December 1993. Regional governments have found it possible to gain a degree of political autonomy uncharacteristic of Russia's long historical experience, yet increasingly in line with global trends toward decentralization of governmental authority. Two political patterns in the current Russian Federation are explored, both of them promising broad and enduring significance. First, the political ambiguity of relations between the national government and regional authorities may provide the context in which divided government serves to enable democracy, despite the appearance of authoritarian rule in many regions themselves. Second, the nature of the interaction between the centre and regional authorities may be breaking new ground, in terms of flexible solutions to intra‐state relations among different levels of government. Because certain aspects of centre‐regional relations in the Russian Federation replicate comparable issues elsewhere (particularly regarding the ethnic‐territorial dimension of politics), the Federation's approaches and solutions to this aspect of state‐formation could suggest useful lessons for other parts of the world.     

俄罗斯剧院运营状况浅析

俄罗斯戏剧艺术在世界舞台上享有极高的声誉。上世纪90年代初,俄罗斯戏剧界曾受苏联解体、经济危机等问题的影响,一度举步维艰。近年来,随着剧院市场化运作机制的日趋成熟、政府对剧院扶持力度不断增强,俄罗斯剧院的运营已经基本步入正轨,重现昔日辉煌。     

Hanging the Kaiser: Anglo-Dutch relations and the fate of Wilhelm II, 1918-20

The flight of the German Kaiser to the Netherlands at the end of the First World War led to a crisis in Anglo-Dutch relations. Prime Minister David Lloyd George made the trial of the Kaiser a key issue in the British general election campaign of December 1918. Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles called for the Kaiser's surrender by the Netherlands government for trial before an international tribunal, a request the Dutch repeatedly refused during the period January to March 1920. Using both British and Dutch sources, this article highlights the internal Dutch debate over the fate of the Kaiser, and the confusion and hypocrisy with which the problem was handled by the British government.     

The British government and the sale of arms to the lesser European powers, 1936-39

This article considers sales of British arms in the prelude to the Second World War, during the end of last Baldwin government, and the Chamberlain government, which had political as well as commercial motivations. Particular attention is paid to the leading British arms manufacturer, Vickers-Armstrong, and sales to Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland. There was often a concern that a failure to procure British arms would lead countries to turn to Germany and Italy. The interest in meeting these requests often conflicted with growing domestic defence needs for the same equipment. The conclusion is drawn that Britain ultimately failed to inspire potential allies with sufficient confidence to commit themselves to Britain.     

'The limits of international leadership': The Eisenhower administration, East-West trade and the cold war, 1953-54

This article examines the Eisenhower administration's trade policy towards the Soviet Union in 1953-54. It argues, contrary to previous scholarship on the subject, that the liberalization of East-West trade controls in August 1954 cannot be attributed solely to the presidential leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Instead, whilst Eisenhower played a significant role in changing American embargo policy, it was the Churchill government which provided the impetus required for the revision of the international export control lists. Despite conflict and confrontation over the shape and contents of the new embargo between Washington and London, the two governments forged a compromise in the summer of 1954.     

浅析俄罗斯移民政策及其对中国移民的影响

20世纪90年代初中俄签订互免签证协议后,大量中国人跨过边界来到俄罗斯寻找致富机会,这引起俄罗斯政府的恐慌和担心,开始对中国人逐渐实行越来越严格的移民政策。这些法律和规定为赴俄的中国人合法居留和就业筑起难以逾越的障碍,将大多数劳动移民排挤到非法领域。严格的移民政策影响了两国的经济贸易发展,我们应该采取相应的针对性措施改善目前状况,促使中俄两国关系稳步发展。     

Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited

In The Gathering Storm, Winston S. Churchill claimed that during the 1930s British leaders were willfully blind to the German threat and failed to meet it by rearming. Accepting the Churchillian narrative, leading IR scholars regard British grand strategy during the 1930s as glaring example of strategic adjustment failure. This article reappraises British grand strategy during the 1930s and rejects both the Churchillian narrative, and the scholarly claims that Britain did not adjust its strategy to the German threat. In the 1930s, Britain did balance against Germany and focused on countering what policy makers perceived as the key threat facing Britain: its vulnerability to German air attack. Britain's grand strategic options were limited by external conditions and by domestic economic constraints. Neville Chamberlain, therefore, was playing a weak hand, and did the best that he could with the cards he was dealt. Britain's 1930s grand strategy is one of the historical cases most frequently used by IR scholars for theory testing. For that reason alone, it is important to get the history right. This is not the only reason, however. The 1930s have provided many of the concepts, images, and metaphors that have dominated the discourse about American foreign policy since World War II. Because scholarship about the events of the 1930s shapes the discourse about real-world policy, getting the history right matters.