Advance price announcements and antitrust policy

This paper analyzes the competitive significance of advance price announcements. In the model, advance price announcements are used by firms to communicate private information on demand or cost. By so sharing the information, the firms are able to set their prices at more profitable levels. When the advance price announcements resolve demand uncertainty, profits rise and consumer surplus falls. Interestingly, when the advance price announcements resolve cost uncertainty, both profits and consumer welfare rise. Finally, we examine U.S. antitrust policy regarding price announcements.     

Threat-Based Competition Policy

This note suggests a link between the theory of contestable markets and competition policy. We propose that in the absence of potential hit and run entrants into an industry the behaviour of a firm may be constrained by the fear of intervention by the competition authorities. Hence, in periods in which hit and run entry is believed to be a non-credible threat, the competition authorities can affect a firm's behaviour by the threat of intervention, as well as by intervention itself. Requirements for the successful use of threat-based competition policy are identified, and its potential benefits are outlined.     

The economic analysis of antitrust consents

Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques.     

论班轮公会反垄断豁免法

对世界上主要航运国家相关立法及国际公约的规定进行了比较研究,详细分析了班轮公会哪些行动和相关协议享有反垄断法豁免权以及其附加义务,最后对中国正在制定的《航运法》提出了相关立法建议。     

反垄断法的域外适用

许多学者主张 ,我国应以效果原则为依据 ,建立反垄断法的域外适用制度。但美国反垄断法的历史表明 ,效果原则有许多弊端。美、德、欧洲法院、欧共体委员会的实践表明 ,需要采用多种方法对效果原则进行限制 ,并应借鉴冲突法的方法 ,尽可能采用能体现真实联系的连结因素 ,而以效果原则作为补充 ,从而避免单纯的效果原则所产生的扩大本国反垄断法适用的倾向。     

Competition in the Netherlands and Belgium: Service sector evidence

This paper examines competition in the Dutch and Belgian service sector for the period 1995–1999. The paper explores the link between firm profitability and market structure, and provides evidence of a non-optimal functioning of both markets. While analysis reveals the existence of a market sector effect in both countries, this effect is larger in the Dutch sample than in the Belgian sample, implying that the Dutch service sector is less competitive than the Belgian service sector. An analysis of the market friendliness of regulations in both countries does not provide a comprehensive explanation for this finding. JEL Classification: L12 · L16 · L51 · L80     

The Road to EU Membership. Enforcing Competition Policy in Hungary: Double Protection and Domestic Developments

The present article is concerned withthe so-called process of harmonisation to theCommunity Law, which is taking place in thecentral eastern European countries, candidatesto join the European Union. Specifically, thisarticle deals with the building of a matureHungarian competition policy, inaccordance with the acquis communautaire,as part of a larger long-term programme ofpro-market decisions concerning privatisationand market openness. On the one hand, theso-called iterated multi-level interaction indifferent arenas between Hungarian institutionsand the Union, structured on path-dependentdynamics, influences the mechanisms and thetiming of harmonisation to the EuropeanUnion. On the other hand, the gradualempowerment of an independent national Office of Economic Competition and theprogress made to the adaptation of policystructures and policy behaviours to theEuropean Union's canons and laws are taken asthe main factors explaining the development ofa clear, predictable, and transparent processof competition law enforcement. Byfollowing a multidisciplinary approach, thisarticle combines an analysis of the meaning ofboth the Hungarian Competition Act and theprovisions on competition contained in the Europe Agreement, alongside a study of theirenforcement experience, revealing a gap betweenthe high consistency of the Hungariandiscipline on competition protection withEuropean Union law and the real enforcement capacity.     

政策变迁的理论与实践浅析

政策变迁通过对政策目标、政策内容、政策手段等某一方面或几个方面的调整,使政策合理化。任何政策都不可能一成不变。可以说,政策变迁贯穿于每个政策过程;并且政策变迁本身就是政策过程的一个子循环。所以,政策变迁是对现行政策进行的变革活动。可能引起政策变迁的原因是多方面的,如:政策主体主观认识的变化、政策自身缺陷的显现等。针对中国政策实践和相关理论研究的实际,既要加强对政策变迁问题的探讨,又要为合理的、必须的政策变迁创造条件。     

浅析劳动合同中的竞业禁止条款

在当今知识经济时代,拥有特殊知识、技能的雇员与拥有物质资本的雇主已成为企业运营的核心,缺一不可,雇主为保护其具有现在与未来潜在利益的商业秘密被泄漏或离职雇员的恶意竞争,要求与雇员签订竞业禁止条款的做法无可厚非,由于竞业禁止条款的签订会影响雇员的自主择业权,因此必须仔细斟酌其内容。为了保障竞业禁止条款的实现,应该双管齐下,通过积极提升雇员自我实现的理想与消极实行违约赔偿机制来达到雇主与雇员双赢的目的。     

论中国反垄断执法机构的设置

以维护自由公平竞争秩序为己任的反垄断法是现代市场经济的基本法律之一,而其功能的有效发挥离不开一个权威、独立的执法机构。反垄断执法机构的科学设置及其职责的合理确定是中国反垄断法制建设中的重要一环,也是行政管理学和行政法学中的一个重要问题。本文首先分析国外反垄断执法机关的设置及其职能,作为我国反垄断执法机关的设计参考。在确定中国反垄断执法机构的设置时要考虑到反垄断法本身的特点、现有相关机构的设置情况以及外国经验的比较借鉴等因素,通过中西方政府职能的发展比较,对我国反垄断执行机构的地位作出合理的定位。最后,我国反垄断执法机关的设置,要遵循权威独立、依法设置、精干效能等原则。据此,不宜在现有机构中指定反垄断执法机构,而应该单独创设专门的执法机构,其可以称为"国家反垄断委员会"或"国家公平交易委员会",并只在中央和省两级设立。这是由于反垄断法更注重维护宏观经济秩序、防止市场竞争不足从而具有政策性、灵活性和行政主导性的特点决定的。这样的机构应拥有调查检查权、审核批准权、行政处罚权、行政强制措施权和行政裁决权,并应拥有对地方各级政府及其部门和国务院各部门的限制竞争行为(行政垄断行为)直接进行处理的权力。     

Internet of things – Governance quo vadis?

The Internet of Things (IoT) as an emerging global Internet-based information architecture facilitating the exchange of goods and services is gradually developing. While the technical aspects are being discussed in detail a legal framework does not exist so far. The first supranational organization trying to work out an IoT governance framework has been the European Commission by appointing a large group of experts to examine the relevant aspects of a possible IoT governance regime. In the meantime, however, the activities have been degraded. Nevertheless, even if the differences between the IoT and the Internet have been overestimated at the beginning, many elements of the IoT differ in part from the corresponding problems in the Internet. Therefore, an analysis of the major IoT governance issues (legitimacy, transparency, accountability, anticompetitive behavior) seems to be worthwhile to conduct.     

Explaining differences in EMAS participation rates across Europe: the importance of institutions,incomplete information and path dependence

What factors shape environmental policies across Europe? In order to answer this question most economists would probably adopt a Public Choice approach. This approach has convincingly explained some aspects of environmental policies that exist in a similar fashion across Europe. But why do many environmental policies differ across European countries? This article argues that in order to understand differences in environmental policies in Europe North’s analysis of institutional change focusing on formal and informal institutions, incomplete information and path dependence is useful. North’s approach is applied to explain differences in a particular field of European environmental policy: The implementation of the EU’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) in Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. The starting point of the analysis is the observation that participation of companies in EMAS markedly differs between countries. It is shown that these differences can be explained with differences in formal and informal institutions in the three Member States, incomplete information of relevant actors, and path dependence.     

The Role of Panels in Enhancing Legal Predictability

This article considers the justification for using panels of judges to make decisions in common law systems. The usual argument is that panels are more likely than lone judges to make correct judgments. This article suggests an additional justification: panels increase the law's predictability, so potential litigants can anticipate correctly which legal rules will apply in their cases. Three models, each with a different conception of the legal process, are employed to demonstrate the predictability-enhancing effect of panels. Comparison of the models suggests the effect is strongest when precedent has a substantial impact on how judges make decisions.