THE STOCHASTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATENTS AND ANTITRUST

This article develops a novel theory by which to construe theinteraction between the patent and antitrust laws. The rulesof these respective disciplines are often portrayed as conflictingin means, yet harmonious in purpose. Although the intellectualproperty and antitrust laws have ostensibly divergent viewson the role of competition, their interaction is typically limitedto one of constraint. More specifically, antitrust rules havebeen (poorly) designed to limit the exclusivity inherent ina patent grant to the claimed invention alone. This article,however, articulates a new vision for the role of antitrust:it posits that competition rules operate as a stochastic regulatorof exclusionary patent rights. The Sherman Act constrains patentees'efforts to positively transform the probabilistic nature oftheir intellectual property rights through contract. Yet, becausethe empirical calculation of optimal innovation rates is anelusive, if not Sisyphean, task, the normative desirabilityof the foregoing fact is abstruse. Nevertheless, policymakers'inability to pinpoint precisely the ex post rewards requiredto trigger ideal levels of ex ante investment need not bindour hands to inaction. If contemporary rates of innovation aredeemed acceptable (even if not necessarily perfect), there maybe ways to trigger equivalent levels of ex ante investment withlower social cost. In this regard, it is clear that currentlyenacted competition rules significantly accentuate the uncertaintysurrounding patents' apotropaic effect. Concluding that contractssecuring otherwise stochastic rights may be highly desirable,the article calls for the incorporation of this concern intocontemporary rules, with modest substantive effect, and furtheradvocates a qualified antitrust immunity for "gold-plated" patentsif and when they are introduced.     

Antitrust, health care quality, and the courts

Antitrust law represents the principal legal tool that the United States employs to police private markets, yet it often relegates quality and nonprice considerations to a secondary position. While antitrust law espouses the belief that vigorous competition will enhance quality as well as price, little evidence exists of the practical ability of courts to deliver on that promise. In this Article, Professors Hammer and Sage examine American health care as a vehicle for advancing understanding of the nexus among competition, quality, and antitrust law. The Article reports results of a comprehensive empirical review of judicial opinions in health care antitrust litigation between 1985 and 1999, with specific attention to courts' handling of quality and other nonprice concerns. Professors Hammer and Sage conclude that, although antitrust law cannot be expected to serve as the sole oversight mechanism for industries as complex and quality dependent as health care, courts have been successful incorporating some nonprice factors into antitrust analysis.     

The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute

The antitrust laws demand competition but, in general, no competitive outcome is possible in markets characterized by substantial fixed costs. Consequently, restrictions on competition may have an efficiency defense, and a prohibition of cartel agreements may entail costs as well as benefits. Giving examples, this essay illustrates the problem that fixed costs pose for competition, long recognized in economics, and discusses implications for real-world industries. The author addresses Wiley's recent criticism of theoretical and empirical work on the fixed cost problem and outlines an agenda for legal research that can help illuminate the underlying economic and antitrust policy issues posed by industries with high fixed costs.     

Anticompetitive Employment

Scholars, antitrust agencies, and policy makers have historically paid little attention to anticompetitive practices in labor markets. This was largely due a misconception that antitrust law is meant to govern conventional markets in which goods and services trade, rather than govern labor markets. Antitrust law may also offer a poor remedy to redress employers who enter no-poaching agreements or otherwise impair competition. The primary tension involves antitrust's purpose, which is to promote “consumer welfare.” To identify whether conduct eroded consumer welfare, courts tend to scrutinize whether prices increased. But here, lessening wages can enable firms to sell goods at cheaper prices, benefiting consumers. Another issue is that the typical restraint affects only a smattering of workers instead of lessening wages throughout the greater market. This article uses empirical analyses to show that antitrust should promote labor's welfare as it does consumer welfare, and it argues that enforcement must condemn labor cartels as per se illegal. The research demonstrates that labor cartels are more pernicious than restraints in product markets, as employers can lessen wages with less effort than in product markets. Antitrust should even proscribe no-poaching agreements formed for a legitimate purpose (e.g., to protect trade secrets) because employers could have achieved the same goals using less coercive means; the noncompete agreement, at least, provides labor with a semblance of notice and bargaining power without drawing antitrust scrutiny. The prohibition of labor cartels would thus promote competition and consumer welfare, especially in minimum wage labor markets.     

The economic analysis of antitrust consents

Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques.     

论反垄断法适用除外制度的理论基础

适用除外制度之所以成为反垄断法的一项重要制度,有其深刻的经济基础和法律基础。从经济基础上讲,垄断与竞争均是利弊兼具,垄断并不必然消灭竞争,甚至会使竞争加剧。适用除外制度的确立,有利于发挥垄断的积极作用, 克服竞争的某些消极作用。从法律基础上讲,反垄断法要解决虽然属于垄断、但又不予禁止的技术问题,只有通过适用除外制度加以解决;另一方面,适用除外制度还是反垄断法与其他法律进行协调的一项必不可少的措施。     

我国反垄断行政诉讼的困境及因应——基于165份判决书的实证分析

行政诉讼在我国反垄断执法体系中居于重要地位。通过165份司法判决文书的实证分析,表明我国反垄断行政诉讼虽有发展,但总体呈现发展起点低、案件总量低、执法机构被诉比例低、原告胜诉率低等"四低"现象,这与反垄断行政诉讼的原告资格认定困难与合法性审查范围偏窄等内因不无关系。反垄断立法条文模糊、执法专业性强等特点易使反垄断执法存在不确定性,要消除这种不确定性,除了实体规范的细化保障外,程序保障亦不容忽视。所以说,为反垄断行政诉讼确立特殊的程序规则不但具有理论必要性,也存在现实紧迫性。申言之,在反垄断行政诉讼中应当尽快确立以程序参与为基础的利害关系认定制度,建立司法审查对程序性执法细则制定的督促机制,并适度加强法院实质审查的力度。     

美国反垄断法豁免中的诺尔——本灵顿原则评析

诺尔——本灵顿原则是由美国联邦最高法院通过几个案例确立的联邦反垄断法中的一个原则,其主要含义是:根据《美国宪法第一修正案》的规定,即使竞争者通过游说政府而改变法律将会削弱竞争,其行为也不违反反垄断法。诺尔——本灵顿原则是协调《谢尔曼法》的重要目标与公民请愿权利和各级政府有效决策之间关系的产物。诺尔——本灵顿原则对中国的反垄断法执法也有一定启发意义,在执法过程应当全面协调经营者的竞争利益与其他经营者的宪法权利、与政府行为的关系。     

反垄断诉讼的价值定位与制度建构

反垄断诉讼是反垄断法实施的重要机制之一,是反垄断法理论研究和司法实践中的重要问题。对此问题有两种研究思路：一是以个人权利为中心,将诉讼看作争议解决机制;二是以秩序建构为中心,将诉讼看作建构理想秩序的重要机制。反垄断法的产生、发展与有机社会的生成同步。垄断行为属于风险行为,其造成的损害具有不确定性、延伸性、难以恢复性,因而反垄断法属于现代社会规制法。与此相应,反垄断诉讼应是秩序建构诉讼,在价值上注重竞争秩序的建构,在功能上主张司法能动、积极回应社会在竞争上形成的价值共识,在构造上主张放宽原告条件,建立多元参与的诉讼机制。     

COMPETITION POLICY IN CHINA AND ITS RELEVANCE TO SMES

Competition policy has great relevance to all the firms in any economy. Even though it is unlikely that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have enough market power to constrain competition through a misuse of such power, they may still face prosecution if they are involved in a boycott of competitors or suppliers, price-fixing, output-restriction and other monopoly agreements. This article discusses antitrust issues pertaining to SMEs with a focus on China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) and its implementation rules. Contrary to the popular view that SMEs benefit from competition laws, evidence shows that they are reluctant to get involved in antitrust litigation against large firms partly because of the high legal costs involved. There is an urgent need to promote an awareness of antitrust compliance in China and to educate SMEs about the need to avoid breaching the new antitrust law and its associated regulations. In the meantime, SMEs should take full advantage of the antitrust laws to fight against the abuse of market dominance directed at them, and to gain equal opportunities to market access.     

The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A Developing Country Perspective

Although the issue of trade and competition policy has beendropped from the Work Programmes of the Doha Round of WorldTrade Organization (WTO) negotiations, it continues to be discussedin other fora and may return to the WTO after the completionof the Round. This article assesses the case for an agreementfrom the perspective of developing countries. It begins by reviewingthe ‘development dimension’ of the WTO debate andthen examines three specific antitrust issues that were of considerablerelevance to developing countries but were not pursued: exportcartels, anti-dumping and intellectual property rights (IPRs).There follows a critical assessment of the empirical and theoreticalarguments for the kind of agreement that was being advocatedto deal with international cartels. Alternative proposals, involvingdeveloping countries ‘outsourcing’ antitrust enforcementto developed countries, are also sceptically examined, as isthe relevance for developing countries of the kind of competitionpolicy that is currently in place in developed countries. Finally,a general approach to international trade agreements suggeststhat developing countries had nothing to gain from the proposalthat was on the table, and the article concludes by proposinga range of more suitable alternatives.     

The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law

It is well understood that the exchange of information between horizontal competitors can violate competition law provisions in both the European Union (EU) and the United States, namely, article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, despite ostensible similarities between EU and U.S. antitrust law concerning interfirm information exchange, substantial differences remain. In this article, we make a normative argument for the U.S. antitrust regime's approach, on the basis that the United States’ approach to information exchange is likely to be more efficient than the relevant approach under the EU competition regime. Using economic theories of harm concerning information exchange to understand the imposition of liability in relation to “stand-alone” instances of information exchange, we argue that such liability must be grounded on the conception of a prophylactic rule. We characterize this rule as a form of ex ante regulation and explain why it has no ex post counterpart in antitrust law. In contrast to the U.S. antitrust regime, we argue that the implementation of such a rule pursuant to EU competition law leads to higher error costs without a significant reduction in regulatory costs. As a majority of jurisdictions have competition law regimes that resemble EU competition law more closely than U.S. antitrust law, our thesis has important implications for competition regimes around the world.     

反垄断法视野中的低于成本价销售行为

反垄断法规范限制竞争的低于成本价销售行为虽然在一定程度上限制了市场主体的经营自主权 ,但却维护了竞争机制 ,有利于实现社会整体利益最大化。试图从现有的法律规定出发来研究反垄断法规范低于成本价销售行为的一些具体问题 ,揭示出反垄断法并不是禁止所有的低于成本价销售行为 ,而只是禁止具有市场支配地位或者经济优势的企业从事目的在于限制竞争 ,行为后果已经限制或可能限制竞争的低于成本价销售行为 ,防止竞争执法机构陷入禁止所有低于成本价销售行为的执法误区     

论反垄断法的伦理基础

对反垄断伦理的研究能够给反垄断提供更加深刻的解释力。竞争正义是反垄断法的伦理基石,反垄断法研究必须解答何谓正义的竞争这一问题。竞争自由是竞争正义的前提条件,竞争效率是反垄断法的核心理念,竞争公平是反垄断法永恒的价值追求。     

Can Common Business Practices Ever Be Anticompetitive? Redefining Monopolization

For most of its modern history, antitrust law distinguished between normal competition and monopolization by looking for merit, legitimate business justifications, or efficiencies in the challenged business conduct. These proxies were seen as appropriate because they served antitrust law's welfare objectives well. However, the universal adoption of these proxies has overshadowed significant shortcomings, chief among them being that firms do not think in terms of legitimate business justifications or efficiencies, but rather in terms of long-term sustainability and appropriation of value. As a result, antitrust law becomes detached from the very subjects it purports to regulate. Against the backdrop of the recent resurgence of enforcement activity, particularly involving tech giants, this article attempts a conceptualization of monopolization that does not revolve around merit in any form or function. Instead it introduces the proxy of commonness of business practices to determine their legality. This helps highlight the importance of considering “how things are done” in the relevant market, and helps reground antitrust law in business realities, which can enhance the heuristic mechanism of distinguishing between normal and anticompetitive practices. To prove this point the article develops an error test framework, through which it compares current tests with the proposed test in terms of their error footprint and concludes that the integration of the commonness parameter delivers better results. Ultimately, the inquiry undertaken herein is not only about constructing a conception of normal competition different from the only standard we currently have, that is, variants of merit, but also about shifting the conversation from how to fine-tune existing standards to how to capture a more complete conception of competition.     

The Damage Done: Cocaine Methods in Detroit

The pro-competitive antitrust doctrine has originated in the free-market economies of Western capitalist countries but with economic transformations in Eastern Europe the doctrine ceased to be an exclusive Western concept. Using the example of the Polish law on combating Trust in the National Economy of 1987, the author demonstrates the spread of the antitrust doctrine from capitalism to socialism. Apart from these changes, the doctrine has been spreading on the international level because increasingly it has found application not only within particular countries but also with regard to trade and commerce between and among countries. The multidimensional nature of the antitrust doctrine has important implications for combating both domestic and international antitrust crime. The efficiency of efforts to combat abuse of a dominant market position, limiting access to the market or other forms of restraining competition will depend increasingly on the degree to which organs responsible for fighting antitrust crimes are willing to benefit from the multi-dimensional nature of the antitrust doctrine.     

反垄断法的价值构造

价值问题是反垄断立法和实施中的核心和前置性问题,在当前中国反垄断法实施面临制度分裂、"纸面上的法"与"行动中的法"相背离等背景下,对这一话题的研讨尤为重要。成熟反垄断法律制度的实体价值主要表现在自由、效率和公平等诸方面,在经济理性的作用下,这些价值呈并存、竞争和融合的矛盾运动之势。受制于政治、经济、社会文化以及制度等因素的影响,中国反垄断法表现出来的自由价值和经济理性等先天不足,是该法实施乱象的重要根源,亟待通过制度实践和竞争文化培育凝聚更多价值共识。     

Taming digital gatekeepers: the ‘more regulatory approach’ to antitrust law

Antitrust enforcement and competition policy in the digital economy is high on the agenda of authorities and policymakers. The distinctive features of digital markets and the strategic role played by large platforms apparently require a rethinking of the antitrust regime. Several reform proposals point to the need to integrate the antitrust toolkit with ex ante measures since there is a risk that ex post enforcement would be too slow to successfully keep markets competitive and contestable. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the invoked regulatory approach reflects the distinctive structural features of digital markets or whether it is just an enforcement short-cut.     

反垄断法中垄断的法经济学分析

反垄断既是一个法律问题,又是一个复杂的经济问题。而垄断在反垄断法中是一个基石范畴的问题,垄断的合理界定是研究反垄断法的先决条件。通过对垄断利弊的评价分析,从经济学的角度来看,至少要从有效竞争,规模经济,公共利益等三个方面对垄断进行阐述,最后通过对垄断的阐述来界定反垄断法中垄断的范围。     

The WTO's First Antitrust Case - Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition

A World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute panel has decided theWTO’s first antitrust case. It resolved the matter infavour of the United States’ claim that Mexico had anticompetitivelyfacilitated exploitative prices and a cartel that raised theprice of terminating cross-border telephone calls in Mexicoand thereby harmed trade and competition. The case is Mexico– Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (April2004) (‘the Mexican telecom case’). This essay arguesthat if the WTO’s antitrust clause was in fact triggered(which is a point of contention), Mexico’s conduct violatedits obligations. Furthermore, it argues that the GATS antitrustobligation in the telecommunications sector should be acknowledgedas occupying an important place at the intersection of trade,competition and industrial policies. Antitrust law is the otherside of the coin of liberal trade law. Antitrust law opens marketsby prohibiting private and other commercial restraints, whiletrade law opens markets by prohibiting public restraints. BeforeMexican telecom, no legal discipline was regarded as copiousor flexible enough to address combined public and private restraints.In particular, nations were allowed free rein to privilege nationalchampions that harmed competition in and out of their country,imposing costs on outsiders as well as on their own people.A positive reading of the antitrust clause helps to fill thegap.