Transformation of political elite as regime changes in Pakistan

Burton and Higely [(2001). ‘The study of political elite transformations’, International review of sociology/Revue internationale de sociologie, 11(2): 181–199] argue that when elites of a society are not united this will lead to an unstable political regime. Consensual elite cohesion is only created through distinctive elite transformation. This essay attempts to elaborate their argument in Pakistan, by developing a link among a continuous regime shift from authoritarian to democratic governments and the political elites who keep transforming their structure accordingly. The technique followed for it is analysing the epochal events over time from pre-partition till date which became reason for regime transformations. The discussion focuses on the collusions and contestations of multiple power elites within given social context which are embedded under the international context. It concludes that political elites in Pakistan were always embraced by multiple other power elites who accordingly hold dual elite identity to control the command post in the political arena. Such complex elite structure makes it paradoxical to distinguish political elite of Pakistan from other power elites of Pakistan.     

Rose,Orange, and Tulip: The failed post-Soviet revolutions

In 2003–2005, democratic revolutions overthrew the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. However, disillusioned citizens witness today their new leaders creating a Bonapartist regime, entering into open conflict with former revolutionary allies or being forced to accept cohabitation with leaders of the previous regime. This article argues that despite internationally acclaimed civic mobilisation, civil society's weakness seriously affected the three revolutionary processes. These were in fact initiated, led, controlled, and finally subordinated by former members of the authoritarian regimes’ political elite. Finally, the supposedly democratic revolutions proved to be little more than a limited rotation of ruling elites within undemocratic political systems.     

State formation,development, and the politics of self-help in Kenya

Issues of rural development, state formation, and political effectiveness are of paramount importance in Africa today. Analysis of Kenya's Harambee self-help approach to development contributes to our understanding of these issues by clarifying not only the ways in which political and economic concerns are linked in one African nation in a hierarchy based on a patrimonial model of political behavior but also some facets of elite behavior and peasant-state relationships. This paper argues that self-help is central to Kenyan politics and hence to the operation of this model of political behavior, serving the interests and needs of both Kenyan elites and rural communities. Through their self-help projects rural Kenyans neither reject the state retreating into the economy of affection nor permit elites exclusive access to the benefits of both public and private resources. Rather, using elite networks to gain support for self-help projects, residents of rural communities improve their access to highly valued collective goods. These processes are currently being modified in some important ways by the Moi government.     

Weep for the One Who Descends? African Democracies,Politics of Stomach Infrastructure,and Homology of Corruption

This article discusses contemporary African democratic practices vis-à-vis politics of stomach infrastructure that debilitates sustainable infrastructural development in the region. In this article, clarifications are articulated within four interlinked phenomena: the enthusiasm for democracy, its collapse, and the resurgence of hybrid-democratic order that metamorphosed into politics of stomach infrastructure that facilitates corruption in African postcolonial state. It unravels the existing democratic prototype against ideal democratic order. The article considered the prevailing democratic inclination moseyed through citizens and political elite’s armistice that presage democratic peril. The article argued that unscrupulous political collaboration and democratic debauchery that exist between the political elites and the electorates craft an opportunity for institutionalized corruption in the region. Finally, the article found homogenous paradigms of corruption in the selected African states, including South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria.     

The Philippine democratic uprising and the contradictions of neoliberalism: Edsa II

Select responses to the January 2001 uprising against the government of President Josef 'Erap' Estrada in the Philippines demonstrate a great deal about certain contradictions and paradoxes implicit in neoliberal conceptions of democratic governance. This paper presents a critique of these conceptions, based on a radical democratic outlook. Dubbed EDSA II - given its location at the same place as the 1986 Epifanio de los Santos uprising against President Ferdinand Marcos - the uprising resulted in Estrada's replacement by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and a different faction of the Philippine political elite. Despite never seriously threatening the hold and influence of traditional political elites in the Philippines, the uprising was criticised by some Western commentators. Their criticisms were founded on mistaken interpretations of events and are a reflection of these commentators' increasing reluctance to endorse any forms of popular political mobilisation and resistance. Their reluctance is a reflection of their neoliberal conception of democratic governance, which privileges the building of institutions to promote market efficiency over issues of power and social change.     

Who has led Russia? Russian regional political elites, 1954 – 2006

Quantitative measures are used to compare the age, tenure, gender and change of political elites in 18 Russian regions from 1954 to 2006. The study finds more similarities than differences between regional elites from the Soviet era and from the post-Soviet Russian era. The Russian regional political elite since 1992 is actually older than the Soviet elite and resembles it quite closely in terms of years in office and turnover, comparing both the total time spans of the elites of each era and at 10-year intervals from 1956 through to 2006. Even in relation to differences by region and gender since 1992, there has been a re-emergence of a regional political establishment in a similar pattern to that of the Soviet era.     

Legacies of State Socialism: A Comparative Study of Elite Attitudes towards EU Economic Competitiveness in Western and Central Eastern Europe

Abstract

The elites of Western Europe prefer social security for all citizens as the major aim of the EU, while the preference of Central and Eastern European elites is for a more globally competitive European economy. This disparity between elite preferences may be accounted for by the distinct electorates and elites’ responsive strategic calculations, or by the process of socialisation Central and Eastern European elites undergo during exposure to the EU. This article argues that the predominant reason for the difference in elite attitudes towards economic competition is the lasting effect of state socialism in Central and Eastern European countries.     

Elite networks and worldviews during the Yel'tsin years

Conflict characterised Russian elite politics during the Yel'tsin years. This article adopts a network approach to understand the sources of elite contention in one Russian locality between 1994 and 2000. The findings suggest that elite conflict during the Yel'tsin years had its roots in structural and cultural forces deeper than control over official positions and differences in socio-demographic characteristics. The article reveals that elites fragmented over time into factions. Rather than having a unifying culture, elites from different factions held distinct worldviews that were patterned by their networks. The characteristics of their worldviews matched the structural properties of elite factions and reinforced differences between them.     

The More Things Change,the More They Stay the Same: the Swedish Local Government Elite between 1985 and 2005

This article examines the development of the main characteristics of the Swedish local political–administrative elite, by analysing repeated surveys, performed in 1985, 1991, 1999 and 2005, of all important leaders in a representative sample of 20 towns and cities. Despite the great changes that have occurred at the local government level, the local government elite retains a surprisingly high degree of homogeneity and stability over time. Although this elite has become increasingly gender equalised and professional, local problems are perceived to have become slightly more complex; meanwhile, the perceived influence and effectiveness of leaders in solving these problems has remained unchanged, probably because the perceived power and autonomy of local government to act effectively has declined somewhat. In contrast, the leaders' political capital (networks, democratic values and global relations) has remained strong and stable.     

Karamojan politics: extension of state power and formation of a subordinate political elite in northeastern Uganda

State-making processes that occur in peripheral areas and the role that local political elites play in such processes have not been adequately explored by scholars. This article investigates these important phenomena through the lens of the Ugandan state’s presence in Karamoja, in the country’s northeast, which until the early years of the twenty-first century was very limited. Rapid extension of the power of the Ugandan state in the region, upon which the country’s rulers have embarked in the last decade, has radically altered existing governance arrangements in Karamoja and led to the formation of a subordinate Karamojan political elite. This elite has been instrumental in government efforts to establish control over the region’s population and shaped this state-making process in important ways.     

What kind of capitalism for Russia?: A comparative analysis

Post-communist governing elites had a vision of a transition to a type of society characterised by wealth, markets, private ownership, democracy and civil society. The transformation in Russia is analyzed in terms of company structure, economic outcomes and patterns of social integration, elite and class fragmentation. On the basis of a comparative political economy, different models of capitalism are defined (competitive or market-led and cooperative or negotiated). The Russian economy is defined as a perverse chaotic social formation. It is contended that policy should move towards a state-led “negotiated” type of capitalist system.     

The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class

This article integrates the dynamics within authoritarian elites into analysis of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. This variable has been excluded from nearly all analysis on the subject. Based on a comparison of three cases, this article concludes that only in cases where popular mobilization was accompanied by deep divisions within the ruling coalition did democratization ensue. The division of the authoritarian coalition in Benin and South Africa created a window of opportunity which enabled pro-democracy forces to push through democratic reforms. Furthermore, only when a majority of the authoritarian elite in South Africa favoured negotiations with the African National Congress and other anti-apartheid political organizations did the transition towards democracy in South Africa make any progress. In contrast, in the Togolese case, a united ruling coalition precluded any reform that would have challenged its political hegemony.     

Economic policy elites and democratization

Is the authoritarian potential of policy elites a mortal threat to the consolidation of democracy in Latin America? This article suggests that in the context of democratic transitions, significant variations may exist in the performance of technocratic roles. In most countries in the region, elected governments faced the crisis of the 1980s by retaining markedly technocratic and exclusionary styles of policy-making. In Chile, a highly technocratic form of authoritarianism was succeeded by a novel pattern of pragmatic cooperation between technical and political elites. Democratic institutions were reestablished while a strong economic team enforced coherence and continuity in economic policy. Historical and institutional factors are used to show that Chile may now be nearer the democratic pole than other “hybrid” democratic-authoritarian regimes in the region.     

The Toxic Politics of Bangladesh: A Bipolar Competitive Neopatrimonial State?

In order to understand the structural dimensions of the problems concerning democratic governance in Bangladesh, this article seeks to explicate whether or not Bangladesh is a neopatrimonial state. This article examines contemporary Bangladesh politics with a particular focus on the notion of neopatrimonialism and with special reference to the personalization of state power. The concept of neopatrimonialism has great utility in explaining leadership behaviour in a dysfunctional democracy such as Bangladesh, where personalized exchanges, exploitation of bureaucratic and state mechanisms and political scandals are common. I argue that Bangladesh is a special variant of the neopatrimonial state, which I suggest to be bipolar neopatrimonialism. I contend that since independence, successive governments and political leaders always attempt to monopolize state power in various ways. The patron-client society of Bangladesh helps political leaders to personalize the state power they possess. To monopolize state power, the political elites of Bangladesh create networks and alliances, relying on exchanges to meet their objectives. In this regard, state elites use elements of the state and political system to mediate these exchanges.     

Revisiting Russian and Polish elite value orientations: Are the elites still committed to the original goals of post-communist transitions?

This article investigates the extent of continuity and discontinuity of the original political, economic, and foreign policy value orientations of Russian and Polish post-Communist elites. I conclude that during the post-Communist period the Russian elite shifted the priorities from pro-democratic to authoritarian positions, engaged in a debate over the most desirable foreign policy course, and ultimately chose a pragmatically independent direction, but remained loyal to original beliefs in the free market. In Poland, with its cyclical rotation of governments, original pro-democratic and pro-Western elite value orientations survive to this day, while the issue of preferred economic model is contested and highly sensitive to electoral cycles.     

Electronic Resources and the Study of Political Elites in Russia

Developments in the information society in Russia have led to the creation of an abundance of online primary texts by political actors and institutions. This article surveys a large selection of official electronic texts with the aim of encouraging more extensive use of online sources and easing researchers' navigation of Russian politicians' use of the internet. While the authors do not claim that online data can replace the insights gained from elite interviews, the article suggests that online texts could be used more extensively as a valuable addition to existing methods applied to the study of Russian political elites.     

Varieties of capitalism in Eastern Europe (with special emphasis on Estonia and Slovenia)

The authors proceed from the assumption that the institutional and economic efficiency of a particular country (or society) depends on its historic legacy or ‘path-dependence’, strategic interactions of the elite and the impact of the international environment. Estonia and Slovenia are both – not only economically, but also institutionally – perceived as relatively successful and prominent post-communist countries and new members of the EU. Yet they have developed completely different – in some aspects even diametrically opposite – regulative settings and socio-political arrangements. The main emphasis is on the connection between the dynamics and ideological preferences of political actors and the pace of reforms as well as institutional regulations. One can argue that the political elite in Estonia encouraged the shaping of the state in a direction close to the liberal-market model, whereas Slovenia is closer to the corporatist social welfare-state model. In both cases, some dysfunctional effects are evident that represent a new challenge to the elites and, at the same time, a test of their credibility and competence.     

‘I never had a political career’: Russian political actors on politics and morality

This article explores the question of moral discourse among Russian political elites. Morality is reflected in elite narratives in various forms—as an espousal of abstract principles, as a moral–pragmatic hybrid, and as loyalty to one's associates. Proximity to political power correlates with the various versions of moral discourse employed by elite members. Each version, respectively, offers an index of social relations through the prism of morality: in some instances, negatively, as that which prevents the attainment of the good; in others, problematically, as that which makes difficult that attainment; and in a third version, that which contributes to securing the good itself.     

The transition from limited access orders to open access orders in the post-communist Europe

This paper attempts to explain the process of institutional transition of post-communist countries applying conceptual framework proposed by D.C. North, J. J. Wallis, and B. R. Weingast. The first part of the article is devoted to outline the theory of North, Weingast, and Wallis. The second part the theory is used to analyze transformation processes in post-communist countries. An important conclusion of this paper is that cultural, religious and historical factors have crucial impact on formation of new coalitions of elites in the transitions countries. In the countries where Western values were present the transfer of the market and democratic formal institutions was easier. Also, the process of transformation was strongly influenced by external factors, especially the prospect of integration with the European Union, which encouraged elites to take action that benefited the opening of both political and economic markets. These observations suggest that, in general, the success of transformation in transition countries did not depend on the intentional actions of ruling elites.     

Out with a whimper: the final days of Hungarian socialism

The objective of this article is to provide a snapshot of Hungary's political, social, and to a lesser extent, economic conditions on the eve of the transition. The paper examines the desperate attempts of the socialist political elites to regain their legitimacy through half-hearted political and economic reform proposals, and briefly surveys the country's profound economic difficulties and its pervasive social malaise.