日本对华直接投资的特点趋势与我们的对策

一、日本对华直接投资的发展现状 日本对华直接投资始于1979年,当时仅为1400万美元。在整个20世纪80年代,对华投资虽然有较大的增长,但与欧美国家相比增长的速度缓慢。在“广场协议”以后,日本为了应付日元升值压力,开始大量购买外国的企业或在外国开设工厂,对外直接投资规模不断扩大,其中也包括加大了对华直接投资力度。这一时期对华投资大都集中在非制造业上,例如饭店、宾馆等回收较快的非工业性生产领域;对制造业的投资仅限于小规模试验性投资。1984—1985年以及1988年曾出现了两次日本对华直接投资高潮。     

日本对华直接投资中存在的问题及对策建议

我国改革开放以来,外国对华直接投资迅速增长,其中日本对华直接投资是中国吸引外资的重要方面。战后日本对华直接投资,从1979年的第一件开始,经历了曲折的过程,先后经历了起步阶段、稳步发展阶段、挫折徘徊阶段、快速发展阶段、重新审视和定位阶段。据中国对外经济贸易合作部统计,截止到2001年底,日本对华直接投资项目件数累计为22380个,合作金额达441亿美元。2001年,日本对华直接投资实际执行金额在香港、美国、维尔     

日本对华直接投资的新特点及思考

近几年来,日本对华直接投资增长迅速,并表现一些新的特点.一、新特点     

新世纪日本对华直接投资与中国产业结构升级

从日本开始对华直接投资以来,两国在这一领域的合作就不断加强。进入新世纪后,中国经济实力的增强以及入世后明朗的发展前景,对日本新一轮对华直接投资产生了很大的吸引力。本文通过分析20世纪90年代以来日本对华直接投资的产业分布特征以及新世纪日本对华直接投资的产业转移趋势后,提出了优化日本对华投资产业结构的对策,旨在吸引更多的日资,使其在中国经济增长和产业结构升级中发挥更大作用。     

略论90年代日本对华投资及其特点

日本是当今世界上最大的资本输出国之一,也是目前向亚洲提供资金最多的国家。80年代中后期,日本对外直接投资的重点是北美和西欧,投资于亚洲的比例不大,投资于中国的数量更为有限。但是进入90年代以后,随着日本对欧美大规模投资告一段落,随着亚洲经济、特别是东亚经济的持续高速增长及日本国家发展战略的调整,日本对外投资的重点已从欧美开始转向亚洲。日本的对华投资也随之急剧增加,出现了跳跃式发展的新局面。     

日本对华直接投资对中国经济发展影响研究

日本对华直接投资对中国的经济发展起到了重要的推动作用。日本对华直接投资可划分为全面启动、合作深化、调整转型三个时期,具有以制造业为主、集中于东部沿海地区等特点。通过国际经济学理论分析,运用回归与ARMA组合模型、格兰杰因果关系检验等实证分析方法,认为日本对华直接投资对中国经济的主要作用有:促进中国产业升级转型、拉动中日贸易发展、通过技术溢出效应提高中国技术水平。中国应加强引导日本对华直接投资,提升日本对华直接投资质量,助力中国经济结构转型。     

2005年日本经济财政白书述评

一、经济景气长期化的日本经济日本经济自2002年初开始进入景气恢复局面。2002年在前年度负增长基础上,实现了0.8%的GDP增长,2003年再次增长2.0%,2004年达到1.9%。目前进入景气增长的第四个年头。此次经济景气特征为三个方面,一是民间消费和企业投资支撑了经济增长,二是政府支出得到了抑制,三是失业率下降已成定势。关于日本经济景气状况,白书指出,2004年由于IT产业的全球不景气,上半年和下半年出现了明显的差异,上半年受国内消费、投资等民间需求及外需的正面影响,年率达到4%,而下半年的外需和民间需求均出现了负增长,致使年增长率仅为1.…     

日本对华直接投资及其影响

从90年代至今,日本对华直接投资几经起伏,造成这一势态的原因主要在于投资国和东道国两个方面.日本对华直接投资对中日贸易和中国经济的发展有一定的促进作用.中国加入世贸组织后,面对新一轮日本对华直接投资的兴起,如何合理有效地对其加以利用,在当前是值得研究的.     

中国加入WTO与日本对华直接投资

自1979年日本开展对华直接投资以来,经历了一个起伏多变的发展过程,如今已成为中国重要的投资大国。中国加入WTO,进一步开放市场,放宽对外资限制是一种必然趋势。这无疑会对与中国有着密切经贸关系的日本产生重大影响,为日本对华直接投资的进一步发展提供新的机遇。为此,中日双方有必要共同努力,采取更积极的对策,促进     

日本经济自律复苏浅析

1999财政年度日本经济增长 0 5% ,是时隔 3年首次转为正增长。这种增长主要是由政府的巨额财政投入和超低利率政策的刺激所致。从目前情况看 ,尽管日本经济的景气状况改善缓慢 ,但可以说已经出现了以民间需求为主导的自律性恢复迹象 ,这是 2 0 0 0年日本经济能否摆脱长期低迷的关键。一、日本经济自律复苏的迹象首先 ,在全球ＩＴ革命的带动下 ,日本的电信、通讯、半导体等ＩＴ相关企业开始大规模扩大投资 ,增加移动电话、电子零部件生产。ＮＥＣ、东芝、日立制作所、富士通大公司等均投资 1 0 0 0亿日元以上开设新工厂 ,加上三菱电机 ,这五…     

2002年东亚经济的前景

2001年世界各地经济大多陷入或迈向衰退,东亚各地除中国、越南等外亦陷于深度的衰退与停滞之中.2002年下半年或晚些时候,随着美国经济逐步走向复苏,亚洲各地经济亦将逐步恢复与反弹.然而由于美国资讯科技投资过度,"后遗症"的化解尚需时日,使得东亚各地今后必须更多地依靠内部需求,自力自强,加强合作,步向经济稳定增长的轨道.     

2002年亚太地区形势讨论会在京举行

20 0 2年 1 2月 2 6日 ,中国社会科学院亚太研究所 2 0 0 2年亚太地区形势讨论会在北京举行。来自各研究机构及政府部门的 4 0余位专家学者参加了会议。与会的专家学者们对亚太地区政治经济形势进行了回顾与展望 ,并就一些地区的热点问题进行了深入的讨论。关于地区经济形势 ,学者们认为亚太地区的经济形势总体较好。尽管在亚太地区经济中占比重最大、影响面最广的美国经济持续波动 ,第二大经济体日本的经济处于停滞状态 ,但在高速发展的中国经济的带动下 ,亚太地区的经济复苏趋势仍较为明显。学者们认为 2 0 0 3年的国际形势虽存在一些不稳…     

美国的农村金融体制及借鉴意义

本文对美国农村金融体制进行考察,对其农村金融组织体系及配套的扶持政策进行评介,并通过与中国农村金融的比较,指出中国农村金融体制改革应积极发挥市场机制的导向作用,建立农村资金良性循环机制,同时政府应承担主导作用,建立多层次、全方位的农村金融体制。     

The Nakba in Palestinian Memory in Israel

Changes in the international, regional and domestic arenas in the late 1990s resulted in discursive change with regard to interpretation of the Al Nakba in the political and civil societies of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Apart from fuelling a discursive challenge to the Israeli dominant discourse about the 1948 events, this reinterpretation allowed the Palestinian Arab citizens to discuss the historical roots of the problems they experienced within the Israeli political and civil societal spheres. This article analyses the nature and significance of discursive change of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel on the Nakba by referring to its impact on their identity politics as well as their political and civil societal activities.     

Islam in Mali in the neoliberal era

If before 11 September 2001, many praised Mali as a model ofdemocracy, secularism and toleration, many have now begun toexpress concern about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism inMali. I consider a number of recent public debates in Mali overmorality, so-called women’s issues, and the proposed changesin the Family Code and show how the perspectives of many Malianson these issues are not new but rather relate to longstandingand ongoing debates about Islam, secularism, politics, moralityand law. What is new is the way in which some Muslim religiousleaders have been articulating their complaints and criticisms.Since the guarantee of the freedom of expression and associationin the early 1990s, there has been a proliferation of independentnewspapers and private radio stations and new Islamic associationswith a coterie of increasingly media-savvy activists. I explorehow some Muslim activists have used such outlets to articulatethe concerns of some ordinary Malians, who face the contradictionsof living as modern Muslim citizens in a modernizing and secularizingstate where, in this age of neoliberal governmentality, theallegedly un-Islamic seems to be always just around the corner. Portions of the paper have been presented at the workshop, ‘Islam,Society and State in West Africa’, Rutgers University,New Brunswick, 29 March 2003; at the symposium, ‘Constructionand Dissemination of Islamic Knowledge in Africa’, IndianaUniversity, Bloomington, 19 April 2003; and at the conference,‘Governance and Insecurity in West Africa’, NorthwesternUniversity, 13–15 November 2003; and at UniversitätBayreuth. ^1. United States Agency for International Development, ‘Assistanceenvironment’, in USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 11. ^2. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The political scene’,in EIU Country Report: Mali (EIU, London, March 2002), p. 47. ^3. See Joshua Muravchik, ‘Freedom and the Arab world’,The Weekly Standard, 31 December 2001. ^4. ‘Overview’. USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 18. Such sentiments were alsoexpressed in journalistic accounts published shortly after 11September 2001. See, for example, Douglas Farah, ‘Mali’sMuslim clerics send troubling message: fragile democracy seenas vulnerable to extremism’, Washington Post, 30 September2001, p. A24; Kader Konaté, ‘Mali. Le danger islamiste’,Le Continent, 14 September 2001, p. 1. ^5. See Joan Baxter, ‘Challenging tradition’, BBC Focuson Africa Magazine, January-March 2002, pp. 48–50. Otherexamples include Nicolas Colombant, ‘Mali’s Muslimssteer back to spiritual roots’, Christian Science Monitor,26 February 2002, p. 8. ^6. These included various Western media outlets and several Maliannewspapers. ^7. James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, ‘Spatializing states:toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality’,American Ethnologist 29, 4 (2002), pp. 981–1002. ^8. For critical perspectives on the fashionable civil society approachto ‘good governance’ in Africa, see John L. Comaroffand Jean Comaroff (eds), Civil Society and the Political Imaginationin Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999);Béatrice Hibou and Richard Banégas, ‘Civilsociety and the public space in Africa’, CODESRIA Bulletin1 (2000), pp. 39–47. ^9. For example, Sunjata, the mythical founder of the medieval Malianempire, Mansa Musa, the Muslim rulers of Macina (r. nineteenthcentury), al-Hajj Umar Tall (d. nineteenth century), the Kuntashaykhs of the Timbuktu region, and Shaykh Hamallah (d. twentiethcentury), to name only some of the most prominent. ^10. For an example of how such ‘orthodoxy’ changes overtime and space in Mali, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Muslimproselytization as purification: religious pluralism and conflictin contemporary Mali’ in Abdallah A. An-Na’im (ed.),Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa (Orbis,Maryknoll, NY, 1999), pp. 228–45. ^11. Two studies that have received quite a bit of attention areAnna L. Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginalityin an out-of-the-way place (Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1993); Charles Piot, Remotely Global: Village modernityin West Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999). ^12. See Gregory Starrett, ‘The political economy of religiouscommodities in Cairo’, American Anthropologist 97, 1 (1995),pp. 51–68. ^13. On these developments, see Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares,‘The formation of an "Islamic sphere" in French colonialWest Africa’, Economy and Society, 28, 4 (1999), pp. 497–519;Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Islam and public piety in Mali’,in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds), Public Islamand the Common Good (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2004);Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy: History andauthority in a Malian town (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburghand the University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005). ^14. Malians with access to satellite television have a wider arrayof choices, which are hard to quantify. ^15. Some of the themes in this section are treated at greater lengthin my book, Islam and the Prayer Economy. ^16. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1993). ^17. See Seydina Oumar Diarra, ‘Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali’,Info-Matin, 18 January 2002, p. 5. ^18. Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy, p. 212. Seealso David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim societiesand French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920(Ohio University Press, Athens, OA, 2000); David Robinson andJean-Louis Triaud (eds), Le temps des marabouts: Itinéraireset stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale françaisev.1880–1960 (Karthala, Paris, 1997). ^19. Many Malians also regularly apply diverse principles from ‘custom’,which is often referred to as laada (from the Arabic) in theregion’s vernaculars. ^20. For one example, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Notes on theanthropological study of Islam and Muslim societies in Africa’,Culture and Religion, 1, 2 (2000), pp. 277–85. ^21. Ahmad Uthman Bah, Diya’ al-ghasaq manzuma nasihat al-shabab(Matba’at al-najah al-jadida, Casablanca, Morocco, 1992). ^22. See, for example, Amadou Tall, Dimensions de l’Islam (DarEl Fikr, Beirut, Lebanon, 1995–1996). ^23. On Haïdara and his career, see Soares, ‘Islam andpublic piety’ and Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy.Cf. Dorothea Schulz, ‘"Charisma and Brotherhood" revisited’,Journal of Religion in Africa, 33 (2003), pp. 146–71. ^24. See Louis Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, power andschooling in a West African Muslim society (Indiana UniversityPress, Bloomington, IL, 2001). ^25. Cf. Olivier Roy (trans. C. Volk), The Failure of Political Islam(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994); Olivier Roy, GlobalizedIslam (Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2004). ^26. Cf. Armando Salvatore, ‘Social differentiation, moralauthority and public Islam in Egypt: the case of Mustafa Mahmud’,Anthropology Today, 6, 2 (2000), pp. 12–15. ^27. For a discussion of Haïdara and his association’srelation to Sufism and Sufi orders, see Soares, Islam and thePrayer Economy. ^28. This was also a topic of discussion in some print media. See,for example, Cheick Sidya Diombana, ‘La jeunesse et lafoi en l’Islam’, La Roue, 25 October–3 November1993, p. 5. ^29. I am grateful to Roman Loimeier for making his copy of thissign available to me. ^30. See, for example, ‘Déclaration finale des associationsislamiques du Mali concernant les valeurs islamiques et àpropos du programme d’action de Beijing rélatifaux droits des femmes’, La Roue, 22–31 January 1996,pp. 3–5. ^31. For a discussion of some of the controversy around excision,see Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa: Culture, controversy, and change (Lynne Rienner,Boulder, Colorado, 2000). For campaigns against excision inMali, see Claudie Gosselin, ‘Handing over the knife: Numuwomen and the campaign against excision in Mali’, in BettinaShell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa, pp. 193–214; Jean Sanou, ‘Lutte contreles mutilations génitales feminines’, Le Soudanais,22 November 2000, p. 3; Yousouf Camara, ‘Réligionet excision’, Le Tambour, 22 June 2001, p. 3; MamadouBlodin Sissok, ‘Religion et excision. Quand les chrétienss’engagent contre les mutilations génitales féminines’,Info-Matin, 29 June 2001, p. 8. ^32. See, for example, Mady M. Dembélé, ‘L’excisionest un poids des traditions, elle n’a rien de religieux’,Les Echos, 18 July 2001, p. 5. ^33. See C.H. Sylla, ‘Interview exclusive. Le Présidentdu Collectif des islamistes parle’, Le Républicain,16 May 2001, pp. 1, 4–5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘L’excisionau Mali. La position des musulmans’, Nouvel Horizon, 30January 2001, p. 5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Interdire l’excisionest une atteinte grave’, Le Républicain, 31 January2001, p. 5. ^34. ‘Brèves’, Le Politicien Musulman, 18 March–18April 2002, p. 8. ^35. Leaflets produced and distributed by AISLAM (Association islamiquedu salut) in the author’s possession. ^36. See Mamadou Keïta, ‘Les imams à l’affûtdes jouisseurs’, Nouvel Horizon, 23 November 1998, p.4. ^37. Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Boycottons "Miss Cedeao" ’, NouvelHorizon, 16 October 1998. See also Mamadou Keïta, ‘MissCedeao’, Nouvel Horizon, 2 November 1998, p. 5. ^38. Yoro Sow, ‘Incertitudes pour la tenue du Congrèsdes homosexuels’, Sud Info, 8 December 1999, p. 4. ^39. However, some prominent Muslim religious leaders, most notablyChérif Haïdara, would eventually take positionsin support of condom use. See Benjamin Soares, ‘Mali:Im Visier der Islamismus-Fahnder’, INAMO 41 (2005), pp.16–18. ^40. Talal Asad, ‘Religion, nation-state, secularism’,in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), Nation andReligion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1999), p. 191. ^41. Djibril Traoré, ‘El Hadji Mahmoud Dicko,’Le National, 2 October 2000, p. 5. ^42. El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Declaration du Collectif des associationsislamiques du Mali’, Info-Matin, 7 May 2001, p. 7. Seealso El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Déclaration’,Le Républicain, 4 May 2001, p. 7; Amara Diapy Diawara,‘Meeting du Collectif des associations musulmanes du Mali’,Info-Matin, 13 February 2001, pp. 4–5. ^43. See, for example, Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (Routledge,New York, NY, 1993); Homi Bhabha, ‘Of mimicry and man’,in The Location of Culture (Routledge, New York, NY, 1994),pp. 85–92. ^44. On this heightened sense, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori,Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,1996). For Malian press coverage of the OCI meeting, see, forexample, ‘Organisation de la Conférence islamique.Le monde musulman’, Liberté, 3 July 2001, p. 4. ^45. See the extensive coverage of the meeting in a special editionof Le Continent, 2 February 2001. ^46. For a discussion of some of the proposed reforms and specificcontroversies, cf. Benjamin F. Soares, ‘The attempt toreform family law in Mali’, in Margot Badran (ed.), Genderand Islam in Africa (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, forthcoming);Dorothea E. Schulz, ‘Political factions, ideological fictions:the controversy over family law reform in democratic Mali’,Islamic Law and Society, 10, 1 (2003), pp. 132–64. ^47. Birama Fall, ‘Islam et politique. La colère desislamistes contre le pouvoir’, Le Républicain,23 April 2001, p. 1; Belco Tamboura, ‘Le front religieux,un front de plus pour Konaré’, L’Observateur,14 June 2001, p. 6. ^48. C. H. Sylla, ‘Code de la famille et excision. La dernièrevictoire des islamistes sur Alpha’, Le Républicain,10 June 2002, p. 5. ^49. See Christian Coulon, Le marabout et le prince: Islam et pouvoirau Sénégal (Pédone, Paris, France, 1981). ^50. Boukary Daou, ‘Code de la famille et excision. Les musulmansdisent non à Alpha’, Le Républicain, 5 June2002, p. 1. ^51. Cf. Michael Bratton, Massa Coulibaly, and Fabiana Machado, ‘Popularviews of the legitimacy of the state in Mali’, CanadianJournal of African Studies 36, 2 (2002), pp. 197–238;Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion,Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2005).     

近年越南的外商投资

受亚洲金融危机的影响,越南外商投资减少.由于越南政府调整了外资政策,外资出现回升势头,投资来源结构、投资产业结构也发生了变化.估计今明两年越南外商投资会继续增长.     

2002年东亚经济回顾

东亚经济在 2 0 0 2年保持了较快的增长。这主要归功于出口迅速增长 ,内需保持强劲 ,适度宽松的财政货币政策的刺激等因素。但是 ,东亚内部仍存在产业结构调整滞后、金融和公司部门的重建尚未完成、公共部门债务负担加重等问题 ,这些问题如不能很好解决 ,可能阻碍中长期经济增长。虽然面临着许多不确定的因素 ,各大机构对 2 0 0 3年的东亚经济增长仍然抱有较为乐观的预期。