How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi‐presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet, yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, it is argued that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by his or her perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi‐presidentialism and executive‐legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors; this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non‐partisan actors.     

Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism

This article develops a theory of presidential unilateralism in which both ideological divergence with Congress and legislative capacity influence the president's use of executive orders. We argue that when Congress is less capable of constraining the executive, the president will issue more executive orders during periods of divided government. Conversely, in periods of high legislative capacity, the president is less likely to issue executive orders when faced with an opposed Congress. Based on an examination of institutional changes, we identify years prior to the mid‐1940s as characterized by low congressional capacity and the subsequent period as characterized by high capacity. Testing the theory between 1905 and 2013, we find strong support for these predictions and demonstrate that legislative capacity conditions the role of ideological disagreement in shaping presidential action. Overall, this article deepens our current understanding of the dynamics of separation‐of‐powers politics and the limits of executive power.     

Presidential image and economic performance: A dynamic analysis

How do people form and revise their images of the president's personal characteristics? While analysts have made considerable progress in uncovering the content, structure, and political impact of images of political figures—especially presidential candidates—we know very little about how these beliefs develop and change over time. This study of change and stability in presidential images is based on two contrasting theoretical perspectives. Research by several rational choice theorists suggests that individuals base their images of the president's personal characteristics on observations of presidential performance and these images remain open to revision, based on new performance evaluations. Research on social cognition, however, suggests that early impressions tend to maintain themselves by biasing performance evaluations. These perspectives guide an examination of five-wave panel data in an effort to determine the extent to which people's evaluations of the president's handling of economic problems influence, and are influenced by, general images of the president's competence.     

The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress

While the president's relationship to Congress has been carefully studied, the broader executive branch has received far less attention in that context. Scholars rely on assumptions about the relationship between the president and cabinet departments that remain untested. We construct the first statistical portrait of executive branch ideology by estimating ideal points for members of Congress, presidents, and the heads of cabinet‐level departments between 1991 and 2004 in a Bayesian framework. We empirically assess claims about the composition of the president's administrative team and the influence of institutions on the ideology of principal executive decision makers. We also test an important claim regarding the trade‐off between ideological congruence and budgetary authority to demonstrate the utility of our estimates for other scholars. Our analysis reveals a new picture of the executive branch as ideologically diverse, casting into doubt some essential assumptions in a substantial body of work on the separation of powers.     

Sharing Isn't Easy: When Separate Institutions Clash

There is a lively debate in the United States about how the president and Congress do and ought to relate, and about the significance of recent clashes between the two over control of the bureaucracy. This article focuses on the causes and consequences of increased congressional (and presidential) review and specification of administrative behavior. It examines congressional oversight behavior, micromanagement by Congress, struggles over control of regulations and interpretations of statutes, and efforts by the White House to increase its control over appointments to executive positions. The article concludes with an overview of the sources of tension between the two institutions and an analysis of the conditions under which they could more successfully share power.     

The Puzzle of Presidential Leadership: Persuasion, Bargaining, and Policy Consistency

Political science can offer few theoretical generalizations about the exercise of presidential power. From one perspective, this is no disadvantage: there are few presidents, and presidential leadership so intrinsically involves the interplay of ideas and persuasive deliberation that success depends on personal traits and the fit of the president's ideas with the times. Striving for inductive generalizations in such a case would mistake rote scientific method for the pursuit of knowledge. Others argue, however, that the dearth of theoretical generalizations is a temporary weakness, remediable by shifting to a deductive approach. Deductive theorizing can claim insights in other areas once typified by historiographic methods, notably in studies of Congress, and formal models of legislation have been extended to generate hypotheses about transactions between president and Congress. I suggest that neither side of the dilemma offers a satisfactory and complete approach to the puzzle of presidential leadership; it then goes on to specify how the contributions from each side fit together. Rational choice models, based on bargaining as the mode of influence and the repeated game as the image of process, show how institutional structures can produce stable decisions where majority rule tends toward endless cycling. But the cost is that the resulting decisions are typically ad hoc and disjointed. Achieving consistent and coherent policy requires more subtle coordination of individual expectations than legislative organizations can manage, and it is this limitation of bargaining that establishes the potential for presidential leadership. Presidents can attempt to capitalize on this opportunity either by intervening as an additional (but situationally advantaged) bargainer, or by employing persuasion, the explicit appeal to collective goals rather than particularistic trades. I develop the distinction between bargaining and persuasion as alternative strategies of advocacy, and illustrate their use with examples from President Reagan's interactions with Congress over his key economic policy proposals.     

Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive–legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade‐off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis‐à‐vis the legislature.     

The Nationalization of Special Elections for the U.S. House of Representatives

Scholars and political commentators have argued that special elections to the U.S. House of Representatives are national contests, serving as a referendum on the president's party and a predictor of future election outcomes (Sigelman 1981; Smith and Burnnell 2010). But the empirical record is mixed, with one leading study demonstrating that candidate and district characteristics alone explain special election outcomes (Gaddie, Bullock, and Buchanan 1999). We investigate this disagreement by comparing special election and open-seat results using new data for the period 1995–2014. We find that while candidate characteristics affect special election outcomes, presidential approval is predictive of special election outcomes as well. Furthermore, we find that the effect of presidential approval on special election outcomes has increased in magnitude from 1995 to 2014, with the 2002 midterm representing an important juncture in the nationalization of special elections. We conclude that special elections have developed into national contests since the 1970s and situate this development within broader electoral trends.     

Administrative reform in Haiti: Problems,progress and prospects

A growing awareness among officials in Haiti of the need for public service reforms has resulted in the reorganization and revitalization of the country's Administrative Reform Commission (Commission Administrative). At present there is no uniformity in organization, procedures, regulations or remuneration between the different government agencies. The bureaucrats have little security and the bureaucracy is completely dominated by the executive branch of government. Coupled with this, owing largely to the budgeting system, the public service has developed into virtually two separate services, one dealing with development and the other with recurrent tasks. The number of public servants has doubled in the past decade. The Administrative Reform Commission has identified its priorities including the creation of a unified career service system, a restructuring of the bureaucracy and decentralization. This article comments on the Commission's proposals and the problems of implementing them.     

Public responses to the presidential use of military force: A panel analysis

How do citizens respond to dramatic uses of military force? While we know a great deal about the conditions that driveaggregate changes in presidential popularity in response to a president's use of military force, we know surprisingly little about howindividuals respond to such events. What types of individuals operating under what types of conditions are more likely to support such actions? And to what extent does approval of the use of force affect subsequent changes, not only in presidential popularity, but also in more general foreign policy attitudes? We use panel survey data collected before and after the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986 to investigate the individual-level dynamics of opinion change in response to this dramatic event. Because our study neatly brackets the Libyan air strikes, we are able to examine in some detail the antecedents and consequences of individuals' reactions to a president's use of military force. We find that watching President Reagan's dramatic televised speech had an unmistakable impact in moving respondents to support the bombing. We also find that support for the Libyan air strikes appeared to precipitate greater approval for a range of more “hard-line” military responses toward terrorism, thus creating opportunities for similar-or even broader—presidential initiatives in the future. Finally, because the bombing was the only significant event occurring between the waves of the panel, our quasi-experimental design ties approval of the bombing clearly to an upsurge in presidential approval. Implications for various perspectives on presidential leadership of public opinion in foreign affairs are discussed.     

Presidential Bureaucratic Power and Supreme Court Justice Voting

Presidency scholars suggest that the federal bureaucracy has become presidentialized and that the federal agencies have become a primary tool for presidential policy implementation. However, in its review of federal agency litigation, the Supreme Court stands as an important monitor of executive bureaucratic action. Here, the conditions under which Supreme Court justices choose to facilitate executive bureaucratic action are assessed. This study tests the proposition that Supreme Court justices' voting decisions to support the president's bureaucratic agents are conditioned upon theoretically interesting extra-legal factors. Logistic regression analysis was conducted on justices' votes from Supreme Court cases involving cabinet and independent agencies during the years 1953–1995. The results indicate that Supreme Court justices' voting decisions to favorably review bureaucratic actions are influenced by extra-legal factors including attitudinal, political, and external concerns.     

Agency Leaders, Gendered Institutions, and Representative Bureaucracy

This study examines three central questions: Do women state agency heads establish priorities that advance women's interests more frequently than men agency heads? Among state agency heads with women‐related top priorities, are there systematic differences between women and men in the influences on their priority choices? Do the organizational and political contexts in which agency leaders work explain variation in policy priorities? Analysis of data from a national survey of women and men department heads reveals that working in a redistributive agency affects whether a leader pursues a women‐centered policy agenda, regardless of the leader's gender, other personal characteristics, or reported influences on priority choice. The authors conclude that the way representative bureaucracy actually plays out can be more fully understood if the tenets of social science theory on gendered institutions are incorporated into analyses of how representative bureaucracy works.     

The Elusive Search for Presidential Power

Unilateral presidential actions, such as executive orders, are widely cited as a key strategic tool for presidential power. However, is unilateral action evidence of unilateralism or might it represent executive acquiescence? We answer this by (1) specifying three competing models, each with a different presidential discretion assumption and generating alternative hypotheses; (2) extending the canonical item‐response model to best measure executive‐order significance; and (3) comparing competing theoretical models to data for 1947–2002. Theoretically, we show that legislative preferences may impact unilateral actions differently than previously thought and indicate how parties may be influential. Empirically, a model where the president is responsive to the chamber's majority‐party median fits the data better than models assuming responsiveness to the chamber median or no presidential acquiescence. Unilateral action appears not tantamount to presidential power, as evidence implies that legislative parties, or the judicial actors enforcing their will, are key conditioning factors.     

Rethinking Loyalty and Competence in Presidential Appointments

Studies in presidential appointments, particularly principal-agent models, posit that presidents employ a top-down strategy to control the bureaucracy, one that promotes loyalty over competence. However, many studies have two critical limitations: (1) treating loyalty and competence as binary constructs and (2) focusing only on presidential nomination and Senate confirmation (PAS) appointments. In this article, the authors construct a continuous measure of loyalty and competence to determine how much loyalty or competence an appointee offers a president and examine other appointment tools—Senior Executive Service (SES), Schedule C, and presidential appointments—that allow presidents to influence different levels of the bureaucracy. Findings show that presidents are more likely to reward competence with their PAS and SES appointments. In addition, few appointees score high on both loyalty and competence, explaining why presidents generally must make a trade-off between loyalty and competence.     

Competency Costs in Foreign Affairs: Presidential Performance in International Conflicts and Domestic Legislative Success, 1953–2001

Numerous prominent theories have relied on the concept of “audience costs” as a central causal mechanism in their arguments about international conflict, but scholars have had greater difficulty in demonstrating the efficacy and even the existence of such costs outside the bounds of game theory and the political psychology laboratory. We suggest that the audience costs argument focuses too narrowly on the likelihood that leaders will be removed from office by domestic constituencies for failing to make good on threats. Instead, we argue that scholars should ground these arguments on Alastair Smith's ( 1998 ) broader concept of “competency costs.” Our analysis of presidential legislative success from 1953 to 2001 demonstrates the existence of foreign policy competency costs by showing that public disapproval of presidential handling of militarized interstate disputes has a significant and substantial negative impact on the president's ability to move legislation on domestic issues through Congress.     

Whither Power in Public Administration? Attainment,Dissipation, and Loss

Norton Long's 1949 essay, “Power and Administration,” has a complicated legacy. First, analysis reveals both support for and important refinements of Long's arguments since the article's publication. Second, Long's claim has proven problematic that competition among agencies for power would bring more coordination and a cross‐agency sense of purpose to the federal government. Third, the bureaucratic pluralism that he explained and defended produced special interest biases that were off‐putting to large segments of citizens and thus helped create an unsupportive political environment for needed capacity building in the federal government. Fourth, by not considering how institutions “coevolve,” Long failed to warn that “horizontal power” building by individual agencies would provoke efforts by elected officials to enhance their control over bureaucracy in ways that, over time, diminished their collective sources of power. Finally, much remains to be done before what Long called a “realistic science of administration” incorporating the “budgeting of power” exists in public administration.     

Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight

Does the president or Congress have more influence over policymaking by the bureaucracy? Despite a wealth of theoretical guidance, progress on this important question has proven elusive due to competing theoretical predictions and severe difficulties in measuring agency influence and oversight. We use a survey of federal executives to assess political influence, congressional oversight, and the policy preferences of agencies, committees, and the president on a comparable scale. Analyzing variation in political influence across and within agencies reveals that Congress is less influential relative to the White House when more committees are involved. While increasing the number of involved committees may maximize the electoral benefits for members, it may also undercut the ability of Congress as an institution to collectively respond to the actions of the presidency or the bureaucracy.     

India: Searching for a Consensus by Amending the Constitution?

Two major themes have dominated the debate over India's constitutional destiny since the 1980s: parliamentary versus presidential government and federalization of its predominantly parliamentary system. India will do well to continue with its parliamentary form of government. Besides familiarity with it through British colonial experience and practice for nearly half a century, India's social diversity and fragile democracy are better served by a “collective” parliamentary/cabinet system than a “singular” presidential one. The latter may prematurely centralize the system and promote executive aggrandizement and adventurism. But India's continental diversity and complexity cannot be adequately represented solely along the parliamentary axis; they require the additional — and more vigorous — federal axis for democratic accommodation and national integration. The impact on India's parliamentary/federal system of the changing nature of the party system and premiership styles is also analyzed. Six phases of party system evolution are identified: (1) predominant party system-I (1952–1969); (2) multi-party system-I (1969–1971); (3) predominant party system-II (1971–1977); (4) two-party system (1977–1984); (5) (a stillborn) predominant party system-Ill (1984–1989); and (6) multi-party system-II (1989–to date). Three styles of prime ministerial leadership are delineated: (1) pluralist, (2) patrimonial, and (3) federal. Federal forces and features of the political system were generally accentuated when the party system was not a one-party dominant one and the prime ministerial leadership was not a patrimonial one. Some viable constitutional amendments designed to promote federalization are considered. The two particularly promising avenues of federalization that combine “responsible federalism” with “responsible parliamentary government” are those that establish a series of autonomous federal instrumentalities recommended by the Sarkaria Commission and create a President-in-Council interlocked with the Inter-Governmental Council that takes away the power of proclaiming president's rule in a state from the federal Home Ministry.     

Appointee Confirmation and Tenure: The Succession of U.S. Federal Agency Appointees, 1989–2009

This article analyzes the confirmation and tenure of 2,300 Senate‐confirmed, presidential appointees to U.S. government agencies between 1989 and 2009, linking patterns of appointee confirmation and tenure to institutional politics, appointee independence, and agency context. Consistent with prior research, the authors find that nominees of new, powerful, and popular presidents enjoy expedited Senate confirmation. Contentious congressional committee oversight, by contrast, tends to delay confirmation and reduce tenure. Agency heads and positions insulated from removal, such as for fixed‐term positions and inspectors general, increase tenure. Extending empirical research, the analysis highlights program‐ and agency‐level variations that speak to the many contingencies shaping appointee politics. Appointee positions associated with national security and broad statutory discretion receive expedited confirmation. Agencies with more professionals are associated with increased tenure, whereas agencies with more appointees among managers see shorter tenures. The results speak to scholarship on appointee politics and to public knowledge about the role of appointments in American government.     

Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency Leadership Appointments

Presidents become increasingly effective at managing the bureaucracy because of the information and expertise that they acquire from on‐the‐job experience. In their appointment choices, this theory predicts that presidents become better at reducing information asymmetries incurred from the bureaucracy (Agent Selection Learning), improve the vertical balance of leadership agent traits between top supervisory positions and subordinates directly beneath them (Agent Monitoring Learning), and place a greater relative premium on loyalty in response to horizontal policy conflict between the White House and the Senate (Common Agency Learning). This logic obtains empirical support from the analysis of bureaucratic agent traits for Senate‐confirmed presidential appointees serving in leadership positions covering 39 U.S. federal government agencies from 1977 to 2009. Presidents’ appointment strategies reflect their increasing effectiveness at managing the bureaucracy, thus complementing their increasing reliance on administrative mechanisms to achieve policy objectives as their tenure in office rises.