The Party Faithful: Partisan Images,Candidate Religion,and the Electoral Impact of Party Identification

We argue that the factors shaping the impact of partisanship on vote choice—“partisan voting”—depend on the nature of party identification. Because party identification is partly based on images of the social group characteristics of the parties, the social profiles of political candidates should affect levels of partisan voting. A candidate's religious affiliation enables a test of this hypothesis. Using survey experiments which vary a hypothetical candidate's religious affiliation, we find strong evidence that candidates’ religions can affect partisan voting. Identifying a candidate as an evangelical (a group viewed as Republican) increases Republican support for, and Democratic opposition to, the candidate, while identifying the candidate as a Catholic (a group lacking a clear partisan profile) has no bearing on partisan voting. Importantly, the conditional effect of candidate religion on partisan voting requires the group to have a salient partisan image and holds with controls for respondents’ own religious affiliations and ideologies.     

Political polarization, congressional redistricting, and trade liberalization

During the last 50 years, political polarization in the US House of Representatives has intensified. One explanation for this trend emphasizes the importance of congressional redistricting. This paper analyzes the relationship between political polarization and redistricting in the context of two trade liberalization bills. The results of the paper indicate that redistricting has not contributed significantly to party polarization over trade policy although it has produced a partisan shift in favor of trade liberalization. Redistricting does not appear to impact political polarization largely because district-level characteristics currently are dominated by broader, national factors such as party affiliation. The results of the paper clearly demonstrate this point by showing that changes in party affiliation have a much greater impact on voting behavior than changes in district characteristics. The paper also finds, however, that institutional control of the redistricting process at the state level has influenced political polarization with respect to trade policy.     

Political Control and Managerial Survival in State‐Owned Enterprises

This article explores the impact of political determinants on the survival of managers in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). Drawing on theories of bureaucratic delegation, it is argued that preference divergence between principals and agents as well as among principals is a major driver of managerial turnover. More specifically, the partisan affiliation of SOE‐managers with the government, the opposition, or individual ministers can serve to explain the length of their tenure. The analysis employs Cox proportional hazard regressions to test these hypotheses on an original data set of 1,671 managers serving in 87 public corporations in Austria between 1995 and 2010, thus presenting one of the first large‐n analyses of political appointments in a parliamentary system. The results strongly support the proposition that partisan affiliation drives managerial survival.     

Secular geographical polarization in the American South: The case of Texas, 1996–2010

This article uses fine-grained data to demonstrate that, since 1996, the State of Texas has undergone a process of ‘secular geographical polarization’ – a continuous divergence in the geographical bases of its political parties. It is suggested that this process exemplifies a new era of partisan politics in the American South. Analyses of spatial regression models show that the geographical polarization can be partially explained by a tighter link between demographic characteristics and aggregate voting patterns, but that growth in spatial clustering cannot be attributed entirely to demographics. The possibility that spatially-bounded social contexts are affecting partisan change is thus explored. Finally, the article's findings are considered in light of the growing debate about geographical polarization in the American electorate.     

Candidate Choice Without Party Labels:

In the absence of party labels, voters must use other information to determine whom to support. The institution of nonpartisan elections, therefore, may impact voter choice by increasing the weight that voters place on candidate dimensions other than partisanship. We hypothesize that in nonpartisan elections, voters will exhibit a stronger preference for candidates with greater career and political experience, as well as candidates who can successfully signal partisan or ideological affiliation without directly using labels. To test these hypotheses, we conducted conjoint survey experiments on both nationally representative and convenience samples that vary the presence or absence of partisan information. The primary result of these experiments indicates that when voters cannot rely on party labels, they give greater weight to candidate experience. We find that this process unfolds differently for respondents of different partisan affiliations: Republicans respond to the removal of partisan information by giving greater weight to job experience while Democrats respond by giving greater weight to political experience. Our results lend microfoundational support to the notion that partisan information can crowd out other kinds of candidate information.     

Danish Political Culture: Fair Conditions for Inclusion of Immigrants?

In the age of migration, the inclusion of immigrants in national politics is crucial for democratic reasons, and because it increases the coordination and cooperation ability of society. The informal norms, values and beliefs of the political culture are one aspect of the institutional and discursive opportunity structures immigrants face as ethnic and religious minorities. This article analyses the Danish political culture with regard to the potential barriers it has for the inclusion of immigrants in national political life. It finds that the predominantly liberal, secular and republican character of the Danish political culture excludes certain kinds of cultural and religious identities and interests at the symbolic discursive level, while Danish political culture may in fact provide more openness at the practical and institutional level. However, the question of whether or not Danish political culture is able to deal adequately with cultural and religious diversity remains.     

Trading policy: Constituents and party in U.S. trade policy

Studies of US trade policy legislation focus on the effect of constituents on trade policy voting and give less weight to institutions such as political parties. To demonstrate that political parties affect voting, I compare the votes of politicians who share constituency characteristics but differ in political party affiliation. This approach requires less reliance on assumptions about, or empirical measures of, constituents’ trade preferences. The results demonstrate that political parties play a significant role in legislative voting on trade policy. Theories of political economy therefore should incorporate how constituency interests and partisan pressures affect legislative voting.     

Collective and individual economic judgments and voting in West Germany, 1961–1984

Abstract: : This article attempts to provide individual-level support to findings of longitudinal macro-level studies of the relation between economic variables and electoral outcomes in the Federal Republic. The theoretical framework is one of incumbency-oriented vs. policy-oriented political responses to collective vs. individual economic judgments (Kiewiet, 1983). The data base consists of 25 surveys from 1961 through 1984. Empirical analysis comprises three steps: First, the relation between economic judgments and partisan sympathies is analyzed, since it appears likely that part of the covariations between voting and such judgments is spurious due to a common dependence upon partisan orientations. Second, the impact of both kinds of economic judgments upon voting over time is investigated with and without controls for partisan affiliation. Finally, the impact over time of macropolitical and macroeconomic variables on individual political response patterns to economic judgments is estimated at the longitudinal macro-level. The analysis demonstrates that collective economic judgments are generally a more potent predictor of electoral choice than individual economic judgments, and that there is clear empirical evidence both for the incumbency-oriented and the policy-oriented hypothesis linking such judgments to the vote.     

Election campaigns and the cyclical nature of emotions—How politicians engage in affective polarization

Do politicians get emotional during an election campaign? We examine the existence of changes in partisan in-group favoritism and partisan out-group hostility among political elites by evaluating the degree to which they fluctuate before, during and after election campaigns. The lack of elite level panel data has prevented scholars from studying the dynamics of politicians' emotions around the most emotionally intense political event in democracies: elections. We focus on Sweden around the 2014 election and follow more than 700 Swedish politicians before, during and after a national election campaign using a unique three-wave panel survey. The results reveal that politicians' emotions towards other parties are affected during the election, but less so for their own party. Our study adds to the body of recent evidence that campaigns mobilize partisan identities and increase partisan animus.     

Does Choice Bring Loyalty? Electoral Participation and the Development of Party Identification

Party identification is known to influence almost all aspects of political life. How this attachment develops across the adult life cycle, however, remains unknown. I argue that people reinforce their partisan predispositions by voting for their preferred party. Voting entails a choice over a set of alternatives. This choice is likely to induce rationalization. In so doing, it provides signals of group identity, which in turn strengthens people's partisan ties. Testing this hypothesis is made difficult because it implies a reciprocal relationship between partisanship and vote choice. I address this problem by using vote eligibility as an instrument of vote in a sample of almost equally aged respondents. The results indicate that elections fortify prior partisan orientations. Moreover, they do so not by increasing political information. Rather, it is the act of voting for a party that, itself, bolsters partisan attachment. This act leaves a long‐lasting imprint on people's partisan outlooks.     

Explaining variation in concern about the outcome of presidential elections, 1960–1980

Since 1960 there has been a steady erosion in concern about the electoral outcome of presidential elections among the white electorate. An analysis of the six SRC-CPS presidential election surveys conducted between 1960 and 1980 shows that a substantial portion of the erosion of electoral concern can be accounted for by the weakening of partisan loyalties and the decline in feelings that the political system is responsive. More generally, the analysis suggests that extent of concern about the electoral outcome is primarily a long-term secular component and not a short-term, election-specific factor as is commonly assumed in the literature.     

On the political and fiscal determinants of income redistribution under federalism and democracy: evidence from Germany

Several recent studies suggest that transfers from central to regional governments are motivated by political considerations. In this paper we examine if this is also the case for transfers from regional to central governments in the context of the German fiscal equalization system. We examine the factors that contribute to differences in tax revenues across German states. The evidence indicates that both fiscal incentives and political factors can explain these differences, although in Germany the former are more important. Moreover, accounting for fiscal institutions has important consequences for the empirical assessment of political influences on taxation. Overall we find that the political affiliation of the state governor is an important factor in explaining differences in state tax revenues. Thus, the right-wing party (CDU/CSU) is effective in relaxing the tax burden at the state level. In contrast, partisan alignment between the state government and the federal government loses its importance once fiscal conditions enter the empirical model.     

Labor Unions and White Democratic Partisanship

The Democratic Party’s declining support among white voters is a defining feature of contemporary American politics. Extant research has emphasized factors such as elite polarization and demographic change but has overlooked another important trend, the decades-long decline of labor union membership. This oversight is surprising, given organized labor’s long ties to the Democratic Party. I argue that the concurrent decline of union membership and white support for the Democratic Party is not coincidental, but that labor union affiliation is an important determinant of whites’ partisan allegiances. I test this using several decades of cross-sectional and panel data. I show that union-affiliated whites are more likely to identify as Democrats, a substantively significant relationship that does not appear to be driven by self-selection. Overall, these findings underscore the political consequences of union decline and help us to better understand the drivers of declining white support for the Democratic Party.

     

Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union

Political brokers mobilize voters all over the world, yet little is known about what motivates them to do so. This article theorizes about two drivers of brokers' efforts: (1) incentives—monetary rewards or sanctions—and monitoring and (2) partisan attachment. We examine our theory using data on the Mexican National Educational Workers Union (SNTE), Latin America's largest union and a well‐known political machine. Consistent with the role of teachers as brokers, we find that the vote share of parties supported by the SNTE machine is higher in polling stations located in schools. This effect is absent when teachers are asked to mobilize voters in support of a party for which they have no partisan attachment, and it is uncorrelated with the union's monitoring capacity. This suggests that partisan attachment, rather than incentives and monitoring, explains the SNTE's effectiveness as a political machine.     

Partisanship,Ministers, and Biotechnology Policy

Research in public policy and political economy has provided many insights in the evolution of public resistance against genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the last two decades. But how does the partisan composition of a government, its programmatic orientation and the allocation of cabinet offices affect policy making in this specific area? We argue that the regulation of GMOs is determined by the ideological orientation of governments and the presence of parties with a specific ideological background in the cabinet. In addition, we hypothesize that the parties' control over relevant cabinet posts matter for GMO regulation. We test our hypotheses by using an innovative dataset that contains information on biotechnology regulation outputs of European governments in the time period from 1996 until 2013, the partisan composition and policy‐area specific positions of governments, and the party affiliation of key cabinet actors. The results show that the presence of a Christian democratic party in a cabinet increases the chances of a ban on biotech crops, in particular if it controls the Ministry of the Environment.     

Popular evaluations of election quality in Africa: Evidence from Nigeria

Despite the important consequences of citizens' election quality perceptions on political behavior and political attitudes, very little is known about how citizens formulate their perceptions of election quality. In this paper, I assess the correlates of citizens' perceptions of election quality. I suggest that the performance of election-related institutions is an important correlate of citizens' election quality perceptions. However, citizens' experience with electoral irregularities, and partisan affiliation also matter. I test these hypotheses in the context of the 2007 Nigerian general elections using survey data from Afrobarometer and International Foundation for Electoral Systems. The findings provide robust support for the hypotheses. Most importantly, the results indicate that the performance of electoral management bodies is associated with citizens' assessment of election quality in Africa and that citizens demand electoral management bodies with impartiality and professionalism.     

Party strategies,world demand,and unemployment in Britain and the United States, 1947–1983

This paper replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in Britain and the United States from 1947 to 1983. Unemployment falls under left-wing governments and rises under right-wing governments. However, these partisan effects on unemployment in an open economy like Britain's can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the level of world economic activity. The United States has major effects on world economic activity but is also subject to feedback from the economies of other countries. Politicians' strategic incentives and economic regime constraints determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained, transitory, or absent. In Britain, only a model in which partisan impacts are transitory satisfactorily estimates the effects of changes of party control. In the United States, only the transitory-impact model is able to estimate partisan effects in recent administrations.     

Finding Partisanship Where We Least Expect it: Evidence of Partisan Bias in a New African Democracy

Much of the literature on political behavior in Africa’s new semi-democracies has treated partisan affiliation as weak, purely pragmatic, or a proxy for other, more meaningful identities such as ethnicity. In this article, I dispute these conceptions by demonstrating that partisanship in an African context, like partisanship in established democracies, is a psychologically meaningful identity that can inspire voters to engage in motivated reasoning. By combining survey data with an original dataset of objective indicators of local public goods quality in Uganda, I show that supporters of the incumbent president systematically overestimate what they have received from government, while opposition supporters systematically underestimate. Partisan support precedes, rather than results from, this mis-estimation. I also show that partisans of the incumbent (opposition) are significantly more (less) likely to attribute any bad outcomes they observe to private actors rather than the government. I argue that these findings are consistent with the predictions of social identity theory: the conflict that marked many African political transitions, and the mapping of African parties onto existing social cleavages, are sufficient conditions for the creation of strong political-social identities like those that characterize partisanship in the West. My findings indicate that Africanists should take partisanship seriously as a predictor of political behavior and attitudes.     

How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi‐presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet, yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, it is argued that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by his or her perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi‐presidentialism and executive‐legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors; this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non‐partisan actors.     

Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments

Does partisan conflict damage citizens’ perceptions of Congress? If so, why has polarization increased in Congress since the 1970s? To address these questions, we unpack the “electoral connection” by exploring the mass public's attitudes toward partisan conflict via two survey experiments in which we manipulated characteristics of members and Congress. We find that party conflict reduces confidence in Congress among citizens across the partisan spectrum. However, there exists heterogeneity by strength of party identification with respect to evaluations of members. Independents and weak partisans are more supportive of members who espouse a bipartisan image, whereas strong partisans are less supportive. People with strong attachments to a political party disavow conflict in the aggregate but approve of individual members behaving in a partisan manner. This pattern helps us understand why members in safely partisan districts engage in partisan conflict even though partisanship damages the collective reputation of the institution.