马克里经济政策的回顾与评述

在马克里总统执政期间,阿根廷经济增长乏力,通货膨胀居高不下,比索大幅度贬值。尽管马克里政府采取了一系列振兴经济的政策措施,但效果并不如意。在民粹主义盛行的阿根廷,新自由主义经济政策缺乏良好的社会政治基础,许多看似美好的政策实施起来阻力重重。贸易自由化没有显著提高阿根廷出口额,金融自由化也无助于吸引更多外国直接投资进入阿根廷,却给短期投机资本进入和逃离阿根廷创造了便利条件。货币政策不能有效扼制通货膨胀,外汇及资本管理政策未能有效阻止国际储备流失,也未能控制本币持续贬值。日趋紧缩的财政收入政策抑制了企业的生产性投资意愿,也降低了对外资的吸引力;过多的社会福利支出削弱了政府对基础设施等公共产品的供给能力,债务增长显著提升了债务违约和本币进一步贬值的风险,短期内阿根廷经济实现复苏的难度较大。持续的经济衰退不仅导致前总统马克里未能实现连任,也给新当选的费尔南德斯政府留下了诸多难题。不断增加的贫困人口和民粹主义的再次兴起,将给未来阿根廷的经济改革和政策调整带来重重阻力,并可能对阿根廷长期经济发展带来深远影响。     

Assessing the High Representative’s Role in Egypt during the Arab Spring

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty institutionalised an intergovernmental constitution for managing policies traditionally a matter of national sovereignty, such as foreign and defence policies. However, important innovations were introduced in the foreign policymaking structure to limit its intergovernmental logic, in particular, with regard to the role of the High Representative (HR). It was generally assumed that those innovations would have made development of a coherent EU foreign policy possible. Yet, in one of the most significant tests for the EU’s foreign and defence policies in the post-Lisbon era, namely the Egyptian crisis (2011-14), those reforms did not work as expected. Notwithstanding the innovations, the HR’s role was diminished by the European Council’s strict control over foreign policy toward Egypt. The lack of clear policy guidelines towards the issue of democratisation in the Arab world in the 2003 European Security Strategy, although partially mitigated by the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Barcelona Process/Union for the Mediterranean, made it even more difficult for the HR to bring a European perspective into the largely intergovernmental setting.     

Commercial Diplomacy and Statecraft in the Context of Economic Reform: The Indian Experience

It is almost a decade since India began its economic reforms. Apart from the purely domestic economic objectives that the reforms were expected to achieve, there was a recognition that reform was imperative if India wanted to become an economic power of consequence within and beyond its region. This had important foreign policy implications. Official pronouncements reflected the concern that the balance of fiscal power as opposed to military power was the key factor in determining a country's international standing. This called for an integrated strategy to bring economic and foreign policies closer. The implementation of a vigorous foreign economic policy could not be undertaken without sharpening the commercial diplomatic tool. Indian foreign policy over the last decade has been grappling with this challenge. This article analyses the reorientation in Indian foreign policy, assesses the efforts undertaken so far to make commercial diplomacy viable and highlights the challenges that multi-layered diplomacy poses for a country like India.     

他信经济学及其对后他信时代泰国经济政策的影响

他信经济学在亚洲金融危机后东亚经济模式终结,川立派政府新自由主义改革广受批判,外资对泰国经济控制加强,泰国贫困人口扩大和经济民族主义升温的背景下产生,其主要政策包括基层信贷投入计划、普遍医保计划、重大工程计划和产业竞争力振兴计划。他信经济学的实施恢复并巩固了泰国实体经济的基础地位,降低了贫困人口和城乡差距,保障了经济稳定增长,但其CEO风格的强势政府理念及扩张性的财政货币政策与泰国传统的政治经济生态存在较多冲突,加之信贷配给和内需导向的局限性,注定了他信经济学难以持久。后他信时代泰国历届政府都保留了他信经济学多数政策措施,而且在相当长的时期内扩大投资刺激经济及实施惠民政策仍将是泰国政府核心经济政策,因此他信经济学将成为他信影响力最持久的政治遗产。     

关于俄罗斯经济政策与发展路径的研究

本世纪以来俄罗斯推行"国家资本主义"经济发展路径,俄罗斯国内对此存在分歧。在对内经济政策方面,俄罗斯高层的主要分歧是关于市场经济主体——国有公司还是私营经济在俄市场经济中的地位及其出路问题;对外政策上的分歧是关于俄经济发展是否需要依赖西方。"新普京时代"是俄罗斯发展与变革的时期,普京提出的俄罗斯新经济政策要点是以创新带动俄罗斯经济发展,俄罗斯既定的"国家资本主义"经济发展路径能否发生变化,普京的新经济政策能否得以实施,需要给予进一步观察。     

Germany and European security governance: how well does the Birmingham model perform?

Abstract

The expansion of the security agenda after the end of the Cold War, propelled by the blowback of 11 September 2001, raises questions about the German ability and willingness to contribute to the regional and global security governance tasks facing Europe and Germany's continuing fidelity to its post-war European avocation. It also calls for a reconsideration of the Birmingham model of foreign policy analysis, particularly its emphasis on (and interpretation of) the ideational and institutional factors defining the German foreign policy agenda and shaping German foreign policy behaviour, at least with respect to the implementation (rather than formulation) of European Union security policies. Towards assessing the continuing utility of the Birmingham model, this article proceeds in three steps: the presentation of the Birmingham model and its restatement as six conjectures; a discussion of the security governance functions undertaken by the EU and the collective action problem facing Europe (and Germany) in executing them; and an empirical investigation of Germany's contribution to the EU as a security actor since 1990.     

Commercial Diplomacy and Statecraft in the Context of Economic Reform: The Indian Experience

It is almost a decade since India began its economic reforms. Apart from the purely domestic economic objectives that the reforms were expected to achieve, there was a recognition that reform was imperative if India wanted to become an economic power of consequence within and beyond its region. This had important foreign policy implications. Official pronouncements reflected the concern that the balance of fiscal power as opposed to military power was the key factor in determining a country's international standing. This called for an integrated strategy to bring economic and foreign policies closer. The implementation of a vigorous foreign economic policy could not be undertaken without sharpening the commercial diplomatic tool. Indian foreign policy over the last decade has been grappling with this challenge. This article analyses the reorientation in Indian foreign policy, assesses the efforts undertaken so far to make commercial diplomacy viable and highlights the challenges that multi-layered diplomacy poses for a country like India.     

No Return to the Past for Russia

Russian society is awakening and issues of domestic political and economic performance have come under closer scrutiny. To respond to the change, the Kremlin has moved to modify its method of governance – and strengthen its instruments of control – but there can be no return to the past. How the political process will evolve, and what the results will be, is impossible to predict, but the change will impact on Russia's domestic and foreign policies. In the meantime, Russia's international partners will have to deal with a familiar set of policies aimed at balancing between Moscow's real needs, its views of Russia's role and the opportunities which present themselves.     

Setting a Course: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs In Post-World War II U.S. Foreign Policy

"Congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs" are those legislators who initiate their own foreign policy agendas. These individuals seek to frame policy discussions and mobilize public and interest group interest; to direct congressional agendas toward specific foreign policy issues; to structure and influence the formulation of foreign policies by the executive branch; to revise, refocus, or reformulate foreign policies; to generate alternative and replacement foreign policies; and to fill policy vacuums with their own preferred foreign policies. This paper examines the evolution and impact of such entrepreneurs across the periods of the Cold War Consensus (1946–1967), the Cold War Dissensus (1968–1989), and the Post-Cold War (1990–2000). The paper first provides an overview of the concept of foreign policy entrepreneurs. It then turns to case studies of entrepreneurial initiatives from three prolific entrepreneurs whose careers span the post-World War II era: Senators Jacob Javits, Edward Kennedy, and Christopher Dodd. Together, the overview and cases shed light on the different avenues and activities that entrepreneurs use to address their preferred issues and the impact entrepreneurs have on policy, as well as highlight changes in both over time.     

Reversing Course: Fiscal Policy and Economic Interdependence

In response to the 2008 financial crisis, countries throughout the developed world widely embraced fiscal stimulus policies. But about one year later, with their economies still weak, a majority of these countries reversed course and adopted austerity measures, despite having the ability to maintain fiscal expansions. With little variation in domestic interests, institutions, or political ideologies over this short time period, theories of budgetary politics struggle to explain this policy shift. This shortcoming may be the result of the literature generally ignoring the international effects of fiscal policy. I argue that policymakers strategically consider their trade partners’ likely fiscal policies before setting domestic fiscal policy. If incumbents expect their major trade partners to enact fiscal expansions, they are more likely to pass expansionary policies of their own. But when incumbents expect their counterparts to enact contractionary policies, they are less likely to fund expansionary policies, as these policies may boost foreign economies with suppressed effects at home. I test this argument using spatial econometrics and a data set of OECD countries from 1998 to 2015. The evidence suggests that shifting expectations of fiscal policies abroad explains much of the move from stimulus to austerity over the short time span.     

The ambivalent influence of the domestic industries on India’s meandering foreign economic policies

Most of the Indian government’s bi- and multilateral trade initiatives are stuck in political deadlock. At the same time, the unilateral measures are lurching between trade restricting and liberalizing policies. By conducting detailed investigations into the process of the trade policy formulation in three industries, this article seeks to discern the societal pressures that are driving the government’s trade preferences and policies. The empirical results show that the government’s tortuous dealings can be explained by two impulses of the domestic industries that have been emanated by the opening of the economy in the 1990s. Most of the domestic industries—grappling with competition from abroad—will call for some form of protection from the global markets. These compulsions, however, endanger the benefits that other domestic industries derive from the global markets—through the access to intermediate goods, foreign investments or export opportunities. This is why they will militate against protectionist interventions. The outcome is an overall consolidation of the open trade regime, which is, however, frequently upset by spats between different domestic industries over the formulation of trade policies.     

Economic Competitiveness and Social Policy in Open Economies

While many studies have shown that greater trade openness affects the overall size of social spending, this study emphasizes that it also affects types of social policies that a government prioritizes. When faced with deepening trade competition, governments tend to use different policy measures to address the opportunities and challenges stemming from their economic competitiveness in the international market. Policy makers in countries with high relative labor costs are likely to privilege social insurances and income transfer. This is because as high labor costs make their workers more vulnerable in the trade competition, governments seek to protect skilled labor in order to maintain their economic advantage in advanced industries. In contrast, when relative labor costs are low, human capital investment programs are likely to be emphasized to enhance productivity and the quality of labor to capitalize the cost competitiveness of a country’s workers. The findings from empirical analyzes of 26 OECD economies from 1991 to 2012 support these arguments.     

The EU and Russia's conflicting regime preferences in Ukraine: assessing regime promotion strategies in the scope of the Ukraine crisis

This paper evaluates the competitiveness of the European Union (EU) and Russia's regime preferences in their foreign policies towards Ukraine in the scope of the on-going Ukraine crisis. It is argued that the underpinning geopolitical environment Ukraine currently resides in, wedged between two much larger powers (the EU and Russia), renders it a vulnerable target state for regime promotion from both sides. Indeed, since the 2004 Orange revolution in Ukraine, both the EU and Russia have had discernible regime promotion strategies in their foreign policies. The EU's regime promotion has focussed on facilitating democracy in Ukraine, along with more material interests (trade and strategic aims) while Russia has reacted with increasingly zero-sum policies which pursue its preference for having a loyal and Russian-facing regime in Ukraine. Ultimately, the increasing competitiveness of the EU and Russia has been a key factor in the onset of the Ukraine crisis, which offers important insight into the relationship between large powers and the smaller third states which lie in their overlapping spheres of influence.     

“互利共赢”与“相互利用”——冷战后中印在东盟地区的竞争

冷战结束后,随着中印两国经济政治和社会的发展以及综合国力的提高,两国都加强了与东南亚国家的关系。由于地缘政治与经济的影响,中印在东南亚地区存在竞争是客观存在的现实,这些竞争体现了中印对东盟＂互利共赢＂与＂相互利用＂政策的分歧和竞争。但竞争并不等于冲突,关键还要看中印两国实行怎样的对外政策,尤其是相互之间实行怎样的政策。     

An ‘Aladdin's lamp’ for free enterprise: Eisenhower,fiscal conservatism,and Latin American nationalism, 1953–61

This study explores the Eisenhower administration's efforts to promote free trade and investment policies in Latin America. US officials believed that private capital investment, rather than US foreign aid, would best promote Latin American economic development and improve its abiliry to purchase American products. By eliminating the need for foreign aid, Latin American economic autarky complemented Eisenhower's zeal for fiscal conservatism. Although most scholars have focused on the primacy of anti-communism in Eisenhower's inter-American policies, this study contends that economic nationalism posed the greatest threat to Eisenhower's policies. US officials eventually responded by expanding aid to Latin America, but the additional economic aid was always intended to complement private capital, rather than replace it. This article, based upon the papers of influential administration officials and State Department records, sheds considerable light as to why the United States promoted free trade and investment policies in the developing world, as it still does today.     

Systemic interaction opportunities and war behavior∗

State leaders must often address domestic and foreign-policy concerns simultane-ously, though doing so can be complicated and risky. One way in which leaders can seek to satisfy domestic demands and pursue foreign policy goals simultaneously is by implementing policies that complement one another; i.e., the implementation of one policy influences the ease with which the other policy can be implemented. For instance, one manner in which leaders can placate domestic audiences is via distributive policies such as social insurance payments that provide economic security to individuals. By providing economic security guarantees, leaders may gain greater discretion over other policy areas, including foreign policy. However, while the social insurance effort may satisfy an audience and enable a leader to take foreign- policy action, especially high payment levels may indicate that a leader must devote an inordinate portion of his budget to domestic concerns, making foreign policy more difficult to implement. Thus, guarantees of economic security might provide leaders with greater foreign policy latitude until domestic expenditures reach sufficient levels that foreign-affairs budgets are reduced. We employ zero-inflated event count models to estimate the relationship between social-insurance levels and the number of Militarized Interstate Disputes in which states engage. Our analyses include 69 states between 1975 and 1990. Our models support the hypothesis that lower levels of social insurance lead to greater numbers of disputes, but that, after a certain level of insurance effort is passed, dispute involvement declines. Our findings suggest a differential effect of social insurance on a leader's ability to act in the foreign policy arena and support the notion that leaders may employ the welfare state to enhance their foreign-policy capabilities, though they appear to meet with conditional and limited success.     

When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey's Iraq Decision

Turkey's decision on its role in the Iraq war in 2003 illustrates the power—and limits—of parliaments as actors in foreign policy. Traditionally, assemblies are not seen as important players in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies. Instead, cabinets are generally considered the chief policymaking authorities. If the government enjoys a parliamentary majority, legislatures typically support the cabinet, if they are brought into the process at all. The March 1, 2003 vote by the Turkish parliament to not allow the United States to use Turkey as a base for the Iraq invasion challenges this conventional wisdom on parliamentary influence (in addition to many interest-based explanations of foreign policy). This paper examines this decision in the context of the role of parliaments in foreign policies and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intraparty politics, and public opinion.     

朝鲜国外科技引进现状及其发展趋势

进入20世纪90年代末期,朝鲜对作为经济发展的助推器和起关键作用的科学技术政策的调整格外重视,先后出台了一系列促进科技发展的新政策,其中突出强调扩大同国外科技合作和引进先进技术对经济发展的重要性,使朝鲜在同国外科技合作方面发展较快。今后,朝鲜对外科技合作政策应是趋向较开放型的,重点是引进符合经济发展和利于提高整体科技水平的先进技术。     

A New Kind of Competition: How American Producers Respond to Incoming Foreign Direct Investment

Domestic producers in the U.S. have not lobbied for formal restrictions on incoming foreign direct investment in the same way that they have for import barriers, even though both types of foreign competition depress profits. At the same time, many U.S.-based multinational corporations, despite their global orientation, have put forth demands for government policies that favor American ownership. Domestically based producers have conflicting economic interests; they want protection against foreign competitors, against the possibility of retaliation, and against the perceived injuries sustained from investment restrictions abroad. Economic interests, then, lead to indeterminate predictions of how firms will respond to IFDI. Firms will only demand policies that they see as feasible (which depends on the presence of domestic institutions to channel demands and supply the policy output) and legitimate (which depends on how the policy accords with widely held norms regarding the proper role of the state). Understanding the domestic responses to globalization requires more research on the political, as well as economic, origins of policy demands.     

Rethinking Italy’s Shrinking Place in the International Arena

Italy’s foreign policy is still shackled by two features inherited from its modern history: an obsessive focus on rank and prestige, and a no less delusional faith in the redemptive character of the EU and other multilateral arrangements it belongs to. The ‘middle power’ foreign policy model elaborated in the 1980s had a rationale of its own but it can hardly be adapted to the globalised world, nor can it be sustained by a deteriorated economic and societal domestic fabric. Italy has to rethink its basic national interests, adapt its foreign policy tools to new concepts of relevance and influence, and focus on a long-term, concerted effort at domestic regeneration if it is to withstand the challenges of the globalised world we live in.