Does terrorism create terror?

The conceptual and etymological meaning of the terms ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ is so closely connected that it seems difficult to distinguish the one from the other. However, by comparing the idea that terrorism inevitably creates terror with the results of recent empirical studies of the psychological effects of terrorist attacks, four different points of view emerge corresponding to four distinct interpretations of the results. It is thus clearly necessary to redefine the terminology relating to terrorism, in order to conduct the discussion on a more rigorous basis.     

“International terrorism” in the League of Nations and the contemporary terrorism dispositif

This article recovers states’ discursive practices regarding “international terrorism” in the 1930s. It examines the internal conditions of the discourse of terrorism among states in this period with a particular focus on its conspiratorial elements and suggests external conditions for this discourse’s emergence and order. Furthermore, it points to continuities and discontinuities between the 1930s discursive series and the constituent discursive forms of the contemporary global terrorism dispositif – an assemblage of power practices which bear on individual human bodies, populations or (rogue or fragile) states and which are all strategically oriented through the concept of terrorism. The purpose of such a genealogical history is to expand the space of dissent to power practices in the dominant structures of (terrorism) knowledge by problematising their object and the ways in which these formations are productive of human subjectivity.     

Alias ‘GBGPGS’: Action directe internationale's transition from revolutionary terrorism to euro‐terrorism

This article discusses terrorism as a ritual act or series of acts that expresses a message. The case of GBGPGS illustrates how complex such messages are by referring them to their French and global contexts. The group's violent struggle against political rules has a ‘sacrificial’ dimension and was justified as a response to ‘crisis’. Through attempting to re‐interpret French extreme‐left traditions, the GBGPGS campaign foreshadowed Euro‐terrorism. The most salient evidence of this shift was the group's concentration on economic globalization and the weakening of traditional state and great power structures.     

Political terrorism in South‐East Asia

This article will provide an overview of one specific non‐military threat that is beginning to assume greater prominence on south‐east Asia's broadened security agenda: political terrorism.¹ Although by no means new to the south‐east Asian environment, for much of the twentieth century its importance was sidelined and, in a sense ‘contained’, by the more pressing concern over US‐Soviet nuclear rivalry. With the end of the Cold War, however, the ‘bottle has been uncorked’ on a variety of lower‐level threats, with issues such as terrorism now taking on greater prominence and relevance in their own right as significant regional and national security concerns.²     

Comment on ‘terrorism and democracy’

The December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 raises an important legal problem for decision‐makers contemplating retaliation against such acts of terrorism. Conceivably, retaliation could conflict with and help erode international norms of self‐defense. Counter‐terrorist experts and government officials espousing the use of force have minimized, if not ignored, this potential conflict and its negative impact on world order. On the other hand, the 1986 US raid on Libya and the 1985 Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunisia reveal that under limited circumstances force would be deemed appropriate. The informal adjudication of these incidents by relevant international actors suggests a tolerance for the resort to force in the US case and ambivalence in the Israeli case. The US and Israeli cases guide a subsequent discussion of the conditions under which the use of force against terrorist bases in response to terrorist attacks could be legitimated. The resort to force against such activity, it is argued, would have to meet the test of necessity, including: (1) a previous and ongoing series of terrorist attacks, and demonstrated responsibility for those attacks by the actor, state or non‐state, against whom force is used; (2) immediately expected or imminent terrorist attacks endangering human life; and (3) the absence of non‐forcible remedies effective in terminating the terrorist threat. In addition the amount of force would have to be proportional, limited to targets responsible for specific terrorist activity and limited by the objective of terminating that threat.     

Conceptualizing the effects of mass‐mediated terrorism

Abstract

In summer 1985, a TWA plane was hijacked by Shiite terrorists to Beirut creating what turned to be one of the most impressive spectacles of the mass‐mediated “theater of terror.” After the event the American media were blamed for fanning the crisis atmosphere, giving the terrorists the publicity they craved, abetting the terrorists by reporting U.S. military movements, holding a brutal competition among themselves to get exclusive footage or interviews, harassing the hostages’ families, negotiating directly with the terrorists, milking the hostages still held by the terrorists for political and ideological declarations, and propagandizing the terrorists’ anti‐U.S. and anti‐Israel messages. The resulting debate that followed these accusations, illustrates the lingering argument regarding media and terrorism. While some claim that “the media are the terrorists’ best friends. The terrorist act by itself is nothing. Publicity is all”,¹ others argue that the media are avoiding the “real terror” for ideological reasons, averting Western public opinion from U.S. terrorism by underreporting its share in Third World Terrorism.² The ideological loadings of definitions and arguments are combined with confused interpretations of media effects and public opinion to yield an endless, futile debate. The purpose of the paper is to conceptualize basic effects of mass‐mediated terrorism by relating media effects studies to the case of terrorism and public opinion.     

Can terrorism become a scientific discipline? A diagnostic study

This study offers a meta-information analysis of the state of the art of terrorism research from structural disciplinary perspectives, and by comparisons with several other fields of study. It observes the interrelationship of disciplinary characteristics, specifically, scientific collaboration among terrorism researchers, the growth rate in the number of conferences in the field after 9/11 and the fragmentation of terrorism studies into separate research specialties. These three trends coincide, indicating the growing importance and visibility of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies for government decision-makers and an increase in funding for this research, much of which is channelled in specific desired directions. The new research on terrorism has created disciplinary studies on the subject in the sciences and the life sciences, side by side with traditional social science research. The fragmentation of the field, growing collaboration and the appearance of conference proceedings on terrorism are indicative of the beginnings of an autonomous academic research field, a distinct discipline of study. In great part, these developments are not only due to the infiltration of new subject areas into the network of terrorism research, but also to the expanding number of journals devoted to different aspects of the subject. The road to recognition as an academic discipline depends on whether the various aspects of terrorism studies can be integrated into one comprehensive branch of learning. This ability, in turn, is conditional on the field's cognitive structure or knowledge characteristics, as well as on the shifts and changes in the actual terrorism scene in the future that might influence the nature of research.     

The old terrorism: a dataset, 1860 – 1969

ABSTRACT

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, research on terrorism has grown exponentially. Data limitations, however, have made temporal generalization difficult. Most terrorism datasets extend back only to the 1970s, which inhibits the ability to quantitatively examine earlier waves of terrorism. To address this limitation, this article presents a dataset of over 250 terrorist organizations formed between 1860 and 1969. These data, which have global coverage, include country-year information on group formation, allowing scholars to examine the relationship between various country-year factors and the emergence of terrorist organizations. To illustrate their usefulness, these data are used to examine the relationship between democracy and terrorist group formation. Following several recent studies, the empirical analysis reveals a curvilinear or inverted u-shaped relationship between terrorism and democracy.     

Moral panics and anti‐cult terrorism in Western Europe

Religious minorities in Western Europe today are often perceived as threatening. After Solar Temple suicides and homicides, parliamentary and other official commissions investigated the dangers of ‘cults’ or ‘sects’. The article reviews reports published between 1996–1999 and argues that they may be classified into two categories. ‘Type I’ reports (more prevalent throughout French‐speaking Europe) rely on anti‐cult models and stereotypes, and may perpetuate moral panics by seeing all unfamiliar religious minorities as uniformly dangerous. ‘Type II’ reports, while still maintaining elements of the anti‐cult models, appear to be more balanced and concentrate more attention on academic findings. ‘Type I’ reports, and anti‐cult models in general, generated ‘anti‐cult terrorism’ (an expression first used in one of the Swiss ‘Type II’ reports) in the form of both verbal and actual violence, with extremist groups acting as self‐appointed anti‐cult vigilantes. While there are actually and potentially dangerous religious minorities, anti‐cult rhetoric in official documents may incite and provoke violence both against the assaulted movements and by the movements threatened. Law enforcement, the article concludes, should focus on the minority of violent religious and millenialist movements and the small extreme anti‐cult fringes.     

International terrorism? Indian popular cinema and the politics of terror

The first decade of the twenty-first century has been marked by the decisive entry into our media landscape of the so-called global war on terror, with countless films and TV series from all over the world addressing the issue of international terrorism. Even Indian popular cinema, which has been addressing the issue of domestic terrorism since the late 1980s with films such as Roja (Ratnam, 1992), Drohkaal (Nihalani, 1994), Maachis (Gulzar, 1996), has, since the new millennium, begun to tackle the topic of international terrorism. In this article, I will analyse the shift in the construction of the terrorist discourse in Indian popular cinema from a domestic to an international perspective in order to highlight the close proximity between the two, as in fact, the “global war on terror” narrative seems to offer Indian filmmakers the possibility to simultaneously address international and domestic terrorism. In particular, I will refer to Karan Johar’s film My Name Is Khan as a text which, while discussing the consequences of the American war on terror on its minorities, problematises the official discourse on terrorism and its neo-Orientalist character. It also draws a parallel between the situation of minorities in the United States and India. In so doing, the film triggers a reflection on the state of the Indian nation and questions the state of the secularist values of newly independent India after decades of communal violence.     

What's so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’?

This article assesses the validity of the concept of ‘religious terrorism’ and its consequences for research and policy practices. It explores the origins, assumptions and primary arguments of the term and subjects them to an analytical assessment. It argues that the distinctions typically drawn between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ terrorism are problematic, both conceptually and empirically, and that the term is misleading in its typical assumptions about the motives, causes and behaviour of groups classified as ‘religious terrorist’. In particular, it shows that the behaviour of those thus labelled is so diverse, and often so indistinguishable from their ‘secular’ counterparts, that the term has little meaning without further qualification, while simultaneously obscuring important aspects of both ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ violence. It then goes on to illustrate how the term, rooted in a particular historically situated understanding of religion and a particular set of power structures, serves as a disciplinary device to domesticate ‘political religion’, delegitimising certain actors while legitimising a number of highly contentious counterterrorist practices designed to deal with those described as ‘religious terrorists’. The article ends with some suggestions for alternative ways to study the role of beliefs and institutional structures, religious or otherwise, in producing political violence.     

American perceptions of terrorism: A Q‐methodological analysis of types

The literature on terrorism makes a number of significant predictions of the effects of media coverage of terrorism on audiences, public policy, and terrorism itself. Many of these predictions are contradictory, and little or no empirical social‐scientific research has been done to determine public perceptions of international terrorism. Q‐methodology offers a means of identifying groups or “types” of persons who share similar attitudes toward a phenomenon. Use of Q‐methodology here revealed four types of respondents sharing similar views of international terrorism. These distinctive types helped shed light on the many diverse and contradictory predictions of the effects of terrorism coverage on American public opinion and public policy.     

Television and terrorism: Implications for crisis management and policy‐making

Because few of us experience terrorism firsthand, the media play an important role in informing us when major incidents occur. Because of its instantaneity and its ability to reach many audiences at once, the electronic media and particularly television can have a significant impact on the various players who become involved in a particular crisis. This article examines the kinds of effects that television can have on four sets of actors most commonly involved in terrorist crises or major incidents: politicians, police, the public and the print media. While some of these effects can be negative, others can be positive. As a whole, however, television tends to diminish the quality of political discourse, with its emphasis on simplification and dramatization. In time of crisis, this can have serious consequences on decision‐makers who depend upon an informed public to understand the issues at stake and the limits on government action. The article ends by examining briefly how these effects relate to the increasing role of the private sector in public safety and security.     

EU counter‐terrorism,the Maastricht third pillar and liberal democratic acceptability

The article examines the effectiveness of the Maastricht Third Pillar's internal security provisions with respect to the fight against terrorism. An assessment of EU internal security cooperation is made from a perspective that takes into account questions of both operational anti‐terrorist proficiency and democratic acceptability. Police and security forces throughout the European Union (EU) have strongly endorsed the Third Pillar as providing an efficient response to serious criminality. However, from a liberal democratic point of view the Maastricht provisions raise extremely serious questions concerning the lack of critical public debate and systems of accountability within the EU. Close coordination between member states is definitely necessary if terrorism is to be effectively countered in the region. However, it is vital that in the headlong rush to provide for an enhanced international operational capacity critical considerations of democratic control are not lost. One cannot expect to gain the type of public consent that is crucial for democratic acceptability if fundamental fears exist over the legitimacy and desirability of ever closer law enforcement and judicial cooperation.     

Editors’ introduction: critical terrorism studies: practice,limits and experience

The articles in this special issue are drawn from papers presented at a conference titled Critical Terrorism Studies: Practice, Limits and Experience. The conference was organised by the Critical Studies on Terrorism Working Group of the British International Studies Association (BISA). The event was supported by both a BISA workshop grant and by Loughborough University’s Centre for the Study of International Governance (CSIG) and was held at Loughborough University from 9–10 September 2013. The conference aimed to explore what we know about terrorism and counterterrorism and importantly to ask how we know it. Reflecting the recent “materialist”, “everyday”, “experiential” and “narrative” turns in the fields of International Relations (IR), Geography and Cultural Theory, the event brought together scholars and practitioners to reflect on practices of research and knowledge production in Critical Terrorism Studies and related fields. The articles in this special issue reflect those aims.     

Terrorism,counter‐terrorism and democracy: The assessment of national security threats

The development of radical Islamist strategic thinking and the impact of post-modern, Western styles of thought upon the ideology that informs that strategy is often overlooked in conventional discussions of homegrown threats from jihadist militants. The propensity to discount the ideology informing both al-Qaeda and nominally non-violent Islamist movements with an analogous political philosophy like Hizb ut-Tahrir neglects the influence that critical Western modes of thought exercise upon their strategic thinking especially in the context of homegrown radicalization. Drawing selectively on non-liberal tendencies in the Western ideological canon has, in fact, endowed Khilaafaism (caliphism) with both a distinctive theoretical style and strategic practice. In particular, it derives intellectual sustenance from a post-Marxist Frankfurt School of critical thinking that in combination with an “English” School of international relations idealism holds that epistemological claims are socially determined, subjective, and serve the interests of dominant power relations. This critical, normative, and constructivist approach to international relations seeks not only to explain the historical emergence of the global order, but also to transcend it. This transformative agenda bears comparison with radical Islamist critiques of Western ontology and is of interest to Islamism's political and strategic thinking. In this regard, the relativist and critical approaches that have come to dominate the academic social sciences since the 1990s not only reflect a loss of faith in Western values in a way that undermines the prospects for a liberal and pluralist polity, but also, through a critical process facilitated by much international relations orthodoxy, promotes the strategic and ideological agenda of radical Islam. It is this curious strategic and ideological evolution that this paper explores.     

Diplomacy,terrorism, and national narratives in the United States–Iran relationship

The United States and Iran have failed repeatedly in the last thirty years to normalise diplomatic relations. Each attempt to open a dialogue has been set back by acts of terrorism or perceptions thereof, and the small openings for diplomacy were quickly shut. The difficulties of normal diplomacy should be understood in light of the national narratives that guide each country's international behaviour, narratives that include strong admonitions on terrorism and sow distrust. One method to overcome the obstacles thrown up by these national narratives is to explore their dynamics and attempt to write a new, common narrative.