尹锡悦政府的联盟政策与美韩联盟的走向

尹锡悦执政以来，韩国联盟政策进行了大幅调整，这将对韩国的对外政策和美韩联盟产生重要影响。尹锡悦政府为推动美韩联盟由区域向全球范围转变，对美国战略政策追随更加明显，不仅实现了日韩关系的缓和，还与北约开启了多层次合作。本文通过梳理尹锡悦政府的联盟政策，并分析其联盟政策调整动因，认为尹锡悦政府受到中美战略竞争加剧、韩国保守势力崛起、美国战略拉拢以及朝鲜半岛局势动荡等多重因素影响，倾向于采取更激进的联盟政策。展望未来，美韩联盟加强并向全球化转型的可能性增加，但由于尹锡悦联盟政策的激进性、理想化和矛盾性，美韩联盟的转型又不得不受制于朝鲜半岛局势、韩国战略选择空间缩小以及国内政治斗争等多重因素，存在一定的不确定性。     

艰难的、渐进的和不彻底的转变——第二届艾森豪威尔政府对韩政策探析

20世纪50年代后半期,美国对国家安全基本政策和亚洲政策进行了大幅度的调整。与此同时,朝鲜半岛的局势发生了很大变化。在此背景下,美国国家安全委员会制定了第6018/1号文件,对韩政策出现重大转变,主要表现为更加重视韩国的政治经济发展并有意识地推动美韩关系走向平等化。虽然此次政策转变是艰难的、渐进的和不彻底的,但它奠定了60年代美国对韩政策的基础。     

体系、社会和国家:理解《美韩自由贸易协定》

2007年6月,美韩双方签署了《美韩自由贸易协定》。美韩之间为什么要签署该协定?该协定对两国国内分别产生了哪些影响?该协定为何至今没能获得美国国会的通过?针对上述问题,本文结合美国贸易政策理论,从体系、国家和社会三个层面对其进行了分析。《美韩自由贸易协定》的签署及其实施,在体系层面上将会为双方带来经济、政治和战略上的多重收益,而在社会层面上却产生了不同的反应。尽管由于国内经济困难和利益集团的掣制使得协定的通过还面临不小的阻力,但基于协定所蕴含的重要价值和两国政府对此认识的高度一致,协定获得通过只是时间上的问题。     

美韩越南军事合作析论

1964～1973年,关韩双方在越南进行了近十年的军事合作。美韩在越南军事合作的实现,是彼此国家战略利益重合的结果。两国军事合作的阶段性特征与双方战略利益重合的程度密切相关。约翰逊政府时期,在越南战争问题上,关韩双方的国家战略利益重合度较大,双方军事合作比较默契。随着尼克松政府东亚战略转变,美韩战略利益的分歧扩大,双方的军事合作便很快终结。美韩双方在越南的军事合作也对韩国自身的发展、双边的同盟关系和美国的对韩政策产生了相应的影响。     

中韩关系发展的走向、难点与经验

<正>文在寅总统上台伊始,针对韩国外交深处窘境的现实状况进行了一系列的政策调整和外交公关活动,但其外交思路仍以对美外交和美韩同盟为基轴,致力于修复中韩伙伴关系,改善朝鲜半岛南北关系,重构"周边四强合作外交"的基础与框架。文在寅总统试图在最短时间内改变当前韩国外交的周边孤立境地,旨在为重新赢得韩国在东北亚地区"中心国家"的有利地位、为进一步争取朝鲜半岛局势变化的自主权和主导权创造条件、营造环境。这牵动着中韩关系发展、美韩     

美国亚太贸易战略新趋势:基于对《美韩自由贸易协定》的研究视角

《美韩自由贸易协定》于2012年3月15日正式实施,有力地促进了美国在亚太经济事务中扮演更重要的角色,成为美国"重返亚太"战略的标志之一。《美韩自由贸易协定》生效后,美国一方面实现了与韩国互惠互利的初衷,另一方面也在一定程度上牵制了东亚一体化进程,实现了制衡中国的战略目的。文章主要论述了《美韩自由贸易协定》对美国的经济福利、地缘利益和"新贸易政策"的影响,并进一步分析了美国"重返亚太"战略背景下《美韩自由贸易协定》与美国的APEC政策、主导TPP发展与美国国内政治博弈之间的关系,勾勒出美国新亚太贸易战略的轮廓。在此基础上,提出中国在出口受阻和影响力受限的情况下,应在加快调整经济发展方式、推动多元平衡的区域合作和积极应对美国主导TPP的发展等方面进行研判和对策选择。     

肯尼迪政府援韩政策析论

为了减轻对外援助负担,肯尼迪政府开始缩减美国的对外援助资金,推动受援国的自我发展。但由于美韩同盟关系的特殊性,美国政府内部在对韩援助政策调整过程中出现严重分歧,尤其是在对韩军事援助和经济援助的分配问题上难以达成一致。而缩减韩国军事力量及驻韩美军力量作为缩减对韩援助引发的问题,在美国政府内部的决策中也面临各种阻碍。最终,如何分配援韩资金和缩减韩国军事力量问题始终困扰着肯尼迪政府。与此同时,韩国则竭力阻止美国援韩资金的缩减并在韩国经济发展政策上和美国产生分歧,迫使美国不得不以缩减援助来规制韩国的经济行为。     

调整中的美韩同盟:发展历程、强化动因及其挑战

出于亚太战略考虑和朝鲜半岛国际政治考虑,美韩在不断强化同盟关系。然而,美韩同盟面临多种挑战,美国战略收缩调整和韩国国内政治、社会变动,都将对美韩同盟造成破坏,中美关系变化及东北亚地区一体化发展,是影响美韩同盟关系发展的重要外部因素。鉴于地区局势现状,在未来相当长时期里,美韩同盟仍将保持稳定。美国在强化对韩国影响力的同时,将在同盟框架内适当提升韩国的自主性,韩国也将因此承担更大的安保责任。从更为长远的视角看,韩国将继续追求真正意义上的自主性,这必定会直接削弱美韩同盟关系。随着东亚地区经济一体化的推进,多边合作将成为时代潮流,双边同盟将面临越来越大的挑战。从中长期看,同盟秩序存在的空间会被压缩。     

美国对跨国直接投资的干预及其对中国的启示

美国政府对本国企业对外直接投资和外商对关直接投资都进行了某种程度的干预，以服务于其战略目的、政治利益和经济政策目标。中美都是拥有独立对外战略和海外利益的大国，而中国正处于国内深化改革、对外直接投资格局初步形成、外资政策调整时期，为了更好地“走出去”和“引进来”，必须对跨国直接投资进行合理干预，以辅助对外战略和经济目标的...     

美韩同盟再定义与韩国的战略选择:进程与争论

本文系统总结了自2002年底以来美韩同盟再定义的磋商过程,以及双方在驻韩美军基地调整、同盟内部军事安全角色分工、同盟的未来战略构想等三大焦点问题上所取得的实质性进展,认为通过区域扩展和内涵扩展的路径选择,美韩同盟再定义已基本实现利益平衡与威胁平衡的双重目标。通过对美韩全球性战略同盟关系的定位与确认,韩国也由此结束了数年来激烈的外交方向辩论,再度确立了中近期亲美的结盟外交路线,然而有关韩国对外战略的争论不会就此终结。     

2002年东亚经济的前景

2001年世界各地经济大多陷入或迈向衰退,东亚各地除中国、越南等外亦陷于深度的衰退与停滞之中.2002年下半年或晚些时候,随着美国经济逐步走向复苏,亚洲各地经济亦将逐步恢复与反弹.然而由于美国资讯科技投资过度,"后遗症"的化解尚需时日,使得东亚各地今后必须更多地依靠内部需求,自力自强,加强合作,步向经济稳定增长的轨道.     

2002年亚太地区形势讨论会在京举行

20 0 2年 1 2月 2 6日 ,中国社会科学院亚太研究所 2 0 0 2年亚太地区形势讨论会在北京举行。来自各研究机构及政府部门的 4 0余位专家学者参加了会议。与会的专家学者们对亚太地区政治经济形势进行了回顾与展望 ,并就一些地区的热点问题进行了深入的讨论。关于地区经济形势 ,学者们认为亚太地区的经济形势总体较好。尽管在亚太地区经济中占比重最大、影响面最广的美国经济持续波动 ,第二大经济体日本的经济处于停滞状态 ,但在高速发展的中国经济的带动下 ,亚太地区的经济复苏趋势仍较为明显。学者们认为 2 0 0 3年的国际形势虽存在一些不稳…     

美国的农村金融体制及借鉴意义

本文对美国农村金融体制进行考察,对其农村金融组织体系及配套的扶持政策进行评介,并通过与中国农村金融的比较,指出中国农村金融体制改革应积极发挥市场机制的导向作用,建立农村资金良性循环机制,同时政府应承担主导作用,建立多层次、全方位的农村金融体制。     

The Nakba in Palestinian Memory in Israel

Changes in the international, regional and domestic arenas in the late 1990s resulted in discursive change with regard to interpretation of the Al Nakba in the political and civil societies of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Apart from fuelling a discursive challenge to the Israeli dominant discourse about the 1948 events, this reinterpretation allowed the Palestinian Arab citizens to discuss the historical roots of the problems they experienced within the Israeli political and civil societal spheres. This article analyses the nature and significance of discursive change of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel on the Nakba by referring to its impact on their identity politics as well as their political and civil societal activities.     

Islam in Mali in the neoliberal era

If before 11 September 2001, many praised Mali as a model ofdemocracy, secularism and toleration, many have now begun toexpress concern about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism inMali. I consider a number of recent public debates in Mali overmorality, so-called women’s issues, and the proposed changesin the Family Code and show how the perspectives of many Malianson these issues are not new but rather relate to longstandingand ongoing debates about Islam, secularism, politics, moralityand law. What is new is the way in which some Muslim religiousleaders have been articulating their complaints and criticisms.Since the guarantee of the freedom of expression and associationin the early 1990s, there has been a proliferation of independentnewspapers and private radio stations and new Islamic associationswith a coterie of increasingly media-savvy activists. I explorehow some Muslim activists have used such outlets to articulatethe concerns of some ordinary Malians, who face the contradictionsof living as modern Muslim citizens in a modernizing and secularizingstate where, in this age of neoliberal governmentality, theallegedly un-Islamic seems to be always just around the corner. Portions of the paper have been presented at the workshop, ‘Islam,Society and State in West Africa’, Rutgers University,New Brunswick, 29 March 2003; at the symposium, ‘Constructionand Dissemination of Islamic Knowledge in Africa’, IndianaUniversity, Bloomington, 19 April 2003; and at the conference,‘Governance and Insecurity in West Africa’, NorthwesternUniversity, 13–15 November 2003; and at UniversitätBayreuth. ^1. United States Agency for International Development, ‘Assistanceenvironment’, in USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 11. ^2. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The political scene’,in EIU Country Report: Mali (EIU, London, March 2002), p. 47. ^3. See Joshua Muravchik, ‘Freedom and the Arab world’,The Weekly Standard, 31 December 2001. ^4. ‘Overview’. USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 18. Such sentiments were alsoexpressed in journalistic accounts published shortly after 11September 2001. See, for example, Douglas Farah, ‘Mali’sMuslim clerics send troubling message: fragile democracy seenas vulnerable to extremism’, Washington Post, 30 September2001, p. A24; Kader Konaté, ‘Mali. Le danger islamiste’,Le Continent, 14 September 2001, p. 1. ^5. See Joan Baxter, ‘Challenging tradition’, BBC Focuson Africa Magazine, January-March 2002, pp. 48–50. Otherexamples include Nicolas Colombant, ‘Mali’s Muslimssteer back to spiritual roots’, Christian Science Monitor,26 February 2002, p. 8. ^6. These included various Western media outlets and several Maliannewspapers. ^7. James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, ‘Spatializing states:toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality’,American Ethnologist 29, 4 (2002), pp. 981–1002. ^8. For critical perspectives on the fashionable civil society approachto ‘good governance’ in Africa, see John L. Comaroffand Jean Comaroff (eds), Civil Society and the Political Imaginationin Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999);Béatrice Hibou and Richard Banégas, ‘Civilsociety and the public space in Africa’, CODESRIA Bulletin1 (2000), pp. 39–47. ^9. For example, Sunjata, the mythical founder of the medieval Malianempire, Mansa Musa, the Muslim rulers of Macina (r. nineteenthcentury), al-Hajj Umar Tall (d. nineteenth century), the Kuntashaykhs of the Timbuktu region, and Shaykh Hamallah (d. twentiethcentury), to name only some of the most prominent. ^10. For an example of how such ‘orthodoxy’ changes overtime and space in Mali, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Muslimproselytization as purification: religious pluralism and conflictin contemporary Mali’ in Abdallah A. An-Na’im (ed.),Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa (Orbis,Maryknoll, NY, 1999), pp. 228–45. ^11. Two studies that have received quite a bit of attention areAnna L. Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginalityin an out-of-the-way place (Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1993); Charles Piot, Remotely Global: Village modernityin West Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999). ^12. See Gregory Starrett, ‘The political economy of religiouscommodities in Cairo’, American Anthropologist 97, 1 (1995),pp. 51–68. ^13. On these developments, see Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares,‘The formation of an "Islamic sphere" in French colonialWest Africa’, Economy and Society, 28, 4 (1999), pp. 497–519;Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Islam and public piety in Mali’,in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds), Public Islamand the Common Good (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2004);Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy: History andauthority in a Malian town (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburghand the University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005). ^14. Malians with access to satellite television have a wider arrayof choices, which are hard to quantify. ^15. Some of the themes in this section are treated at greater lengthin my book, Islam and the Prayer Economy. ^16. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1993). ^17. See Seydina Oumar Diarra, ‘Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali’,Info-Matin, 18 January 2002, p. 5. ^18. Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy, p. 212. Seealso David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim societiesand French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920(Ohio University Press, Athens, OA, 2000); David Robinson andJean-Louis Triaud (eds), Le temps des marabouts: Itinéraireset stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale françaisev.1880–1960 (Karthala, Paris, 1997). ^19. Many Malians also regularly apply diverse principles from ‘custom’,which is often referred to as laada (from the Arabic) in theregion’s vernaculars. ^20. For one example, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Notes on theanthropological study of Islam and Muslim societies in Africa’,Culture and Religion, 1, 2 (2000), pp. 277–85. ^21. Ahmad Uthman Bah, Diya’ al-ghasaq manzuma nasihat al-shabab(Matba’at al-najah al-jadida, Casablanca, Morocco, 1992). ^22. See, for example, Amadou Tall, Dimensions de l’Islam (DarEl Fikr, Beirut, Lebanon, 1995–1996). ^23. On Haïdara and his career, see Soares, ‘Islam andpublic piety’ and Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy.Cf. Dorothea Schulz, ‘"Charisma and Brotherhood" revisited’,Journal of Religion in Africa, 33 (2003), pp. 146–71. ^24. See Louis Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, power andschooling in a West African Muslim society (Indiana UniversityPress, Bloomington, IL, 2001). ^25. Cf. Olivier Roy (trans. C. Volk), The Failure of Political Islam(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994); Olivier Roy, GlobalizedIslam (Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2004). ^26. Cf. Armando Salvatore, ‘Social differentiation, moralauthority and public Islam in Egypt: the case of Mustafa Mahmud’,Anthropology Today, 6, 2 (2000), pp. 12–15. ^27. For a discussion of Haïdara and his association’srelation to Sufism and Sufi orders, see Soares, Islam and thePrayer Economy. ^28. This was also a topic of discussion in some print media. See,for example, Cheick Sidya Diombana, ‘La jeunesse et lafoi en l’Islam’, La Roue, 25 October–3 November1993, p. 5. ^29. I am grateful to Roman Loimeier for making his copy of thissign available to me. ^30. See, for example, ‘Déclaration finale des associationsislamiques du Mali concernant les valeurs islamiques et àpropos du programme d’action de Beijing rélatifaux droits des femmes’, La Roue, 22–31 January 1996,pp. 3–5. ^31. For a discussion of some of the controversy around excision,see Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa: Culture, controversy, and change (Lynne Rienner,Boulder, Colorado, 2000). For campaigns against excision inMali, see Claudie Gosselin, ‘Handing over the knife: Numuwomen and the campaign against excision in Mali’, in BettinaShell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa, pp. 193–214; Jean Sanou, ‘Lutte contreles mutilations génitales feminines’, Le Soudanais,22 November 2000, p. 3; Yousouf Camara, ‘Réligionet excision’, Le Tambour, 22 June 2001, p. 3; MamadouBlodin Sissok, ‘Religion et excision. Quand les chrétienss’engagent contre les mutilations génitales féminines’,Info-Matin, 29 June 2001, p. 8. ^32. See, for example, Mady M. Dembélé, ‘L’excisionest un poids des traditions, elle n’a rien de religieux’,Les Echos, 18 July 2001, p. 5. ^33. See C.H. Sylla, ‘Interview exclusive. Le Présidentdu Collectif des islamistes parle’, Le Républicain,16 May 2001, pp. 1, 4–5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘L’excisionau Mali. La position des musulmans’, Nouvel Horizon, 30January 2001, p. 5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Interdire l’excisionest une atteinte grave’, Le Républicain, 31 January2001, p. 5. ^34. ‘Brèves’, Le Politicien Musulman, 18 March–18April 2002, p. 8. ^35. Leaflets produced and distributed by AISLAM (Association islamiquedu salut) in the author’s possession. ^36. See Mamadou Keïta, ‘Les imams à l’affûtdes jouisseurs’, Nouvel Horizon, 23 November 1998, p.4. ^37. Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Boycottons "Miss Cedeao" ’, NouvelHorizon, 16 October 1998. See also Mamadou Keïta, ‘MissCedeao’, Nouvel Horizon, 2 November 1998, p. 5. ^38. Yoro Sow, ‘Incertitudes pour la tenue du Congrèsdes homosexuels’, Sud Info, 8 December 1999, p. 4. ^39. However, some prominent Muslim religious leaders, most notablyChérif Haïdara, would eventually take positionsin support of condom use. See Benjamin Soares, ‘Mali:Im Visier der Islamismus-Fahnder’, INAMO 41 (2005), pp.16–18. ^40. Talal Asad, ‘Religion, nation-state, secularism’,in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), Nation andReligion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1999), p. 191. ^41. Djibril Traoré, ‘El Hadji Mahmoud Dicko,’Le National, 2 October 2000, p. 5. ^42. El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Declaration du Collectif des associationsislamiques du Mali’, Info-Matin, 7 May 2001, p. 7. Seealso El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Déclaration’,Le Républicain, 4 May 2001, p. 7; Amara Diapy Diawara,‘Meeting du Collectif des associations musulmanes du Mali’,Info-Matin, 13 February 2001, pp. 4–5. ^43. See, for example, Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (Routledge,New York, NY, 1993); Homi Bhabha, ‘Of mimicry and man’,in The Location of Culture (Routledge, New York, NY, 1994),pp. 85–92. ^44. On this heightened sense, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori,Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,1996). For Malian press coverage of the OCI meeting, see, forexample, ‘Organisation de la Conférence islamique.Le monde musulman’, Liberté, 3 July 2001, p. 4. ^45. See the extensive coverage of the meeting in a special editionof Le Continent, 2 February 2001. ^46. For a discussion of some of the proposed reforms and specificcontroversies, cf. Benjamin F. Soares, ‘The attempt toreform family law in Mali’, in Margot Badran (ed.), Genderand Islam in Africa (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, forthcoming);Dorothea E. Schulz, ‘Political factions, ideological fictions:the controversy over family law reform in democratic Mali’,Islamic Law and Society, 10, 1 (2003), pp. 132–64. ^47. Birama Fall, ‘Islam et politique. La colère desislamistes contre le pouvoir’, Le Républicain,23 April 2001, p. 1; Belco Tamboura, ‘Le front religieux,un front de plus pour Konaré’, L’Observateur,14 June 2001, p. 6. ^48. C. H. Sylla, ‘Code de la famille et excision. La dernièrevictoire des islamistes sur Alpha’, Le Républicain,10 June 2002, p. 5. ^49. See Christian Coulon, Le marabout et le prince: Islam et pouvoirau Sénégal (Pédone, Paris, France, 1981). ^50. Boukary Daou, ‘Code de la famille et excision. Les musulmansdisent non à Alpha’, Le Républicain, 5 June2002, p. 1. ^51. Cf. Michael Bratton, Massa Coulibaly, and Fabiana Machado, ‘Popularviews of the legitimacy of the state in Mali’, CanadianJournal of African Studies 36, 2 (2002), pp. 197–238;Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion,Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2005).     

近年越南的外商投资

受亚洲金融危机的影响,越南外商投资减少.由于越南政府调整了外资政策,外资出现回升势头,投资来源结构、投资产业结构也发生了变化.估计今明两年越南外商投资会继续增长.     

2002年东亚经济回顾

东亚经济在 2 0 0 2年保持了较快的增长。这主要归功于出口迅速增长 ,内需保持强劲 ,适度宽松的财政货币政策的刺激等因素。但是 ,东亚内部仍存在产业结构调整滞后、金融和公司部门的重建尚未完成、公共部门债务负担加重等问题 ,这些问题如不能很好解决 ,可能阻碍中长期经济增长。虽然面临着许多不确定的因素 ,各大机构对 2 0 0 3年的东亚经济增长仍然抱有较为乐观的预期。