(Un)secured debt and the likelihood of court-supervised reorganization

Secured and unsecured creditors engaged in a bankruptcy process have different preference on the issue of financial distress. Secured creditors generally prefer liquidation whereas unsecured creditors tend to promote firm??s reorganization. As a consequence, secured creditors might be an obstacle to reorganization when all classes of creditors have to vote to approve the reorganization plan. To complete this analysis, we study the link between bankrupt firm??s capital structure and the likelihood of reorganization when bankruptcy Courts (instead of creditors) decide whether or not firms are reorganized. Our main result is that the reduction of secured creditors?? influence on the reorganization process might constitute a means to promote bankrupt firm??s reorganization. More generally, the paper analyses the link between the amounts/numbers of both secured and unsecured claims and the final issues of a Court-supervised reorganization process.     

金融危机的应对:以日本银行业金融机构破产处理法律为例

伴随着泡沫经济崩溃金融系统问题爆发,日本经历了从出台特例措施应对金融机构个别破产事件,到制定和完善法律,以使金融机构破产处理走向制度化的过程。通过完善存款保险金制度,充实资金援助机制,确立金融整顿管财人、继承银行等金融机构破产处理的常规措施和专门的金融危机应对措施,《存款保险法》使金融机构破产处理制度得以恒久化;而《金融机构重组程序特例法》为行政处理手法之外,提供了金融机构破产处理的司法程序。这些制度适应了金融机构破产处理措施所要求的尽早预防、业务继续、保护存款人、集团处理以及责任追及等特性,显示日本金融机构破产处理法制已基本完善。     

Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of Its Relative Use

The law and finance literature highlights the role of investorrights in financial development, firm corporate governance,and financing patterns. For a panel of 35 countries, we investigatehow bankruptcy use relates to countries’ creditor rightsand judicial efficiency. Bankruptcies are higher in countrieswith more creditor rights, except for a "no automatic stay onassets" provision. Higher judicial efficiency is associatedwith more bankruptcies and appears as a substitute with morecreditor rights. Although only a first step, our findings suggestcreditor rights are complex, balancing prioritization of claims,ex ante risk-taking incentives, and an efficient resolutionof distressed firms.     

What discount rate should bankruptcy judges use? Estimates from Canadian reorganization data

Using data from financial reorganization plans filed by insolvent Canadian firms, we estimate the discount rate implicit in the unsecured creditors’ reorganization decision. Using (HARA) utility functions, we find the implicit monthly discount rate of creditors to be 4.9%, which corresponds to an annual discount rate of 77%. This is 7–10 times higher than discount rates used in previous empirical studies of reorganization. The discount rate estimates are robust to a range of assumptions about the degree of risk aversion and the market-to-book-value ratio of assets.     

Secured debt and the likelihood of reorganization

Theory suggests that secured creditors may increasingly oppose a debtor’s reorganization as the value of their collateral approaches the amount of their claims. If reorganization occurs and the value of the firm appreciates, the secured creditor receives only part of the gain. But if the firm’s value depreciates, the secured creditor bears all of the cost. Secured claimants, thus, often have more to lose than to gain in reorganizations. This study of Finnish reorganizations filed in districts that account for most of the country’s reorganizations finds that creditor groups most likely to be well-secured are most likely to oppose reorganization. We also find a negative correlation between how well-secured banks and other institutional lenders are and the likelihood of a confirmed reorganization plan. Limiting the priority of secured debt might stimulate reorganizations.     

Survival Rates in Bankruptcy Systems: Overlooking the Evidence

Extensive research on bankruptcy still has not made it possible to end the efficiency discussion concerning the need for a reorganization provision in bankruptcy laws. In this paper, I discuss the pervasiveness of asset sales in bankruptcy procedures and the effect it has on survival rates. Without these figures on going concern asset sales Western countries show astonishingly low firm survival rates. In addition, it becomes clear that the bankruptcy system in the US may be under-researched to such an extent that it seriously confounds our view of bankruptcy resolution.     

Optimal Trust Design in Mass Tort Bankruptcy

Many firms have filed for bankruptcy to manage mass tort liabilities,most notably asbestos producers. We model a bankruptcy procedurethat optimally balances the liquidity needs of present claimantsand an uncertain number of future claimants. We find that futureclaimants should receive greater awards in expectation thanpresent claimants as compensation for bearing greater futureclaims risk. We also find that allocating more value to contractualcreditors in bankruptcy makes an earlier filing more likely,which may increase overall welfare. Optimal risk-sharing impliesthat creditors should receive equity in a trust fund, with tortclaimants receiving senior debtlike securities.     

Costs and recovery rates in the Dutch liquidation-based bankruptcy system

We present evidence on the efficiency of the resolution of financial distress in bankruptcy in The Netherlands. Direct costs average 16%, firm recovery 37% and bank debt recovery 80%. The direct costs are lower in larger firms and in firms with more bank debt. Costs increase with the time it takes to sell assets. Firm recovery is influenced by asset structure, capital structure and to a lesser extent Dutch legal variables. However, the opportunity to continue operations in bankruptcy is chosen by about half the firms and this has a positive effect on recoveries.

Congress,The U.S. Supreme Court And Must-Carry Policy: A Flawed Economic Analysis

The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which requires cable operators to carry the signals of local broadcast television stations, was hailed by supporters as a measure that would preserve the economic viability of the local independent broadcaster by unlocking the anticompetitive grip that the local cable company places on access to its system. In upholding the Act in 1997, the United States Supreme Court seemed to ignore the degree to which the cable and broadcast industries have become vertically integrated. In the end, local independent stations became economically viable not because they were guaranteed carriage on a cable system, but because they represented a practical programming outlet for conglomerate firms with large investments in content production. This article recommends that Congress repeal the Act.     

An experimental investigation on optimal bankruptcy laws

We performed an experimental investigation to assess whether the “restricted auction” mechanism proposed by Berkovitch, Israel and Zender in 1997 works effectively as an optimal bankruptcy law or not. An optimal bankruptcy law is a commitment device that implements efficient choices both before (ex ante) and after (ex post) financial distress, even if moral hazard is binding. We designed an experiment focused on ex ante efficiency and we found that the restricted auction mechanism was able to direct an optimal amount of effort toward entrepreneurial activities. This result confirms the theoretical predictions. Nonetheless, we found that under a plain unrestricted auction mechanism our experimental subjects chose to allocate into their firms a larger amount of effort than that predicted by theory. Although difficult to justify on theoretical grounds, this experimental evidence is robust. Our behavioral interpretation is that this result is due to “moral sentiments”, such as the natural propensity of subjects toward socially desirable behaviors. In fact, we show that it vanishes once these motives are removed.     

Retiree medical benefit plans and the impact of the bankruptcy filing of LTV Corp.

In the past two decades, post-retirement medical benefit programs have become a significant feature in the benefits packages of many employers. Soaring medical costs and decreasing work forces have made it increasingly difficult for employers to pay for these programs, while at the same time, Congress has made it more difficult for employers to prefund them. The critical level of unfunded retiree medical liability faced by many companies was brought to prominence when LTV Corp., the nation's second largest steel producer, filed for bankruptcy reorganization and promptly terminated its retiree medical benefit plan.     

破产重整制度中各方主体的角色定位

新《破产法》(草案)①引入了破产重整制度,并对其专设一章,可见重整制度之重要。破产重整的立法精神是再建主义精神。笔者认为,要想使破产重整制度发挥其最大功效,实现立法者拯救企业的立法本意,最关键的是在利益制衡原则的基础上,对破产重整制度各方主体的角色进行科学合理的定位,在此基础上,对破产重整制度中各主体的权限与职责做明确科学的规定,这样才能最大限度的发挥破产重整制度的作用。本文基于破产重整的制衡原则,对破产重整中各方主体进行了角色定位,希望能构建起破产重整制度中各方主体间完善科学的关系,从而加深对破产重整制度的理解,促进破产重整制在我国度发挥其最佳效果。     

论我国个人破产法律制度的构建

我国目前正在着手修改的《合伙企业法》,拟增加关于“有限合伙”的内容。在有限合伙相应的破产环节上各国一般均通过个人破产制度予以调整和化解。加之我国家庭整体负债率高,居民个人消费和社会的整体经济形式存在失衡,个人破产立法势在必行。目前我国消费信用体系正在建设之中且已初具规模,中国实施个人破产已初步具备条件。但是个人破产是一把双刃剑,应当设置较高的申请破产的门槛和合理的财产扣押范围,建立符合中国实际的债务清偿计划制度和破产免责制度,并实行人格破产和限制消费制度,同时应避免金融机构为获取贷款利润滥发信用卡,鼓动消费者过分超前消费。     

Does it pay to pollute? Shareholder wealth consequences of corporate environmental lawsuits

In this paper, we employ the event study methodology to examine shareholder wealth consequences of corporate environmental lawsuits filed in the US Circuit Courts from 1980 to 2001. We find that stocks of defendant firms experience significant negative abnormal returns around the lawsuit filing dates. When the plaintiffs are government entities, the abnormal returns of the defendant stocks are significantly negative. On the other hand, when the plaintiffs are individuals or nonpublic business entities, the abnormal returns are statistically insignificant. When lawsuits are filed under EPA's superfund statute, defendant firms experience significant loss in equity value. For shareholders of the average firm in our sample, the empirical evidence suggests that it does not pay to pollute if the firm is sued.     

Does a Reorganization Law Improve the Efficiency of the Insolvency Law? The Finnish Experience

This paper provides empirical evidence on issues related to the role of reorganizations. The results show that creditors receive a better payoff in a reorganization than in a going concern sale in liquidation bankruptcy. The study finds support for one explanation, namely that the direct costs of a reorganization are lower than the costs of liquidation bankruptcy. However, direct costs can explain only a part of the reorganization surplus, since the reorganization surplus is much higher than the difference in direct costs.     

论企业破产重整信息披露时间节点的规范与细化

企业破产重整中债权人与债务人利益的平衡依赖于破产法上的正当程序,知情权的实现是保障债权人等利害关系人利益的基本前提。本文通过对26家上市公司重整程序中的信息披露情况进行实证分析并结合制度比较后发现,目前我国企业破产法上关于重整程序中信息披露的时间没有明确的规定,在实践和立法上均存在不足。建议结合我国实际情况按照破产重整程序推进的逻辑完善我国破产法上信息披露制度,规范信息披露的时间节点,在重整程序启动前、重整计划草案表决前和重整计划执行三个阶段对信息披露的时间节点与内容进行规范与细化。     

Does court-supervised reorganization work? Evidence from post-confirmation firm failure

Unlike the US Chapter 11, the Belgian reorganization legislation requires that distressed firms remain temporarily under court-supervision during the post-confirmation stage. Using a hand-collected sample of firms, we analyze the likelihood of business failure and the time to failure during this period. Less viable firms are more likely to fail and do faster so, indicating relatively effective reorganization proceedings. Firms that are indebted to highly secured banks or owe high sums of unpaid taxes are more likely to fail. Judicial discretion affects the likelihood of failure only in a subsample of sole proprietorships.     

破产原因的反思与解析——兼对《企业破产法》第2条的解读

破产原因是债务人是否被宣告破产的关键,其破产原因的法律界定影响着破产法维护社会经济秩序功能的发挥。从破产原因的一般理论出发,借鉴国外破产原因的立法规定,反思我国1986年破产法中的破产原因,进一步解析2006年《中华人民共和国破产法》第2条,将破产原因区分为不能清偿到期债务且资不抵债和不能清偿到期债务且停止支付两种,分别适用于债务人自愿提出破产申请和债权人提出破产申请的情况。     

Employment preservation vs. creditors’ repayment under bankruptcy law: The French dilemma?

The paper investigates the French dilemma associated with court administered resolution of corporate financial distress. In such a legal system, the courts seek a double objective: maintaining job positions through continuation, and determining the best outcome for the claimants. We discuss this dilemma empirically, using a unique sample of bankruptcy files on French SMEs. We address successively three critical questions. First, we highlight the determinants of the final bankruptcy outcome (continuation through reorganization or sale, or piecemeal liquidation): does continuation (the most employment-friendly outcome) depend on the firm's characteristics, and/or on the way the procedure is managed? Second, we study the determinants of the creditors’ recovery rates: do the courts play an active role in increasing recoveries? Third, we address the dilemma directly by focusing on sales as a going concern. We model the court administered selection process between rival buyout offers: do the courts balance the social content against the financial content of each offer? Is there an explicit arbitrage between employment preservation and creditor recoveries? Our main results are: (1) the French courts actively work to facilitate continuation against liquidation, and thus play a role in employment preservation. Besides, we find continuation is more likely to prevail when default is an outcome of specific difficulties (outlets, finance, and production). (2) We confirm the Radulovic (2008) findings: the global recovery rate mainly depends on the firm's ex ante characteristics at the time of triggering, while the way the procedure is managed by the court has little impact. Similarly to LoPucki and Doherty (2007), continuation via reorganization does not generate lower recovery rates on average than the other outcomes. (3) Last, the courts’ choice between rival buyout offers confirms that social considerations prevail in the arbitration. Yet, the courts still consider financial issues as well (a higher sale price increases the chances that an offer is selected), but without clear connection with the amount of due claims (one direct consequence is a moderate recovery rate on sales).     

Corruption and hold-up: the role of intermediaries

Corrupt contracts are illegal and, therefore, vulnerable to hold-up. That is, a bureaucrat who has accepted a bribe from a firm in exchange for a license may still choose not to grant the firm that license (hold-up). This paper develops a model to study the role that intermediaries play in preventing hold-up. There are two types of firms, good firms that are legally entitled to receive a license, and harmful firms that are not. Without intermediaries only good firms enter the market, and harmful firms do not enter because of hold-up. Intermediaries are legally permitted to help firms reduce their navigation costs of obtaining licenses. Thus, intermediaries increase entry of good firms. However, by utilizing the legal aspects of their transaction with good firms as leverage against the bureaucrat, intermediaries can prevent hold-up among harmful firms. Thus, intermediaries increase participation by both good and harmful firms and their welfare costs are ambiguous. Data obtained from occurrences of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are broadly consistent with our model.