Levinasian Ethics and Legal Obligation*

Abstract. This paper discusses the implications of the ethical theory of Emmanuel Levinas for theoretical debates about legal obligation. I begin by examining the structure of moral reasoning in light of Levinas's account of ethics, looking particularly at the role of the “third party” (le tiers) in modifying Levinas's primary ethical structure of the “face to face” relation. I then argue that the primordial role of ethical experience in social discourse, as emphasised by Levinas, undermines theories, such as that of H. L. A. Hart, that propose a systematic distinction between legal and moral species of obligation.     

Thinking like a lawyer/acting like a professional: communities of practice as a means of challenging orthodox legal education

Increasingly, there is pressure upon law schools, in Australia and elsewhere, to impress upon students the significance of the ethical and professional obligations of legal practice. The recent Carnegie Report explicitly looked to law schools “to initiate novice practitioners to think, to perform, and to conduct themselves (that is, to act morally and ethically) like professionals”. Many law students, however, have little appreciation of legal ethics and any concept they may have of professionalism tends to be envisaged as applying only after graduation. In this paper, we explore the idea of a “community of practice”. Lave and Wenger, who coined the phrase, contend that “learning is conceived as a trajectory in which learners move from legitimate peripheral participant to core participant of the community of practice”. We will argue that law students should appreciate that they are entering the legal profession's community of practice and that all aspects of their conduct relevant to professionalism – not only academic integrity, but matters such as time management, teamwork, relationships with peers and staff – relate to this transition into a legal professional community. Such an approach may not only serve to impress upon students the significance of “professionalism” and ethics, but inculcate in them a sense of belonging to a professional community.     

The Use of Unwritten Legal Principles by Courts*

Abstract. I argue that one can distinguish two types of unwritten legal principles as applied by courts (in Europe). On the one hand, what are called “structural principles,” which are induced, or at least pretended to be induced, from the written law. On the other hand, what are called “ideological principles,” which are not induced from the actual legal system, but refer to current dominant beliefs in society as to morals, politics or other non legal ideologies. It is argued that the distinction between structural legal principles and ideological legal principles could be an important element for the elaboration of a legal principle theory, as both these types of principles meet a different need and play a different role in legal practice. Structural legal principles primarily meet the need for a new ius commune, in order to achieve the coherence and the completeness of the legal system, whereas ideological legal principles, just like the human rights, meet a revived demand for an ethical framework for the law.     

Beyond the Goods/Resources Dichotomy: Animal Labor and Trade Law

Abstract

Since its inception, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has, in a rather self-evident manner, treated animals as objects of trade: Animals must be either goods or natural resources subject to the terms and conditions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, broader public and legal efforts to recategorize animals from goods to “sentient beings,” which are emerging across the world, are casting serious doubt on these assumptions. Using animals’ subjectivity as a starting point, a new and bourgeoning strand of anthropological, ethical, and political studies argues that animals should properly be recognized as working subjects. Be it guide dogs, truffle hogs, logging elephants, or dairy cows—working animals, they argue, are owed wholly new legal and ethical duties. This article builds on these arguments to examine the consequences of “animal labor” for trade law: Are animals wrongly classified as commodities or resources? Is there a need and room to recognize animals as service providers under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)? What are the legal consequences of this proposed change? This article sets out to answer these questions and argues that recognizing animals as workers in trade law is conceptually coherent and can play a crucial role in empowering states to protect animals effectively at the international level.     

Boundary Work: Transcendence and Authoriality in Religious and Secular Law

The semiotic investigation of the divine or transcendent authoriality of religious law involves, in the context of discussions concerning the propriety or impropriety of the influence of religion in “secular” political and legal systems, preliminary boundary work to discern the meanings of “religion”, “secular”, and “belief.” Jeremy Waldron’s account of the propriety of religion in “secular” politics, mirroring but reversing John Rawls’ account of religion’s impropriety in that context, can be contrasted with neo-Calvinist (and other) conceptions of pluralism and the inevitability of fundamental “beliefs” in all political and legal thought. In the latter perspectives, religious believers are neither unique in their appeal to transcendent values, nor relegated to advancing theocracy (because pluralism is conceived as a religious value rather than religion’s opposite). A workable alternative to the conventional discourse of religious influence in politics and law is therefore evident.     

Decision to Know: City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge v. Stephen C. Myers

Abstract

Stephen Myers was leasing a single‐family residential property in an area zoned A‐1 within the city of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to four unrelated persons. Per Baton Rouge’s Unified Development Code (UDC) a “family” is defined as “an individual or two (2) or more persons who are related by blood, marriage or legal adoption living together . . . or not more than two (2) persons, or not more than four (4) persons (provided the owner lives on the premises rpar; living together by joint agreement. . . . ” (Myers at 9). In response, the city brought the action seeking to compel Myers to cease his alleged violation of the UDC, and Myers made a reconventional demand alleging the UDC’s definition of family was unconstitutional.     

Evaluation of Two New Methods for DNA Extraction of “Legal High” Plant Species

A quick, simple, and high-yield nucleic acid isolation process is crucial for high-quality DNA analysis. The ability of the MicroGEM PDQeX phytoGEM system and Omega Bio-tek E.Z.N.A.® Plant DS Mini kit to extract PCR-ready DNA was evaluated by extracting the forensically relevant “legal high” plant species: Ipomoea purpurea, Artemisia absinthium, Mitragyna speciosa, Datura stramonium, and Papaver somniferum. The plant material was pulverized, processed using the manufacturer’s plant protocol for the PDQeX Nucleic Acid Extraction or the manufacturer’s protocol for the Omega extraction, quantified using the Invitrogen Qubit 2.0 Fluorometer, and analyzed for amplifiability by PCR using a Qiagen Rotor-Gene Q instrument and published assays. The DNA amplicons for the legal high species produced high-resolution melt curves concordant with the melts observed when DNA was isolated using the Qiagen DNeasy Plant Mini Kit in previous studies.     

The Sheffield School and Discourse Theory: Divergences and Similarities in Legal Idealism/Anti‐Positivism*

Abstract. When first I began this paper, I envisaged it as a fairly straightforward exercise in comparison between the Sheffield School’s and Discourse Theory’s varieties of legal idealism or anti‐positivism (these terms being synonymous for the types of theory that contest positivism’s separation thesis, that is, the contention that there is no necessary conceptual connection between law and morality). One obvious distinction, for example, is between the moral substance at the heart of these respective theories: the Sheffield School’s legal theory being founded on Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency, and Alexy’s theory focusing on Radbruch’s intolerable degree of injustice. However, the more I thought about the two respective theories, the more interested I became in one particular issue: the denial of the separation thesis that constitutes legal idealism. Here, I present a paper which is not so much concerned with the substance of two different types of legal idealism or anti‐positivism, but which focuses on the question of whether and in what way either or both of the theories can correctly be characterised as legal idealist or anti‐positivist. I focus in this paper on two works in particular: Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword’s Law as a Moral Judgment (1994), and Robert Alexy’s The Argument from Injustice (2002).     

Enacting the “Incomprehensible China”: Modern European Jurisprudence and the Japanese Reconstruction of Qing Political Law

The great ambition of Japanese colonialism, from the time of its debut at the end of the nineteenth century, was the reformulation of Chinese law and politics. One of the most extraordinary examples of this ambition is The Administrative Law of the Qing Empire [Shinkoku Gyōseihō], a monumental enterprise undertaken by the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan intended not only to facilitate Japanese colonial administration of Taiwan but also to reorder the entire politico‐juridical order of China along the lines of modern rational law. This article examines the legal analysis embraced in The Administrative Law of the Qing Empire and recounts its attempt to reconstruct the Qing's “political law” (seihō) by a strange, ambiguous, and hybrid resort to “authenticity.” The strangeness of this Japanese colonial production comes from Japan's dual position as both colonizer of Taiwan and simultaneously itself colonized by “modern European jurisprudence”(kinsei hōri). In uncovering the effects of modern European jurisprudence on the Japanese enterprise, we will discover Japan's pursuit of its own cultural subjectivity embedded in The Administrative Law of the Qing Empire, epitomizing the campaign of national identities observable in the process of East Asian legal modernization.     

Instituting Authority. Some Kelsenian Notes

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view     

Legislative Intentions and Counterfactu-als: Or,What One Can Still Learn from Dworkin's Critique of Legal Positivism

Riggs v. Palmer has become famous since Dworkin used it to show that legal positivism is defective. The debate over the merits of Dworkin's claims is still very lively. Yet not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the content of the statute at issue in Riggs was given by the counterfactual intention of the legislature. According to arguments from legislative intent, a judicial decision is justified if it is based on the lawmaker's intention. But can legislative intentions be determined counterfactually? More generally, what are the discursive commitments undertaken by a lawyer or a judge, in an exchange of legal reasons, when using this interpretive methodology? This paper addresses these issues considering, in particular, David Lewis's “resemblance” condition and “relevant similarity” between possible worlds in the evaluation of counterfactual statements. The analysis sheds some new light on the debate on theoretical disagreements and shows that Dworkin's conception of law as an argumentative practice is not necessarily at odds with legal positivism. It rather allows us to look at it under a better light.     

Metaphorical Use of Algorithm in Legal Reasoning

The current use of big data in the legal framework suggests the idea of algorithm as a new topos of the legal rhetoric. Indeed, in addition to the “rhetoric of algorithm”, an “algorithm of rhetoric” may also exist, in strict connection with an anthropological structure. Even leaving aside its epistemic value, the algorithm is in fact always experienced by the jurist through a metaphorical process, in a very similar way, for instance, to the metaphorical use of graphs in economics (McCloskey). That said, the reasoning about big data is metaphorical as well, and this allows us to believe that there is still a role for pathos and ethos within the legal reasoning. Moreover, and most importantly, the ideal to which the data-based knowledge (the so called dataism) aims—that is, the pretension of being able to map all that there is to know—is metaphorical, too. In this paper I will discuss algorithms and big data in the guise of new topoi. The aim of this paper is therefore to imagine a philosophical-juridical semiotic by means of which it is possible to highlight the persistent difference between reasonableness and reason in the judge’s work. Vis-à-vis algorithms and big data, as well as the rules of law, the judge does not act as bouche de la loi, but rather practices a reason which is irreducibly rhetoric and related to the humanities.

     

General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.     

Agency,Authority, and the Logic of Mutual Recognition

The “Cartesian” model of the rational subject is central to the political philosophy of Hobbes and Locke and is “transcendentally” affirmed in Kant's account of ethics and legality. An influential body of Hegelian inspired critique has suggested, however, that the dialectical deficiencies of the dominant models of Liberalism in late modernity inhere in this “atomistic” or “self‐supporting” characterisation of the individual. The “atomistic” perspective appears as an obstacle not only to the coherent articulation of the compatibility of liberty and equality, but also to the attempt to express the mutuality of recognition between agents that might offer a genuinely communal conception of constitution and subject. Employing as a frame of reference Alan Brudner's analysis of these issues in his comprehensive Constitutional Goods (Brudner 2004) it is argued that legal and political theory might usefully adopt an understanding of Hegel's notion of “recognition” (Anerkennung) in this regard without drastic phenomenological reconstruction of the Cartesian or Kantian subject.     

“Oral Tradition” as Legal Fiction: The Challenge of Dechen Ts’edilhtan in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia</Emphasis>

Often understood as synonymous with “oral history” in Indigenous title and rights cases in Canada, “oral tradition” as theorized by Jan Vansina is complexly imbricated in the European genealogy of “scientific history” and the archival science of Diplomatics with roots in the development of property law and memory from the time of Justinian. Focusing on Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, which resulted in the first declaration of Aboriginal title in Canada, this paper will discuss Tsilhqot’in law (Dechen Ts’edilhtan) in the context of the court’s deployment of Vansina’s theory and its genealogy, and conclude that “oral tradition” functions as a legal fiction enabling the court to remain in the familiar archive of its own historiography while claiming to listen to the Elders.     

The State of Nature and Laws of Seinfeld: Not That There’s Anything Wrong With That

Seinfeld (1989–1998) and it’s co-creator’s Curb Your Enthusiasm (2000–present), are each considered groundbreaking television. Critics regard their humor and intellectual comedy as Twain-like and creative. While both shows have been criticized for their character’s indifference and apolitical attitude, the programs resonate with those in society who more subtly consider law and politics. This project argues that Seinfeld and Curb present a unique theory of justice. These two shows constitute a common and current image of what is just in society. While critics have argued that Seinfeld and Curb are not shows about nothing, I argue that these comedians offer us a legal philosophy. For those who view these characters as merely “self-absorbed, superficial, and immature,” I posit that they represent the obscure area between what John Locke termed “the state of nature” and what legal scholars call “legal culture.” I propose that these sitcoms demonstrate a way of speaking about law that provides a constitutive theory of law and justice.     

人与人格分离技术的形成、发展与变迁——兼论德国民法中的权利能力

人格是特定社会的准入条件,因而生物人与法律人的分离,乃是法律人格制度的基本模式。这个模式中核心的要素,就是法律人格的“适格判断”的标准。在法律文明的早期,血缘、地域、财产等身份要素,充当着法律人格的判别标准,由此所引起的身份人格必然带有不平等的色彩。近代法律人格的基本特点,就是个人的伦理属性成为了法律人格的适格标准,由此奠定了近代法律人人平等的基础。《德国民法典》上的“权利能力”概念,是由实定法所界定的法律人格的适格条件,这一实定法上的概念,仍然是建立在关于人的伦理性判断的基础之上的。     

Treatment of procedural irregularities in Nigerian courts and the need for a principled approach: Yaki v Bagudu (2015) in retrospect

The courts are usually stuck in between the need to do substantial justice to litigants and the strict observance of procedural rules. The article considers this issue in Nigerian legal system using the Supreme Court’s decision in Yaki v Bagudu as a signpost. The article argues that the absence of any clear-cut guidelines on procedural irregularities often leads to legal uncertainty and unpredictability of results. Drawing on experiences from other jurisdictions, the article suggests a principled approach which distinguishes between irregularities affecting the substantive jurisdiction of courts and those which do not as a panacea.