在发展民主中实现村庄“善治”——对天津市武清区深化村级民主的研究

“善治”的本质特徵就是政府与公民对公共生活的合作管理，民主执政的理念体现了执政党对“善治”的追求，村民自治是民主执政理念的实践。天津市武清区在村民代表会议制度等一系列民主实践的基础上，针对一些村级党组织民主执政能力与村民自治发展不相匹配的问题，实行了村支书担任村民代表会议主席的制度；针对农民群众参与村务管理的广泛性要求与村级民主成本短缺之间的矛盾，推行了户代表会议制度。本文从武清区近期深化村级民主的实践分析入手，论述了村民自治与村党组织的民主执政方式形成良好的互动合作机制，是村民自治深化发展的必要条件；经过十几年的村级民主实践，村民自治与村级党内民主已初步形成良性互动的发展方向；为防止村民自治的异化，必须加强和改善党对村民自治的领导；两委矛盾的产生有其深层根源，其实质在于权力与利益之争；实现村庄“善治”需要村级党组织与村民自治组织的互动与合作，在大力加强村级党组织建设，提高其民主执政能力的同时，必须不断完善科学的村民自治运行机制，并逐步建立村党组织与村民自治组织良性互动的合作机制。     

村民流动对村级党组织建设的影响及对策

村民的流动是村落社会里的必然趋势.村民流动既有经济根源又有社会根源.村民的流出使村级党组织后备力量缺乏,影响了村民对党的认识,促使了村级党组织家族化的形成,使得农民工党员管理较为困难.因此,村级党组织要积极发展村落社会先进生产力和先进文化;同时放宽政策,促进村民在村与村之间的合理流动,合并村级党组织,设立跨村组织,设立流动党组织.     

在村民自治条件下如何实现村党组织和村民自治组织的和谐

《中华人民共和国村民委员会组织法》规定，我国在村一级实行村民群众性自治。而这一制度运行的有效性在很大程度上取决于村党组织和村民自治组织的关系。一 自８０年代中国村民自治制度出现以来，取得了举世瞩目的成绩。但是，在一些地方村民自治的运作很不规范，村民自治组织和村党支部的关系存在很多问题，严重影响了村民自治的有效性。 第一，组织权限模糊。村党组织对本村经济建设和社会发展中的重大问题拥有决定权。村民自治组织有权依法开展自治活动，亦有权讨论和决定村中事务。这样，村中就存在两个对村中事务拥有决定权的组织。虽…     

农村基层组织关系的失范及对策

规范村级组织的关系，明确划分农村基层党组织与村民自治组织的职责权限，形成一个合理分工、团结协作、相互监督、规范运作的村级管理体制，既有利于加强农村党组织建设，又有利于贯彻《村民委员会组织法》，落实村民自治体制，走依法治村之路，是推动农村经济社会发展、化解农村基层矛盾、维护农村社会稳定的关键。     

结构矛盾与体制创新:村民自治背景下村党组织职能的科学定位与领导方式转换

在村民自治背景下,村党组织势必要发生角色和职能的转换,即村党支部由传统体制下直接领导行政管理、决定村庄事务,转变为领导、组织村民行使民主选举、民主监督、民主管理、民主决策等各项权利。但是,从实行村民自治政策以来,国家立法层一直采取的是党支部领导村委会的领导方式,这不仅造成了村党组织对村民委员会权力的取代,也使村民在行使民主权利时领导者和组织者缺位,从而引发了权力结构矛盾和村民自治权力运转机制的失灵。鉴于此,应科学界定党组织在村民自治中的角色和地位,转换党组织的领导对象,由领导村民委员会转为领导村民会议和村民代表会议,以落实村民民主选举、民主监督、民主管理、民主决策等各项权利。     

论直选后农村党组织与自治组织的关系

《中华人民共和国村民委员会组织法》，将村民自治纳入法治建设的轨道，是我国民主政治建设的重要组成部分。以村委会主任、副主任和委员由村民直接选举为主要标志的村民自治活动，在中国农村基层民主政治建设历史上揭开了崭新的篇章，全国广大农村正在经历着民主自治的洗礼，农村政治面貌正在发生着深刻的变化。但在某些地方直选产生的村民自治组织与村党组织闹矛盾，搞独立，争谁大谁小的问题，这既影响了村民自治的正常有效运作，又影响了党组织作用的发挥。可以说，党组织与村民自治组织的关系能否协调好，关系到农村社会的稳定，关系到…     

冲突和调控:村民自治法律关系中的权力与权利

村民(村民会议)、村民委员会、村党组织、乡镇政府是村民自治法律关系中的权力(权利)主体;在村民自治实践中,这些主体之间存在矛盾和冲突,这些矛盾和冲突的实质是其背后的利益博弈;要解决矛盾、调控冲突应从两个层面着手,其一,通过立法厘定权力(权利)主体的权力边界;其二,是各主体应抑制权力的自我扩张。     

支部建在百姓家门口工作做到群众心坎上

嘉定区江桥镇党委积极探索新形势下村党组织的党建工作，按照党的十八大提出的。“健全觉的组织体系”新要求，在太平村尝试开展基层村民组党建活动，积极发挥村党组织的领导核心作用，将许多工作做到群众心坎上，获得了村民的好评、创先争优有成效。     

从实体到程序:理顺村“两委会”关系的新向度

村“两委会”关系研究与实践中存在着一些误区,其原因在于没有解决好党的建设实践与党的建设目的的关系;长时期党组织一元化领导所形成的“路径依赖”以及制度建设方面“重实体、轻程序”的思维方式。理顺村“两委会”关系的目的在于推进村民自治,要从运行机制上理顺村“两委会”的关系,并找准切入点把村党组织纳入村民自治的系统中。     

利益分化、差异共融与城中村治理

城中村问题作为基层社区治理的一种常态化典型现象,其研究正从宏观视角向微观视角转变,即转向对城中村社区居民诉求的关注。当前城中村社区居民的利益出现了分化,根据是否为"户籍人口"以及"嵌入性"程度指标,可以形成"村民-谋利型""村精英-经纪型""移民-谋生型"和"漂流族-落脚型"四种不同的利益类型。城中村治理实质上就是协调与整合不同群体利益的过程。有效的城中村治理需要识别、尊重和满足不同类型群体的利益需求。以S村为例,基于不同群体的利益格局,要通过城中村治理来满足不同群体的合理需要,保障全体居民的环境公共利益,弥合不同群体的福利差距,从而促进新型利益共同体的形成与城中村社区的融合发展。     

乡政村治格局中乡村关系的失调与调适

"基层群众自治制度"首次被纳入中国特色政治制度范畴,是我们党不断推进社会主义政治制度自我完善和发展的生动体现。而要坚持和完善农村基层群众自治制度就必须充分发挥村委会的作用,确立恰当的乡村关系。     

单位社区再组织化的网络建构逻辑——对北京市海淀区学院路街道的案例研究

社会发展需要基本的组织载体和平台,但因社会转型而导致的社会组织结构和社会组织方式的改变,使得现阶段我国单位社区出现一定程度的“去组织化”。如何打破单位社区的封闭性,实现单位社区与社区外其他组织单元结合实现再组织化,以解决基层社会治理中的成员动员、统筹协调和资源整合等问题,是当前我国基层社会治理的一个重要问题。北京市海淀区学院路街道通过区域化党建引领基层治理创新,建构了一个由党组织引领、统筹的基层治理组织间网络,其单位社区的再组织化过程就是一个基层治理网络重构的过程。借助网络分析框架,考察学院路街道的基层治理创新实践,尝试揭示转型社会中单位社区再组织化的动态过程,以丰富学界对基层治理网络及其建构过程的认识。     

When Are Agenda Setters Valuable?

Why do industries donate money to legislative campaigns when roll‐call votes suggest that donors gain nothing in return? I argue that corporate donors may shape policy outcomes by influencing powerful agenda setters in the early stages of lawmaking. On the basis of a new data set of more than 45,000 individual state legislator sessions (1988–2012), I document how agenda control is deemed valuable to legislators and groups seeking influence on policy. Employing a difference‐in‐differences design, I assess the revealed price, as measured by campaign contributions, that firms are willing to pay for access to committee and party leaders and document how this price varies across industries and institutions. The results indicate that industries systematically funnel money to the legislative agenda setters by whom they are regulated, and to those endowed with important procedural powers. I document that the value of agenda‐setter positions has increased dramatically in recent years. Finally, exploiting changes in state laws, I show that relaxing contribution limits significantly benefits committee chairs and party leaders more so than it does other legislators, suggesting that agenda setters have strong incentives to obstruct restrictive campaign finance reforms.     

Legislative committees as loyalty-generating institutions

The current debate over models of self-selection in Congress — whether Congressmen by-and-large find themselves on committees which most closely correspond to their constituents' interests — has implications for theories of Congressional organization. Building on recent findings which question a categorical self-selection process, in this paper we present a theory of committee function based on loyalty to party leaders. As a rationale for leadership privilege, and to provide context for our argument, we first present a theoretical framework based on a modified model of cooperation. We then focus on certain specifics of our leadership theory; that rank-and-file members vote leadership interests in exchange for leader support in gaining choice committee assignments and aid in passing legislation. This leads to predictions about voting patterns across committees. Static tests of these relations are performed, as well as those incorporating changes in voting patterns with seniority.     

提升乡村治理绩效的系统思考

提升乡村治理的制度绩效是一项涉及到理念、制度和结构的系统工程,主要包括:改变传统的对立型的国家与社会关系,以先进的"强国家-强社会"互强型国家与社会关系理念来指导乡村治理;改进和完善国家法律法规、省级地方法规、各级地方性执法规定以及村级规约,提高相关制度设计的质量和水平;优化乡村治理的结构,主要着眼点在于规范两委关系、乡村关系,提高村委会选举的质量,拓展村民代表会议的功能等.     

乡村混混的历史转向

本文从年轻人愿意当混混的主要原因、主要活动场域、使用暴力的方式、组织化程度、与村庄政治的关系等几个方面入手,考察了混混自1980年代初在乡村社会重新出现到当下这个时间段内所发生的历史转向。     

Going once, going twice, sold! The committee assignment process as an all-pay auction

I analyze the committee assignment process as an all-pay auction and derive equilibrium lobbying strategies of legislators competing for vacant seats on a committee. The model illustrates the relationship between sincere and revealed preferences, which earlier formal models of committee assignment do not explicitly consider. Incorporating seniority, party loyalty, effort constraints, or committee transfers can discourage those who highly value the assignment from competitively lobbying for the seat. I also offer an alternative interpretation of the model’s parameters to consider the pure partisan assignment model, where efforts are contributions to the party’s collective good.     

Why do only some people who support parties actually join them? Evidence from Britain

What makes people join a political party is one of the most commonly studied questions in research on party members. Nearly all this research, however, is based on talking to people who have actually joined parties. This article simultaneously analyses surveys of members of political parties in Britain and surveys of non-member supporters of those same parties. This uniquely enables us to model the decision to join parties. The results suggest that most of the elements that constitute the influential ‘General Incentives Model’ are significant. But it also reveals that, while party supporters imagine that selective benefits, social norms and opposing rival parties’ policies are key factors in members’ decisions to join a party, those who actually do so are more likely to say they are motivated by attachments to their party’s values, policies and leaders, as well as by an altruistic desire to support democracy more generally.     

Legislator Success in Committee: Gatekeeping Authority and the Loss of Majority Control

In multiparty legislatures, the largest party or coalition may fall short of controlling a majority of plenary seats. However, plurality‐led congresses generally endow the largest parties with extensive agenda‐setting prerogatives, even when plenary majorities are lacking. In this article, we present a model and compelling evidence describing changes in the strategic behavior of committee chairs when majority control is lost. Using a dataset that includes all the bills proposed to the Argentine House in the last 25 years, we estimate success in committee in majority‐ and plurality‐led congresses. We provide extensive evidence that the loss of majority control reduces the importance of the median voter of the plurality party while improving the success of the median committee voter.     

Exclusive Committee Assignments and Party Pressure in the U.S. House of Representatives

Most studies of committee agency in theU.S. House of Representatives consider theideological location of the committee’smedian with respect to some agent. Littlestudied, however, is the effect committeeagency may have on legislators seekingcommittee assignments. I show that whencommittees are agents to the party,legislators feel pressure to selectideological positions more proximate to theparty. They respond to this pressure byexhibiting voting behavior more similar tothe preferences of the party median. Committee assignments, then, are a means bywhich parties can influence the votingbehavior of their members.