SIDESTEPPING A QUAGMIRE: RUSSIA,SYRIA, AND THE LESSONS OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR

Russia's military intervention in Syria (2015-present) has ensured the Assad regime's survival to date. Why though has Russia succeeded in achieving its objective? This article provides an analysis of Russia's involvement in the Syrian civil war in comparison to the Soviet Union's military debacle in Afghanistan (1979-89). Accordingly, by avoiding the USSR's mistakes in Afghanistan, this article posits that Russia has not become entangled in a protracted conflict in Syria. In Syria, Russia has militarily intervened to buttress the Assad regime, not to reorganize the host government's leadership and assume control over the war effort. Meanwhile, Syrian opposition forces lack concerted international support and Russia has allies that are assisting the embattled Syrian government. Lastly, Russia intends to ‘freeze’ the Syrian civil war in place by (i) pressuring opposition forces to submit and other countries to re-embrace Damascus in a diplomatic forum, (ii) endorsing Syria's claim to sovereignty, and (iii) relying upon a small military presence to deter others from destabilizing Assad's rule.     

The relationship between Kenneth Koma and the Botswana Democratic Party, 1965-2003

This article assesses the weaknesses of opposition in Botswanathrough the case of Kenneth Koma, the influential Presidentof the Botswana National Front (BNF) from 1977 to 2001. Thisis done by examining the perception that from 1997 Koma's relationshipwith the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) destabilizedand weakened the opposition in the country. The article challengesa view, held by some of his detractors in the opposition, thathis leadership style was out of tune with global trends. Italso argues that what some people have viewed as ‘tribalism’— the domination of the BDP leadership by members of theBangwato tribe (of which Koma is also a member) — seemsto be primarily a matter of expediency. This alleged tribalismis used by Koma's critics as a smear. The article analyzes therelationship between Koma and the BDP at both political andpersonal levels. At the political level, Koma's failure to keepthe BNF united has been capitalized on by the BDP to tightenits grip on power. At the personal level, Koma has used hisconnections in the BDP to advantage in his business dealings.Koma's cult status and his personal and political choices havetherefore significantly contributed to de facto one-party rulein Botswana.     

'Liberation' or capture: Youth in between 'hakuma', and 'home' during civil war and its aftermath in Southern Sudan

Generational tension and youth crisis have been prominent themesin recent analyses of civil conflict in Africa. Field researchin Southern Sudan in 2004–2006 suggests that the analysisdoes not fit the Sudanese war. This article examines a structuralopposition between the sphere of military/government (the ‘hakuma’)and the sphere of ‘home’. It argues that to be a‘youth’ in Southern Sudan means to inhabit the tensionsof the space between these spheres. While attempting to resistcapture by either sphere, youth have used their recruitmentby the military to invest in their home or family sphere. Theiraspiration to ‘responsibility’ illustrates not generationalrebellion, but the moral continuity in local society, also evidentin discussions of marriage.     

ERRATA

The Editors regret that the following mistakes occurred in thetext of the article ‘The Great West African Drought, 1972–74’,by Jonathan Derrick, which appeared in the October 1977 numberof the journal. The main reason for these mistakes was a breakdownin communications between the editors and the author, whilethe article was being processed for publication. P. 540—line 36: The word ‘population’ shouldbe inserted after ‘West-Indian style’. P. 543—line 33: ‘1969–70’ should read‘1970–71’. P. 544—line 34: ‘Ivory Coast’ should read‘Upper Volta’. P. 546, Table: The Maiduguri figures are incorrect and shouldbe ignored (The author apologizes to the source of the statisticsfor this misquotation). P. 548—line 12: ‘eruption’ should read ‘irruption’. P. 564—note 69 refers to the sentence ‘In fact ...for tax’, not to the preceding sentence. P. 569—note 87: ‘Protection’ should be ‘Production’. P. 571—note 94 should be deleted. P. 582—line 34: ‘affected’ should be ‘effective’.      

Cote d'Ivoire: Patriotism, ethnonationalism and other African modes of self-writing

One of the key elements in the political-military struggle thathas wracked Côte d’Ivoire since 2002 has been the‘young patriots’ — youthful supporters ofPresident Laurent Gbagbo who claim to be struggling for thecountry’s ‘second independence’ from the formercolonial power, France. Many of them conceive of their strugglenot just as a political one but as a search for social affirmation.This article examines the politics of Ivorian ‘patriotic’youth in the light of Achille Mbembe’s influential ideason African modes of self-representation.     

Under the gaze of the 'big nations': Refugees, rumours and the international community in Tanzania

In most academic literature refugees are portrayed either asthose who lack what national citizens have or as a threat tothe national order of things. This article explores the effectsof being excluded in such a way, and argues that Burundian refugeesin a camp in northwest Tanzania find themselves in an ambiguousposition, being excluded from the national order of things —secluded in the Tanzanian bush — while simultaneouslybeing subject to state-of-the-art humanitarian interventions— apparently bringing them closer to the internationalcommunity. The article explores the ways in which refugees in the camprelate to the international community. Ambiguous perceptionsof the international community are expressed in rumours andconspiracy theories. These conspiracy theories create a kindof ontological surety by presenting the Hutu refugees as thevictims of a grand Tutsi plot supported by ‘the big nations’.Finally, the article argues that refugees — being excludedfrom the nation-state and being subject to the government ofinternational NGOs — seek recognition from the internationalcommunity rather than any nation-state. This does not, however,destabilize the hegemony of the nation-state, as refugees perceivetheir own position as temporary and the international communityas the guarantor of a more just international order in the longrun.     

FROM 'NATIONHOOD' TO REGIONALISM TO THE NORTH WEST PROVINCE: 'BOPHUTHATSWANANESS' AND THE BIRTH OF THE 'NEW' SOUTH AFRICA

Although majority rule has been achieved in South Africa, thefinal years of one ‘independent’ bantustan, namelyBophuthatswana, and their aftermath, illustrate the problemsof creating a unified identity. Ironically, in the death throesof apartheid, a Pandora's box of ethnic and regionalist claimswas opened. Although these claims were tied to the maintenanceof privileges gained by a tiny minority created through apartheidpolicy, Bophuthatswana had also been sustained by an ideologywhich, although at times highly contradictory, was also indicativeof the space given to twenty years of bantustan nation-building.This article provides a reinterpretation of these complex territoriesby showing how, in the 1990s, in the wake of fundamental politicalchanges in South Africa, the Bophuthatswana regime reshapedits nation-building discourse into a distinctive regionalistcoalition based upon socio-economic and ethnic criteria. Moreover,unlike previous approaches to the region, it shows how contestedterritorial claims were integral to this regionalist movement.Whilst the Bophuthatswana regime finally imploded and its regionalistcoalition was absorbed into South Africa's North West Province,the legacy of the bantustans for South Africa is replete withambiguity. In the post-apartheid era of transition to the NorthWest Province, some of these fault lines, termed ‘Bophuthatswananess’,are discussed. The continuing influence of their core of ‘Batswanaarbiters’ raises pertinent questions concerning the obstaclesto inclusive nation-building.     

The politics of ownership: Tanzanian coffee policy in the age of liberal reformism

In the last two decades, the twin processes of liberalizationand privatization have facilitated the ‘capturing’of key markets and assets by foreign interests in many Africancountries. This is being increasingly perceived in domesticconstituencies as a loss of national ownership and has promptedattempts by the state to defend the interests of ‘local’firms and businesspeople. These actions have often been portrayedin the literature as manoeuvres that — in the guise ofnationalism — are ultimately characterized by clientelisticand rent-seeking objectives. The analysis of coffee politicsand policy in Tanzania carried out in this article challengesthis interpretation. It shows that practices affecting the perceived(il)legitimacy of ‘foreign’ ownership of assetsand control of markets constitute elements of a ‘politicsof ownership’. This politics, although often sportingantiliberal features, does not question the essential natureof market reforms. Rather, it seeks to undermine the dominationof ‘foreign’ interests in key industries throughthe redefinition of the parameters of competition to the advantageof local actors.     

Loyalty,disloyalty, and semi-loyalty in Pakistan’s hybrid regime

The 2013 election in Pakistan was a significant point in a presumed transition from autocracy towards democracy, since for the first time an elected government completed a full term and was replaced by another freely elected government. Pakistan’s hybrid regime, however, continues to be threatened by a significant ‘disloyal opposition’, in the form of secessionists in Balochistan and jihadi Islamists of the Tehrik-e-Taliban (the so-called Pakistan Taliban). Drawing on the literature on hybrid regimes, and using Juan Linz’s framework that focused on both ‘disloyal’ and ‘semi-loyal’ oppositions to democratic rule, this article examines the threat to a continuing movement towards democracy posed by secessionists, Islamists, and the military.     

Mauritania, August 2005: Justice and democracy, or just another coup?

A military coup abruptly ended Ould Taya’s authoritarianregime in Mauritania, one of the longest-running regimes inWest Africa. The bloodless coup broke a dangerous politicalimpasse and stopped what seemed to be a slide towards breakdownand violence. Using the democratization literature, this articleexplains its root causes and evaluates the prospects for theestablishment of a genuine democracy after two decades of arepressive military and then quasi-military regime. It arguesthat several variables combined to seal the regime’s fate.These are essentially the deeply flawed, tribally based, make-believedemocracy, Ould Taya’s own troubled personality, and finally,the security apparatus’s withdrawal of its backing. Thearticle also argues that the new military junta’s firstdecisions appear encouraging enough but that its determinationto keep a tight control over the transition process and avoidthe fundamental aspects of Mauritania’s malaise may jeopardizegenuine long-term democratization. ^1. Julius O. Ihonvbere, ‘A balance sheet of Africa’stransition to democratic governance’, in John Mbaku andJulius O. Ihonvbere (eds), The Transition to Democratic Governancein Africa (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003), p. 51. ^2. On Mali, see Zeric K. Smith, ‘Mali’s decade of democracy’,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), pp. 73–9; for the Ivorianexperiment under General Guéï, see Boubacar N’Diaye,‘Not a miracle after all ... Côte d’Ivoire’sdownfall: flawed civil-military relations and missed opportunities’,Scientia Militaria 33, 1 (2005), pp. 89–118. ^3. Alfred Stepan, ‘Paths toward redemocratisation: theoreticaland comparative considerations’, in Guillermo O’Donnell,Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule (The Johns Hopkins University Press,Baltimore, MD, 1988), pp. 64–84. ^4. One of the very few Anglophone specialists on Mauritania, AnthonyPazzanita, thought that the prospects for democracy for Mauritaniaafter 1992 were ‘bright’, but apparently never revisitedthe issue. See Anthony Pazzanita, ‘The origin and evolutionof Mauritania’s second republic’, Journal of ModernAfrican Studies 34, 4 (1996), pp. 575–96. ^5. For an authoritative discussion of the subject, see PhilippeMarchesin, Tribus, ethnies et pouvoir en Mauritanie (Khartala,Paris, 1992). ^6. See Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, ‘Des voix dans le désert:sur les élections de l’ère pluraliste’,Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 31–9. ^7. There are no official statistics on the ethno-cultural make-upof the country. At independence, it was assumed that the Beydane(including the Haratines) made up 75 percent of the population.However, in the late 1970s, the government kept under seal theresults of the national census, prompting allegations that thiswas done to conceal the demographic shift in favour of blacks,who have a higher birth rate. Unspoken quotas seem to stilluse 75:25 percent of Beydane and Negro-Mauritanians, respectively.However, there is a growing consensus that the general breakdowngiven here, although a rough estimate, is closest to the demographicreality of Mauritania today. ^8. ‘El Hor’ means freeman. It is a semi-recognizedpolitical movement set up by the Haratine elites to fight themanifestations and legacy of slavery. SOS-Esclaves is (untilrecently non-recognized) a human rights organization set upto monitor the issue of slavery and assist slaves to attainfreedom. ^9. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, Mauritania’s Campaign ofTerror: State sponsored repression of black Africans (HumanRights Watch, New York, 1994); Janet Fleishman, ‘Ethniccleansing’, Africa Report 39 (1994), p. 45. ^10. The chairman of the junta has publicly stated that the fearof a complete breakdown of the state is what prompted the militaryto act. As I argue, other less lofty considerations, such aspersonal survival, cannot be discounted. ^11. The International Crisis Group, in particular, issued a reportthat exposed Ould Taya’s attempts to delegitimize thelegal opposition, including moderate Islamists, by assimilatingthem to fundamentalist terrorists, warning that the whole schemecould very well backfire. See International Crisis Group, L’Islamismeen Afrique du nord IV: Contestation islamiste en Mauritanie:Menace ou bouc émissaire? (Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afriquedu Nord No. 41, Brussels, 2005). ^12. After his November 2003 electoral victory, which the US governmentmust have known to be fraudulent, he received a glowing messageof congratulations from President Bush. This support to oneof the most repressive regimes in West Africa was bitterly resentedby many democratic activists. Initially, the Bush administrationwas the only government to demand the return of Ould Taya topower, who was called, in the early hours of the coup, by theUS ambassador in Nouakchott, as the US State Department dailybriefings of 4 August 2005 indicate. ^13. The chairman of the military council made this statement threedays after the coup when he addressed the assembled leadersof political parties. For the text of the statement, see http://ufpweb.org/transition/ce385/interv/alloc_eli.htm,4 December 2006. ^14. Author’s interviews with Mohamed Vall Ould Oumere, editorialdirector of La Tribune, Nouackchott, May 2004. ^15. Mahamadou Sy, L’enfer d’inal (L’Harmattan,Paris, 2000). ^16. The best-known members of this financial and political network:Ahmed Ould Taya (Ould Taya’s brother), Abdallahi OuldNoueguet, Sejad Ould Abeidna (both Smasside), Mohamed Ould Bouamattou(an Oulad Bousbaa), and Abdou Ould Maham (an Idewaali). ^17. See Africa Research Bulletin (15 November 1987), p. 8674. ^18. See Philippe Marchesin, ‘Origine et évolution despartis et groupes politiques’, Politique Africaine 55(1994), p. 27. ^19. Stepan, ‘Paths’, p. 76. ^20. See ‘Petit coup d’Etat entre amis’, La Lettredu Continent (Paris), 25 August 2005. ^21. Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Mauritania’s stalled democratisation’,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), p. 93. ^22. Peter Da Costa, ‘Democracy in doubt’, Africa Report37, 3 (1992), p. 60. ^23. Boubacar N’Diaye, Abdoulaye Saine, and Matturin Houngnikpo,‘Not Yet Democracy’: West Africa’s slow farewellto authoritarianism (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC, 2005),pp. 107–37. ^24. Cedric Jourde, ‘"The President is coming to visit!" Dramasand the hijack of democratisation in the Islamic Republic ofMauritania’, Comparative Politics 38 (2005), pp. 421–40. ^25. Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘The effect of Mauritania’s"human rights deficit": the case against "to forgive and forget"’,African Journal of Policy Studies 8, 1 (2002), pp. 17–35. ^26. N’Diaye et al., ‘Not Yet’, p. 193. ^27. The coup leaders made a point to signal the transitory natureof military regime and their willingness to usher in a politicalsystem that was completely different from the one they overthrew.See ‘Nouakchott calm, but new "colonels’ regime"faces outside political pressure’ (http://journals.aol.com/mfg917/Lilithharp17/entries/2378,5 April 2006). ^28. Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The rise of semi-authoritarianism(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC,2003), pp. 3–27. Up to August 2005, Mauritania seemedto fit approximately Ottaway’s ’semi-authoritarianismof decay’ category, pp. 21–3. ^29. William Case, ‘New uncertainties for an old pseudo-democracy’,Comparative Politics 37, 1 (2004), pp. 83–104. ^30. N’Diaye et al., ‘Not Yet’, pp. 122–6. ^31. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa:Prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant (University of CaliforniaPress, Berkeley, 1982). ^32. Jennifer Widner, ‘Two leadership styles and patterns ofpolitical liberalisation’, African Studies Review 37,1 (1994), pp. 151–74; Larry Diamond, ‘Beyond authoritarianism:strategies for democratisation’, in Brad Roberts (ed.),The New Democracies, Global Change and U.S. Policy (MIT Press,Cambridge, MA, 1995); also Juan J. Linz, ‘Crisis, breakdownand re-equilibration’, in Juan Linz and A. Stepan (eds),The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, Baltimore, MD, 1978), pp. 4–5. ^33. Mohamed Nassirou Athie, ‘Il y a onze ans, le 16 mars’,Al Beyane 14 (1996), p. 8. ^34. Since the 1978 coup, there has been a proliferation of Arabnationalist groups in the Mauritanian army. See Anthony Pazzanita,‘Mauritania’s foreign policy: in search of protection’,Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 3 (1992), pp. 288–300.For example, the military council’s No. 2, Mohamed OuldAbdel Aziz, is said to be one of the leaders of the Nasseristmovement, a pan-Arab nationalist group. ^35. See for example, Mohamed Fall Ould Oumère, ‘Ilévite le face à face’, Al Beyane 5 (1992),p. 1. ^36. Habib Ould Mahfoudh, ‘La tension’, Al Beyane 6 (1992)(Supplement), p. 2. ^37. Ibid, p. 1; see also François Soudan, ‘MaaouiyaOuld Taya: "Le Sénégal nous veut du mal"’,Jeune Afrique 1513 (1990), pp. 34–7. ^38. Pierre-Robert Baudel, ‘La Mauritanie dans l’ordreinternational’, Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 11–19. ^39. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,‘Report of the Chairperson of the commission on the situationin the Islamic Republic of Mauritania’ (African Union,Addis Ababa, 8 September 2005), p. 7. ^40. Ibid, p. 10. ^41. N‘Diaye, ‘Not a miracle’, p. 105. ^42. Stepan, ‘Paths’, pp. 77–8. ^43. See Amnesty International, ‘Mauritania: a future freeof slavery?’, 17 November 2002 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engAFR380032002!Open,17 August 2005). ^44. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005 (The World Bank,Washington, DC, 2005), p. 23. ^45. According to the same World Bank report (Ibid, p. 73), in 2000,the top 10 percent of Mauritanians enjoyed nearly 30 percentof national ‘income or consumption’, whereas thelowest 30 percent share less than 9 percent. ^46. Moussa Diop, ‘Quand Ely se fâche, les fauteuilstremblent!’, L’éveil-hebdo 613 (2005), pp.1, 3. ^47. The IMF statement is available at http://www.imf.org/external/country/mrt/index.htm,10 January 2005. ^48. See Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi (eds), Security Sector Governancein Africa: A handbook (Centre for Democracy and Development,Lagos, 2004). ^49. For a population of less than three million, Mauritania hasnearly twice the number of men in the security forces as eitherMali or Senegal. The population of each of these states is atleast three times that of Mauritania. See International Institutefor Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002–2003(International Strategic Studies, London, 2002), pp. 207–11. ^50. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertaindemocracies (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,MD, 1989), p. 66. ^51. The UN Office for West Africa has finally identified this situationas a major cause of coups and instability in the sub-region.The author has collaborated in the drafting of a report to callattention to this issue and how to address it. ^52. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,‘Report of the Chairperson’, pp. 10–11.     

Inadequately self-critical: Rwanda's self-assessment for the African peer review mechanism

During the first stage of the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD) peer review process, the country under reviewcompiles a report on the state of economic, political, social,and corporate governance in the country. This article examinesRwanda’s evaluation of its political governance duringthis first stage, as reflected in the January 2005 version ofthis country’s self-assessment report. After sketchingthe compromised political environment in which the report waswritten, it is indicated how this rosy report inadequately addressesa number of serious political problems in Rwanda, such as Rwanda’sinvolvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the inadequateseparation of powers in the Rwandan political system, tensionsin Rwandan society, and the flawed presidential and parliamentaryelections of 2003. While it remains to be seen to what extentRwanda either acknowledges its political problems in the finalversion of its self-assessment report, or is censured in thesubsequent stages of the peer review process, it is concludedthat the greater the failure to do either, the greater the doubtthat will linger over the value of the African peer-review exercise. ^1. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Memorandum of understanding on theAfrican Peer Review Mechanism’ (http://www.nepad.org,17 July, 2005). ^2. P. Chabal, ‘The quest for good government and developmentin Africa: is NEPAD the answer?’ International Affairs78, 3 (2002), pp. 447–62; I. Taylor, NEPAD: Towards Africa’sdevelopment or another false start? (Lynne Rienner, Boulder,CO, 2005). ^3. See Taylor, NEPAD, pp. 15–44. ^4. On this problem, see ibid, pp. 61–74. ^5. M. Katzenellenbogen and W. Hartley, ‘No political peerreview, says Mbeki’, Business Day, 31 October, 2002. ^6. T. Mbeki, ‘Critics ill-informed about NEPAD peer review’,ANC Official Home Page (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at45.htm,27 July, 2005). ^7. Ibid. ^8. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, Rwanda Country Self-Assessment Reportfor the African Peer Review Mechanism (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat,Kigali, 2005). The 230-page report consists of an introduction,followed by four chapters, each addressing one of the thematicareas set out in the questionnaire. ^9. On Kigali’s ‘official line’, see J. Pottier,Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, survival and disinformation inthe late twentieth century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2002). ^10. During the second stage of the peer review process, the countryvisit by the Country Review Team, this team’s ‘priorityorder of business will be to carry out the widest possible rangeof consultations with the Government, officials, political parties,parliamentarians and representatives of civil society organizationsincluding the media, academia, trade unions, business and professionalbodies’: NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines for countriesto prepare for and to participate in the African Peer ReviewMechanism (APRM)’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm/aprmguidelinesforcountryreview200104final.pdf,27 July, 2005). Never mind that ‘representatives of civilsociety organizations’ in Rwanda tend to be not all thatindependent from the government, the NEPAD documents make nomention of possible consultations with embassy staff, the UNand its agencies, international financial instutions, internationalchurch groups and international NGOs — groups that wouldbe able to broaden the perspectives of the Country Review Team. ^11. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration on democracy, political,economic, and corporate governance’, NEPAD Official HomePage (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/2.pdf, 15 July,2005). ^12. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism(APRM) base document’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf,22 July, 2005). ^13. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines’. ^14. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment for the AfricanPeer Review Mechanism’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/156.pdf,24 January, 2005). ^15. Ibid. ^16. Ibid. ^17. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM base document’. ^18. According to Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM NationalCommission’, Rwanda NEPAD Magazine 1 (2004), pp. 14–16. ^19. Ibid, p. 14. ^20. NEPAD Secretariat, Final Report: African Peer Review Mechanismcountry support mission to Rwanda, 21–June 24, 2004 (NEPADSecratariat, Midrand, 2004), p. 4. ^21. Ibid. ^22. On the extent of presidential and senatorial appointments, seeGovernment of Rwanda, The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda(Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Kigali, 2003),Articles 88 and 113. ^23. In May 2003, Pro-Femmes sided with the government and attackedHuman Rights Watch for being ‘divisive’: UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2003’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27744.htm,27 January, 2005). ^24. They were Aimable Kabanda (African Peer Review Focal Point,Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat), Alex Semarintoya (Ministry of LocalGovernment), Solange Tuyisenge (Member of the National Assembly)and James Ngango (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). ^25. US Department of State, ‘Country Report 2003’; UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2004’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41621.htm,23 July, 2005). ^26. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: human rights organizationforced to close down’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470012005,22 January, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: preparingfor elections: tightening control in the name of unity’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503.bck.htm,9 February, 2005). ^27. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration’, op. cit. ^28. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué: The African PeerReview (APRM) support mission to Rwanda’, Southern AfricanRegional Poverty Network Official Home Page (http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000845/P958-Rwanda_APRM.pdf,31 July, 2005). ^29. Nepad Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^30. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 26. ^31. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: observing the rules ofwar?’ Human Rights Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/rwanda2,15 February, 2005). ^32. See Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:killing human decency’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620072000,9 February, 2005); Amnesty International, ‘DemocraticRepublic of Congo: Rwandese-controlled east: devastating humantoll’, Amnesty International Official Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620112001,19 July, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Observing the rulesof war?’ ^33. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo:"Our brothers who help kill us" — economic exploitationand human rights abuses in the east’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620102003,19 July, 2005). ^34. T. Longman, ‘The complex reasons for Rwanda’s engagementin Congo’, in J.F. Clark (ed.), The African Stakes ofthe Congo War (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002), p. 136. ^35. Government of Rwanda, ‘Reply to the final report (documentS/2002/1146) of the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitationof natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo’ (http://www.afrol.com/Countries/Rwanda/documents/reply_un_resources_2002.htm,15 June, 2005). ^36. Amnesty International, ‘Our brothers who help kill us’. ^37. United Nations, ‘Final report of the panel of expertson the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other formsof wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UnitedNations in Denmark Official Home Page (http://www.un.dk/doc/S20021146.pdf,10 February, 2005). See also Amnesty International, ‘Ourbrother who help kill us’. ^38. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^39. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:Arming the east’, Amnesty International Official HomePage (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620062005,14 July, 2005). ^40. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 25. ^41. Amnesty International, ‘Arming the East’. ^42. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^43. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 36. ^44. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^45. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’; USDepartment of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^46. F. Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide todictatorship’, African Affairs 103, 411 (2004), p. 187. ^47. Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, p. 9. ^48. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^49. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^50. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^51. National Electoral Commission, ‘Executive summaries ofNational Electoral Commission reports on the constitutionalreferendum, presidential and parliamentary elections’,National Electoral Commission of Rwanda Offical Home Page (http://www.comelena.gov.rw/english/resumeelection2003.html,18 July, 2005). ^52. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^53. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^54. European Union Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report2003’, EU Official Home Page (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/rwanda/moe_ue_final_2003.pdf,25 July, 2005). ^55. During the presidential elections (August 2003), the incumbent,Paul Kagame, won 95 percent of the vote, while his party, theRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), won 74 percent of the vote inthe parliamentary elections (September 2003). ^57. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: government slams dooron political life and civil society’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470122004,22 January, 2005); US Department of State, ‘Country report2003’. ^56. The US Department of State referred to the 2003 presidentialelections as ‘seriously marred’: US Department ofState, ‘Country report 2003’. ^58. Amnesty International, ‘Government slams door’;Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: run-up to presidentialelections marred by threats and harassment’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470102003,22 January, 2005); I. Samset and O. Dalby, ‘Rwanda: presidentialand parliamentary elections 2003’, Norwegian Centre forHuman Rights Official Home Page (http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2003/12.pdf,28 February, 2005). ^59. Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: resolve disappearances, assassination’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/05/04/rwanda133.htm,9 February, 2005). ^60. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: deeper into the abyss— waging war on civil society’ Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470132004,22 January 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^61. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^62. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^63. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^64. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^65. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report 2003’. ^66. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^67. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^68. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report’. ^69. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^70. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^71. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^72. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’, emphasisadded. ^73. Amnesty International, ‘Devastating human toll’(http://web.amnesty.org, 19 July, 2005). ^74. As had happened during the previous year, as during 2004 Rwanda’sjudiciary ‘was subject to presidential influence’:US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^75. N. van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of PermanentCrisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge University Press, 2001),p. 51. ^76. On this tension, see Chabal, ‘Good government and developmentin Africa’; Taylor, NEPAD. ^77. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué issued at the endof the third summit of the Committee of Participating Headsof State and Government in the African Peer Review Mechanism(APR Forum), 19 June, 2005, Abuja, Nigeria’, Institutefor Security Studies Official Home Page (http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/nepad/aprm/comsum3jun05.pdf,28 July, 2005).     

BETWIXT AND BETWEEN: 'TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY' AND DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION IN POST-WAR MOZAMBIQUE

The end of civil war in Mozambique has been accompanied by democratizationof political processes, as exemplified by the 1994 multi-partypresidential and parliamentary elections. Under the rubric ofdemocratization, the issue of state decentralization has alsobeen raised. Current political debates focus on what role ‘traditionalauthority’ might play in local governance. Advocates arguethat ‘traditional authority’ constitutes a genuinelyAfrican form of local governance, while detractors suggest thatthese institutions were irrevocably corrupted by their involvementwith the colonial administration. This article challenges notonly the black-and-white framework in which the present-day‘legitimacy’ of ‘traditional authority’has been debated, but also questions the value of the term ‘traditionalauthority’ itself. The article explores the diverse historiesof kin-based political institutions in Mozambique, arguing thatthe meaning and function of ‘traditional authority’has been transformed many times over with changes in the largerpolitical contexts in which local institutions have existed.As a result of historical events, the issue of ‘traditionalauthority’ is, today, intimately bound up with the dividebetween the ruling FRELIMO party and the opposition, RENAMO.Only by approaching the issue of ‘traditional authority’through an understanding of its variegated and contentious historywill policy-makers and Mozambican residents alike be able totranscend existing political divides on issues of local governance.     

Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan

This paper examines the consolidation and maintenance of hegemonic authoritarianism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Hegemonic regimes are characterized by their nearly total lack of political competition. Despite the presence of opposition parties and regular elections, the incumbent in these cases is reelected with 70% or more of the vote. What does it take to sustain overwhelming margins of victory in regular elections in the face of institutionalized opposition? Previous studies have suggested that either violent repression or institutionalized co-optation of opposition groups is central to securing long-term hegemonic regime stability. These mechanisms explain how rulers forestall potential opposition. Upon coming to power in 1993, however, Heydar Aliyev – like many post-Soviet leaders – inherited a genuine, existing opposition in the Popular Front movement. I suggest that in the presence of an intractable opposition, Azerbaijan's rulers have taken a different approach with regard to regime maintenance. Drawing on over 50 original interviews conducted during 6 months of field research, I identify the mechanisms by which the government has “hidden the opposition in plain sight” by making it effectively difficult for existing opposition groups to function as credible political parties. Since the mid-1990s, the Aliyev regime has used informal measures to prevent these groups from aggregating and articulating the diverse interests present in society from visibly competing in elections and from serving effectively in government to craft and implement policy. These practices have rendered the opposition technically legal, but completely ineffective. Besides weakening the opposition, these measures produce a series of mutually reinforcing effects – including noncompetitive elections by default and a politically disengaged society – that sustain long-term regime stability. The paper concludes by examining this argument in comparative perspective. Hegemonic regimes have proliferated in the post-Soviet region, and I suggest that this strategy is an important factor in sustaining many of these regimes.     

Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: the new order no one ordered

For almost 18 years, the so-called ‘Lord’s ResistanceArmy’ (LRA) has waged war on the Ugandan government andits own people, the Acholi. The robustness of the conflict indicatesthat the forces working against peace outstrip those workingfor it. Analysis of the conflict is often reduced to describingthe LRA rebellion as the handiwork of a religious fanatic. However,the social disorder that the National Resistance Movement, ledby current President Museveni, inherited in 1986 after the downfallof the Acholi-led Okello regime, contained the root causes forcontinued insurgency. These were amplified by external circumstancesthat created the operational leeway for rebellion, gatheringforce in the absence of a credible Acholi political leadership.A deliverance couched in religious discourse resolved the quandary.The emergence and transformation of the LRA can be made comprehensibleonly in relation, or even in opposition, to the emergence anddownfall of the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) as a radicalstructure of rejection. Millenarian religious justificationcontextualizes violence and the use of terror as a means ofimmobilization and control of the population. As the characterand composition of the LRA evolved to include the kidnappingof children, and as the terror escalated, the insurgency becameincreasingly ensnared in a web of internal contradictions. Theresult is that the LRA has exacerbated the process of dehumanizationthe HSMF first set out to counter.     

Reasons for sub-Saharan Africa's development deficit that the commission for Africa did not consider

Despite a substantial amount of aid (much larger in per capitaterms than provided to any other region), sub-Saharan Africancountries, with very few exceptions, have regressed since independence.The general history of Africa since achieving independence hasbeen one of development failure. Some protagonists point tosigns of change that argue for more aid. This article suggeststhat aid to Africa has not worked because human, social andinstitutional capital — not financial capital —poses the binding constraint. In that context, doubling aidto Africa from $23 billion in 2004 to $50 billion annually by2015 seems a questionable proposition. This commentary suggestsunconventional ways of dealing with the problems involved inimporting the essential ingredients that Africa needs. It concludeswith the observation that the aid community’s currentobsession with poverty reduction and the Millennium DevelopmentGoals (MDGs) may be harming rather than helping the cause ofdevelopment in Africa and argues that the focus on growth anddevelopment should be restored.     

RECONSTRUCTING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE COLLAPSE OF DEMOCRACY IN GHANA, 1979-81

This article attempts to contribute to an understanding of thechallenges involved in trying to bring military and securityagencies under constitutional rule in new democracies by analysingthe case of the Limann regime and the failed democratic transitionin Ghana in 1979–81. In the aftermath of democratizationin 1979 the civilian government made aggressive (and not alwaysdiplomatic) efforts to bring the armed forces under its control.In this instance both the civil government and the militarycommand were threatened by the possibility of a coup from belowand were anxious to prevent it. The analysis tries to answerthe question of why the government and the military commandfailed to make common cause, examining first the conflict betweencivilian officials and the military high command over jurisdictionaland other issues, and then between the security agencies themselvesthat provided the opening for the overthrow once again of democracy.The coup itself was the result of the double crisis of civiland military authority. The institutional arrangements throughwhich civil command has been exercised are examined; it is arguedthat civil control of the military in independent Ghana hashistorically been a myth, and that the existence of a civilianregime does not necessarily suggest civil control of the military.     

A fissure in ‘unanimous democracy’: parliamentary contestations over property rights on land in early Republican Turkey

The parliamentary politics of Turkey's one-party regime (1925–1946) has been described as a ‘unanimous democracy’, particularly on account of the absence of a voting opposition. Many scholars consider the Law for Providing Land to Farmers of 1945 as the first instance of parliamentary opposition in the one-party legislature. The current article challenges this widespread view and argues that property rights on land tended to provoke backlashes even before 1945. It examines the making of the deportation, land distribution and settlement laws of the 1920s and 1930s, all of which sanctioned intervention into property relations on land in the form of the expropriation of landowners. Going beyond an exclusive focus on voting patterns, this article traces parliamentary resistance by examining how government bills changed as they proceeded through both the reviewing committees and the general assembly. It links the birth of a full-fledged parliamentary opposition in 1945 to the previous waves of discontent and shows that property rights on land was a constant fissure in the early Republic's unanimous democracy.     

The oil boom in Equatorial Guinea

In less than a decade, Equatorial Guinea has transformed itselffrom an African backwater into one of the world’s fastestgrowing economies and a sought-after political partner in theGulf of Guinea. The sole reason for this transformation hasbeen the discovery of oil and gas. This article outlines therise of Equatorial Guinea as one of Africa’s leading oilproducingcountries and investigates the political, economic and socialeffects of becoming a petro-state. The article is based on theauthor’s field research in Equatorial Guinea in the autumnof 2003 and interviews with senior oil company staff, governmentofficials and staff of international organizations as well assecondary sources. This research demonstrates how reliance onoil and gas exports can lead to profound changes in a country’spolitical economy.     

The politics and ethnography of environmentalisms in Tanzania

This article explores the forms of environmentalism flourishingin Tanzanian villages and district and central government. Itargues that their apparent unity should be explained by severalfactors. In central government, there is support for environmentalistpolicies because they generate revenue. In local government,environmentalism diverts attention away from bureaucratic failure,while simultaneously being the subject of intense politickingamong the legislature. In villages, environmentalism reflectsrealities of environmental change, different ecologies of agriculturalactivity, competition and jealousy and the manipulation of officialdiscourse. This article highlights the diversity of sourcesof environmentalist prominence in different sites of politicalactivity. ^1. The word used for ‘waste’ is translated from theSwahili: ‘jangwa’. It is also translated as ‘desert’but can be used in a wide variety of contexts and scales. Ihave heard it used to describe small patches of land, and itis also the name for the Sahara. It can be used in both aridlowlands and humid mountains [cf. C. Conte, ‘The forestbecomes a desert: forest use and environmental change in Tanzania’sWest Usambara mountains’, Land Degradation and Development10 (1999), pp. 291–309]. I prefer the term ‘waste’because its central notion is lack of productivity, rather thanaridity. ^2. <http://www.ippmedia.com> Accessed on 18 October 2002. ^3. Cf. O. B. Rekdal, ‘When hypothesis becomes myth: the Iraqiorigin of the Iraqw’, Ethnology 37, 1 (1998), pp. 17–38. ^4. R. Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial expansion, tropical islandEdens and the origins of environmentalism (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 1995); J. Fairhead and M. Leach, Misreadingthe African Landscape (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1996); R. Neumann, Imposing Wilderness: Struggles over livelihoodand nature preservation in Africa (University of CaliforniaPress, Berkeley, CA, 1998); D. Brockington, Fortress Conservation:The preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania (JamesCurrey, Oxford, 2002). ^5. J. P. Brosius, ‘Analyses and interventions: Anthropologicalengagements with environmentalism’, Current Anthropology40, 3 (1999), pp 277–309. ^6. J.-F. Bayart, The State in Africa: The politics of the belly(Longman, London, 1993); J.-F. Bayart, S. Ellis, and B. Hibou,The Criminalisation of the State in Africa (James Currey, Oxford,1999); P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works (James Currey,Oxford, 1999). ^7. J. M. Klopp, ‘Pilfering the public: the problem of landgrabbing in contemporary Kenya’, Africa Today 47 (2000),pp. 7–28. ^8. The constituency building reached the British press. Cf. ‘Kenya’srulers clear way for drought and disaster by felling forestfor votes’, The Independent (London), 16 January 2002,p. 14. ^9. J. M. Klopp, ‘ "Ethnic clashes" and winning elections:the case of Kenya’s electoral despotism’, CanadianJournal of African Studies 35 (2001), pp. 473–517. ^10. P. Richards, Indigenous Agricultural Revolution: Ecology andfood production in West Africa (Allen and Unwin, Hemel Hempstead,UK, 1985); M. Leach and R. Mearns, The Lie of the Land: Challengingreceived wisdom on the African environment (James Currey, Oxford,1996). ^11. M. Leach and J. Fairhead, ‘Fashioned forest pasts, occludedhistories? International environmental analysis in West Africanlocales’, Development and Change 31 (2000), pp. 35–59. ^12. J. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’,depoliticisation and bureaucratic state power in Lesotho (CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1990). ^13. Cf. R. A. Schroeder, ‘Community, forestry and conditionalityin the Gambia’, Africa 69, 1 (1999), pp. 1–22. ^14. Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works. ^15. Klopp, ‘Pilfering the public’. ^16. E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The origin of the Black Act(Pantheon Books, New York, NY, 1975); J. Scott, Weapons of theWeak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance (Yale UniversityPress, New Haven, CT, 1985); B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, UnhappyValley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa (James Currey, London,1992). ^17. J. Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 1979). ^18. R. Willis, A State in the Making. Myth: history and social transformationin pre-colonial Ufipa (Indiana University Press, Bloomington,IN, 1981). ^19. See S. Charnley, ‘Communal resource use and migrationinto the Usangu plains, Tanzania’ (PhD thesis, StanfordUniversity, California, 1994); P. B. Coppolillo, ‘Thelandscape ecology of pastoral herding: spatial analysis of landuse and livestock production in East Africa’, Human Ecology28, 4 (2000), pp. 527–60; F. Cleaver, ‘Reinventinginstitutions: bricolage and the social embeddedness of naturalresource management’, European Journal of DevelopmentResearch 14, 2 (2002). ^20. J. Ford, The Role of Trypanosomiases in African Ecology: A studyof the tsetse fly problem (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971); J.Igoe and D. Brockington, ‘Pastoral land tenure and communityconservation: a case study from north-east Tanzania’,Pastoral Land Tenure Series 11 (IIED, London, 1999); J. G. Galaty‘Pastoral and agro-pastoral migration in Tanzania: factorsof economy, ecology and demography in cultural perspective’,in J. W. Bennett and J. R. Bowen (eds), Production and Autonomy:Anthropological studies and critiques of development (UniversityPress of America, Lanham, MD, 1988), pp. 163–83. ^21. E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The short twentieth century 1914–1991(Abacus, London, 1994), p. 236. In 1961, US military expenditurewas 9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP); and althoughit was to decline (just over 5 percent in the 1970s), it remaineda powerful trope for explaining US economy, society and politics.Indeed the military-industrial complex is still important nowwith the Cold War won and US military expenditure down to lessthan 4 percent of GDP. ^22. Tanzania Wildlife Sector Review Task Force, A Review of theWildlife Sector in Tanzania. Volume 1: Assessment of the currentsituation (Ministry of Tourism, Natural Resources and the Environment,Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1995). ^23. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, United Republicof Tanzania, Tourism Master Plan. Strategy & Actions, April2002 <http://www.tzonline.org/pdf/tourismmasterplan.pdf>Accessed on 9 November 2004. ^24. Brockington, Fortress Conservation. ^25. K. Hart, The Political Economy of West African Agriculture (CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1982). ^26. DANIDA, Overview of Donor Supported Environmental Activitiesin Tanzania (Royal Danish Embassy, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,1999). Spent in 1 year, this would be equivalent to just over4 percent of the country’s GDP. ^27. Leach and Fairhead, ‘Fashioned forest pasts’, pp.47–9. ^28. W. A. Rodgers, T. T. Struhsaker, and C. C. West, ‘Observationson the red colobus (Colobus badius tephrosceles) of Mbisi forest,Southwest Tanzania’, African Journal of Ecology 22 (1984),pp. 187-94. ^29. J. Igoe, ‘Ethnicity, civil society, and the Tanzanianpastoral NGO movement: the continuities and discontinuitiesof liberalized development’ (PhD thesis, Boston University,Boston, MA, 2000). ^30. Mr. Mbegu’s stance on the forest, and emphasis of theimportance of the red colobus monkey, encouraged villagers toname him Mr. Colobus. His name was unfortunately similar tothe Swahili for the black and white colobus. ^31. D. Brockington, ‘Communal property and degradation narratives:debating the Sukuma immigration into Rukwa Region, Tanzania’,Cahiers d’Afrique 20 (2001), pp. 1–22. ^32. Ibid. ^33. Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption, Reporton the Commission of Corruption (Dar es Salaam, United Republicof Tanzania, Tanzania, 1996). ^34. Brockington, ‘Communal property’; D. Brockington,‘Local government, taxation and natural resource management:corruption, accountability and democratic performance in Tanzania’,Development and Change, forthcoming. ^35. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine. ^36. I was unable to discuss the purpose of the visit and its causewith the representatives. However, the circumstances and languagedo suggest that villagers were exploiting government rhetoric.This explanation was favoured by people in the valley with whomI discussed the case. The result of their complaints was a largepublic meeting which unearthed many of the problems of governanceunderlying the grievances. See Brockington, ‘Communalproperty’. ^37. With good reason — the concentrating of dung in kraalsis sometimes referred to as ‘nutrient stripping’and forms an important part of the patch dynamics of semi-aridrangelands. ^38. One of the most lively contests in the village while I was therewas between two herders who had broken that agreement. ^39. This is a Sukuma innovation. Weeding parties I observed containedmixtures of residents and immigrants. ^40. Nicknamed Chuma (steel) because it was so tough. ^41. The importance of herd boy skill was underlined by the lamentof a (Fipa) herd owner whose herd boy was going to leave hisemployment and who had remarkably managed to guard his cattlefor 3 years without causing any case of crop damage. ^42. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft Oracles and Magic Among theAzande (OUP, Oxford, 1937), p. 82, 540; C. Geertz, Local Knowledge:Further essays in interpretive anthropology (Basic Books, NewYork, NY, 1983), p. 75. ^43. ‘Local knowledges’ here could cover a vast arrayof understandings and beliefs in all parts of the world. Ithas proven particularly productive to consider the incoherence,incompleteness and lack of co-ordination of Western knowledgesand certain areas of supposed expertise (R. Grove-White, ‘Newwine, old bottles? Personal reflections on the new BiotechnologyCommissions’, Political Quarterly 72 (2001), pp. 466–72). ^44. J. Fairhead and M. Leach, Science, Society and Power: Environmentalknowledge and policy in West Africa and the Caribbean (CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 2003). ^45. Leach and Fairhead ‘Fashioned forest pasts’, p.35. ^46. K. Milton, Loving Nature: Towards an ecology of emotion (Routledge,London, 2002). ^47. I am grateful to Dr. John Lonsdale for this point. ^48. It is indicative of the importance of environmental concernsin Tanzania that its value can be equated with that of development.I have heard a funeral peroration for a village chairman whichconcluded with the praise that he had tried hard to bring developmentand conserve the environment. ^49. As the manager of the Mkomazi Game Reserve of northern Tanzaniatold me in 1994, when justifying the eviction of herders fromthe reserve — we cannot have these people living out therelike animals, they must develop.