Economic security, 1935-85

The economic well-being of both working and retired persons has improved significantly since the Social Security Act was passed in 1935. More people are employed now than at any time since then, despite declining employment among the aged and more years of school attendance among the young. The ratio of non-workers to workers--a broad measure of dependency--is lower now than at any time since the 1930's. Social security has grown and matured to become a strong foundation of retirement income, and other work-related employee benefits have grown in tandem with social security. Employer contributions for social insurance and related employee benefits have grown from being about a 1-percent supplement to aggregate wages and salaries in 1929 to nearly 20 percent today. Social security and Medicare account for just over a fourth of employer contributions, while other public and private retirement systems represent just over another fourth. The balance of benefits for active workers includes group health and life insurance, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, temporary disability insurance, and related benefits. Pay for holidays, vacations, and sick leave is estimated to have increased from less than 1 percent of aggregate pay in 1929 to about 10 percent today. The improved economic status of the aged has been documented by a series of surveys beginning in 1941-42 and carried out from time to time until 1972 and biennially since 1976. The earlier surveys were supplemented with estimates from record data and tables from the Bureau of the Census. The income of the aged as a whole has grown by about 75 percent over the past 2 decades after taking inflation into account. The income of the aged as a whole grew faster than that of the nonaged in the 1970's and early 1980's when real social security benefits increased faster than inflation and wages lagged behind it. New beneficiaries in 1982 were in better health and were more likely to retire because they wanted to than was true of their counterparts in the early 1940's. Not only have benefits continued to be the main component of income of the aged as total incomes have grown, but also benefits have become much larger in relation to average earnings than used to be the case. Retired workers are much more likely now than in the early 1940's to have other pensions or income from assets to supplement benefits.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Worldwide trends and developments in social security, 1985-87

This article highlights major trends and developments in social security programs featured in the publication Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1987. Certain developments observable in industrialized countries, especially in Europe--continuing high unemployment levels, particularly among the young; growing numbers of long-term unemployed; and aging populations--tend to create financial instability in social security programs. Thus, as program costs continue to rise, the emphasis on cost-effective use of social security funds becomes more pronounced. In the period under review, this concern is reflected in the widening interest in mandated private pension supplementation of social security, as well as in measures to encourage employment. In developing countries, a strengthening of programs for families and, in some instances, a lowering of the retirement age are noted, in addition to a general expansion in the benefit structure of the work-injury program.     

Social security: a program and policy history

Many of the federal and state programs that provide income security to U.S. families have their roots in the Social Security Act (the Act) of 1935. This Act provided for unemployment insurance, old-age insurance, and means-tested welfare programs. The Great Depression was clearly a catalyst for the Social Security Act of 1935, and some of its provisions--notably the means-tested programs--were intended to offer immediate relief to families. However, the old-age insurance program-the precursor to today's Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, or Social Security, program-was not designed specifically to deal with the economic crisis of that era. Indeed, monthly benefit payments, under the original Act, were not scheduled to begin until 1942. In addition, from the beginning, the Social Security program has embodied social insurance principles that were widely discussed even before the onset of the Great Depression. The first four decades of the Social Security program were, in general, ones of expansion. In fact, the program was expanded even before it became truly operational. In 1939, amendments added child, spouse, and survivor benefits to the retirement benefits authorized by the 1935 Act. Those amendments also allowed for monthly benefits to begin in 1940. Although the program was not changed substantially during the war years and the initial postwar period, the 1950s were a transformational decade in the program's history: benefit amounts were increased substantially, coverage under the program became close to universal, and a new disability insurance benefit was offered. The 1960s witnessed additional growth in Social Security, but the most important development in social insurance occurred in health insurance, with the creation of the Medicare program in 1965. Legislative actions in the 1970s had profound effects on the Social Security program and, indeed, set the stage for many of today's reform debates. Large benefit increases, a new benefit formula that was erroneously generous, and other changes in the early 1970s created a situation in which annual program costs, as a share of gross domestic product, increased during a 12-year period from about 3 percent to 5 percent. In 1977, amendments to the Act corrected the flawed benefit formula and made other changes in the financing of the system to shore up the program. Thus, the 1970s represent a watershed in the program's history-program growth gave way to increasing concerns about the program's finances. Those concerns were reflected in the amendments to the Act in 1983, which were the last major changes to the program. These amendments, based largely on recommendations from a commission chaired by Alan Greenspan, adjusted benefits and taxes to address pressing near-term financing problems faced by the system. Although the Greenspan Commission focused to a large extent on short-range issues, the resulting reforms have generated large surpluses in the program and the buildup of a substantial trust fund. However, the looming retirement of the baby boomers and several other demographic factors will, according to projections, result in the exhaustion of the trust fund by 2042.     

The relationships between public and private pension schemes: an introductory overview

Only recently have social insurance and private pensions, collectively, come to be thought of in terms of a total social security benefit package. The economic problems brought on by the 1974 oil crisis initially triggered consideration of a common, integrated role for the two systems. The second oil crisis reinforced the relative expansion in private pension programs, as a supplement to social security. Before these events, private and public pension programs interacted in only a limited number of ways, confined to relatively few countries. These interactions were largely confined to collective bargaining, whereby private pensions were gradually extended to nearly all employees in France and Sweden; mandating, or legally requiring private supplementation of social security, debated in several countries in the early 1970's, but postponed by the 1974 oil crisis; and contracting out, or covering a part of the social security benefit under a private plan, as in the United Kingdom. Overall, the tradition of private pensions was not very strong or broadbased. The current debate centers on which public/private pension mix is desirable from the point of view of an old-age income-maintenance program. A new element is the rising support for a "third pillar"--individual tax-encouraged savings--not only as a supplement, but as an alternative to social insurance.     

TILTING TOWARD MARKETIZATION: Reform of the Canadian Pension Plan

Public concern about the earnings‐related Canada Pension Plan has forced the Canadian government to move toward fuller funding, a new investment policy, and changes to benefits and administration. Together, the three initiatives, and particularly the first two, amount to a modest degree of marketization. The assumption behind the reform is that the Canada Pension Plan will remain public and mandatory but the change will create a board and an investment policy which are more sensitive to market pressures and less amendable to government interference. The Canada Pension Plan is one of three tiers of support for the elderly in retirement. It is a contributory social insurance scheme which protects against loss of income. The other two are a social allowance (Old Age Security) as well as an income tested benefit (Guaranteed Income Supplement) which provide basic income support and employment based retirement pension plans as well as group and individual registered retirement savings plans which supplement the other two tiers on a voluntary basis. This article examines the reform of the Canada Pension Plan. After a brief examination of Canada's retirement benefits in an international context, the article summarizes recent debates in Canada, government policies to develop fuller funding and new investment strategies, and reflections on possible developments in the future.     

Characteristics of the longest job for new retired workers: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

This article describes the duration and type of employment, occupational and industrial classification, and pension coverage associated with the longest job ever held by new social security retired-worker beneficiaries and nonretired persons enrolled only for Medicare. The Medicare-only enrollees usually had their retired-worker benefits withheld because their earnings exceeded exempt amounts under the social security earnings test. They were more likely to be self-employed and to be in executive, administrative, managerial, or professional occupations. By contrast, new retired-worker beneficiaries closely resembled the general labor force with respect to occupation, industry, and employer type. Persons who claimed benefits before age 65 differed from older retirees in that they were more likely to be in service and blue-collar occupations and less likely to be self-employed. Both sexes increased their pension coverage between the late 1960's and the early 1980's. By the latter period, the majority of retired workers reported employee pension coverage and, of those covered, most received a monthly benefit. Fewer women than men indicated pension coverage. Married women who retired early were least likely to indicate pension coverage and, when covered, were more likely than other retirees to report the receipt of a lump sum payment in lieu of monthly payments.     

Worldwide trends and developments in social security, 1983-85

This article highlights the major developments and trends in social insurance programs that are presented in detail in the 1985 edition of Social Security Programs Throughout the World. The data in that reference book reflect the fact that as countries have adapted to the slow economic growth in recent years, increased emphasis has been placed on the cost effective use of social security funds. Some industrialized countries have restructured benefit provisions and reallocated resources among programs and beneficiaries to target benefits for specific groups. In the developing nations, the introduction of additional programs and expanded benefits continued on a limited scale amidst widespread concern about maintaining the real value of benefits after years of high inflation.     

Why triggers fail (and what to do about it): An examination of the unemployment insurance extended benefits program

During periods of high unemployment, many workers exhaust their unemployment insurance (UI) benefits before regaining employment. To help alleviate this problem, Congress created the extended benefits (EB) program, expanding the number of weeks of benefits available to UI recipients in high unemployment states. The EB program operates by “triggering on” additional weeks of benefits in states where unemployment and UI benefit receipt are above federally established thresholds. We analyze the performance of the EB program by creating a series of policy simulations using weekly UI claims and unemployment data from the program's inception in 1970 through the most recent economic expansion in 2005. Overall, we find that EB triggers, as currently constructed, fail as a policy tool for extending UI benefits. Minor adjustments to the triggers are unlikely to be effective. We develop an alternative set of “fix point” triggers that allow the EB program to trigger on and off in a more timely fashion. These triggers outperform all previously legislated triggers as well as other commonly proposed triggering mechanisms on criteria of timeliness, breadth, and duration. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Pension status of recently retired workers on their longest job: findings from the New Beneficiary Survey

Pension coverage among recently retired workers was greater in the early 1980's than it was a decade earlier. Workers whose longest job was with a private employer and women workers were among the groups that experienced the largest increases in coverage by a pension plan other than the social security program. Private pension plan coverage increased from 47 percent to 64 percent for men and from 21 percent to 39 percent for women. The key factors analyzed here include industry, occupation, length of employment, and earnings. Data from the New Beneficiary Survey reveal that a high proportion of covered workers received pension payments at retirement. Pension payments were received by 9 in 10 retirees covered by a government plan and by 3 in 4 retirees covered by a private industry plan on their longest job. In addition, lump-sum payments were received by 12 percent of the men and 21 percent of the women in private pension plans.     

The erosion of retiree health benefits and retirement behavior: implications for the disability insurance program

The effects of retiree health insurance on the decision to retire have not been examined until recently. It is an area of increasing significance because of rising health care costs for retirees, the uncertain future of Medicare, and increased life expectancy. In general, studies suggest that individual retirement decisions are strongly responsive to the availability of retiree health insurance. Early retiree benefits and retirement behavior are also important because they may affect the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program. It is not apparent that if a person loses retiree health benefits, or if fewer people are eligible for retiree health benefits in general, claims for DI will increase. The potential 2-year loss of health benefits may be a deterrent to leaving the labor force and claiming DI, although persons who are unable to work would leave the labor force even without health benefits. In order to understand how the decline in retiree health benefits may affect enrollment in DI, analysts must at least incorporate the role of coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). That act provides many people with access to health insurance during the 2-year gap between eligibility for DI and Medicare. In fact, persons with sufficient means to retire early could use the income from Disability Insurance to buy COBRA coverage during the first 2 years of DI coverage. Determining the effect of the erosion of retiree health benefits on DI must account properly for the role of other factors that affect DI eligibility and participation. The financial incentives of Social Security, pension plans, retirement savings programs, health status, the availability of health insurance, and other factors influencing retirement decisions must be taken fully into account in order to isolate the precise effect of retiree health benefits.     

Receipt of multiple benefits by disabled-worker beneficiaries

In 1971, 44 percent of workers who had been currently entitled to social security disability insurance (DI) benefits for 1 year or more also received benefits from at least one other source. Their average disability insurance benefit was higher than that of persons who received only DI benefits. On the average, total benefits to those receiving multiple benefits were double the amounts paid to those receiving only DI benefits. The combined benefits for the former produced median replacement rates about 50 percent larger than the median replacement rates for the latter. High replacement rates--defined here as more than 80 percent of predisability earnings replaced by benefit--predominate among those with multiple benefits. Considering replacement rates based solely on disability insurance benefits substantially understates the extent to which benefits from public and private programs actually replace predisability earnings. Replacement rates based solely on DI benefits are generally higher for those receiving DI benefits only than for persons receiving multiple benefits. Limiting DI benefits to the replacement rate from DI benefits alone is disadvantageous for persons who receive only DI benefits, compared with those who also receive other benefits.     

The evolution of Japanese employer-sponsored retirement plans

This article examines the development of Japanese voluntary employer-sponsored retirement plans with an emphasis on recent trends. Until 2001, companies in Japan offered retirement benefits as lump-sum severance payments and/or benefits from one of two types of defined benefit (DB) pension plans. One type of DB plan was based on the occupational pension model used in the United States before the adoption of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), but lacked the funding, vesting, and other protective features contained in ERISA. The other type of DB plan allowed companies to opt out of the earnings-related portion of social security, commonly referred to as "contracting out." Landmark laws passed in 2001 introduced a new generation of occupational retirement plans to employers and employees. One law increased funding requirements and enhanced employee protections for employer-sponsored DB plans, while a second law introduced defined contribution (DC) plans for several reasons, chiefly to increase retirement savings and help boost Japanese financial markets. These laws complemented earlier changes in the tax code and financial accounting standards already affecting employer-sponsored retirement plans. As a result, new retirement plan designs will replace most prereform era company retirement plans by 2012. In 2001, the experience of 401(k) plans in the United States, where 42 million participants had accumulated more than $1.8 trillion in assets over 20 years, attracted considerable attention among Japanese lawmakers finalizing provisions of the DC pension law. Even with government support and encouragement from the financial services industry, Japanese companies have not adopted these new DC plans in large numbers. As a result, occupational retirement plans in Japan have remained predominantly DB-a surprising development in light of the shift in a number of countries from DB to DC plans observed in recent decades. However, recent proposals to make DC plans more attractive to employers in Japan are likely to be implemented in the near future. This article summarizes the Japanese retirement system, with an emphasis on private-sector employees, and the complementary role played by voluntary employer-sponsored retirement plans; describes the financial pressures that faced retirement plan sponsors in the late twentieth century and the factors motivating the reform of Japanese voluntary retirement plans; examines the 2001 legislative changes that have transformed company retirement plans; and concludes with a review of trends and recent developments in employer-sponsored retirement plans since the implementation of the 2001 pension laws.     

Retirement income security in the United Kingdom.

This article examines the U.K. retirement income security system from the American perspective. It addresses issues that most concern U.S. analysts: how the United Kingdom has kept its future public pension costs at a manageable level, the extent to which privatization of public pensions has contributed to low pension costs, the popular appeal of individual pension accounts, and the impact of privatization on retirement income. These issues are best understood in the context of the U.K. pension program's particular institutional structure and policies, two of which--"contracting out" of public pensions, and strong reliance on means-tested benefits--have been largely rejected in the evolution of U.S. policy to date. Particular use is made of recently available data on coverage rates for public and private pension programs over the total working population and administrative records on inactive personal pension accounts.     

Workers' compensation: 1984-88 benchmark revisions.

About 93.1 million workers were covered under workers' compensation laws in 1988--an increase of 11 percent from the 1984 total. Benefit amounts totaled $30.7 billion--an increase of about 56 percent since 1984. Of the total payments made under the workers' compensation program, $17.6 billion went to disabled workers, $1.6 billion to their survivors, and $11.5 billion for medical care. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is interested in measuring economic security in the United States, and workers' compensation plays a large role in that measurement. This article represents one part of our overall effort to determine the roles the various income-maintenance programs play in helping citizens of the United States achieve economic security. The figures presented here provide readers with an opportunity to review workers' compensation program operations during much of the 1980's. Workers' compensation is also important to SSA because that program is directly related to the Social Security Disability Insurance program. Since 1965, Social Security disability benefits have been subject to reduction if the beneficiary also receives workers' compensation and the combined benefits exceed 80 percent of previous earnings. In addition, SSA has been directly involved in providing income maintenance for disability from work-related diseases since 1969 when the Federal Black Lung benefits program was established.     

Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986

In June, President Reagan signed the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-335), which establishes the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) for employees hired after December 31, 1983. The program, which goes into effect on January 1, 1987, features a defined benefit retirement plan to augment mandatory coverage under social security. It also permits FERS participants to contribute up to 10 percent of their earnings, on a tax-deferred basis, to a thrift savings plan, with partial matching by the Government. This article describes the provisions of the new system, including survivor annuities and disability benefits. It also explains how employees covered under the Civil Service Retirement System may freeze their earned benefits under that program and transfer to FERS during the period July-December 1987.     

事业单位养老金制度的帕累托改进条件分析

事业单位养老金制度是社会保障体系的重要组成部分,本文分析了目前我国事业单位养老金制度的弊端及改革滞后的主要原因和存在问题,提出了"职业养老金替代退休金和对接国民基础养老金"的二元结构事业单位养老金方案;利用世代交替模型,求出这一制度安排相对于原有的退休金制度,实现"事业单位职工的养老金待遇不降低,我国整体养老金制度得到改善,财政养老金负担趋于下降"这一"帕累托改进"目标的条件;分析了该二元结构养老金方案的帕累托改进效应及这一方案在推进国民基础养老金改革、促进职业养老金和养老金市场的发展、完善养老金个人账户和公共服务体系等方面所能发挥的积极的社会效应;分析了方案实施的政治、经济和社会基础并通过仿真分析验证了本方案的有效性和可行性。     

Variation of employee benefit costs by age

Health care, pension, and disability plans account for the bulk of employers' benefit costs, as defined in this article. Because those costs tend to rise as employees get older, the age structure of the workforce affects not only employers' costs but ultimately their competitiveness in global markets. How much costs vary depends in large part on the structure of the benefits package provided. The method a company chooses to finance benefits generally varies with its size. This article focuses primarily on the benefit practices of large, private employers. In the long run, such employers pay the costs associated with the demographics of their workers, whereas small employers can often pool costs with other companies in the community. In addition, small employers often offer fewer benefits, and the costs and financing of those benefits are subject to the insurance markets and state regulations. The discussion of benefit packages is illustrated by case studies based on benefits that are typical for three types of organizations--a large traditional company such as steel, automobile, and manufacturing; a large financial services company such as a bank or health care organization; and a medium-sized retail organization. The case studies demonstrate the extent to which the costs of typical packages vary and reveal that employers differ radically in the incentives they offer employees to retire at a specific time. An employer can shift the variation in cost by age by changing the structure of the benefit program. The major forces that drive age differences in benefit costs are the time value of money (the period of time available to earn investment income and the operation of compound interest) and rates of health care use, disability, and death. Those forces apply universally, in the United States and elsewhere, and they have not changed in recent years. However, the marketplace and the prevalence of various types of benefit programs have changed, and those changes have generally resulted in less cost variation by age and more frequent employer selection of benefit packages that exhibit less variation by age.     

Pension coverage and benefits, 1972: findings from the retirement history sutdy

This article, based on data from the Retirement History Study, examines coverage by an employee pension plan on the longest job and the extent to which covered workers received an employee pension upon retirement and the size of their benefits. It also examines the joint receipt of employee pension and OASDI benefits and the size of the combined benefits. Each of these pension variables is analyzed for differences by class of worker (private wage and salary or government), sex, and characteristics of the longest job (industry, occupation, tenure, recency of job, extent of employment, and annual earnings rate). The majority of completely retired individuals in their early to middle sixties in 1972 did not receive employee pension benefits in that year. Women employed in private industry on their longest job were the most disadvantaged in this regard. Even when they were fortunate enough to receive retirement benefits from employee pension plans, their benefits were substantially lower than those of men or of women employed in government.     

The deserving sick: Income-maintenance policy towards the ill and disabled

Illness and disability often result in a serious loss of income. Government response to this problem has been piecemeal, so that there is a patchwork of different programs, some state and some federal, covering particular types of medical disabilities and particular categories of people. This article briefly describes existing programs and then evaluates income-maintenance policy towards the ill and disabled using four broad criteria: clarity of objectives, adequacy of coverage, adequacy of benefits, and equity. The general findings are that extreme program fragmentation in this policy area have led to competing (and sometimes inconsistent) objectives, large gaps in population coverage, benefit levels that do not meet even minimal standards, and tremendous inequities across different programs. Recommendations for improvement include the development of a more workable definition of disability and development of a guaranteed minimum income plan in conjuction with supplementary disability insurance plans.The author would like to thank Randall Bovbjerg and James Vaupel for their thoughtful criticisms.     

Disability benefit coverage and program interactions in the working-age population

Over three-fourths of the working-age population in the United States is insured for Disability Insurance (DI); this group is protected against a total loss of earned income typically associated with severe disability. However, little is known about the role the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program plays in protecting against the financial consequences of severe disability for this population. We find that over one-third (36 percent) of the working-age population is covered by SSI in the event of a severe disability. Three important implications follow, which we discuss in sequence below: (1) SSI increases the overall coverage of the working-age population; (2) SSI enhances the bundle of cash benefits available to disabled individuals; and (3) interactions with other programs also enhance the safety net, most notably in the area of health insurance coverage. Ignoring these implications could lead to inaccurate inferences about disability program coverage, health insurance coverage, and the well-being of working-age individuals with disabilities. The first major finding is that SSI substantially increases overall cash benefit coverage. Thus SSI dramatically increases protection against the financial risk of disablement in the working-age population. While roughly 23 percent of the U.S. working-age population was not insured for DI in November 1996, SSI provides coverage for more than half of this seemingly "uncovered" population. An important innovation of our analysis is that we account for the possibility that many of those who appear ineligible for SSI based on current income could become eligible as a result of a disability shock that causes their earnings to drop. Thus the estimated proportion that is protected by SSI increases when the possibility of earnings loss because of disability is considered. Considering DI and SSI together, roughly 90 percent of the working-age population would be potentially covered for benefits in the event of a disability. Those who are covered by SSI--as opposed to those covered by DI alone-tend to be relatively young, less educated, and in relatively poor health. The remaining 10 percent or so are not covered by either DI or SSI. This group is economically vulnerable in some sense (they are poorer, older, and more likely to be women than those covered only by DI), but they are not as economically vulnerable in terms of income, resource holdings, and private health insurance coverage as those who are eligible for SSI. A disproportionate share of those who are not covered by either DI or SSI consists of married women. The second major finding is that SSI substantially enhances the bundle of available cash benefits. Roughly one-third of those covered by DI are initially covered by SSI as well. SSI enhances the bundle of available cash benefits through two mechanisms: (1) SSI provides cash payments during the 5-month DI waiting period, and (2) SSI supplements the DI benefit after the DI waiting period for people whose initial SSI payment is larger than the DI benefit. We find that the role of SSI cash payments is temporary for most of those who are initially covered by both SSI and DI: They would receive SSI during the DI waiting period, but would lose SSI eligibility afterwards because the higher DI benefit completely offsets the SSI benefit. However, a smaller group of DI beneficiaries with low DI benefit levels would continue to be covered by both SSI and DI after the DI waiting period because the relatively low DI benefit would not completely offset the SSI benefit. The third major finding is that interactions with other programs also substantially enhance the safety net. The most important interactions involve health insurance coverage. In the working-age population, Medicare is available to DI beneficiaries, but only after a 24-month waiting period. By contrast, SSI is an important pathway to Medicaid benefits for severely disabled adults with limited income and resources and has no waiting period. SSI can provide a pathway to health insurance coverage during the 24-month Medicare waiting period for some DI beneficiaries through providing access to Medicaid. Interactions with other programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Food Stamp, Unemployment Insurance (UI), workers' compensation (WC), and veterans' disability programs, modify the role of DI and SSI in protecting people against the adverse financial effects of disablement. The nature of the interactions with other programs differs depending on individual circumstances. Employment-related programs (including UI, WC, and veteran's disability programs) are particularly important for those who are covered by DI. By contrast, the means-tested programs (including TANF and Food Stamp) are more important for those who would be eligible for SSI. In conclusion, SSI plays a substantial role in protecting working-age people against the adverse financial consequences of disablement through three mechanisms: (1) providing coverage to many who are not DI insured; (2) providing additional cash benefits to many who are DI insured and also covered by SSI; and (3) enhancing the social safety net by interacting with other programs, most notably Medicaid. Through these mechanisms, the role of SSI is substantial enough that it cannot be safely ignored in econometric and policy research on DI.