The Arendtian Dread: Courts with Power

Hannah Arendt was fearful not only of a populist President speaking in the name of the people and unbound by legality. She was also concerned that popular support could be harnessed by those responsible for limiting it. In other words, she was fearful of the American Supreme Court relying on popular support. This is the meaning of her obscure depiction of the American Supreme Court as “the true seat of authority in the American Republic” but unfit to power. I argue that Arendt's characterization of authority as requiring “neither coercion nor persuasion” means that the Court's source of legitimacy is expertise rather than public support. Yet the current dominant understanding among American Justices as well as scholars is that public support is the source of the Court's authority. In Arendt's mind, such an understanding means that the Court has become the seat of power. The corruption of the Court's authority and constitutional law as a language of expertise capable of resisting public opinion will inevitably follow.     

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.: Supreme Court Expands Rights of Regulated Parties to Challenge Agency Decisions

This article analyzes the potential impacts of the Supreme Court's recent decision in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. Prior to this decision, federal agency action that merely provided information could not be challenged because of the Administrative Procedure Act allowed parties to challenge only “final agency action.” The Court recognized that some actions that merely provide information can be final because they have legal consequences. To understand the extent to which the Hawkes decision expands the right to challenge agency action, the article compares the Hawkes decision with the Court's decision in Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, where the Court also discussed the issue of “final agency action.” The article concludes that the Court's reasoning regarding what type of consequences make an action “final” is the key to understanding what regulatory action can now be challenged.     

马萨诸塞州诉美国联邦环保局案的述评

马萨诸塞州诉美国联邦环保局案是美国第一件具有里程碑意义的气候变化公益诉讼案件,该案体现了美国各州和民间力量通过公民诉讼方式促进政府采取温室气体减排行动的艰巨努力。该案从联邦上诉法院一审到联邦最高法院再审,始终存在较大争议,其中关于原告诉讼资格的争议更是人声鼎沸。在联邦最高法院判决中,原告仅以微弱优势胜诉。尽管关于原告胜诉的理由仍有颇多争议,但该案在明确温室气体属于《清洁空气法》的调整范围、拓展气候变化公民诉讼原告的诉讼资格以及确立公民诉讼可以促进政府采取减排行动等方面,都具有非常积极的意义。     

Shifting the Metaphor: Examining Discursive Influences on the Supreme Court's Use of the Marketplace Metaphor in Twenty-First-Century Free Expression Cases

Justices on the Supreme Court of the United States have employed the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor to communicate how they understand freedom of expression for nearly a century. The meanings behind metaphors, however, are not static. This article examines whether justices’ references to the metaphor in twenty-first-century cases remain primarily tied to the original meaning – one related to the Enlightenment ideas at the heart of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's first use of the metaphor in 1919 – or if the meaning has shifted to represent more discourse-based understandings of communication in democratic society, such as those put forth by John Dewey and Jürgen Habermas. This article, through an analysis of twenty-first century Supreme Court decisions that discussed the marketplace metaphor, identifies evidence of a shift in the Court's understanding of the foundational theoretical concepts behind the meaning of the metaphor.     

Letters to the Editor

While many basked in the euphoric rays emanating from the New Jersey state court Mt. Laurel decision, commentators and litigators in the land use field were tempering their sentiments with the knowledge of the U.S. Supereme Court's impending consideration of a primary federal land use challenge in Warth v. Seldin. The Court's 5-4 decision, affirming a federal appeals court'ss affirmance of the dismissal of an exclusionary zoning challenge by various individuals and groups, was predicated on the elusive concept of “standing.” If a sufficient case or controversy existed, according to the Court, or if the various classes of plaintiffs alleged a sufficiently personal stake in the outcome of challenge, their right to challenge Penfield's zoning could be established. In Warth the majority took a restrictive view and, on a one by one basis, denied standing to each of the plaintiffs.     

Opinion Construction in the Roberts Court

The Supreme Court's main output is the decision on the merits. Little is known, however, about how such decisions are constructed. This article is one of the first to look at the way Supreme Court opinions are constructed by examining the impact of the core linguistic resources at the Court's disposal. It does so in a novel manner by measuring the Court's reliance on wording from parties’ merits filings, amicus briefs, and lower‐court opinions between the 2005 and 2014 terms. To accomplish this goal, the article compares language in over 13,000 documents in the Court's docket during this period with their respective majority opinions. The article then looks at the relative impact of parties’ briefs and filings, amicus curiae briefs, and lower‐court opinions on the Court's majority opinion language. This article provides both macro– and microlevel analyses by locating the relative effects of these linguistic resources on the Court's overall opinion language as well as by breaking these findings down by individual justice. In the aggregate, this article finds that, of the three resources analyzed, the Court tends to use language from parties’ merits briefs most frequently, then wording from lower‐court opinions, and the least from amicus briefs, but that differences in case level factors shift the relative utility of each of these three resources.     

The Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act: A Very Shy Statute

When the Massachusetts legislature unanimously passed the Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA) in 2008, the legislation was hailed as a groundbreaking and potent law that elevated Massachusetts to climate change leader status. However, while the law gave state agencies broad authority to make significant reductions in commonwealth greenhouse gas emissions, those state agencies have retreated from the GWSA's most powerful provisions. Undeniably, Massachusetts has made real greenhouse gas emissions cuts since 2008, but the ability of current programs to meet the GWSA's ambitious goals is becoming increasingly unlikely.     

Lawyers' Perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court: Is the Court a “Political” Institution?

Do legal elites—lawyers admitted to federal appellate bars—perceive the Supreme Court as a “political” institution? Legal elites differentiate themselves from the mass public in the amount and sources of information about the Court. They also hold near‐universal perceptions of Court legitimacy, a result we use to derive competing theoretical expectations regarding the impact of ideological disagreement on various Court perceptions. Survey data show that many legal elites perceive the Court as political in its decision making, while a minority perceive the Court as activist and influenced by external political forces. Ideological disagreement with the Court's outputs significantly elevates political perceptions of decision making, while it exhibits a null and moderate impact on perceptions of activism and external political influence, respectively. To justify negative affect derived from ideological disagreement, elites highlight the political aspects of the Court's decision making rather than engage in “global delegitimization” of the institution itself.     

Burnt Bridges: Retreat of the Federal Judiciary from Land Use Litigation

The decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Petaluma, despite its obvious and substantial reliance on the requirements of standing to sue, tempts the commentator to leap to a discussion of the merits. After the District Court's decision, many of us watched the case closely, either hoping or fearing that it would become the tock to the tick of Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,¹ establishing some limitations to the license of communities to define themselves and their growth at the expense of excluded nonresidents. The unanimous opinion by the Ninth Circuit panel bristles with hostility to the right-to-travel rationale of the District Court and invites comment on this level.     

Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Constitutional Impact of Lorillard Tobacco Co.

Since 1980, the Supreme Court has used a complex form of intermediate constitutional scrutiny-the Central Hudson analysis-when government regulations of commercial speech are challenged on First Amendment grounds. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Court used this analysis for the first time to test the constitutionality of government restrictions on tobacco advertising. This article reviews the Court's commercial speech doctrine including previous treatment of governmental attempts to restrict harmful product advertising. The article then provides an overview of the national regulatory framework for tobacco advertising and analyzes the Supreme Court's 2001 opinion in Lorillard Tobacco. The article then explores the impact of the case on the Court's commercial speech doctrine and in subsequent lower court opinions.     

An Analysis of Policy‐Based Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court's Constitutional Decisions

While Congress can attempt to overrule constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court by initiating the constitutional amendment process, an amendment is rarely a practicable option. Instead, Congress regularly tries to modify the impact of constitutional decisions with ordinary legislation. I analyze policy‐based responses to the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions that were initiated in Congress between 1995 and 2010. For each responsive proposal, I consider the relationship between the proposed legislation and the Court's legal holding and the relationship between the proposal and the public policy associated with the Court's decision. I find that Congress enjoys considerable success in reversing the policy impacts of the Court's decisions but is limited in its ability to overcome the Court's legal rules.     

Direct Concern in Regional Policy: The European Court of Justice and the Southern Question

For a few years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has declared inadmissible, for lack of direct concern, a number of annulment actions initiated by sub‐state actors in the context of regional policy. This article compares the ECJ's holdings with the General Court's more generous application of the ‘direct concern’ standard in some of the same disputes, and argues in favour of the General Court's approach. The cases hereby analysed pertain to the implementation of structural funds in Southern Italy. Relating regional policy to the historical unfolding of the ‘Southern Question’, this article examines the unexpected opportunity for civic and administrative renewal brought by regional policy to Italy's South in the late 1990s, and links standing for sub‐state actors to the long‐term realisation of that opportunity. It further argues that a more direct judicial involvement with territorial policies would prompt taxonomic renewal in EU law as a discipline.     

The Balance Between Student Drug Testing and Fourth Amendment Rights in Response to Board of Education v. Earls

In 1995, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton , holding that a school district's random suspicionless drug testing of student athletes for participation in interscholastic athletics did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In light of the Acton decision and in response to statistics indicating that drug use among students is rising, a number of school districts nationwide implemented mandatory drug testing for students. A 2001 study of the student drug-testing policies of Texas school districts confirmed this trend. The Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of random suspicionless drug testing of students in Board of Education v. Earls , where it upheld the district's policy requiring drug testing of students in any extra-curricular activities. This article examines the effects of the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education v. Earls on Texas school districts' student drug-testing policies.     

Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Consequences of the Court's Extended Jurisdiction

Despite the explicit exclusion of its jurisdiction, the Court of Justice of the European Union exercises judicial control over Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This article examines and explains how the Court's extended jurisdiction contributes to the juridification, judicialisation and constitutionalisation of the EU's compound CFSP structures. It first lays the groundwork by explaining the link between constitutionalisation and democratic legitimation and setting out the Court's formal jurisdiction over CFSP under Article 40 Treaty on European Union and Articles 218(11) and 275(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The centre piece of the article then identifies how the Court's jurisdiction has expanded since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, points at additional ‘substantive’ avenues of judicial review on the basis of access to information and access to justice, and analyses the effects of the Court of Justice of the European Union's extended jurisdiction for CFSP.     

Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable Terms Beget Malleable Doctrine

Recent scholarship has demonstrated that the Supreme Court of the United States has defined poorly and inconsistently applied two core First Amendment concepts-content and viewpoint discrimination. This article systematically explores the malleability of the Court's speech discrimination principles. Using data from The Supreme Court Compendium that categorize the ideological voting behavior of justices on the Court, the article studies decisions in three socially divisive areas of law in which content and viewpoint discrimination have been central issues of significant cases. Analysis shows that the Court's weak definitions and inconsistent applications leave the content and viewpoint concepts especially ripe for manipulation. The article concludes, therefore, by suggesting a new method of analysis that would offer more consistency.     

A New Chapter in the Normalisation of Closed Material Procedures

This note provides an analysis of the Supreme Court decision in Haralambous, which authorised the use of closed material procedures (CMPs) in proceedings surrounding search and seizure warrants issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). After presenting the facts of the case and the reasoning of the Court, the note examines the decision as an instance of CMP normalisation consistent with the model of normalisation argued for by Eva Nanopoulos in a previous MLR article. The notes goes on to make the case that Haralambous may be distinguished from previous instances of CMP normalisation on account of the Supreme Court's more open acceptance of CMPs in the decision, which signals a new chapter in CMP normalisation in the UK.     

Northern Ireland Dimensions to the First Decade of the United Kingdom Supreme Court

This article focuses on the relationship between the United Kingdom Supreme Court and Northern Ireland over the course of a constitutionally significant period of time, namely the first decade of the Court's existence. It does this by exploring what difference the Court has made to the law of Northern Ireland, what significance the cases from Northern Ireland have had for the law in other parts of the United Kingdom, and what part has been played in the Court's work by the sole Justice from Northern Ireland, Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, and by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland, John Larkin QC. It concludes that the Court has established itself as an indispensable component of the legal system of Northern Ireland.     

Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions: Lloyd v Google LLC

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out ‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.     

EARLY INTERVENTION IN NEW ZEALAND FAMILY COURT CASES

In April 2010 the New Zealand Family Court introduced the National Early Intervention Process (NEIP) to diversify its previous unitary dispute resolution pathway into two tracks (standard and urgent). A “triage” model is now in use to assess and assign cases appropriately. This article outlines the key milestones in the Family Court's 30‐year history which have led to this new initiative to reduce delays and help avoid the escalation of family conflicts over the care of children into bitter and intractable disputes. NEIP represents the most overarching reform of the Family Court since the Court's inception in 1981.     

Naming Names: The Impact of Supreme Court Opinion Attribution on Citizen Assessment of Policy Outcomes

The manner in which political institutions convey their policy outcomes can have important implications for how the public views institutions' policy decisions. This paper explores whether the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court communicates its policy decrees affects how favorably members of the public assess its decisions. Specifically, we investigate whether attributing a decision to the nation's High Court or to an individual justice influences the public's agreement with the Court's rulings. Using an experimental design, we find that when a Supreme Court outcome is ascribed to the institution as a whole, rather than to a particular justice, people are more apt to agree with the policy decision. We also find that identifying the gender of the opinion author affects public agreement under certain conditions. Our findings have important implications for how public support for institutional policymaking operates, as well as the dynamics of how the Supreme Court manages to accumulate and maintain public goodwill.