Rethinking Security: Organizational Fragility in Extreme Events

Providing public security is a fundamental function of government. As the class and degree of threat vary, government agencies must adapt to changing conditions or risk failing their basic mission. The events of September 11, 2001, illustrated the limits of governmental performance in identifying and interrupting actions intended to harm innocent citizens. These events are examined against the resources, range, and limits of governmental capacity to adapt to the emerging threat of terrorism, and an alternative perspective on administrative performance as a complex adaptive system is proposed. This perspective redefines the search for public security as a dynamic process that balances mechanisms of control with processes of information search, exchange, and feedback among public, private, and nonprofit organizations and is supported by a well–designed information infrastructure. The article concludes that the search for public security is an interactive learning process that, while guided by public organizations, must involve responsible participation by private and nonprofit organizations as well as an informed citizenry.     

Collaborative Innovation: A Viable Alternative to Market Competition and Organizational Entrepreneurship

There are growing pressures for the public sector to be more innovative but considerable disagreement about how to achieve it. This article uses institutional and organizational analysis to compare three major public innovation strategies. The article confronts the myth that the market‐driven private sector is more innovative than the public sector by showing that both sectors have a number of drivers of as well as barriers to innovation, some of which are similar, while others are sector specific. The article then systematically analyzes three strategies for innovation: New Public Management, which emphasizes market competition; the neo‐Weberian state, which emphasizes organizational entrepreneurship; and collaborative governance, which emphasizes multiactor engagement across organizations in the private, public, and nonprofit sectors. The authors conclude that the choice of strategies for enhancing public innovation is contingent rather than absolute. Some contingencies for each strategy are outlined.     

Protection of Commercial Satellite Communications Infrastructure

Although a nation's interest in protecting its commercial assets in space would seem obvious, the task of protecting commercial satellites is inherently complicated. Protection of commercial space infrastructure requires coordination among multiple actors in the public and private sectors. Although most public sector actors ultimately report to the same political leadership, the process of establishing coherent policies across agencies can take time. Coordination is even more complicated in the private sector, where multi-national firms compete against each other for profits by serving a wide range of customers.

Given the complexities of this process, it is not surprising that efforts to protect commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) networks have been slow in coming. At the same time, recent progress in the U.S. may pave the way for a more coherent approach to commercial SATCOM protection. If successful, these efforts can provide increased assurance of uninterrupted satellite connectivity, thus benefiting the economic and national security interests of America, its allies and its trading partners.     

The Changing Public-Private Infrastructure Mix: Economy-wide Implications

This article provides an economy-wide perspective on the changing role of the public sector in developing economic and social infrastructure in Australia. It analyses the scale and macroeconomic significance of the key economic and social infrastructure sectors — communication services, electricity, gas and water supply, transport, education, health and community services, government administration and defence. It then canvasses the major policy issues that have arisen in the progression from public to private infrastructure provision and considers why concerns about the trend fall in traditional public works spending may be misplaced in light of recent economic and institutional changes.     

The Contribution of Local Public Infrastructure to Private Productivity and its Political Economy: Evidence from a Panel of Large German Cities

This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to theestimation of the contribution of infrastructure accumulationto private production. A political economy model for theallocation of public infrastructure investment grants isformulated. Our empirical findings, using a panel of largeGerman cities for the years 1980,1986, and 1988, suggest thatcities ruled by a council sharing the State (`Bundesland')government's current political affiliation were particularlysuccessful in attracting infrastructure investment grants.With regard to the contribution of infrastructure accumulationto growth, we find that public capital is a significant factorin private production. Moreover, at least for the samplestudied, we find that simultaneity between output and publiccapital is weak; thus, feedback effects from output toinfrastructure are negligible.     

Hybrid annuity model: Hamming risk allocations in Indian highway public–private partnerships

A new public–private partnership (PPP) model, that is, hybrid annuity model (HAM) was introduced in 2016, to revive investments in the Indian highway infrastructure and to remedy the troubled relationship between the public and private sectors. This model marked a significant policy departure in the management of long‐ and short‐term public interest, which is inherent to public utilities and service delivery. Through a dispassionate lens, this paper critically examines the extent to which HAM has fulfilled its stated objectives. The analysis of project award data provides mixed empirical evidence of HAM's early success. As a positive policy imperative, HAM has been able to attract private participation in highway infrastructure by readjustment of risk allocations, and hence, it is a welcome step forward in improving public affairs. Worryingly though, HAM also brought about extensive de‐risking of the private sector, with evidence of rendering risk retention, that is, “skin‐in‐the‐game” by the less significant private infrastructure investors, and thereby adversely impacting development priorities. We find that HAM has taken the reengagement of private sector two steps back in management of PPP affairs. Recognizing that a true performance assessment is unlikely at this early stage of HAM introduction, the paper adopts a more analytical stance in identifying possible pitfalls based upon the telltale signs presented by project bidding and award data. This study offers fresh insight and course correction on the role of government and other stakeholders in this newly introduced PPP template.     

Institutional Constraints,Managerial Choices,and Conflicts in Public Sector Supply Chains

In this research, we compare the governance mechanisms that public sector managers and private sector managers leverage when responding to conflict in supply chain relationships. We find evidence that public sector managers are more likely than private sector managers to rely on written (formal) contract mechanisms, but that both public and private managers use relational (informal) governance mechanisms to similar extents. We also find that managers from both sectors perceive an improvement to the quality of the exchange relationship when a relational approach is emphasized in managing the conflict. Our research provides an important contribution to our understanding about the actions public managers take in dealing with supply chain conflicts and suggests potential policy alternatives to foster contracting efficiency and effectiveness.     

Comparing Accountability in the Public and Private Sectors

Analysis of public accountability tends to concentrate on public sector institutions. However, increasing use of the private sector in the provision of public services suggests the need to compare accountability in the two sectors. While private sector (for-profit) companies are more accountable in terms of their 'bottom line', accountability requirements in the public sector are generally more stringent, particularly with regard to process and general policy.     

When public principals give up control over private agents: The new independence of ICANN in internet governance

In 2016, the United States (US) government relinquished its long‐standing delegation contract with the Internet Corporation for Assignment of Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private organization that governs the technical infrastructure of the internet. This presents a puzzle as the US not only gave up a power resource, but also relinquished the possibility, as a public principal, to hold the private agent ICANN accountable. I argue that public principals have incentives to leave control in the hands of private stakeholders when a delegation contract is exposed to external pressure by powerful outside states and the probability of extensive policy changes by the privatized agent is limited. The analysis shows that the unilateral US control over ICANN was strongly challenged by other states and private actors. Instead of granting a greater role to rising powers in internet governance, the US gave up its unilateral influence after internal reforms limited the risk that an independent ICANN could deviate too far from former policies.     

发达国家大城市危机管理中的社会参与机制

在西方发达国家大城市危机管理实践中,政府和社会、公共部门和私人部门之间的良好合作,普通公民、工商企业组织、社会中介组织在危机管理中的高度参与,已经成为一个中心的事实。本文从城市应急文化的塑造、社区应急机制、志愿者组织的应急功能和城市应急管理中的公私伙伴合作关系等几个方面,探讨了现代发达国家大城市危机管理过程中社会组织和普通公民的参与机制,试图解析西方发达国家大城市危机管理系统中的全社会型危机管理网络的具体运作机制。     

COMPETITIVE TENDERING POLICIES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS

Abstract: This paper compares and contrasts the application of competitive tendering policies in the public and private sectors. It is based on information derived from a large-scale survey of public and private sector organisations in New South Wales. Analysis of the survey responses suggests a common approach to the basic elements of the tendering (market-testing) process. However, there are also some important differences, the most striking of which is that public sector organisations advertise more frequently and generally review more tenders. Despite this, there appears to be little difference in the degree of effective competition achieved between the two sectors. More generally, while nearly all organisations surveyed collect information that is relevant to performance evaluation, it does not appear to be systematic or rigorous enough to secure contract compliance.     

Private Provision of Services and Infrastructure – An Expanding Industry of the Nineties

A conference devoted to the public sector a decade ago is unlikely to have paid any attention to the private provision of public services and infrastructure, as at that stage such activities had had very little impact on the operations of governments in Australia. This article argues that private provision is an important emerging element of public sector service delivery.While generally supportive of such developments, the article presents reasons why governments have increasingly turned to private provision including the benefits involved, but also raises potential management and accountability considerations.     

Interagency information sharing: Expected benefits,manageable risks

The sharing of program information among government agencies can help achieve important public benefits: increased productivity; improved policy-making; and integrated public services. Information sharing, however, is often limited by technical, organizational, and political barriers. This study of the attitudes and opinions of state government managers shows that more than 8 in 10 judge information sharing to be moderately to highly beneficial. It also reveals specific concerns about the inherent professional, programmatic, and organizational risks. The study proposes a theoretical model for understanding how policy, practice, and attitudes interact and suggests two policy principles, stewardship and usefulness, to promote the benefits and mitigate the risks of sharing.     

Less Government, More Secrecy: Reinvention and the Weakening of Freedom of Information Law

Many critics have suggested that worldwide efforts to reinvent government could also weaken democratic control over public institutions, but few have considered how attempts to implement the "new paradigm" in public management might affect a widely used instrument for promoting accountability: freedom of information law (FOI). FOI laws give citizens and nongovernmental organizations the right of access to government information. However, recent Canadian experience shows that reinvention can weaken FOI laws in three ways. First, attempts to reduce "nonessential" spending may cause delays in handling FOI requests and weaken mechanisms for ensuring compliance. Second, governmental functions may be transferred to private contractors and not-for-profit organizations that are not required to comply with FOI laws. Third, governments' attempts to sell information and increase FOI fees may create new economic barriers to openness. Thus, restructuring provides an opportunity for political executives, public servants, and some well-organized business interests to weaken oversight mechanisms and increase their own autonomy within the policy process.     

Public affairs: an American perspective

This paper explores the development and broadening scope of public affairs practice within the United States of America and charts the factors that have influenced its current development. To understand the scope of how public affairs has developed in the United States, it is necessary to examine the historical evolution of the function in the USA and the early 20th century influence of the US government on defining and regulating its definition of public relations and public affairs, which resulted in the still‐in‐effect Gillett Amendment. Since then, public affairs has expanded into the private as well as the public sectors as corporations and organisations recognise the need to gain public trust for their ventures. In the US today, public affairs practitioners perform duties that range from issues management to environmental scanning to legislative affairs. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Gorillas in the closet? Public and private actors in the enforcement of transnational private regulation

This paper examines to what extent the background presence of state regulatory capacity – at times referred to as the “regulatory gorilla in the closet” – is a necessary precondition for the effective enforcement of transnational private regulation. By drawing on regulatory regimes in the areas of advertising and food safety, it identifies conditions under which (the potential of) public regulatory intervention can bolster the capacity of private actors to enforce transnational private regulation. These involve the overlap between norms, objectives, and interests of public and private regulation; the institutional design of regulatory enforcement; compliance with due process standards; and information management and data sharing. The paper argues that while public intervention remains important for the effective enforcement of transnational private regulation, governmental actors – both national and international – should create the necessary preconditions to strengthen private regulatory enforcement, as it can also enhance their own regulatory capacity, in particular, in transnational contexts.     

Public Capital Investment and Economic Growth in Forth Worth: The Implications for Public Budgeting and Infrastructure Management

There is a common assumption that local government investment in infrastructure stimulates private development. This article examines relationships in one southwestern city between public capital spending and city infrastructure assets and private economic activity as measured by building permit activity, permit values, and assessed property valuations. Two research questions are examined: (1) Is public investment in new capital associated with private capital formation? and (2) Is public investment associated with improvements in the property tax base? The findings hold implications for infrastructure planning, budgeting, and management. First, public and private capital spending patterns varied in tandem across several cycles, and tracking such cycles may help public managers predict short- and mid-term infrastructure needs. Second, utility capital spending is critically related to private capital formation, and may offer higher fiscal returns than other public infrastructure. Third, infrastructure capital had a strong significant effect on the assessed value of urban property, and will therefore influence the property tax base.     

Effects of Public Ownership over Firms' Size and Overstaffing Problems

A model is presented to analyse the impact ofownership over the problem of excess of employmentgenerally found in public firms. A government has toprovide a service or build an infrastructure, underuncertainty about the valuation of the project byconsumers. Three possible ownership schemes areconsidered for the provision of this service: astate-owned firm, a private firm with a completecontingent contract, or a private firm with anincomplete contract. In all three schemes, the agentthat chooses the size of the project is always thegovernment, without any asymmetries of information.Even though multiple solutions are feasible and nodefinitive conclusion is found to be valid for allstates of nature, an evaluation of outcomes shows thata private firm tends to underprovide infrastructure orservices more often, while under public ownership thefirm is typically larger. If incomplete contracting isadded to the private firm case, the model exhibitssolutions in which outcomes could be socially worsethan those obtained by a public firm. Only changes inthe voting behaviour of workers and contracting costsare required in this model to derive these results.Thus, the paper provides an example that ownershipper se may have an effect on the size andefficiency of firms, even under symmetric informationconditions, an extreme that has been generally deniedin the literature on public firms and privatisation.     

Local Government Restructuring: Privatization and Its Alternatives

Local government restructuring should no longer be viewed as a simple dichotomy between private and public provision. A 1997 survey of chief elected township and county officials in New York shows that local governments use both private and public sector mechanisms to structure the market, create competition, and attain economies of scale. In addition to privatization and inter‐municipal cooperation, two alternative forms of service delivery not previously researched—reverse privatization and governmental entrepreneurship—are analyzed here. Logistic regression on the 201 responding governments differentiates the decision to restructure from the level and complexity of restructuring. Results confirm that local governments are guided primarily by pragmatic concerns with information, monitoring, and service quality. Political factors are not significant in the restructuring process and unionization is only significant in cases of simple restructuring (privatization or cooperation used alone). Fiscal stress is not a primary motivator, but debt limits are associated with more complex forms of restructuring. Restructuring service delivery requires capacity to take risks and is more common among experienced local officials in larger, higher‐income communities. Restructuring should be viewed as a complex, pragmatic process where governments combine public and private provision with an active role as service provider and market player. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.