A confusion,not a system: the organizational evolution of strategic intelligence assessment in Canada, 1943 to 2003

Recently released documentation has for the first time made it possible to describe the organizational evolution of strategic intelligence assessment in Canada. During the 60-year period surveyed in this article, the analytical groups involved in strategic assessment and the interdepartmental intelligence committee structure underwent a number of changes. These were almost invariably incremental steps—shaped by bureaucratic factors and resource constraints—rather than initiatives guided by a broader vision of the role of intelligence assessment in support of Canadian foreign and defence policy. This organizational study provides the foundation for long-overdue research into the foreign intelligence function in Canada.     

When Casey’s blood pressure rose: a case study of intelligence politicization in the United States

This article contributes to the debate on the politicization of intelligence with a case study of a major attempt of politicization that so far largely escaped academic attention: the Special National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union’s role in international terrorism produced by the US Intelligence Community in spring 1981. Despite direct and indirect manipulation by members of President Reagan’s Cabinet, this case differs from those usually discussed in a decisive way – politicization failed. Based on the empirical analysis, a theoretical model of intelligence politicization is introduced that extends Joshua Rovner’s oversell model, which can explain why policymakers demand intelligence support but is insufficient due to its exclusive focus on the consumers of intelligence, by integrating the incentives of intelligence producers and specifying the determinants of whether politicization succeeds or fails.     

Explaining the depth and breadth of international intelligence cooperation: towards a comprehensive understanding

ABSTRACT

Despite neorealism's predominance in the academic debate, it is too narrow a basis for the comprehensive understanding of present-day international intelligence cooperation. This approach is perfectly capable of explaining what is currently not happening in international intelligence cooperation and why this is the case. However, it is inadequate to understand what does happen in international intelligence cooperation. To explain international intelligence cooperation, especially in long-standing multilateral arrangements such as the EU and NATO, additional approaches are needed. This article advocates stepping beyond a state-centric approach of international intelligence cooperation, viewing it as a process and using a sociological perspective.     

Improving Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline

As the field of intelligence studies develops as an academic complement to the practice of national security intelligence, it is providing a base of knowledge for intelligence practitioners to interpret their past, understand their present, and forecast their future. It also provides the basis for broader understanding of intelligence as a function of government for other government and security officials, academicians, and the general public. In recent years there has been significant growth in the numbers and kinds of intelligence-related educational and training opportunities, with the knowledge taught in these courses and programs derived from the body of intelligence studies scholarship. The question posed here is: to what extent is this body of knowledge sufficient as a basis for the development of intelligence studies as an academic discipline?     

Is there Something Wrong with Intelligence in France? The Birth of the Modern Secret State

The lack of academic interest in intelligence in France partly explains the prevalence of many preconceived ideas about French Intelligence. This article deals with the slow building of France's intelligence machinery in the nineteenth century, as part of a study of the modern French State. At this time, intelligence practices were transformed by the appearance of several intelligence bureaucracies. Studying three dimensions of the development – informal practices, formal organizations and statutory rules – the article demonstrates the closeness of intelligence to politics. Doing so it suggests that intelligence needs to be considered not only as an instrument of policy-making but as an actor at the centre of the modern French state, a part of its very essence.     

Strategic Ignorance and the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence: Critiquing the Discursive Segregation of UFOs from Scientific Inquiry

Since the late 1940s, a tenacious disconnect between popular interest and professional disinterest in unidentified flying objects (UFOs) has typified the controversy surrounding the subject. Numerous high-profile scientists have seen the topic of UFOs as an opportunity to denounce and rectify a popular, yet allegedly misguided, conviction—that some UFOs are physical anomalies indicating the existence of extraterrestrial intelligence—and thus to advance the explanatory authority of science. Rather than constituting rigorous, informed, and effective assessments, however, the ways in which many prominent scientists publicly address the UFO question often exemplify both the problematic “boundary-work” of scientific discourse in this area and, more specifically, the role that logical fallacies can play in the rhetorical construction of scientific authority in public domains. Through a critical discourse analysis, this article argues that ignorance of UFO phenomena is socially and discursively constructed in ways that are conducive to the public faces of individuals and institutions. More broadly, it suggests that the rudimentary standard of science communication attending to the extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI) hypothesis for UFOs inhibits public understanding of science, dissuades academic inquiry within the physical and social sciences, and undermines progressive space policy initiatives.     

Intelligence Analysis

American intelligence analysts have been severely criticized for failing to anticipate the 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks and for the ill-advised invasion of Iraq. The resulting Intelligence Community reorganization, intended to repair these presumed deficiencies, reflects a misunderstanding of what intelligence analysts can do and where responsibility for political and military decisions lie. In fact, the Intelligence Community is far more diversified in its tasks than is generally realized. Where analysis is done and for whom makes a large difference in its effectiveness. Moreover, changing technology is altering how it is done, where, and by whom. The border between what is ‘strategic’ or ‘national’ intelligence and ‘tactical’ intelligence is much diminished. At the same time, intelligence analysts all too often fail to incorporate the growing amounts of open source information, as well as analytic concepts and theories available from academic and scholarly literature.     

案例研究概推性的理论逻辑与评价体系——基于公共管理案例研究样本论文的实证分析

案例研究是公共管理研究者运用的一种主要研究方法,但却常常被认为科学性不强。其面临的一项主要指责是案例研究的结果缺乏概推性,即源自一个或少数几个案例研究的结果缺乏普遍意义。本文首先梳理既有案例研究方法论文献对该项挑战的理论回应,分析案例研究结果概推性论述中的三种主要理论逻辑:"自然主义式概推"、"分析概推"和"非正式经验概推"。在借鉴现有理论的基础上,提出一个评价体系,以全面评估案例研究者在处理概推性问题上的严谨性。该体系的三个要素是:研究者"运用案例研究的目的"、"选择案例的理由"及"对案例研究结果适用范围的界定"。在分析上述三要素及其相互关系的基础上,设计出具体的评价指标。然后以发表于五种国际一流公共管理学术期刊上的142篇运用案例研究方法的论文为样本,实证分析公共管理案例研究者在应对概推性难题上的实践。结果表明:在所有样本论文中,八成以上以"一般化"研究为目的,四成以上明确说明了案例选择的理由,三分之一以上采用多案例设计,约四分之一说明了影响案例研究结果适用范围的因素。将2005—2009年样本论文与2000—2004年相比,公共管理案例研究者在处理概推性问题上的严谨程度显著提高,明确说明案例选择理由、采用多案例设计及以"一般化"研究为目的的论文比重大幅上升。最后在讨论实证结果的基础上提出拓展案例研究结果概推性的研究策略。     

Politics of E‐Government: E‐Government and the Political Control of Bureaucracy

This case study reports an innovative e‐government experiment by a local government in Seoul, South Korea—Gangnam‐gu. A new local political leadership in Gangnam made strategic use of e‐government applications to exert greater political control over the local civil service bureaucracy. The authors find that e‐government applications possess political properties that can be applied effectively by the political leadership as instruments to improve control over the government bureaucracy as well as to enhance essential government accountability and transparency. The political circumstances underlying e‐government development as well as its impact on local government are reported, along with key variables associated with this innovation and directions for future research.     

James Bond,Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the ‘imagined’

This article looks to answer the question of why the James Bond novels and films should matter to scholars of intelligence and national security. We argue that Bond is important because, rightly or wrongly, and not without inaccuracy, it has filled a public knowledge vacuum about intelligence agencies and security threats. On another level, this article explores the unexpected yet important interactions between Bond and the actual world of intelligence. We contend that the orthodoxy dictating that Bond and spying are diametric opposites—one is the stuff of fantasy, the other is reality—is problematic, for the worlds of Bond and real intelligence collide, overlap and intermesh in fascinating and significant ways. In short, Bond is important for scholars because he is an international cultural icon that continues to operate at the borders of fiction and reality, framing and constructing not only public perceptions but also to some degree intelligence practices. Core narratives of intelligence among not only the public but also policymakers and intelligence officers are imagined, sustained, deepened, produced and reproduced through and by Bond. We conclude that Bond and intelligence should be thought of as co-constitutive; the series shapes representations and perceptions of intelligence, but it also performs a productive role, influencing the behaviours of intelligence agencies themselves.     

War crimes prosecutors and intelligence agencies: the case for assessing their collaboration

Whilst recognizing important distinctions between different types of intelligence agency, and a range of possible contradictions between the imperatives governing the two types of agency, it is necessary to overcome the one-side quality of much existing literature, whose critique of the subversion of the rule of law by intelligence agencies tends to preclude any appreciation that such agencies can play a supportive role for war crimes prosecutors. This article challenges the assumption that analysis of the histories of Western intelligence agencies and the study of war crimes trials must be studied as entirely separate and sharply demarcated fields of inquiry; it advocates an interdisciplinary research programme, informed by a series of indepth historical case studies, capable of addressing issues arising from the interaction between these two institutional fields. The proposed research agenda could illuminate aspects of the contemporary role – and future potential of both intelligence agencies and war crimes prosecution bodies. It would investigate tensions between the prosecutors need to employ intelligence agencies to gather trial credible evidence and detain indicted defendants, often by covert and legally questionable means, and the constitutional justifications for holding war crimes trials by reference to the need to reassert the rule of law in the wake of lawless genocide.     

Unknown Agabekov

The decision to declassify selected historical documents from the archives of the Security Service in 1997 has been a boon to academic historians of intelligence. The declassified files reveal the successes and failures of the Security Service in fulfilling its statutory function of defending the realm. Yet the activity of Soviet spies continues to be one of the most challenging topics in intelligence history. The role of Soviet defectors in transforming the Security Service's understanding of the nature and extent of Soviet intelligence operations, meanwhile, remains largely understudied. In the case of Agabekov, for example, the reaction of SIS or MI5 to his ‘disappearance’ in the spring of 1938 has long been neglected. It is possible that there was no reaction at all, because both services had long-since written off Agabekov as a source. This helps explain why Agabekov's case has been ignored in the relevant literature in both Russia and the West.     

Knowledge corruption and governance in academic knowledge-intensive organizations: The case of molecular mutations research

This paper aims to understand (a) what factors make academic knowledge-intensive organizations (KIOs) susceptible to knowledge corruption and (b) when and how academic KIOs should introduce external governance of interdisciplinary academic knowledge production to ensure outcome quality. This study investigates molecular mutation research as an example of a body of research in which KIOs worked together with commercially motivated organizations and where this altered “ownership” claims made academic scientists less likely to focus on the truth. The paper presents propositions and hypotheses and conducts a retrospective study. The results contribute to governance frameworks of KIOs by providing evidence that questions into the prevailing arrangements for the academic science. Governance principles to be applied include the need for an overarching governance framework in which a field-specific open approach with a methodological underpinning help to reduce corruptive forces.     

Need a Hand? No Thanks! Media Representations and Peace Building Indicators: The Case of UK Foreign Aid Programmes in Colombia

This article considers research approaches often associated with media and journalism studies as complementary assessment strategies to inform decisions associated with evaluating foreign aid. In order to do so, the case of British foreign aid towards Colombia in the context of the War on Drugs is examined as a case study. The authors explore the relationship between aid giving and the receipt of aid by focusing on how the media can be used as a peacebuilding indicator. There is a dearth of academic inquiry into these issues. This article attempts to flesh out some future lines of scholarly enquiry using the UK–Colombia case study example. It uses research interviews with state officials, multilateral organizations and NGO representatives as well as a review of press coverage in Colombia over a two-year period. The article argues that media could potentially be used as an important indicator of peacebuilding success and failure in the context of aid giving and receipt but that to achieve that there are specific pre-conditions and issues to be addressed by the different parties.     

Note on Teaching Intelligence

Over the last decade, intelligence has become one of the most widely taught subjects in higher education. In response to this, a sub-discipline has emerged within Intelligence Studies devoted to thinking about how the subject is actually taught. One of the most common arguments to come out of this literature is that there should be more practitioner involvement in the university teaching of intelligence. However, it is rarely specified what exactly intelligence professionals bring to the classroom, save the largely self-evident point that because they have ‘walked the walk’, they are uniquely qualified to teach the subject. Drawing on student questionnaires, as well as interviews with serving and retired intelligence officers, this article attempts to probe a little deeper and identify the specific benefits of incorporating practitioners into the university teaching of intelligence. It is argued that practitioners ‘put a face on the profession’ and help to remove some of the mystique and misperceptions that surround intelligence work. It is claimed that practitioners, especially with their ‘inside stories’, give added meaning to academic theories and make the subject more exciting. Finally, it is argued that practitioners enrich the broader ‘student experience’. In UK higher education, now under a new fees regime, students are looking for departments to go the extra mile not only in terms of their teaching, but also in areas like careers advice and support. In this context, intelligence professionals are enormously valuable.     

Innovation Inducement Prizes: Connecting Research to Policy

Innovation inducement prizes have been used for centuries. In the United States, a recent federal policy change—the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010—clarified and simplified a path by which all federal agencies can offer innovation inducement prizes, thus intensifying interest in how government agencies can most effectively design and apply such prizes. This paper aims to review and synthesize the academic literature on innovation inducement prizes, to clarify what has been learned that is relevant to current policy discussions, and to highlight unresolved questions that would be fruitful areas for future academic research and policy experimentation. Relative to the existing literature, this paper aims to bridge two gaps. First, I synthesize the academic literature in this area with an eye toward drawing lessons for the types of innovation inducement prizes under consideration by federal agencies under the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act. Second, I discuss the problem of how to evaluate the success or failure of innovation inducement prizes, arguing that careful empirical evaluations of innovation inducement prizes are needed in order to provide guidance to federal agencies (and others) on how to most effectively apply and design innovation inducement prizes.     

Missing revolution: the American intelligence failure in Iraq, 1958

Why were American officials caught by surprise with the military coup and later revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958? Drawing on American intelligence and diplomatic records as well as multilingual sources, this article argues that the US intelligence failure is the product of two factors: the collection of information from too few and too similar human sources of intelligence in Iraq’s ruling regime, and the unreceptivity of US officials to assessing new information and their unwillingness to update assessments of local Iraqi developments. It revisits America’s intelligence failure in Iraq and suggests important lessons for the study of intelligence.     

Intelligence Studies Centers: Making Scholarship on Intelligence Analysis Useful

Abstract

Improving intelligence analysis requires bridging the gap between scholarship and practice. Intelligence studies as an academic discipline is not very theoretical compared to the more established disciplines of political science and international relations. In terms of conceptual depth, levels of abstraction and theoretical development, even the theoretical portions of the academic intelligence studies literature could be described as policy relevant and potentially useful for practitioners, including intelligence analysts. Yet despite this orientation to the practitioner, there is still a substantial gap between scholars and practitioners, thus replicating within a more applied context the conventional theory/practice divide that exists in other fields. Those fields do, however, possess a variety of ideas and recommendations that could be used to bring scholarship on intelligence analysis closer to practice. If implemented, these ideas might help actualize the benefits of scholarship that are as yet still unrealized potential.