不对称同盟与韩国的反美主义

韩国与美国之间是一种不对称的军事同盟关系。1953年朝鲜战争结束后,应韩国的强烈要求,美国开始在韩国长期驻军。民主化后,韩国的反美主义日益高涨,直接针对韩美军事关系,出现了要求驻韩美军撤出的呼声。韩国人态度发生转变的根源在于:经济的高速发展和政治的民主化激发了韩国人空前的民族主义,由于美国的军事存在与民族主义相冲突,导致一些韩国国民对韩美不平等关系的不满日益增长。尽管韩美两国也试图对双边关系做出调整,但这种调整未能满足韩国人的心理需求,反而激起了更多的不满。     

Coercive Diplomacy: Israel,Transjordan and the UN—a Triangular Drama Revisited

The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab–Israeli war. Immediately following the war, Israel made brilliant and shrewd use of diplomacy to achieve its goals at the negotiating table, much as it had previously used armed force. Israel refused to negotiate with a united Arab negotiation team, preferring to isolate the states, picking them off one after the other. The Israeli–Transjordanian talks differed radically from the other armistice negotiations. Here, two parallel tracks were followed. At Rhodes, the two countries negotiated openly under UN auspices, while in Jerusalem and at King Abdullah's palace in Transjordan, representatives of the two countries held secret bilateral talks. Israel masterfully used the context of these talks to maximise its gains, using military operations to create ‘facts on the ground’, combined with direct coercion in the shape of blackmail, while taking full advantage of international power structures and abusing the trust that King Abdullah had placed in personal relations. The UN Acting Mediator, Ralph Bunche, was aware of the secret back channel, where the clearest cases of coercion took place. Physically and mentally exhausted by the protracted negotiations, he allowed the secret talks to progress despite his dislike of the outcome. The British government, at the time the protector of Transjordan, was unable to assist its client for fear of falling out with the USA, while the US government, in many ways the protector of Israel, maintained an equally ‘hands off’ stance because the talks concerned only an armistice, not a peace treaty. Already at this early stage in their relations, the power asymmetry between Israel and the Arab states was the main reason the parties could not arrive at a peaceful, sustainable solution. This article reinvestigates this diplomacy by using a combination of US, Israeli, British and UN archives, as well as the almost untouched Ralph Bunche diary.     

Arab Nationalism and British opposition in Dubai, 1920–66

The article examines the armistice talks between Israel and Jordan (March–April 1949) from the perspective of the UN mediator, Ralph Bunche, who coordinated them. The period described was stormy and complex: at its start, Israel took control of the southern Negev. Later, the two countries conducted formal talks in Rhodes, under Bunche's watchful eye, in parallel to informal negotiations, without UN involvement, in Jordan. The article, based to a large extent on Bunche's unpublished diary, explains why Bunche, who maintained rigorous control of all of the other armistice talks, behaved differently in this case, giving his post factum seal of approval to the Israeli takeover of the southern Negev and allowing Israel to pressure Abdullah to hand over the Triangle. The thesis is that Bunche, who could have put an end to the talks by resigning, or drawn the US into the crisis (as he did in the other rounds of negotiations), recognized the complexity of the relations between Israel and Abdullah and chose to act in a way that would prevent a new eruption of hostilities. In effect he was protecting Abdullah, who would have been likely to lose the West Bank to Israel in another round of fighting.     

The Syrian refugees—left to their fate

ABSTRACT

The war in Syria led to one of the worst refugee crises experienced by the Middle East in recent decades. Its scope is unprecedented and has far-reaching implications not only for Syria or what remains of it, but for the receiving countries as well. In some cases, such as Lebanon or Jordan, the mass of newcomers may have an unsettling and disruptive effect on the demography of their host country. Syrian Refugees who found shelter in neighbouring countries may be able to return home or, alternatively, they may be able to be absorbed relatively easily in their current places of residence. With regard to the refugees in Europe, it is doubtful that they will ever return to their homeland, and, in any case, the Syrian regime is not at all interested in their return. Thus, for many more years even after the war in Syria ends, the problem of the refugees will undoubtedly remain complex, unresolved and an enduring burden on the host countries.

Abbreviation: EU: European Union; ISIS: the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; PPS: the Syrian National Party; SNC: Syrian National Council; UN: United Nations; UNCHR: the UN High commisioner for Refugees     

America's rented troops: South Koreans in Vietnam

Abstract

South Korea's role in the Indochina War—providing an expeditionary force of over three hundred thousand combat troops and unremitting hawkish support for U.S. actions—illustrates two features of the war. The first was the benighted American attempt to internationalize the war as a cover for U.S. intervention. The second was the American utilization of Third Country Military Forces (TCMF), generally completely and secretly financed and equipped by the United States, to supplement U.S. ground forces. Both aspects of U.S. strategy related to a principal objective of the Johnson and Nixon administrations in American domestic politics: to delay or prevent public perception of the real nature of the war and the acts of the U.S. government.     

Statement on peace and reunification of the Korean Peninsula

Abstract

We who have been praying and working for peace and the reunification of Korea would like to express our deep concerns about the rising tensions surrounding the north Korean nuclear controversy and the potentially imminent war on the Korean peninsula. We still remember vividly the nightmare of the Korean War beginning 25 June 1950, and we have endured tremendously painful experiences for the last half century because of the division of our country. We would like to express our positions to the governments of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the United States, and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as we firmly believe that the shortest route to reunification is through the reconciliation and solidarity of the Korean people:     

Introduction to the supplement

Abstract

Today the American press focuses on what might be called the domestic consequences of United States policy toward Korea. We read about the troop withdrawal issue, the unfolding Korea Lobby scandal, and, perhaps, Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) activities within the U.S. The following supplement, however, reminds us of the far worse consequences of American and Korean policies for those who remain within Korea. It was the U.S. CIA which helped to set up the KCIA, thereby providing to the diffuse authoritarianism of the Rhee regime period (1948–1960) an organizational weapon which has kept Park in power through sixteen years of Korean dissent and upheaval: it is the south Korean people who continue to suffer the consequences. It was the Johnson and Nixon administrations which sanctioned what amounted to bribery, first to get the south Koreans to commit troops in the Vietnam War, and then to keep them there as Nixon and Kissinger prolonged the war. It was the Nixon administration which kept a conspicuous silence when Park in 1972 ripped up the old constitution, did away with even the fiction of procedural democracy, and instituted a frankly authoritarian regime.     

Editors’ Introduction

Abstract

This article explains why the United States has not fought a preventive war against North Korea despite that country’s moves to arm itself with nuclear weapons. I argue that the absence of war is mainly attributable to military strategies that the US military has with regard to North Korea. With only attrition strategies available, the United States neither expects to lose a precious military opportunity nor anticipates grave future vulnerabilities vis-à-vis North Korea. The prospect of a costly attritional campaign deters both Washington and Pyongyang from resorting to military force. Straightforward attrition strategies also allow little chance for miscalculation, thereby making inadvertent escalation to war unlikely. The research finds sufficient evidence for my argument, whereas conventional explanations offered by international relations theory fall short when applied to this case.     

Providers Not Protectors: Institutionalizing Responsible Sovereignty in Southeast Asia

Abstract

Despite their declaratory support for the United Nations' adoption of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) governments nonetheless reject the UN proposition that military intervention can and should be employed for implementing the R2P. However, this reluctance has not precluded the development of an ethic of responsible sovereignty in Southeast Asia. But rather than responsibility as protection as assumed by the R2P, ASEAN countries arguably define responsibility in terms of provision for the well-being of their populaces. The development of such an ethic in Southeast Asia has been uneven as evidenced by the Myanmar government's initial reluctance to receive foreign humanitarian assistance following Cyclone Nargis in 2008. That said, as the contemporary policy debate and regional institutional developments in Southeast Asia together attest, an ethic of responsible provision is emerging among ASEAN states.     

Paradoxes of internationalisation of the Anglophone problem in Cameroon

Historically it is not strange that the Anglophone elites in Cameroon took their case to the international community, since this was a strategy that they employed during the British colonial period. A number of petitions and constant visits were made to the United Nations (UN) by Anglophone elites concerning British neglect of their territory. These petitions were made in the form of presentations before the United Nations in New York or whenever there was a visiting UN mission to the trust territory. Nonetheless, since the early 1990s, the pattern of petitions has changed drastically. Petitions against the new state are different from those earlier petitions against colonialism. The aim of the petitions against the new state has been to draw the attention of the UN and the international community to the injustices inflicted upon minority English-speaking Cameroonians by the ruling government. The Anglophone elites believe that, by making their plight known to the international community, the latter might intervene to restore the statehood of Southern Cameroons.     

Contextualising the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in Darfur

ABSTRACT

This article argues for a thorough contextual analysis based on understanding local, regional and international politico-economic linkages in the Sudan, in order to ground prospects of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine in the ongoing crisis in Darfur. The R2P framework was crystallised by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. It was adapted and subsequently endorsed by United Nations (UN) member states during the 2005 UN World Summit. The R2P ostensibly provides normative benchmarks on how states should respond to the quadruple human rights violations of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Indeed, there is debate on whether the prevailing crisis in Darfur constitutes a test case for the application of the R2P. However, such debate is misplaced on two grounds: first, it glosses over the inherent conceptual deficiencies of the R2P, as presently constituted. More importantly, such debate is primarily inspired by reactionary and externalising influences based on past international failings, like Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (1993). Hence, it is argued that the starting point of analysing the Darfur crisis should be a thorough investigation of how local, regional and international politico-economic factors have historically worked in an orchestrated fashion to trigger and sustain the crisis in the Sudan. Knowledge and an understanding of such historical specificity is a requisite for determining the relevance of the R2P in Darfur. The R2P, as presently constituted and practised, does not address this gap.     

Fighting the Korean War in pacifist Japan: Korean and Japanese leftist solidarity and American Cold War containment

Where does “pacifist” Japan fit within the history of the Korean War? Was Japan simply the beneficiary of the wartime boom – a case best exemplified by Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s characterization of the Korean War as “a gift of the gods”? When North Korean troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and launched a full-scale attack against South Korea, the U.S. occupation in Japan quickly transformed the pacifist nation into the indispensable rear base of United Nations military intervention in the Korean War. The Japanese Communist Party and leftist groups organized by zainichi Koreans (Korean residents in Japan) launched an antiwar movement to stop Japan from producing and sending arms to UN forces in Korea. The U.S. occupation responded with determined efforts to contain every antiwar voice emerging from the streets of the pacifist country. By examining the political dynamics of zainichi Korean and Japanese leftist solidarity and U.S. countermeasures, this article shows how the Korean War was fought in pacifist Japan. It also illuminates how the practice of Cold War containment was mutually linked on the ground between occupied Japan and South Korea.     

The coming decade of change on the Korean peninsula: Implications for Northeast Asia and the United States

The next decade on the Korean peninsula will be one of dramatic change. With a nearly nonexistent economy and its people facing severe famine, the DPRK has no choice but to move away from its self-reliance policies towards another course of action—most likely leading to reunification of the peninsula. However it plays out, the changes in Korea will have important regional implications and impact U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia. Policy makers must formulate plans now for U.S. forces in the region during, and after, Korean reunification. Despite being in shambles internally, North Korea remains a hermit kingdom standing steadfastly against the tides of change and pressures from the outside world to become part of the international community. The Korean peninsula remains a potential, and very likely, international flashpoint as no formal peace treaty was signed after the Korean War—only an armistice agreement keeps the peninsula in a fragile military stalemate. With a badly broken economy, its people continuing to face famine, the threat to resume its nuclear program, and the recent missile firings over Japan, North Korea will likely be an international flashpoint sooner rather than later. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.     

The regional outcome of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement five years down the road: Are external forces playing a progressive role?

ABSTRACT

The Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005 is the outcome of regional and international mediation led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)1 and the IGAD Partners’ Forum broadened to include the United States of America, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy and the United Nations. Five years into its implementation the peace agreement appears to have transformed the war between North and South Sudan into a series of engagements of conflicting nature. Numerous contradictory actions by both the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress Party (NCP) (the main political forces behind the CPA) have been noted during the ongoing implementation process (Grawert forthcoming 2010; Grawert and El-Battahani 2005; Wassara 2008). Although internal Sudanese forces are the key actors in implementing the CPA, external forces are critical in providing the support and pressure needed for a complete realisation of the peace deal. The New Regionalism Approach (NRA), as advanced by Grant and Soderbäum (2003), is instrumental in understanding this dynamic. This article is based on the result of a study that seeks to examine why positive engagements of external forces are needed for a timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.     

The International Criminal Court and the Darfur crimes: The dilemma of peace and supra-national criminal justice

ABSTRACT

The supra-national criminal prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of the alleged crimes committed in Darfur raises critical legal and conceptual issues. This article addresses the dilemma of peace, justice and reconciliation from a legal perspective, as well as the justice options that are available. The article also assesses the Sudan's criminal and military laws (both at the substantive and procedural levels) in terms of the country's ability to prosecute international crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In this respect, the article argues that these laws fall short of international criminal law standards and principles – particularly the amendments introduced after the United Nations Security Council referred the Darfur situation to the ICC. The article critically examines the Sudan government's policy of non-engagement, which ultimately led to supra-national criminal prosecution (represented by the ICC intervention under the complementarity principle of the Rome Statute). Finally, the article interrogates the report issued by the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of its recommendations.     

International Law and the November 2004 “Han Incident”

Abstract

The Ishigaki Strait is an international strait by the terms of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, but for national security reasons it is not recognized as such by the Japanese government, which advocates a narrower definition of what constitutes an international strait in which the right of transit passage applies. China, as a traditional land power with tradinationally weak maritime forces, has historically agreed with Japan's limitations on access through such straits. As China's maritime strength grows, it has increasingly greater interest in access to ocean spaces. However, because of tension and poor coordination between its military and foreign policy bureaucracies, China missed an opportunity during the diplomatic crisis in November 2004 to align its position on maritime law with its strategic interests.     

The Circuitous Nature of Operation Ajax

In seeking to protect its economic interests and its control of oil resources in Iran, Britain planned to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Dr Mohammad Mossadegh in a military coup d’état following his decision to nationalize the Iranian oil industry in 1951. However, the British initially faced strong opposition to this plan from the US under the Truman administration, which preferred a more diplomatic approach to the crisis and did not see British interests as being in line with its own. Facing this opposition and after unsuccessful attempts to oust the Iranian leader through economic pressure and propaganda campaigns, the British skillfully leveraged American fear of Communism to secure Washington, under the Eisenhower Administration, as a partner to lead a joint US-UK mission to overthrow Mossadegh. This paper explores the reasons behind the shift in American policy regarding this issue, exploring whether it was the Brit's successful use of covert, circuitous tactics to achieve their intended outcomes or solely a result of ideological differences between the two US administrations     

“Bordering on Treason”? Sir Raphael Cilento and Pre‐Second World War Fascism in Australia

Sir Raphael Cilento died on 16 April 1985 at the age of ninety‐two. The notice in the Canberra Times spoke of Cilento's “worldwide” reputation in tropical medicine, his contribution to the public health service in Queensland, and his role with the United Nations in the immediate post‐war years. In short, he was an “eminent son of Australia”. But Sir Raphael Cilento's halo has been tarnished by his persistent eugenicist beliefs and his later association with the anti‐Semitic League of Rights. There were also lingering allegations and rumours about his apparent pre‐war association with Fascism. Without the evidentiary “smoking gun”, this association has occasionally been alluded to by scholars but never fully examined. Drawing on an unreleased, previously classified security file, this article addresses this question in Cilento's life. Through an examination of what the security service and military intelligence knew of Cilento's activities, the article argues that Cilento was at best an active fellow traveller and at worst a card‐carrying Fascist who narrowly escaped internment.     

Economic Growth,Regime Insecurity,and Military Strategy: Explaining the Rise of Noncombat Operations in China

Abstract

Although China's armed forces have yet to complete its ambitious modernization program, its military strategy has begun to emphasize the ability to conduct noncombat operations such as disaster relief and peacekeeping in addition to traditional war fighting. This new component of China's military strategy is best explained by an unexpected relationship between economic growth and regime security. Although growth is key to the legitimacy of leaders in developing countries, it also creates new sources of domestic unrest and increases the vulnerability of the economy to external shocks, both of which, if unchecked, can harm future growth. As a result, developing countries such as China may use their armed forces to maintain political stability and provide services that the state lacks, such as emergency disaster relief. These conclusions are based on original data from China.     

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Iran–Iraq war: an unconventional military’s survival

Abstract

As Iraqi forces invaded the Iranian border shortly after the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) participated in the battle along with the debilitated Iranian Army. The IRGC was a young religious-revolutionary institution that lacked the resources that revolutionary armies and militias conventionally rely on. Nevertheless, it survived the battle pressure and even achieved relative military successes in the second year of the war. By examining personal narratives written by Iranian veterans, this article argues that in the void of conventional resources in the first year of the war, the Guards retrieved elements of their Shia background to recognize a religiously inspired charisma in every combatant who would devotedly step up for martyrdom. This shared understanding of the omnipotent charisma was then acknowledged in action—by commanders’ deployment of it to impose order and through frequently held Shia rituals on the battlefield. It thereby created an alternative source of cohesion and motivation that led to the IRGC’s survival and prepared them for further successful steps by the end of the war’s first year.