Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's China,by David E. Apter and Tony Saich

Abstract

As early as Edgar Snow's pioneering Red Star over China (1937), Yan'an was seen as the “defining moment” of the Chinese Communists' rise to power. Beginning in 1935, Mao Zedong set his personal imprint on the party as he successfully guided it from the disaster of the Long March to the “Congress of Victors” in 1945. This set the stage for the final showdown with Chiang Kai-shek and the hapless Nationalists in the civil war of 1946-49. With the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, the experiences of Yan'an became the blueprint for the reconstruction of China along the lines first laid out in that remote and impoverished town in the northeast.     

Politics of the left in Taiwan

Abstract

The following interview was conducted in Chinese in the United States during February and March 1980. The interviewee is a Taiwan national whose name and identity have been withheld for protection. “X” has been an understanding & sensitive participant, observer and writer on Taiwan's non-KMT political scene for many years.     

Politics of alienation and polarization: Taiwan's Tangwai in the 1980s

Abstract

After a quarter-century power struggle on the Chinese mainland, in 1949 the Chinese Communists (CCP) defeated the Nationalists (the Kuomintang or KMT) and forced Chiang Kai-shek and his totally demoralized army and government to retreat to Taiwan, an island that had been returned to China in 1945 after fifty years of colonial rule by the Japanese. By 1949, the original residents of the island, the Taiwanese, most of whose ancestors had come from the mainland two or three centuries earlier, had already gone through the initial welcoming of the Nationalists and enthusiasm for going back to China in 1945, and the subsequent great shock, anger, and disappointment of the February 28, 1947 Uprising, and the suppression and massacre that followed it. The February 28 Uprising resulted from harsh and oppressive Nationalist policies that forced the generally passive Taiwanese people, particularly the intellectuals, to resort to a series of protest demonstrations, some of them violent. In response, the Nationalist army led by General Chen Yi carried out a bloody purge, a massacre of the Taiwanese sociopolitical elite. The Uprising has since been regarded by many Taiwanese as the most important historic event in contemporary Taiwanese history, a revolutionary fight against injustice and tyranny. The supporters of the Taiwan independence movement have looked upon it as the beginning, the source of inspiration and legitimacy for their movement. In 1949 the six million Taiwanese were no longer happy, and they were suspicious and resentful of the sudden influx of the one-million-strong Chinese mainlanders who had just been decimated and forced by the Communists to flee to Taiwan and were to rule over the Taiwanese as another colonial power.     

The transnational construction of “national allegory”: China and the cultural politics of postcolonial Indonesia

Abstract

“The story of the private individual destiny,” declares Fredric Jameson, “is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture and society.” Using the case of China's involvement in the cultural politics of postcolonial Indonesia, this essay examines the transnational dynamisms of the making of a national allegory and discusses the production and reception of the China images in Sukarno's Indonesia (1949–65), with a focus on the PRC's cultural diplomacy and how Chinese literary principles were appropriated and domesticated, subsequently constituting an integral component of Indonesian cultural politics. Arguing that the narratives about China (both as a sociopolitical entity and a cultural symbol) served as an important transnational inspiration to public deliberations and cultural polemics—thus contributing to the formation of national allegories in postcolonial Indonesia, this essay takes the Jamesonian thesis a step further by suggesting that a transnational imaginary within Third World countries plays a significant part in the making of domestic literary politics. This essay may also be taken as an exercise in going beyond the nation-state-centric historiography that has been the defining characteristic of Asian Studies and pointing to the need to study Sino-Southeast Asian relations from the angle of cultural politics and its intertwining ambiguities with conventional diplomacy.     

The politics of China's peasant revolution

Abstract

Efforts to explain the success of the Chinese Communist revolution have preoccupied more than a few American historians and political scientists in recent years. Most of these scholars, following the trail blazed by George Taylor's The Struggle for North China, have focused attention on the War of Resistance period (1937–1945) in search of the factors responsible for the phenomenal growth in Communist power. Chalmers Johnson, with his famous thesis of “peasant nationalism,” emphasizes the importance of the Japanese invasion for rural mobilization in China. Mark Selden, by contrast, identifies the Communist Party's positive wartime policies—the “Yenan Way”—as the key to revolutionary victory. Carl Dorris, while agreeing with much of Selden's explanation, locates the source of these successful wartime policies not in the capital of Yenan, but in the guerrilla bases of North China, especially Jin-Cha-Ji.     

Between Interest and Responsibility: Assessing China's Foreign Policy and Burgeoning Global Role

Abstract

This article is situated within the contemporary debates about the nature and purpose of China's growing power. It uses the concepts of “national interest” and “international responsibility” as a framework of analysis for Chinese foreign policy, and develops a three-dimensional typology to conceptualize their relationship (antagonistic; instrumental; mutually constitutive). This article adopts two main arguments. First, a stronger China is one gravitating toward greater notions of international responsibility, albeit instrumentally. Second, observable trends in China's evolving worldview indicate, however, that it is conceiving its national interests more broadly, embracing further socialization and greater normative commitments to international society. One may therefore view China's burgeoning global role as a great power with a degree of “cautious optimism.”     

China's industrial revolution: Politics,planning and management, 1949 to the present,by Stephen Andors

Abstract

The study of Chinese industrial development has come a long way since the 1969 publication of Barry Richman's Industrial Society in Communist China (New York: Random House, 1969). Richman recognized that China had begun to “organize conscientiously and vigorously for industrial progress since the beginning of the 1950's.” Unlike some of his predecessors, he did not explain China's industrial growth in terms of mass coercion or swarms of “blue ants” instead, he warned the reader that “in order to understand more fully how Chinese management and Chinese organization function, it is essential to have an understanding of Chinese ideology.” His examples of the use of ideology-e.g., the study of Mao's On Contradiction to help resolve a problem of cost vs. quality in bicycle production-were refreshingly concrete and useful.     

Rejoinder

Abstract

Many of Mr. van Walt's criticisms are based solely on fabrications of his own making. For example, I am accused, twice, of referring to myself as a “scholar” and to my article as “scholarly.” I could find no trace of either. I am further accused of considering all Tibetan refugee accounts as “unreliable.” To be sure, I believe that one cannot base the study of historical events solely on refugee accounts, but that does not make all of these stories “unreliable.” After all, Dawa Norbu, a refugee himself, wrote in Red Star Over Tibet, “I never saw or heard of any case of misconduct by a Red soldier.” I would never argue that this statement was unreliable. We are further told that I refer to Tibetans as Chinese when in the second paragraph of my review I wrote, “… Tibetans [are] only one of 56 minority nationalities.” Chinese citizens yes, ethnic Hans no. A final example, although there are many more, is Mr. van Walt's attempt to attribute to me the opinion that

… the only importance to the Western academic world is that the situation in Tibet can teach us how to eliminate a “mystical religion” and that “it gives clues as to how Peking will integrate a capitalist Taiwan into a Communist China in the future”. (emphasis added)     

Textbooks and Patriotic Education: Wartime Memory Formation in China and Japan

The treatment of the wartime period in Japan's history textbooks has long been a subject of debate and controversy, even a source of international tension. Since their creation, history textbooks have been used to shape national identity and encourage patriotism. This article, drawing on the comparative study of high school history textbooks in Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States by Stanford's Divided Memories and Reconciliation project, compares the treatment of the wartime period in the textbooks of China and Japan. The study found that Japanese textbooks are relatively devoid of overt attempts to promote patriotism and that they contain more information about controversial wartime issues such as the Nanjing Massacre than is widely believed. In contrast, Chinese textbooks, particularly after their revision a decade ago, are consciously aimed at promoting a nationalist view of the past as part of the country's “patriotic education” campaign. The article warns, however, against efforts in Japan to promote a Japanese-style version of patriotic education.     

Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of “One China” and Beijing’s Taiwan Strait Policy

For rationalists, China (PRC)’s current conciliatory policy toward Taiwan is merely “calculative.” Hence, Chinese leaders must act patiently with Taiwan to dampen the “China threat theory.” This article contends that strategic considerations cannot entirely justify Beijing’s Taiwan policy. Given the PRC’s steadfast position on reunification, it is unclear why Beijing has, since the 1990s, allowed for a looser construction of the “one China” principle and even tacitly acknowledged the existence of Taiwan’s Republic of China (ROC). In line with the constructivist theory of argumentative persuasion, my position stresses that changing discourses have affected Chinese leaders’ perceptions of the Taiwan Strait problem. New identities and interests have been reconstituted to redefine the PRC relations vis-à-vis the ROC. While it is unlikely that Beijing would formally accept the ROC, the current trajectory raises hope that cross-strait ties may become more stabilized in the long run.     

Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization,by Alan M. Wachman

Abstract

How does the national identity problem affect the process of democratization? Is consensus on national identity a prerequisite for democratization? Alan Wachman writes about the most intractable problem in Taiwan and its implications for understanding democratization in general. He contends that previous studies suggesting the importance of a consensus on national identity for building a democratic system are inapplicable to Taiwan. From 1991 to 1993 Wachman interviewed prominent political figures and scholars of various backgrounds in Taiwan regarding five general questions: (I) Is it possible to distinguish between Chinese culture and Taiwanese culture? What are the sources of cultural identity for Taiwanese and Mainlanders? (2) How should we regard China in the present era? Is it a culture, a people, or a place? (3) To what degree is democracy compatible with Chinese culture? (4) How should the matter of Taiwan's political status be resolved? Is democracy a means or an end? (5) To what degree does the inability to resolve the matter of national identity impede the development of democracy in Taiwan?     

Representing Women in Chinese Village Self-Government: A New Perspective on Gender,Representation, and Democracy

ABSTRACT

Recent feminist debate about how to achieve the substantive representation of women in government has been conducted largely in relation to national parliaments in democratic states. This article brings a new perspective by examining grassroots rural government in contemporary China – an authoritarian state, which, however, began implementing village “self-government,” including elections, in 1987. The article draws on qualitative fieldwork in the Chinese provinces of Zhejiang and Yunnan. The authors went into this fieldwork with an understanding that women's substantive representation, democracy, and gender equality are mutually constituted and with an expectation that village self-government might make a much-needed contribution to the achievement of all three. However, we ran into trouble with this analytical framework. First, there were marked variations in villagers’ practices and understandings of “representation.” Second, we found that democracy was not a prerequisite for substantive representation. Third, most villagers we talked with claimed that “men and women are equal” and there was little conception of villagers’ interests diverging by gender. This article explores our analytical “trouble,” with a view to advancing scholarship on constraints to democracy in authoritarian states and suggesting fruitful directions for feminist theorists interested in the relationship between gender, representation and democracy.     

How America mocked the ceasefire: Vietnam since the paris agreement

Abstract

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s human rights violations before and after 1949 have included torture, prison labor, repression of autonomous worker unions, suppression of ethnic collective rights, religious persecution, forced sterilization, and unethical medical violations of human organ transplants. These violations have been concretely documented by China scholars, Chinese dissident organizations, foreign governments, and international human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). While international attention often focuses on the violations of civil and political liberties (such as the unlawful detention of China's small, but increasingly vocal, dissident community), violations of economic, social, and cultural human rights have also been clearly documented. Such documentation explodes the myth, believed by Chinese and foreign observers alike, that China under communist rule has succeeded with economic and social rights while “lagging” behind in political and civil rights.     

The Initiation of the Sino-Indian rivalry

ABSTRACT

Sino-Indian interactions after the mid-19th century had a causal influence on Chinese and Indian elite perceptions. Modern China encountered modern India as an agent of British imperialism. China perceived India as an “imperial” power in the late 1940s by resorting to the availability heuristic while doubting India’s intentions in Tibet/Southeast Asia. By contrast, India viewed China as a fellow victim of colonialism that had sought India’s help during World War II. Consequently, India perceived China as a “partner” in postwar/postcolonial Asia. This interpretation was based on confirmation bias after 1947, despite contradictory Chinese signals. India’s image of China changed only after the 1950–51 invasion/annexation of Tibet. India then ascribed the image of an “expansionist/hegemonic” power to China based on historical analogy. Nevertheless, they carefully calibrated their strategies towards each other in consonance with these images until the 1959 Lhasa Uprising, thereby preventing their relationship from descending into militarized hostilities.     

Extremists are extremely extreme

Abstract

China's foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution is usually treated as a non-event. Melvin Gurtov in his careful and extremely useful chronological account of China's foreign policy at this time (RAND, RM-5934-PR) still deems it “an aberrant episode” (VII, 83). He describes it as the manifestation of a power struggle between extreme young zealots and implacable older powerholders. “Substantive policy views” are almost beside the point (76). Far Eastern Economic Review (1968 Year Book) also characterizes Cultural Revolution foreign policy as one of “excesses” and “‘extreme’ behavior,” giving anti-foreignism as its content. Anti-foreignism is seen as a deeply felt belief that an attempt to borrow from foreigners has resulted in “manipulation and exploitation” by foreigners. Yung Ho, writing for the Union Research Institue's (URI) Communist China 1967, finds the essence of Mao's thought to be opposition to “anything foreign,” and China's attempt at “propagating Mao-Tse-tung's thought abroad” to be an aggressive policy “even worse than Hitler's rule,” one which inevitably produced setbacks which further isolate China (326–327).     

An “Assertive” China? Insights from Interviews

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a more assertive China. What happened to China's “peaceful rise” and “charm offensive”? What explains the changes in China's foreign policy? According to interviews with Beijing and Shanghai-based analysts, China's assertiveness between 2008 and 2010 can be divided into two waves, each triggered by a different cause. The first wave seems triggered by a sense in Beijing that Washington, DC was more differential to China's interests, and less committed to East Asia. The second wave seems best explained as China's response to what it perceived as a far more assertive and threatening United States. Both waves were amplified by two domestic challenges: Chinese leaders’ hypersensitivity to popular nationalism and poor bureaucratic coordination among an expanding number of foreign policy actors.     

DIALOGUE WITH THE WEST

Abstract

This portrayal of China by one of the most respected intellectuals ever to emerge from the shadowy labyrinth of the American diplomatic establishment mirrors twenty years of concentrated work by American China scholars. Not every China expert would accept all of Kennan's assumptions or express them in such strident form. Yet over the last two decades the China profession has evolved a style of thought, a mode of asking questions, which has largely substantiated such views in both the public and scholarly worlds. The majority of China watchers have pleaded for “tolerance” and “patience” towards the People's Republic as she gradually learns, aided by a flexible American containment policy, to “adjust” to the “international community of nations” and the “rationalizing” qualities implicit in the “modernization” process. While protesting against certain aspects of America's foreign policy toward China, however, their thought and work has reinforced, at times deepened, the ideological justifications that support America's role in Asia and her attitudes towards China.     

“The Chinese Dream” and Chinese Foreign and Security Policies—Rosy Rhetoric versus Harsh Realities

The “China Dream” announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping’ in 2012 paints a very rosy picture of China under his seemingly undisputed leadership: China's economic and political rise will be beneficial to China and indeed the international community putting Beijing on top of the list of “peace-loving” countries. Reality, however, as it turned out over the last four years, is distinctively different as a number of countries in China's neighborhood and beyond can surely confirm. Indeed, Beijing unilaterally claiming and building civilian and military facilities on disputed islands in the South China Sea are arguably the very opposite of a peaceful contribution to world politics and security facilitated by the rhetorical hype of Xi's “Chinese Dream.” While outside observers can be excused for concluding that the “Chinese Dream” mantra is directed at the Chinese domestic audience to distract from the very many economic, environment and social problems within China, the consequences of Beijing's “dreaming” of re-gaining its former undisputed “Middle Kingdom” status in Asia are very much felt abroad. This, it is argued, could be the time when “dreams” turn into “nightmares” for those at the receiving end of Beijing's dream.     

SOUTH ASIA

For nearly a hundred years, to many foreigners “Peking” meant the foreign legation quarter and its colourful western inhabitants. The article gives details of the extraordinary life they led a stone's throw from the Emperor's palace in a city that remained virtually untouched by the modern world. After the Boxer Rising of 1900, the legation quarter became a Treaty Port with its own laws and administration. That status continued through the First World War and beyond. But just as the foreigners were at last beginning to value Peking's uniqueness, the end was in sight. Life changed a lot after the 1937 Japanese invasion of China and, for many, internment followed the attack on Pearl Harbour. But the end came when Treaty port status was abolished for good at the end of the War     

Analyzing China's socialist revolution

Abstract

Recent trends in “China scholarship” include two dominant sets of goals and foci in examining China's socialist revolution. Exponents of the more traditional view, represented here by Lucian Pye's Mao Tse-tung, seek to explain it away as a pathological deviation from “normality” in social development. The extremism of Pye's book makes it almost a caricature of the worst in the first trend. By the same token this extremism makes the prejudices and assumptions on which this trend is based easier to perceive than would be the case with other more subtle works. The less traditional and less frequently published view, represented here by Nee and Peck's China's Uninterrupted Revolution attempts to comprehend the Chinese Revolution, historically and philosophically, as a meaningful process directed at increasing human liberation.