Preventing protectionism: International institutions and trade policy

This paper examines the role of international institutions in preventing the rise of protectionism. We analyze states?? choices in trade policy during the current global economic crisis, a situation likely to exacerbate uncertainty in the conduct of commercial relations and to push countries toward ??beggar-thy-neighbor?? trade policies. The main argument of the paper is that the numerous international institutions present in the international system during the current economic crisis serve as conveyors of information and mechanisms of commitment and socialization. They mitigate the uncertainty problem that prevails in prisoner??s dilemma settings such as trade. Economic international organizations increase the flow of information about the preferences and behaviors of its members. Non-economic organizations also have a role to play as social environments that encourage cooperation. Specialized international institutions devoted to trade, such as the WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), not only provide monitoring and enforcement functions but also lock in commitments to liberal trade through legal obligations that make defections costly. We test our argument using a dataset of trade policies during the current economic crisis and of membership in international organizations. The paper finds strong support for the role of international institutions as commitment and socialization mechanisms in preventing the rise of protectionism.     

The negotiation burden of institutional interactions: non-state organizations and the international negotiations on forests

The participation of non-state actors in international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no longer discussed in single isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organizations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as ‘regime complexes’. This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it with the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found to be insignificant, political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found to be real, demanding a certain type of material and organizational resources in order for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, non-governmental organizations being dominant with respect to business groups.     

全球公共卫生治理的制度重叠及其应对之策

近年来,全球公共卫生治理体系彼此通过议题联结、成员联系和功能互动形成了密切的国际制度重叠,包括以世卫组织为核心的联合国诸公共卫生制度、以盖茨基金会等为代表的非正式公共卫生制度、以二十国集团为代表的涉卫新型国际制度以及特朗普政府试图打造的美式国际公共卫生制度。制度重叠是国际公共卫生秩序的结构性特征,可能会约束与限制世卫组织治理有效性的发挥。全球公共卫生议题的复杂性、全球公共卫生治理的政治化倾向和世卫组织的治理限度决定了协同治理具有必然性和紧迫性,为此,国际社会需要秉持人类卫生健康共同体理念,坚持公共卫生多边主义,警惕美国另起炉灶对全球公共卫生治理的冲击。同时,世卫组织发挥协同治理功能的制度化需求迫在眉睫。此外,新型国际公共卫生治理制度是推动多元制度协同治理的重要力量,将发挥愈加凸显的关键作用。作为国际公共卫生体系的重要成员,中国的负责任国际承诺为国际公共卫生制度重叠提供了重要的协调路径,中国支持世卫组织发挥领导作用,加强在联合国、二十国集团、世贸组织、金砖国家集团等多边制度框架内的协调配合和相互支撑,推动构建人类卫生健康共同体。     

Global Economic Governance between China and the EU: the case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

The recent establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the initiative launched by the People’s Republic of China in 2013 underpins Beijing’s intensions to promote its own narrative about global economic governance (GEG) as well as China’s readiness to play a far more proactive role at the international level. In the age of global power shifting and with 14 EU member-states part of the AIIB, the European Union (EU) necessitates to engage further with China, in particular, within the context of multilateral institutions. This article analyses the impact of China’s evolving global governance policies on the EU. China’s and EU’s approaches to the reform of global governance present both differences and similarities, yet, the article highlights EU’s needs to make sense to what extent China’s growing ascent in the realm of global governance is reshaping world’s regional and global architectures vis-à-vis financial multilateral cooperation.     

Looking beyond States: Openings for international bureaucrats to enter the institutional design process

Surprisingly little research investigates a stark reality: the vast majority of today’s international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) were crafted not by states alone, but with participation by international bureaucrats working in pre-existing IGOs. What explains this phenomenon? Drawing on international relations scholarship, this article develops predictions involving the capabilities of states, or a matter’s salience to states. The predictions are tested with a new and original dataset that captures, for the first time, variation in the roles that international bureaucrats play in the institutional design arena. Statistical analyses find that states’ need for expertise, as well as the design negotiations’ distance from high-politics, leave openings for international bureaucrats to enter institutional design processes. The findings enhance our understanding of institutional design, principal-agent relationships, non-state actors, and divisions of labor in contemporary global governance.     

Democracy,Regional Security Institutions,and Rivalry Mitigation: Evidence From Europe,South America,and Asia

The fact that democracies maintain peaceful relations with each other is regarded as one of the few law-like correlations in international relations, but the causes of this empirical phenomenon remain contested. This paper tries to fill this theoretical gap by attributing the remarkable stability between democracies to inter-democratic institutions. At the same time, it contributes to the debate on the need to differentiate among international organizations in order to assess their peace-building effects. We identify transnational and trans-governmental linkages as crucial features that distinguish inter-democratic from traditional institutions with non-democratic or mixed membership. In order to explain these institutions’ peace-building effect, we analyze the impact of international institutions on rivalry mitigation with a view to five pairs of states: France-Germany, Greece-Turkey, Argentina-Brazil, Indonesia-Malaysia, and Japan-South Korea. Those dyads all look back at a history of rivalry, conflict, and mutual threat perceptions, and they are located in highly institutionalized regional settings but vary with regard to their political regime type. The controlled comparison of cases demonstrates that the embeddedness of international institutions in transnational and trans-governmental linkages corresponds to each member's regime type and that these institutional differences are responsible for the varying extent of rivalry mitigation.     

Choosing international organizations: When do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects?

While international cooperation research emphasizes institutional design, states mostly interact with existing organizations. How do states choose organizations for cooperation? We develop a theory of agency choice for development projects, emphasizing the importance of domestic institutions, the scope of cooperation, and the resources of the implementing agency. If states are to cooperate with funding agencies that have abundant resources, such as the World Bank, they must accept more stringent conditions on project implementation. We argue states accept the stringent conditions that resourceful organizations demand if the public goods from project implementation are highly valuable. Empirically, this is the case for democratic states, large projects, and projects that produce national instead of global public goods. We test this theory using data on 2,882 Global Environment Facility (GEF) projects, 1991–2011. The GEF offers an ideal case because various implementing agencies are responsible for the actual projects. States implement projects in collaboration with the World Bank, which has the most expertise and resources among the GEF’s implementing agencies, if their regime type is democracy, the project size is large, and the benefits are primarily national. Qualitative evidence sheds light on causal mechanisms.     

Global Governance Reform

President Barack Obama has trumpeted a ＂new era of engagement＂ for the United States. The central components of his strategy include a world order characterized by peaceful accommodation between established and rising powers; the collective management of transnational problems; and the overhaul of international institutions to reflect these shifting power dynamics and the new global agenda. Placing less emphasis than his predecessor on the pursuit of American primacy, Obama envisions--indeed, insists-that other global powers assume new responsibilities. Notwithstanding its multilateral instincts, though, the Obama administration is limited in its practical ability to promote and embrace sweeping reforms to global governance. Therefore, rather than casting its lot entirely with universal organizations like the United Nations, the United States will adopt a pragmatic approach to international cooperation that combines formal institutions with more flexible partnerships to achieve US national interests. The balance sheet for Obama＇s first year in office underscores both the opportunities for and the constraints on global governance reform in the current geopolitical environment.     

Foundations of an Authoritarian Populism in an International Context

The rise of populism, and its subsequent challenge to liberal democratic institutions, is an ongoing feature of twenty-first century global politics. The author contends that providing college students with theoretical tools to untangle the relationship between the logic and practices of domestic populist political movements and liberal democratic institutions empowers them to analyze critically those challenges and consider the extent to which populism is indicative of prior institutional failure. The work of Antonio Gramsci and Ernesto Laclau are used to develop a model of populism appropriate for advanced undergraduate international relations students. The cases of the Tea Party, Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, Victor Orbán’s rise in Hungary demonstrate the dynamics of the model and its relevance to the study of international relations and foreign policy.     

The Diplomacy of Business

The “new” global capitalism is transforming the ways in which commerce is conducted and organized. Business enterprises have to perform and compete in a largely unregulated global market economy if they are to survive, let alone prosper, and contend with higher levels of financial and political risks. Transnational Corporations (TNCs) have come to occupy a pivotal position in the world economy, commanding immense financial resources and employing tens of thousands throughout the world, and are active participants in global political and economic affairs. TNC executives—the global corporate elite—crisscross the planet as they manage local, national, and international relationships, and represent and advance their global interests in myriad international conferences and meetings. TNCs are now interacting with states and international governmental organizations on a broad array of issues and problems (many far removed from the core business). As global actors with distinct and clear interests, they have had to develop their own representational mechanisms to manage the complex relationships that mark today’s global system.     

Civil Society Democratising Global Governance? Potentials and Limitations of “Counter-Democracy”

A major aspect of global interdependencies during the last two decades has been the intensified interactions between international organizations (IOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). In this paper, we propose a new way of analysing the potential of CSO inclusion to democratise global governance. The aim is to explore the possibility for CSOs to function as a form of counter-democratic force. This approach contrasts with earlier research that has tended to focus on participation, voice or representation when evaluating IO-CSO interaction from a democratisation perspective. Using Pierre Rosanvallon's term, we argue that counter-democratic actors organise distrust against power-holders, pressuring them to strengthen accountability. Counter-democracy is manifested in the institutions, agents and functions that are committed to overseeing ruling institutions, expressing mistrust and channelling dissent. Importantly, counter-democracy is not contrary to democracy, but a vital and perennial aspect of it. Our argument is that Rosanvallon's concept of counter-democracy can help us understand how the monitoring activities of CSOs may restrain the power of IOs and make them more responsible which in turn can be related to democratic qualities of global governance. However, we maintain that not all activities of transnational CSOs have counter-democratic qualities. To examine if and how a specific CSO might serve as a democratising force in global governance, we suggest that the actors and their activities should be scrutinised according to an analytical framework centred on the concepts of power-resources, ideational foundations and activities. Empirically, we investigate three carefully selected cases of CSOs that perform monitoring activities in a global governance context: the Corporate Europe Observatory, the NGO forum on the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and NGO Monitor.     

美国生物防御政策与国家安全

生物防御政策是美国政府旨在应对生物威胁、降低生物风险以及为生物事故事先准备、响应及恢复的行动纲要。自21世纪初以来,美国历届总统皆格外注重生物防御政策的制定和完善,从小布什到特朗普,一共颁布了六部相关法案,发布了七份国家战略报告,签发了五项行政命令,通过拨付巨额经费,设置若干专门机构,整合各种资源,加强国际合作等方式,不断提升生物防御和生物安全在国家安全战略中的地位,旨在为美国构筑一道双向度、立体化、全谱系的"生物安全屏障"。究其原因,主要是为了应对恐怖组织不断寻求生物武器给美国带来的威胁,敌对国家不断掌握和研制生物武器产生的持续性压力以及国际社会的相关立法约束乏力。美国生物防御政策对全球生物安全具有双重影响:一方面,通过与其他国家、相关国际组织展开交流与对话,为其提供生物安全援助等方式推动该领域的国际合作;另一方面,自身庞大的生物防御项目、巨额的经费投入、本国安全利益"唯上"的思维又使全球生物安全形势面临恶化的风险。     

Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960–2001

In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several data sets on militant groups and violent nonstate actors and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions.     

States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly important participants in international environmental institutions. NGOs have been formally—but not fully—incorporated into what were previously "states-only" activities. This article surveys these new participatory roles and offers an analytical framework for understanding the pattern, terms, and significance, for international theory, of NGO inclusion. NGOs are distinctive entities with important skills and resources to deploy in the process of international environmental cooperation. Rather than undermining state sovereignty, active NGO participation enhances the abilities of states to regulate globally. The empirical pattern of NGO participation has been structured across time and functional areas to reap these gains. Recent evidence from the restructuring of the World Bank's Environment Facility is used to test these claims. That NGOs are now more pervasive in international environmental institutions illustrates the expansion, not the retreat, of the state in addressing global environmental problems.     

哈萨克斯坦参与全球治理的举措、动力及前景

自1991年独立以来,哈萨克斯坦不但成功巩固了国家主权,在政治、经济、社会发展等领域取得了举世瞩目的成就,而且在外交领域赢得了国际社会的高度赞誉,使哈萨克斯坦成为全球治理舞台中最为活跃的中亚国家。在参与全球治理进程中,哈萨克斯坦将自己定位为“有实力的重要地区大国”,奉行以巩固主权独立和维护国家利益为中心的“全方位务实平衡”外交战略,通过建立睦邻友好信任带的“近邻外交”和以伙伴关系为基础的“远邻外交”,拉近与世界各大国及周边国家的外交关系,在国际和地区热点问题上扮演着“沟通者”和“调停者”角色,积极推动中亚地区内部的一体化进程,广泛参与全球与地区性国际组织,在核不扩散和文明对话等领域提出了各种有影响力的倡议,力图将本国的利益和世界的利益融为一体,为哈萨克斯坦的发展赢得了很大的机遇和空间,使哈萨克斯坦在国际社会中的能见度不断提升。作为中亚国家经济发展最为成功、外交最为活跃、国际影响力最为显著的国家,哈萨克斯坦参与全球治理的实践经验值得发展中国家学习借鉴。     

Contested multilateralism

“Contested multilateralism” describes the situation that results from the pursuit of strategies by states, multilateral organizations, and non-state actors to use multilateral institutions, existing or newly created, to challenge the rules, practices, or missions of existing multilateral institutions. It occurs when coalitions dissatisfied with existing institutions combine threats of exit, voice, and the creation of alternative institutions to pursue policies and practices different from those of existing institutions. Contested multilateralism takes two principal forms: regime shifting and competitive regime creation. It can be observed across issue areas. It shapes patterns of international cooperation and discord on key security concerns such as combating terrorist financing, halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and banning certain conventional weapons. It is also evident on economic issues involving intellectual property, on environmental and energy issues, and in the realm of global public health. The sources of dissatisfaction are primarily exogenous, and the institutions used to challenge the status quo range from traditional treaties or intergovernmental organizations to informal networks, some of which include non-state actors. Some institutions are winners from the process of contested multilateralism; others may lose authority or status. Although we do not propose an explanatory theory of contested multilateralism, we do suggest that this concept provides a useful framework for understanding changes in regime complexes and the strategies that generate such changes.     

The EU Global Strategy in a Transitional International Order

This article explores the prospects for the EU’s role as a global leader in a transitional international order, based on the assumption that multilateral principles will remain at the heart of global governance. It focuses in particular upon the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy in the context of three principal trends and challenges for global governance: political and normative challenges, legitimacy challenges, and systemic challenges. It argues that the prospects for the EU’s global role are limited as long as the EU remains committed to traditional forms and norms of global governance, because these are increasingly out of touch with the emerging international order, and the nature of contemporary collective action challenges.     

习近平国际公平正义观的理论内涵与实践路径

面对当今国际社会多边主义和单边主义、公道和霸道之争,中国国家主席习近平统筹国内国际两个大局,统合国内社会与国际社会公平正义,创新发展马克思主义的公平正义观、中华优秀传统文化的公平正义思想、中国百年外交实践的公平正义观,提出以世界人民为主体的习近平国际公平正义观,积极倡导国际社会推动权利平等、机会平等、国际规则平等,争取全球治理体系更加符合国际形势的变化需要,更加满足应对后疫情时代全球挑战的现实需要,更加顺应和平发展合作共赢的历史趋势,为增进各国政治互信、促进共同发展、引领全球治理、维护世界和平提供了中国智慧和中国方案。     

Fragile states

Since the 1990s, states that lack the capacity to discharge their normal functions and drive forward development have been referred to as ‘fragile states’. This article focuses on Africa, which not only has the largest concentration of prototypical fragile states, but has been the focus of attention for scholars, international development agencies, and practitioners. The author reviews competing analyses of the post-colonial African state and concludes that its characteristics of weak institutions, poverty, social inequalities, corruption, civil strife, armed conflicts, and civil war are not original conditions, but are rooted in specific historical contexts. It is essential to understand both the external and internal factors of fragility if such states are to get the assistance and empowerment that they need – not only for the benefit of their impoverished citizens, but also for the sake of global peace, prosperity, and security. Ultimately, it is the citizens of the countries concerned who are responsible for determining when states are no longer fragile – not ‘benevolent’ donors and the international community, whose prime motivation for interventions supposedly to strengthen the state is to ensure that fragile states find their ‘rightful’ places in the hegemonic global order.