The organization of influence on the EC's common agriculturalpolicy: A network approach

The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.     

The organization of influence on the EC's common agricultural policy: A network approach

Abstract The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers' lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.     

The Ties that Bind? Intra-party Information Exchanges of German MPs in EU Multi-level Politics

As political authority is successively transferred from the national to the EU level, national parliaments are often considered to lose control over the domestic political agenda. Yet recent studies suggest that national parliaments cannot simply be labelled ‘losers’ of European integration. National parliaments have institutionally adapted to the EU in order to better scrutinise and control their governments in EU affairs. While existing research shows how parliaments employ their institutional opportunities to exercise scrutiny in the national arena, this paper suggests that MPs also employ informal strategies to obtain information on EU affairs to control and influence their governments. It argues that MPs primarily act through political parties, which are viewed here as multi-level organisations, and make use of their partisan ties to regional, transnational and supranational party actors to obtain information on EU issues. The article probes this argument by drawing on original data obtained through a survey of German MPs in 2009.     

Zur Theorie der Interessenvermittlung: Ein Netzwerkansatz dargestellt am Beispiel der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik

Recent policy network studies contribute significantly to the theory of interest mediation. Despite this contribution policy network approaches still contain major theoretical deficiencies and a lack of empirical application can be observed. In this context a typology of systems of interest mediation is theoretically derived on the basis of new developments in the political exchange theory (Pappi/Henning 1998a). Analogously to the typology of economic markets, the typology corresponds to the social organization of political exchange in policy networks. Further, it is demonstrated that in contrast to conclusions found in the literature no general correspondence of specific types of interest mediation and policy-outcomes in terms of weak versus strong states, efficient versus inefficient economic policies and biased versus unbiased mediation of societies interests can be expected. In the empirical part of the paper the typology is applied to the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) using policy network data. In particular, a block model analysis is applied aggregating a set of multiple network relations among a multitude of public and private actors operating in the CAP to identify whether the overall social macro structure corresponds to national clientelism or supranational pluralism.     

Legitimacy through targeted transparency? Regulatory effectiveness and sustainability of lobbying regulation in the European Union

Regulating interest groups’ access to decision makers constitutes a key dimension of legitimate and accountable systems of government. The European Union explicitly links lobbying regulation with the democratic credentials of its supranational system of governance and proposes transparency as a solution to increase legitimacy and regulate private actors’ participation in policy making. This lobbying regulation regime consists of a Transparency Register that conditions access to decision makers upon joining it and complying with its information disclosure requirements. The extent to which transparency‐based regulatory regimes are successful in ensuring effective regulation of targeted actors and in being recognised as a legitimate instrument of governance constitutes a key empirical question. Therefore, the study asks: Do stakeholders perceive the transparency‐based EU lobbying regulation regime to be a legitimate form of regulatory governance? The study answers by building on a classic model of targeted transparency and proposes perceived regulatory effectiveness and sustainability as two key dimensions on which to evaluate the legitimacy of the Register. The arguments are tested on a new dataset reporting the evaluations of 1,374 stakeholders on the design and performance of the EU lobbying regulation regime. The findings describe a transparency regime that scores low in perceived effectiveness and moderate to low in sustainability. Citizens criticise the quality of information disclosed and the Register's performance as a transparency instrument. The Register did not effectively bridge the information gap between the public and interest groups about supranational lobbying. In terms of sustainability, interest organisations appreciate the systemic benefits of transparency, but identify few organisation‐level benefits. Organisations that are policy insiders incur more transparency costs so they instrumentally support transparency only insofar it suits their lobbying strategies and does not threaten their position. Insiders support including additional categories of organisations in the Register's regulatory remit but not more types of interactions with policy makers. They support an imperfect regulatory status quo to which they have adapted but lack incentives to support increased transparency and information disclosure. Targeted transparency proves an ineffective approach to regulating interest groups’ participation in EU policy making, constituting a suboptimal choice for ensuring transparent, accountable and legitimate supranational lobbying.     

Social capital and the public‐private divide in Greek regions

This article argues that the concept of social capital, by facilitating collective action among the actors within institutional networks, constitutes a prerequisite for overcoming the public‐private divide and achieving synergies at the regional and local levels. Thus, within the framework of European regional policy, it is considered to be the crucial factor for the processes of institutional learning and successful adaptation/Europeanisation of the subnational systems of governance. The case of Greece demonstrates that the combination of a centralised state structure and a weak civil society breeds the creation of hierarchical, clientelistic networks that undermine the process of crossing the public—private divide and inhibits the Europeanisation function of subnational governments.     

Corporate interests and public affairs: organised business–government relations in EU member states

The internationalisation of economic and political affairs changes the way in which business interests are brought to bear on public policy. This is a global phenomenon but can, in particular, be observed in Europe. The construction of the European Union, the development of the Single Market and the build‐up of the policy institutions to go with it, together change business–government relations profoundly. This paper answers the question of how organised business interests relate to government agencies and political institutions. By using the example of trade associations in the Netherlands and Germany, the paper shows that, despite the internationalisation of public affairs in Europe, the national political level remains strategically important for the representation of business interests. The paper thus argues that changes in European business–government relations are institutionally embedded at both the European and the national level. The implication for future research is that much of the dynamics of economic and political internationalisation materialises within the domestic arrangements of interest politics. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Corporate interests and public affairs: organised business–government relations in EU member states

The internationalisation of economic and political affairs changes the way in which business interests are brought to bear on public policy. This is a global phenomenon but can, in particular, be observed in Europe. The construction of the European Union, the development of the Single Market and the build‐up of the policy institutions to go with it, together change business–government relations profoundly. This paper answers the question of how organised business interests relate to government agencies and political institutions. By using the example of trade associations in the Netherlands and Germany, the paper shows that, despite the internationalisation of public affairs in Europe, the national political level remains strategically important for the representation of business interests. The paper thus argues that changes in European business–government relations are institutionally embedded at both the European and the national level. The implication for future research is that much of the dynamics of economic and political internationalisation materialises within the domestic arrangements of interest politics. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Bread-and-Butter Agreement and High Politics Disagreement Some Reflections on the Contextual Impact on Agricultural Interests in EC Policy-Making*

In public policy literature a classical argument is that the scope and content of decisions shape both the structure of the policy-making process and the configuration of actors involved. Recent studies have strongly emphasized that the patterns of segmentation and specialization found in national policy-making are also found in EC policy-making. Against this background, the present article discusses the conditions and impact of agricultural interests in EC policy-making in light of the economic crisis of recent years and the increasing budgetary problems faced by the EC. The article illustrates, especially with reference to the Danish case, the special importance of the national interest organization-government relationship for the strategies pursued by national agricultural interest organizations in influencing EC/CAP policy-making. Furthermore, the article indicates how policy-making concerning the CAP has become more complicated as a consequence of the general economic crisis and recent sharp fall in farmers' incomes. National governments are the central actors in the Community policy-making process, and their impulse to promote exclusive national interests in the Community policy-making process has increased. In addition, agriculture has been integrated in the overall Community ‘crisis’ policy, and this development has weakened the segmentation in relation to the CAP. However, because of the general problems of the EC, the national agricultural organizations of the various member states have a growing interest in emphasizing joint activities and mutual agreement with regard to fundamental agricultural issues on Community level. This may affect the role of COPA leaving it primarily as a coordinator and mediator among the various national agricultural organizations, because pressures are more likely to succeed at the national level than at the EC level. This is where ‘bread-and-butter’ agreement really counts in the future. The alternative is that COPA will lose its credibility in EC policy-making.     

Providing information and building capacity: interest group involvement in the application of EU law

Practical implementation has attracted significant scholarly attention in the European Union in the last decade, and the EU compliance literature started to focus more on the players in the domestic arena to help understand the application of EU law. However, a systematic analysis on interest group activities at the application stage is yet to be conducted. Relying on enforcement and management approaches, this article argues that interest groups act as providers of legal and technical information that are needed for correct application of EU law. Also, interest groups actively demand information from political actors to build internal capacity during this period. The results show that interest groups act as providers of information, but only in the national political arena. Moreover, motivation to learn is another factor that explains the level of access seeking during application, and this type of interaction takes place in both European and national venues.     

Protection of Commercial Satellite Communications Infrastructure

Although a nation's interest in protecting its commercial assets in space would seem obvious, the task of protecting commercial satellites is inherently complicated. Protection of commercial space infrastructure requires coordination among multiple actors in the public and private sectors. Although most public sector actors ultimately report to the same political leadership, the process of establishing coherent policies across agencies can take time. Coordination is even more complicated in the private sector, where multi-national firms compete against each other for profits by serving a wide range of customers.

Given the complexities of this process, it is not surprising that efforts to protect commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) networks have been slow in coming. At the same time, recent progress in the U.S. may pave the way for a more coherent approach to commercial SATCOM protection. If successful, these efforts can provide increased assurance of uninterrupted satellite connectivity, thus benefiting the economic and national security interests of America, its allies and its trading partners.     

When trade liberalization turns into regulatory reform: The impact on business–government relations in international trade politics

Business–government relations on trade issues are generally characterized as protectionist lobbying or – less often – lobbying for the liberalization of markets. However, with the evolution of the trading system, negotiations today concern not just market opening, but also the regulatory frameworks that structure international trade. This transformation has important consequences for the ways in which private interests can contribute to trade negotiations. Instead of simply trying to exert pressure, businesses and other private actors now form working relationships with governments based on expertise, learning, and information exchange. This article illustrates these new forms of public–private interactions with examples from the USA, the European Union, and Brazil.     

Macro-regional strategies of the European Union (EU) and experimentalist design of multi-level governance: the case of the EU strategy for the Danube region

Placed within EU Cohesion policy and its objective of European territorial cooperation, macro-regional strategies of the European Union (EU) aim to improve functional cooperation and coherence across policy sectors at different levels of governance, involving both member and partner states, as well as public and private actors from the subnational level and civil society in a given ‘macro-region’. In forging a ‘macro-regional’ approach, the EU commits to only using existing legislative frameworks, financial programmes and institutions. By applying the analytical lens of multi-level and experimentalist governance (EG), and using the EU Strategy for the Danube Region as a case, this article shows that ‘macro-regional’ actors have been activated at various scales and locked in a recursive process of EG. In order to make the macro-regional experiment sustainable, it will be important to ensure that monitoring and comparative review of implementation experience functions effectively and that partner countries, subnational authorities and civil societies have a voice in what is, by and large, an intergovernmental strategy.     

Domestic European Union Coordination and Interest Group Mobilization in Three Member States: Looking Beyond the Formal Mechanisms

One conclusion in the literature on domestic European Union (EU) coordination is that the formal institutional properties of countries—devolved versus centralized or unitary—affect the nature of coordination practices. Basically, the view has emerged that domestic coordination is a largely bureaucratic process in which political control mechanisms remain relatively weak. Instead of only looking at public authorities and their formal networks, this article relies on a data set that allows us to analyse informal political-administrative networks and look at how societal interests mobilize and target policymakers in order to shape the position governments defend at the EU level. One of our conclusions is that despite devolution in Belgium, its intergovernmental coordination shows a considerable level of network centralization, even when compared to unitary countries such as France and the Netherlands, meaning that there are large differences between the three states with respect to the connectedness of the actors involved.     

Economic Actors' Political Activity in 'Overlap Issues': Privatisation and EU State Aid Control

This article considers the political activity of economic actors in what we refer to as 'overlap issues'. The cases examined here are the domestic level privatisation policy-making processes in Spain, France and Ireland, and the subsequent European Commission decisions on state aids given during the sales. Although the influence of economic actors is crucial in understanding the domestic-level privatisation aid negotiations, such actors' participation is absent in the supranational decision-making process. In order to explain this limited political activity of firms at the EU level, attention is focused on both the role of the member states and the paradoxes in EU policies that simultaneously guide and constrain the Commission from making a decision against capital.     

The electoral consequences of austerity: economic policy voting in Europe in times of crisis

Abstract

Voters typically observe macroeconomic outcomes in order to evaluate government performance. However, during crises, when the clarity of economic responsibility is poor and the economy is in recession, citizens need additional sources of information in order to form a reasoned opinion. Government policy response is one such source. This study shows on a sample of 24 European nations from 2004, 2009 and 2014 that in the post-crisis period, economic policies have emerged as one of the key predictors of vote choice, with government decisions to pursue fiscal austerity leading to significantly lower levels of incumbent support. Furthermore, the paper tests the possibility that the effect of austerity is conditioned by the clarity of responsibility. In multilevel systems, where policies are externally imposed, voters could be expected to hold incumbents less accountable for unpopular measures. The analysis, however, provides no evidence that policy effects depend on the extent to which national governments share policy responsibilities with supranational and intergovernmental institutions. Accountability for policy actions is primarily attributed at the domestic level as voters are able to identify the decisional role of national governments.     

Participation,Dialogue, and Civic Engagement: Understanding the Role of Organized Civil Society in Promoting Active Citizenship in the European Union

Abstract

This article looks at current policies concerning the civic and political participation of youths, women, migrants, and minorities in the European Union. It highlights the ways in which active citizenship and civic engagement have become a political priority for European institutions. Representation of local policy actors at the supranational level and strategies for the inclusion of civil society provide a platform for evaluating the impact of Europeanization at the national and subnational level. The article focuses on key discourses and narratives associated with specific policy frames (e.g. European citizenship, European social policies, and the European public sphere (EPS)). Some of the key questions addressed by the article are: What are the strategies that are employed, both by the European institutions in Brussels and organized civil society (OCS), to enhance participation and reciprocal communication? What vision of governance do practices such as active engagement and civil dialogue represent? Drawing on current theories of governance, our article contributes to the debate about the EPS by evaluating the role of OCS in bridging the gap between European institutions and national polities. Equally, our focus on traditionally marginal groups provides a platform for assessing the institutionalization of the ‘European social dimension’.     

Citizenship—the real democratic deficit of the European union? 1

Given the pressures of globalisation, the nation state is limited in its control over public policy agendas, particularly in the field of social policy. The response of domestic governments to the heat of international competition has been to create more flexible, post‐welfare state economies. A significant consequence of this development is the removal of social rights and the acceleration of social exclusion. This gap which has opened up could be filled by the European Union, but it has so far failed to take a leading role in this regard.

So, as European citizens we should be concerned that the forces which operate to balance the harsher effects of the free market have been lost at the European, supranational level. There are three central reasons why this is the case: (1) the European Union consists of 15 member states with competing, historically rooted understandings of social protection and, therefore, social rights; (2) defining social rights is traditionally a state‐derived function and as such, the absence of an EU state means the absence of comprehensive citizen protection; (3) these two factors are magnified by the relative weakness of the supranational institutions and democratic deficit between the key EU institutions (weak vis‐à‐vis member state governments and with regard to the supremacy of the market).

The combination of these problems has meant that the European Union has not taken the primary role in providing the kind of social protection that we used to enjoy in the domestic context. The result of this is a situation in which the market is determining both the level and even the kind of rights that we are entitled to, thus we are citizens of a European market and not of a European state.

As a state‐derived function, and without a European state, social and citizen rights are being neglected. As a consequence, unless citizen protection is developed through an intergovernmental or supranational framework, it is difficult to see how governments can honour their responsibility to safeguard their people.     

The disentanglement of interest politics: Business associability,the parties and policy in Italy and Greece

Abstract. The article explores changes in the politics of business associability in Italy and Greece, focusing in particular on a set of comparable domestic and European developments that have played the roles of stimuli for the slow but unmistakable transformation of interest politics. Against a background of intense politicization, changes that are taking place since the 1980s suggest that organized interests become disentangled from the linkages which sustained party colonization and state dominance. Changes in interest politics were facilitated by the transition to a majoritarian system (in Italy) and party alternation (in Greece). The disentanglement we refer to would be difficult under conditions of sharing–out government; conversely, alternating governments facilitate changes in the relationships between interests, parties and policy–making. Apart from the domestic sources of change, the article argues that shifts in interest politics are the combined outcome of wider challenges and of the impact of Europeanization. On the basis of this analysis, we speculate that the disentanglement of interest politics may be conducive to national policy adjustment in two possible scenarios. Either by enabling intersectoral agreements over policy issues or by freeing national policymaking from the burden of oligopolistic coalitions — a social democratic and a neoliberal scenario respectively.     

The Political Foundations of the Eurocracy

This article explores the politics behind the design of EU regulatory institutions. The EU has established an extensive ‘Eurocracy’ outside of the Commission hierarchy, including over 30 European agencies and a number of networks of national regulatory authorities (NRAs). The article examines the politics of institutional choice in the EU, explaining why EU policy-makers create agencies in some policy areas, while opting for looser regulatory networks in others. It shows that the design of EU regulatory institutions – ‘the Eurocracy’ – is driven not by functional imperatives but by political considerations related to distributional conflict and the influence of supranational actors.