A note on antitrust damages and leniency programs

The European Commission has in recent years initiated an effort to facilitate private actions for damages in cartel cases. This paper demonstrates in a stylized game-theoretic framework that an increase in antitrust damages can be pro-collusive when a leniency program is already in place. The result holds true even if antitrust authorities are allowed to re-shape their leniency program in reaction to the higher damage level. Larger damage payments imply lower incentives to self-report if damages are not fully encompassed by the leniency program; in effect, the program has to be more generous to enforce self-reporting. But if antitrust authorities are not allowed to offer cash rewards to whistle-blowers, the sufficient level of generosity might be unattainable.     

Incentive effects of class actions and punitive damages under alternative procedural regimes

In an economic perspective, punitive damages and class actions can be viewed as sharing a common economic function—creating optimal deterrence. Building on Parisi and Cenini (Class actions for Europe: perspectives from law and economics, ELGAR, 2010), we study the effect of alternative procedural regimes on the effectiveness of punitive damages and class actions. Specifically, we compare the workings of punitive damages and class actions in the American and English (“loser-pays”) regimes. Our findings help explain the limited use and late adoption of class actions and punitive damages in Europe.     

How damages recovery actions can improve the fight against corruption: the crisis of criminal law policies and the role of private enforcement in an Italian case of judicial corruption

In many countries corruption is rife, despite the fact that there is a criminal-law legislative framework for corruption. Italy is one of these countries. The commitment of judges and prosecutors to combating instances of corruption is often frustrated by the consequences of the excessive length of the proceedings. The fight against corruption has been carried out mainly in the field of criminal law. The criminalisation of corruption both in domestic and in international contexts is not enough to reduce corrupt practices. In the last decade another front in the fight against corruption has been explored: the private law approach as a complement to criminal law policies. Indeed, the same corrupt practise may be subject both to criminal proceedings by public authority and to civil proceedings by the victims of corruption. The argument that private law instruments may be used in order to achieve a public policy goal is not new and goes beyond the definition of "private enforcement" in the context of competition law. The idea of creating a favourable social and legal background to encourage the victims of anti-competitive practices can also be transposed to the fight against corruption. In fact, in many cases of corruption the low percentage of successful criminal persecution and the class of punishment associated with corruption offences do not represent a deterrent, considering the benefits deriving from bribe. This paper aims to address the question as to whether private law remedies under national legal systems could constitute an effective disincentive against corrupt practices, alongside criminal prosecutions. The case CIR vs. Fininvest, Lodo Mondadori is one of the first cases involving damages actions resulting from corrupt practices, and addresses two of the main obstacles to civil actions in this field: evidence and the quantification of damages.     

Advance price announcements and antitrust policy

This paper analyzes the competitive significance of advance price announcements. In the model, advance price announcements are used by firms to communicate private information on demand or cost. By so sharing the information, the firms are able to set their prices at more profitable levels. When the advance price announcements resolve demand uncertainty, profits rise and consumer surplus falls. Interestingly, when the advance price announcements resolve cost uncertainty, both profits and consumer welfare rise. Finally, we examine U.S. antitrust policy regarding price announcements.     

Legal damages for losses of chances

Traditionally, damages for torts have been awarded on an all-or-nothing basis. In malpractice suits, however, a growing number of courts are holding doctors liable for negligent acts that reduces a patient’s chance of survival, even if the patient’s chances for recovery have already been less than 50%. For lack of a general principle, a disparate variety of loss of chance rules seems in use. To provide some more systematic guidance, the present paper proposes to look directly at the interaction between the injurer’s act and a random move of nature that captures the uncertainty. For any given move of nature, damages are still awarded on an all-or-nothing basis. If however, for lack of observability, moves of nature cannot sufficiently be distinguished, averages of correct damages over observable events are taken. While the scheme aims at compensatory goals of tort law, as a by-product, it also generates efficient precaution incentives provided that due care standards obey the Hand Formula.     

Toward a definitive antitrust standard for nonprofit hospital mergers

Despite decades of federal and state regulatory efforts to encourage more efficient utilization of hospital resources, recent federal antitrust enforcement actions assert that nonprofit hospital mergers are detrimental to consumers. This policy, however, is derived from misguided attempts to apply the economic assumptions of for-profit industries to the nonprofit hospital sector and to extend statutes enacted to restrain national economic concentration to local nonprofit enterprises. This paper concludes that a rational antitrust enforcement policy that recognizes the unique characteristics of hospital markets can be described within the confines of existing antitrust statutes.     

非法养殖水产品损害赔偿问题研究

从司法实践发展和《中华人民共和国物权法》《中华人民共和国侵权责任法》的角度论证养殖户对于其非法养殖的水产品具有合法的财产权,因此在海上事故造成非法养殖水产品损失时,事故责任人应当负有赔偿责任,水产品损失赔偿范围应当为其在损失发生时的市场价值,而不应仅限于幼苗养殖成本。对于非法养殖所获取的赔偿或利益,司法机关可以建议相关行政机关予以追究处罚,但是行政违法不应影响民事法律关系下的赔偿责任。     

Hospital mergers and antitrust: an economic analysis

The hospital industry has recently experienced substantial merger activity. This paper examines several actual and proposed hospital mergers to determine the extent of competition in the affected markets and the effect these mergers may have on competition. Our focus is on mergers between hospitals in the same market. We define the relevant product and geographic market for hospitals, then develop criteria for evaluating hospital mergers and analyze several merger cases using these criteria. We conclude that these mergers threaten the competition that exists in most of the markets discussed, and that the claimed efficiency justification for mergers is not convincing.