国外公用事业民营化改革的四种模式及其启示

由英国率先掀起的公用事业民营化改革浪潮,影响到了欧美许多国家。综观各国民营化改革的进程,形成了许多模式,如英国的“政府引导型”模式,美国的“市场自由型”模式,德国的“政府主导型”模式以及法国的“公私合作型”模式。这些模式历史悠久,积累了丰富的经验,尽管各具特色,但都可以给我们以一定的启示,其经验都可以为我国目前正在进行的公用事业民营化改革所借鉴。     

公用事业民营化及其在中国的适用性问题

20世纪80年代以来,在世界性的行政改革浪潮中,公用事业民营化作为西方国家“再造”政府运动的重要内容之一,已逐渐成为西方公用事业改革,及至治理模式变革的基本潮流,并对后发展中国家的行政改革产生了巨大的示范效应。本文对公用事业民营化众说纷纭的理论主张和纷繁复杂的实践举措进行了梳理,并结合中国在局部范围内引入这一改革思路所进行的探索,对公用事业民营化的治理模式在中国的适用性问题进行了分析。     

民营化：公共服务领域管制的路径选择

在公共服务领域管制失灵和全球行政改革的时代背景下,政府再造为公共服务民营化提供了理论与实践支持,将民营化理念融入到公共服务行政治理的构建中去,通过民营化模式来更新公共服务领域的管制,不失为公共服务领域管制的路径选择。     

市场化背景下我国城市公用事业设置独立性管制机构的思路分析

城市公用事业市场化及其管制问题是公共管理学、产业经济学以及管制经济学等领域较为活跃的课题之一,更是当前中国经济体制改革与行政体制改革的热点。本文提出,在我国城市公用事业普遍采用公私合作的市场化改革中,应建立独立性的管制机构,以确保市场化改革后公用事业的公益性。     

制度变迁中国家作用的再思考--从新制度经济学的国家理论看转型期我国公用事业民营化改革

新制度经济学将国家作为影响经济绩效和制度变迁的内生变量纳入分析框架,并运用经济理论进行研究和探讨,从而形成了其独特的国家理论.其中关于国家与制度变迁关系的阐述又是这一理论的重要内容.本文将利用这一理论的研究成果,对转型期我国公用事业民营化改革进行一定的反思,从而进一步探讨国家在公用事业民营化改革这一具有重要意义制度变迁中的作用.     

公共事业民营化改革的认识误区及观念重构

公共事业民营化改革是我国公共部门改革中最为引人注意的一项变革,但是,实践表明部分公共事业民营化改革是不成功的,究其原因当然是多方面的,但其主要原因是人们对民营化改革存在认识误区——秉持民营化改革的成效取决于产权的变更,民营化改革的价值取向是效率至上,民营化是包治百病的灵丹妙药,民营化就是私有化等错误观念.公共事业民营化改革欲取得更好的成效,必须走出传统的认识误区,进行观念重构,要深刻地认识到:公共事业民营化改革成功的关键在于引入竞争;公共事业民营化改革不但蕴涵着公共价值危机,而且面临着严峻的风险;公共事业民营化改革需要一个强有力的政府来实施有效的监管.     

从政府垄断到多元互动--公用事业民营化过程中的多重博弈关系解读

公用事业民营化实质上就是公共服务领域内的一场制度变迁,以博弈论作为基本分析工具,探究公用事业民营化过程中存在的多重博弈关系,即公平与效率的博弈、民营化与民营经济的博弈、政府公利性与自利性的博弈、民营化与第三部门的博弈.通过深入分析各自的博弈过程与博弈策略,对可能出现的各种博弈局面甚至是博弈困境,提出相应的引导性对策.     

从政府垄断到多元互动——公用事业民营化过程中的多重博弈关系解读

公用事业民营化实质上就是公共服务领域内的一场制度变迁,以博弈论作为基本分析工具,探究公用事业民营化过程中存在的多重博弈关系,即公平与效率的博弈、民营化与民营经济的博弈、政府公利性与自利性的博弈、民营化与第三部门的博弈。通过深入分析各自的博弈过程与博弈策略,对可能出现的各种博弈局面甚至是博弈困境,提出相应的引导性对策。     

公用事业民营化及其行政规制

中国城市化进程的加快对公用事业提出了更高的要求,为增加融资渠道,补充政府在公用事业上投资的不足,民营企业参与公用事业已是大势所趋。政府应加强在公用事业的市场准入、公共产品的价格形成、普遍服务与适度补偿等方面的研究,以提供公平竞争环境并协调公用事业产品提供中的商业性和社会性原则,从而构建适合公用事业民营化的行政规制体制。     

我国城市公交改革有效性问题研究

城市公交改革有效性如何,需要一套评价标准。以基于乘客、企业和政府三个主体满意度的评价标准,来评价城市公交改革的有效性,结果表明无论是民营化或国有化,有效性都有待提高,需要进一步深化改革。通过构建可竞争市场,克服市场失灵和政府失灵,一是解决过去民营化改革中存在的补贴难题,二是治理经营权垄断下的大量经营者之间的无序竞争,三是解决国有化改革中的低效率问题。     

Employee buy-outs and privatization: Issues and implications for LDCs and post-communist countries of UK experience

Privatization has become an international phenomenon. Most attention has been devoted to privatization by stock market flotation or by sales to third parties. Management and employee buy-outs present a third main possibility for transferring assets from the public to the private sector. This paper discusses the scope for privatization buy-outs in LDCs and ‘post-communist’ economies in the light of conceptual issues and UK experience. The positive aspects of privatization by management and employee buy-outs concern: ownership incentives; the introduction of control mechanisms by institutional investors and various types of financing instruments; indigenous ownership, decentralized privatization; greater incentives in firms where specific skills are involved; the ability to improve trading relationships between a privatized supplier (the buy-out) and its former parent, which remains in the public sector where the supplier is heavily dependent on its former parent; and the general contribution of buy-outs to a redrawing of a state firm's spread of activities to create a more viable entity. The potential problems with buy-outs concern such issues as: absence of entrepreneurial skills; the scope of their applicability; the potentially restrictive effects of debt and debt-like finance; the need to deal with investment requirements of firms; the lack of personal wealth; the use of inside information by managers to purchase a firm at a price which is to the detriment of the public interest; and the possibility of social and political problems if individuals are perceived to enhance their personal wealth significantly as an accident of where they work. There are means by which many of these potential problems can be dealt with and the paper addresses these.     

Jurisdictional integration: A framework for measuring and predicting the depth of international regulatory cooperation in competition policy

This article takes a new approach to international regulatory cooperation by developing a concept of the depth of cooperation, jurisdictional integration. A dataset of international competition policy agreements is compiled and ranked against an ordinal index of the depth of de jure cooperation in enforcing competition policies. There has been both a deepening and broadening of de jure cooperation over time. Statistical analysis finds that common membership of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development is a strong predictor of the depth of agreements to cooperate in enforcing competition policies; that we can be confident that the depth of agreements is low when signatories' substantive competition laws are dissimilar; and that the depth of de jure cooperation is a strong predictor of whether an agreement is “intergovernmental” or “transgovernmental.” The article puts forward a new way to map and measure international regulatory cooperation, and a new variable for use in research on its causes and consequences.     

我国城市土地出让制度的缺陷分析及其完善

目前我国的城市土地出让制度存在法律法规不健全、四种出让方式均易引发诸多弊端、土地出让过程缺乏有效监管以及出让金制度不完善四大缺陷。反映到具体实践中,则突出表现为城市土地出让过程中的权力寻租、"土地财政"、不公平竞争等一系列问题。必须从健全法律法规体系、完善土地产权制度、规范土地出让行为、改革土地出让金制度、加强土地领域廉政建设等方面,进一步改进和完善城市土地出让制度,使之更加适应城市化发展和经济结构调整的需要。     

Political Compromises: The Privatization of Small- and Medium-Sized Public Enterprises in China

One important feature of China’s privatization process is that insider privatization prevailed, and that outsiders could hardly gain access to buying state enterprises. Why was a majority of small- and medium-sized public enterprises sold to the firms’ former managers (and workers)? How did the tightened regulatory environment affect local privatization in China? Building on insights into institutional change, I argue that the choice of a specific privatization strategy results from political compromises among local officials, workers, and managers of public enterprises under specific regulatory constraints. Local officials’ incentives for privatization and their reactions to the changing regulatory environment had a great impact on the dynamics of local privatization.     

Microeconomic Reform and National Competition Policy: Misconceptions and Problems

Microeconomic reform and the so-called National Competition Policy (NCP) have entered political discourse but often with little discussion of their specific meaning. The terminology tends to be emotionally and intuitively appealing. It implies that any microeconomic reform per se is necessarily 'good' for the achievement of economic efficiency. Moreover, misconceptions about the meaning of economic efficiency frequently result in the belief that a higher level of competition is always 'good' for the achievement of that objective.
While there are many features in the new competition policy which deserve the wide acceptance and support it has been given, there are also aspects of it which do not stand up to closer scrutiny. It is those aspects, including the problems which will arise when ambitious but vague principles are put into practice, which will receive attention in this article.     

The theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation

In this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states. We find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors: (1) the extent of public sector union membership, which represents the interest group hypothesis, has a positive influence on pro-union legislation; (2) the extent of employer opposition to unions, as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections, has a negative effect on bargaining laws; (3) two taste variables — the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state — have a positive influence on these laws. A result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation.Our empirical analysis indicates that supply factors are also important in explaining the pattern of public employee bargaining laws across the state. We find that states are more likely to enact pro-union legislation under the following conditions: (1) constituents appear to hold pro-labor views as represented by their Congressmen's voting record; (2) neighboring states have passed mandatory bargaining laws; and (3) when competition is greater among the political parties.     

Agencies’ formal independence and credible commitment in the Latin American regulatory state: A comparative analysis of 8 countries and 13 sectors

This article tests functional and institutional explanations for the different levels of formal independence of regulatory agencies in Latin America. The analysis is grounded in an original database of the formal independence level of 104 regulators in 8 countries and 13 regulatory sectors. The results challenge a central claim of the credible commitment hypothesis as they indicate that privatization is not a significant determinant of agency independence nor are utility regulators more likely to be independent than other economic regulators. Veto players are positively correlated with formal independence, indicating that in developing countries they operate together as credibility‐enhancing mechanisms, rather than as functional equivalents, as previous studies on developed countries have shown. Democratization is positively correlated with formal independence, whereas trade opening and vulnerability to international pressures has no significant impact. Hence, this article enhances the understanding of the delegation of regulatory powers to formally independent agencies in developing countries.     

Privatization as a Political Priority: The British Experience

This article challenges conventional approaches to Thatcher's privatization campaign in which privatization has been judged on the basis of its economic or public policy merits. The privatization programme of the Thatcher Government was driven by political objectives and thus it was more coherent than has been usually asserted. Politicians are motivated by maximizing their political benefits (power) rather than by the pursuit of the common good, that is optimal economic and public policies. Unlike some other papers who have considered the political aspects of the Conservative privatization programme, this paper introduces a distinction between what were the Conservatives' perceptions of the political consequences of privatization and the actual effect of this programme.     

Privatization Within the Chinese State

This article suggests that China's public and collective enterprises have contributed to its economic growth and socio-political stability. The efficiency of these enterprises has been improved not through the privatization of the state (transferring public ownership to private hands) but privatization within the state (decentralization, appropriation, and marketization). This article first provides statistics to juxtapose the growth of the Chinese economy to the continued expansion of public and collective enter-prises. I t then explains the causes and benefits of privatization within the Chinese state. A case study of privatization within the state in Shanghai City follows. The article concludes that China's economic reform has been a transformation of socialism, not a transition to capitalism, and that it is a less costly but more effective alternative to the privatization of the state approach. The former communist countries in Europe have painfully followed this latter approach and have suffered from its political, social, and economic consequences.     

Strategic management of privatization: a framework for planning and implementation

The continuing interest of governments around the world in privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is making privatization policy an important instrument for promoting market-oriented approaches to economic development. Privatization has become an integral part of administrative reform in former centrally planned socialist economies, developing countries, and post-industrial societies. More than a decade of experience with privatization provides lessons that can help governments to plan, implement and manage the process more efficiently, effectively, and responsively. The framework for managing privatization described here draws from lessons of that experience to define the forms, scope and pace of privatization, choose organizational structures for management, identify macropolicy and institutional reforms necessary to facilitate privatization, and develop management procedures for implementing privatization programmes successfully.