The Wrongfulness Constraint in Criminalisation

If conduct must be wrongful in order to be justifiably criminalised, how should its wrongfulness be established? I examine a conception of wrongfulness put forward by A. P. Simester, which makes wrongfulness turn on whether the reasons favouring the performance of an action are, all things considered, defeated by the reasons against its performance. I argue that such a view can only generate appropriate substantive constraints in the context of criminalisation if it can distinguish between the sorts of reasons that a verdict of wrongfulness, as a concept distinct from stupidity or selfishness, should attend to, and the sorts of reasons it should leave out. Assuming that this conception of wrongfulness should operate as a constraint on criminalisation in a liberal-democratic state, the only reasons it should include are other-regarding reasons. What matters is whether the agent commits an other-regarding wrong. This conception of wrongfulness helps us further to resolve fundamental questions concerning mala prohibita and the legitimate reach of any duty to obey the law.     

Comment on Andreas von Hirsch: The Roles of Harm and Wrongdoing in Criminalisation Theory

Whereas liberals tend to emphasize harm as the decisive criterion for legitimizing criminalisation, moralists take a qualified notion of wrongfulness as sufficient even when no harm is at hand. This comment takes up Andreas von Hirsch’s “dual element approach” requiring both harm and wrongfulness as necessary conditions for criminalisation and argues that Joel Feinberg’s account of harming as violation of moral rights is perfectly compatible with it. Subsequently, two issues from the liberalism-moralism debate on criminalisation are examined: The difficulty of how to determine wrongfulness beyond the scope of harming, and the so far disregarded question of whether the democratic legislator is free within the framework of constitution to criminalise whatever conduct he wants to prevent irrespective of philosophical constraints.     

Wrongfulness and Prohibitions

This paper responds to Antje du-Bois Pedain’s discussion of the wrongfulness constraint on the criminal law. Du-Bois Pedain argues that the constraint is best interpreted as stating that φing is legitimately criminalised only if φing is wrongful for other-regarding reasons. We take issue with du-Bois Pedain’s arguments. In our view, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of legitimate criminalisation that φing is wrongful in du-Bois Pedain’s sense. Rather, it is a necessary (albeit insufficient) condition of legitimate criminalisation that φing is what we call bare wrongful—that is, that the reasons in favour of φing are defeated by the reasons against. Though du-Bois Pedain is critical of this view, we argue that her criticisms do not convince.     

Rethinking the Wrongness Constraint on Criminalisation

Orthodox thought holds that criminalisation should be subject to a wrongness constraint: that is, that conduct may be criminalised only if it is wrongful. This article argues that this principle is false, at least as it is usually understood. On the one hand, the wrongness constraint seems to rest on solid foundations. To criminalise conduct is to facilitate its condemnation and punishment; to coerce citizens against it; and to portray it as wrongful. All of these actions are presumptively impermissible when the conduct that they target is not wrongful. On the other hand, the article argues that the wrongness constraint is nevertheless unsound. Although it is presumptively impermissible to criminalise non-wrongful conduct, this might yet be permissible, given sufficient countervailing reasons. Moreover, there are realistic cases – specifically, some cases of over-inclusive criminalisation – in which such countervailing reasons exist.     

What is the Harm Principle For?

In their excellent monograph, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs, Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch argue for an account of legitimate criminalisation based on wrongfulness, the Harm Principle and the Offence Principle, while they reject an independent anti-paternalism principle. To put it at its simplest my aim in the present paper is to examine the relationship between ‘the harms’ and ‘the wrongs’ of the authors’ title. I begin by comparing the authors’ version of the Harm and Offence Principle with some other influential accounts. After examining the (considerable) role wrongfulness plays in their work, I ask what there is left for their Harm and Offence Principles to do. In the light of the understanding and foundations of the Harm and Offence Principles proposed by the authors, I suggest that the answer is little or nothing. The wrongfulness constraint the authors place on their Offence Principle comes close to swallowing it up entirely. Furthermore the part of their Offence Principle that is not thus swallowed by wrongfulness leaves the account with a commitment that is probably best dropped. As far as their Harm Principle is concerned I suggest that the authors’ account of ‘harm’ is so broad that it lacks the resources to distinguish harm-based reasons from wrongfulness- or immorality-based reasons in any principled way. Among other things, I ask in this context, first, whether one can be harmed as one’s character deteriorates and, secondly, whether one is harmed by virtue of the serious wrong one does to another. What really drives the authors’ account of legitimate criminalisation, I believe, is wrongfulness together with an important, amorphous set of potential defeating conditions. They themselves accept such a picture so far as paternalism is concerned. I conclude that their account, which I think has considerable force, would lose little of any significance were their Harm and Offence Principles simply excised. More generally I suspect that a strong role for wrongfulness in an account of legitimate criminalisation is likely to put into serious question the plausibility of an independent principled role for harm and offence.     

Transgression Wrongfulness Outweighs its Harmfulness as a Determinant of Sentence Severity

When students suggest sentences for criminal offenders, do they rely more heavily on the harmfulness or on the wrongfulness of the offender's conduct? In Study 1, 116 Princeton University undergraduates rated the harmfulness and wrongfulness of, and suggested appropriate sentences for, a series of crimes. As expected, participants emphasized wrongfulness when choosing an appropriate criminal punishment. In Study 2, 33 Princeton undergraduates made similar ratings for violations of the University Honor Code, and rated their contempt for fabricated amendments to the Code that required sentencers to focus either only on harmfulness or only on wrongfulness. Again, sentences more closely reflected wrongfulness ratings, and participants were more contemptuous of the harmfulness-based proposal. We also consider the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for sentencing laws and policy.     

The concept of harm reconceived: A different look at wrongful life

In wrongful life litigation a congenitally impaired child brings suit against those, usually physicians, whose negligence caused him to be born into his suffering existence. A key conceptual question is whether we can predicate “harm” in such cases. While a few courts have permitted it, many courts deny that we can, and thus have refused these children standing to sue. In this article the author examines the wrongful life cases and literature enroute to a broader consideration of harm. This literature, and philosophical discussions of harm generally, rely on a definition which ascribes harm by comparing an individual's current condition with that in which he would otherwise have been, but for the allegedly harmful event. The author shows this definition to be conceptually and morally flawed. A superior general definition is offered which, when then applied to wrongful life cases, shows that we can easily ascribe harm in these cases and can find clear potential for tort liability.     

环境污染责任之违法性判断

环境污染侵权责任需以行为人之行为具有违法性为要件。对于违法性之判断,除应考虑被害人所受损害之程度外,加害人行为对于加害人自己及社会上一般大众的效益,亦应一并予以考虑。因而违法性之判断,在纠正正义与功利主义之间,如何取舍,成为环境污染责任的重要议题。     

经济犯罪的规范解释

在经济犯罪的规范解释中,应当注重对经济犯罪规范进行刑法价值上的独立判断。当某种经济不法行为不具有经济犯罪规范所指向的特定的社会危害性而刑法条文在字面上又能够将该种行为包含在其中时,规范的实质内容应当优先,对该种行为要从实质上进行理解,而不应从形式上理解。当值得处罚的经济不法行为在实质上具有某个刑法规范所禁止的性质、但刑法用语在形式上对其无法予以包含的,亦应当从实质上解释经济犯罪规范。由于经济犯罪规范数量众多,法条大小系统庞杂,所以在经济犯罪规范解释中应当特别关注构成要件的体系解释。     

Harriton, Waller And Australian negligence law: is there a place for wrongful life?

Following the decision by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Harriton and Waller, the controversial action for wrongful life has been thrown back into the public spotlight. This article examines the legal and public policy dilemmas arising from a wrongful life claim in light of the Court of Appeal's reasons for its decision in the jointly heard cases of Harriton (by her tutor) v Stephens; Waller (by his tutor) v James; Waller (by his tutor) v Hoolahan (2004) 59 NSWLR 694 and analyses whether there is a sound doctrinal basis for recognising the claim within the Australian tort system. It will be argued that each of the legal elements comprising the claim fall squarely within the traditional tort framework and that public policy considerations favouring recognition of the claim outweigh those raised against it.     

CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANTISM AND THE PERCEIVED WRONGFULNESS OF CRIMES: A RESEARCH NOTE*

This research addresses the relationship between conservative Protestantism and the perceived wrongfulness of crimes. In a recent study, Warr (1989) identified “nondiscriminators”—people who perceived a wide range of crimes to be equally morally wrong. Although lacking measures of religion, Warr hypothesized, based on their written comments, that the respondents used religious beliefs to assess wrongfulness. Since Protestant theology tends to view morality categorically, with no gradations between the extremes, those individuals who most strongly adhere to this doctrine may be the nondiscriminators. This study tests and finds strong support for this hypothesis, which has important implications for the recent shift toward increased punitiveness in sentencing, research concerning public perceptions of crime, and studies of religion.     

WHAT IS THE PERCEIVED SERIOUSNESS OF CRIMES?

Although criminologists have measured the perceived seriousness of offenses for decades, there is no consensus on the meaning of seriousness, nor is there clear evidence as to what individuals have in mind when they rate the seriousness of crimes. Seriousness judgments could reflect normative evaluations of offenses (i.e., their wrongfulness) or factual judgments about their harmfulness to victims. Survey data from Dallas residents show that the two dimensions are distinct and that conventional classes of crime (personal, property, public order) systematically differ on the two dimensions. Where crimes are perceived to be more wrong than harmful, seriousness mirrors wrongfulness. Where crimes are perceived to be more harmful than wrong, harmfulness predominates. A substantial minority of respondents, however, did not perceive differences in the moral gravity of crimes, judging the seriousness of crimes solely on the basis of harmfulness. These and other findings indicate that seriousness judgments are more structured and complex than commonly supposed and that conventional measures of seriousness, when applied to substantive problems, may mask or obscure distinct mechanisms of evaluation.     

Wrongful convictions and claims of false or misleading forensic evidence

The results are reported of a study to examine case factors associated with 732 wrongful convictions classified by the National Registry of Exonerations as being associated with “False or Misleading Forensic Evidence.” A forensic error typology has been developed to provide a structure for the categorization and coding of factors relating to misstatements in forensic science reports; errors of individualization or classification; testimony errors; issues relating to trials and officers of the court; and evidence handling and reporting issues. This study, which included the analysis of 1391 forensic examinations, demonstrates that most errors related to forensic evidence are not identification or classification errors by forensic scientists. When such errors are made, they are frequently associated with incompetent or fraudulent examiners, disciplines with an inadequate scientific foundation, or organizational deficiencies in training, management, governance, or resources. More often, forensic reports or testimony miscommunicate results, do not conform to established standards, or fail to provide appropriate limiting information. Just as importantly, actors within the broader criminal justice system—but not under the purview of any forensic science organization—may contribute to errors that may be related to the forensic evidence. System issues include reliance on presumptive tests without confirmation by a forensic laboratory, use of independent experts outside the administrative control of public laboratories, inadequate defense, and suppression or misrepresentation of forensic evidence by investigators or prosecutors. In approximately half of wrongful convictions analyzed, improved technology, testimony standards, or practice standards may have prevented a wrongful conviction at the time of trial.     

论国家权力干预与公民私领域的法律保护——以“艳照门”事件为例

在"艳照门"事件中,内地国家机关对公民私下浏览和朋友间赠阅相关照片的行为进行干预。这样既没有实质上的法律依据,又缺乏必要理由,权力涉入行为实际上是对公民私领域的过度干预。这种干预会侵害到公民的权利和自由,挤压社会自主空间,同时也是国家权力资源的浪费。从理论上分析,公民权利是首位的,只有在公民个人的行为的社会危害性达到一定的程度,权力才能介入公民的私领域。我们必须在制度上作出一系列的合理安排以实现公民私领域的充分保护。     

Property Offences as Crimes of Injustice

The article provides an outline of the basic principles and conditions of criminalisation of interferences with others’ property rights in the context of a specific context: a liberal, social democratic state, the legitimacy of which depends primarily on its impartiality between moral doctrines and the fair distribution of liberties and resources. I begin by giving a brief outline of the conditions of political legitimacy, the place of property and the conditions of criminalisation in such a state. With that framework in place, I argue that interferences with others’ property rights should be viewed as violations of political duties stemming from institutions of distribution. I then discuss three implications of this view: the bearing of social injustice on the criminal law treatment of acts of distributive injustice; the expansion of criminalisation over the violation of distribution-related duties, which are considered criminally irrelevant under moral conceptions of criminalisation; and, finally, the normative significance of the modus operandi.     

Impulse control and criminal responsibility: lessons from neuroscience

Almost all of the world's legal systems recognize the "M'Naghten" exception to criminal responsibility: the inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of action. This exception rests on the assumption that punishment is morally justified only if the defendant was able to choose whether to do wrong. Jurists and jurisdictions differ, however, on whether to extend M'Naghten's logic to cases where the defendant understood the wrongfulness of an act but was incapable of resisting an impulse to commit it. In this article I ask whether contemporary neuroscience can help lawmakers to decide whether to adopt or retain this defense, known variously as the "irresistible impulse" defense or the "control" or "volitional" test for insanity. More specifically, I ask firstly, whether it is empirically true that a person can understand the wrongfulness of an act yet be powerless to refrain from committing it; and second (assuming an affirmative answer to the first), whether the law of criminal responsibility can practically accommodate this phenomenon? After canvassing the relevant neuroscientific literature, I conclude that the answer to the first question is "yes." After examining the varied treatment of the defense in the United States and other nations, I also give an affirmative answer to the second question, but only in limited circumstances. In short, the defense of irresistible impulse should be recognized, but only when it can be shown that the defendant experienced a total incapacity to control his or her conduct in the circumstances.     

Accountability for Private Military and Security Contractors in the International Legal Regime

Abstract

The rapidly growing presence of private military and security contractors (PMSCs) in armed conflict and post-conflict situations in the last decade brought corresponding incidents of serious misconduct by PMSC personnel. The two most infamous events—one involving the firm formerly known as Blackwater and the other involving Titan and CACI—engendered scrutiny of available mechanisms for criminal and civil accountability of the individuals whose misconduct caused the harm. Along a parallel track, scholars and policymakers began examining the responsibility of states and international organizations for the harm that occurred. Both approaches have primarily focused on post-conduct accountability—of the individuals who caused the harm, of the state in which the harm occurred, or of the state or organization that hired the PMSC whose personnel caused the harm. Less attention, however, has been paid to the idea of pre-conduct accountability for PMSCs and their personnel. A broad understanding of “accountability for” PMSCs and their personnel encompasses not only responsibility for harm caused by conduct, but responsibility for hiring, hosting, and monitoring these entities, as well as responsibility to the victims of the harm. This article provides a comprehensive approach for analyzing the existing international legal regime, and whether and to what extent the legal regime provides “accountability for” PMSCs and their personnel. It does so by proposing a practical construct of three phases based on PMSC operations—Contracting, In-the-Field, and Post-Conduct—with which to assess the various bodies of international law.     

Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals?

While European Union (EU) citizenship has traditionally been key to limiting criminalisation at national level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in its case‐law, where crimes show the offender's disregard for the societal values of the host Member States, and deny his/her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serves to legitimate criminal law. The Court outlines two—counterposing—types of human being: the law‐abiding citizen and the criminal. The article shows the legal unsoundness of the Court's approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case‐law over a crime–citizenship spectrum, marked at its opposing ends by Duff's communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one hand, and Jakobs' criminal law of the enemy, on the other.     

Indirect Crimes

Both law and morality routinely distinguish between direct wrongs of causing harm oneself and indirect wrongs of contributing to another’s harmful actions. This article asks whether this distinction matters for the purposes of a theory of criminalisation. It argues that, in some respects, the distinction matters less than is often supposed: generally, the potential future actions of others have at least some relevance to what we ought to do. However, it is morally significant that criminal liability for indirect wrongdoing can make our freedom to do valuable things contingent upon others’ failure to comply with their moral obligations. This raises substantial concerns of autonomy and fairness that tell against the creation of some – but by no means all – indirect crimes.     

重思民事责任能力与民事行为能力的关系——兼评我国《侵权责任法》第32条

民事责任能力在本质上是广义民事行为能力的一种,与狭义民事行为能力即法律行为能力并列,它是当事人对其过错行为承担民事责任的法律前提。广义民事行为能力概念具有深厚的历史根基,我国民法学者对其进行批判是因为对其历史脉络缺乏了解。民事责任能力的认定应采抽象标准与具体认定相结合主义。我国《侵权责任法》第32条存在诸多缺陷,应通过法律解释或修订予以完善。