Culture Governance: Governing Self‐Reflexive Modernity

Political and administrative analysis is today said to be taking a narrative turn: to learning by telling and listening to the different stories that constitute political life. However, this new approach to studying the decentring of politics and policy as multiple discursive practices carries a new grand narrative too. A new connection between political authority and political community is taking shape outside the spheres of modern government and representative democracy. Political authority is becoming increasingly both communicative and interactive in order for it to be able to meet complexity with complexity. It is employed for reforming institutions by opening them towards the culture and by tying them to the political attributes and capacities of self‐reflexive individuals and to the transformation and self‐transformation of their conduct. I call this development culture governance. Culture governance is about how political authority must increasingly operate through capacities for self‐and co‐governance and therefore needs to act upon, reform, and utilize individual and collective conduct so that it might be amenable to its rule (Bang 2003; Dean 2003). Culture governance represents a new kind of top‐down steering; it is neither hierarchical nor bureaucratic but empowering and self‐disciplining. It manifests itself as various forms of joined‐up government and network governance and proclaims itself to be genuinely democratic and dialogical. This I shall show by a study of local Danish politics and policy in Copenhagen. Culture governance, I shall argue, constitutes a formidable challenge and threat to democracy, in attempting to colonize the whole field of public reason, everyday political engagement, democratic deliberation, and so on, by its own systems logic of success, effectiveness or influence. It seeks to take charge of the working of the more spontaneous, less programmed and more lowly organized politics of the ordinary in political communities, thus undermining the very idea of a non‐strategic public reasoning as founding the practices of freedoms.     

Contested National Identity and Political Crisis in Bangladesh: Historical Analysis of the Dynamics of Bangladeshi Society and Politics

This paper develops the theme that the ongoing political polarization and political crisis in Bangladesh since its independence from Pakistan in 1971 reflect the fundamental weaknesses of the pillars of Bangladeshi society and national identity. The paper adopts an historical approach to explain why and how Muslim nationalism, which was the basis for the establishment of Pakistan, has re-emerged in contemporary Bangladeshi society and politics and is competing against Bengali ethnicity, language, culture and secularism (‘Bengali nationalism’) within an emerging ‘two-party’ political system. However, instead of establishing a stable political system following the Hotelling–Downs principle of democracy, the Bangladeshi society/polity has been polarized and divided almost vertically on the question of national identity and political philosophy and created sustained political instability and uncertainty. This has stifled the formation and consolidation of a national identity based on ethnicity/language/culture or religion/territory/political history or that have elements of both. Neither ethnicity/language/culture/secularism-based nationalism (Bengali nationalism) nor predominantly Muslim-territorial nationalism (‘Bangladeshi nationalism’) alone can dominate and flourish in Bangladeshi society and polity; instead, the objective conditions in the country dictate that a competitive democratic system of politics which accommodates aspects of secularism, language, Muslim identity and Islamic ethical–moral codes remains the feasible political discourse for forming and consolidating the country's multi-racial, multi-religious national identity over the long run and its survival as a sovereign state.     

The Freedom Front Plus: an analysis of Afrikaner politics and ethnic identity in the new South Africa

From the perspective of conflict analysis the main feature of contemporary South Africa is the absence of political violence. Yet it would be naive to think that the new political context is blissful to the point that ethnic tensions or anxieties do not exist. Certainly, for some groups, South Africa is not a place where ethnicity is no longer significant or politically relevant. This article explores contemporary issues relevant to Afrikaner politics and ethnicity in terms of concerns which have been voiced by its political organ – the Freedom Front Plus. The research findings point to the incompleteness of the process of conflict transformation in the country and identify certain factors that have given rise to a mood of alienation among some Afrikaners. Political and cultural disenchantment is manifested in a desire for territorial separatism. By exploring the Afrikaner perspective as it is articulated by the party, this article provides insight into the problems that surround inter-group reconciliation and nation-building in the country.     

Post-hegemony and Gramsci: a bridge too far?

This article expands upon the theory of post-hegemony so as to maintain the multitude as an operative political category alongside the State. Ironically, it does so by returning to Antonio Gramsci. It argues that the multitude – or, for Gramsci ‘civil society’ – is constitutive of statal politics in two specific ways: (1) the multitude as a constitutive outside or alterity that the State carries; and (2) constitutive in its positivity, as a productive immanence that affects the social field from which the State is drawn. This relationship of constituent participation – not representation – is demonstrated by investigating changes in politics-as-usual in Venezuela.     

A tale in stone and bronze: old/new strategies for political mobilization in the Republic of Macedonia

The redesign of Skopje’s main square and the wider central area in the last six years has been a top priority of the Macedonian government. The project, called Skopje 2014, provoked intense domestic debate and controversy as well as international reaction and concern. Although officials say that project’s aim is to unify ethnic Macedonians, it has produced several lines of political, intra-ethnic/interethnic as well as intra-cultural/intercultural divisions in the fragile Macedonian society. The aim of the paper is to offer reflections about its mobilizing potential among ethnic Macedonians in a set of social, economic, and political contexts. In that sense, four areas of mobilization are suggested: (1) around new identity markers; (2) around the name dispute and against threats (real or imagined) to the ethnic and national identity; (3) against the internal Other, that is, the ethnic Albanian community, as well as critics of these identity politics; and (4) in reaction to the global financial crisis and problems within the EU.     

Network Politics,Political Capital,and Democracy

Abstract

Is network politics a good or a bad thing for democracy? Seen from a narrow perspective of democracy the answer is clear. It is a bad thing. However, seen from broader perpsective the answer is more complex since it does not only focus on the preservation of representative democracy but also on the promotion of organizational democracy in civil society and on the enhancement of the citizens' political capital, that is their endowment, empowerment and political identity. The complexity of the relationship between democracy and network politics is apparent in a case study of political decision making in Skanderborg, a small town in Denmark.     

Know thy enemy: Hizbullah, ‘terrorism’ and the politics of perception

The labelling career of the Lebanese armed group and political party Hizbullah is an interesting case with which to investigate the epistemological consequences of the politics of naming. Having found itself since its inception in the mid-1980s on the receiving end of mainly US and Israeli policy makers' and analysts' scorn for being an archetypical terrorist organisation, Hizbullah has been surprisingly successful in achieving its stated aims and in enduring the verbal and military onslaught against it. Although it is not the intention here to reduce explanations for Hizbullah's durability to discursive politics, this article suggests that both the labelling of Hizbullah as terrorist and, conversely, its identification as a ‘lebanonised’ political force that is about to make its conversion into an unarmed political party are misleading and incapable of grasping this organisation's complexities. In fact, both ‘terrorist’ and ‘lebanonised’ labels produce a quality of knowledge inferior to that produced by Hizbullah's own conceptualisation of its enemies. But most importantly, the debate on Hizbullah's alleged terrorist nature has obscured several of its traits that many should register before passing judgement on it. Our analysis shows that the variety of institutions Hizbullah has been carefully elaborating and readapting over the past two decades in Lebanon operate today as a holistic and integrated network which produce sets of values and meanings embedded in an interrelated religious and political framework—that of the wilayat al-faqih. These meanings are disseminated on a daily basis among Shi'a constituencies through the party's institutionalised networks and serve to mobilise them into ‘the society of the Resistance’ (mujtamaa’ al-muqawama), which is the foundation of the hala al-islamiyya (Islamic sphere) in Lebanon. Accordingly, any prospect of Hizbullah's transformation away from armed ‘resistance’ should be firmly placed in an analysis of its hegemony among the Shi'a of Lebanon and of the tools it uses to acquire and sustain this status.     

Shifting Terrain: Styles of Liberalism, Periodization, and Levels of Analysis

The appraisal of background conditions is an important but often neglected element of political interpretation. Influential interpretations of American politics, such as Louis Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America, dismiss the importance of changing political contexts. Set in terms of the debate over American exceptionalism, this article explores changes in political mood in the United States during the twentieth century. Hartz is not wrong to assert the persistence of a uniform underlying political culture in the United States, nor the lasting impact of Lockeanism in establishing boundaries to possibility—for the left and the right. But a finer-grained appraisal of the interaction between political-cultural ethos and activism is possible. As David Greenstone rightly argued, contestation still occurs within a predominantly liberal society. This article contends that the character of this contestation is determined by the nature of political periods produced by interpretations of the underlying Lockean bedrock by political actors. It makes explicit that Hartz and Greenstone were operating at different levels of analysis—Hartz established the persistence of dedication to Lockean liberal tenets in the deep structure of American politics, while Greenstone's interpretation established a meso-level of analysis, above this deep structure. The present article adds temporal periodization to this meso-level. Political actors make history upon a stage received from the past—in the United States, the Lockean bedrock—but they inflect this stage with crucial interpretations that set or stretch the limits of political expression in a new period. It discerns four varieties of liberalism—economic liberalism, social state liberalism, social movement liberalism and cold war liberalism—that have interpreted the deep structure differently since the 1920s. It also suggests that sensitivity to historical changes in political mood does not necessitate repudiation of Hartz's thesis of Lockean liberal predominance in the United States.     

Transformation of political elite as regime changes in Pakistan

Burton and Higely [(2001). ‘The study of political elite transformations’, International review of sociology/Revue internationale de sociologie, 11(2): 181–199] argue that when elites of a society are not united this will lead to an unstable political regime. Consensual elite cohesion is only created through distinctive elite transformation. This essay attempts to elaborate their argument in Pakistan, by developing a link among a continuous regime shift from authoritarian to democratic governments and the political elites who keep transforming their structure accordingly. The technique followed for it is analysing the epochal events over time from pre-partition till date which became reason for regime transformations. The discussion focuses on the collusions and contestations of multiple power elites within given social context which are embedded under the international context. It concludes that political elites in Pakistan were always embraced by multiple other power elites who accordingly hold dual elite identity to control the command post in the political arena. Such complex elite structure makes it paradoxical to distinguish political elite of Pakistan from other power elites of Pakistan.     

Patterns of political instability: Affiliation patterns of politicians and voters in post-communist Estonia,Latvia, and Lithuania

In contrast to established party systems, the transformation of post-communist party systems is not only shaped by shifts in electoral preferences, but also by the changing organizational loyalties of politicians. Post-communist politicians pursue a wide range of organizational strategies such as party fusions, fissions, start-ups, and interparty switching. By focusing on the interaction between these organizational strategies and voters’ electoral preferences, we argue that the seeming instability of post-communist party systems actually reveals distinct patterns of political change. The article develops an analytical framework, which incorporates politician-driven interparty mobility and voter-induced electoral change. It uses this framework to show that the apparently inchoate party systems of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania actually follow definable modes of transformation. Marcus Kreuzer is assistant professor of political science at Villanova University. His work focuses on how electoral and legislative institutions shape the organizational and electioneering practices of parties in interwar Europe and post-communist democracies. He also is studying the origins of liberal democracy in nineteenth century Europe. He is author ofInstitutions and Innovation—Voters, Politicians and Interest Groups in the Consolidation of Democracy: France and Germany, 1870–1939 (2001). Vello Pettai is lecturer in political science at the University of Tartu, Estonia. He specializes in comparative ethnopolitics and party politics. He has published previously inNations and Nationalism, Post-Soviet Affairs, East European Politics and Society, andJournal of Democracy. We would like to thank for Artis Pabriks and Darius Zeruolis for sharing their knowledge of Latvian and Lithuanian party politics as well as John T. Ishiyama, Scott Desposato, and two anonymous SCID reviewers for commenting on an earlier draft. Funding for this research came from an Estonian Science Foundation grant, nr. 4904. We gratefully acknowledge their support.     

Escape from politics: hong kong's predicament of political development?

Political development in Hong Kong is analyzed in terms of its existential rationale, non-sovereign autonomy, capability, and democratization. Changes in these aspects have two implications. First, the conditions for social escape from politics before the conclusion of the Sino-British Agreement on the future of Hong Kong in 1984 no longer exist. Secondly, a political society has emerged to mediate between society and the polity. This represents a fundamental structural transformation in state-society relationship away from the “minimally integrated system” whereby the polity was secluded from the society. Can this political society in Hong Kong be eradicated, arrested, or tamed after the transfer of sovereignty to China in 1997? An educated guess is that it can at best be tamed, provided that democracy remains the ultimate objective of the Basic Law and elections continue to be held.     

Civil society, social capital, and development: Dissection of a complex discourse

This article tries to understand the ongoing intellectual discourse on civil society and related concepts in political science, other social science disciplines as well as among policy-makers and practitioners. It suggests that there are four prominent philosophical lineages going back to the nineteenth century from which most of the contemporary debate draws its inspiration. Thus, there are at least four major schools or approaches to the study of civil society, social capital and development that compete for recognition. The article also draws attention to the need for analyzing these issues, not only at the national but also the associational and global levels. The interaction between these three levels has become increasingly important in the light of the globalization of many conservation and development issues. Finally, the author identifies the principal challenges facing students interested in doing research in this area, focusing, among other things, on the varying implications for civil society that different regime types have. Goran Hyden is professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research interests include issues of governance, particularly as they apply to the interface between politics and development. He has published several books and articles in this area. These includeBeyond Ujamaa in tanzania (1980),No Shortcuts to Progress (1983),Governance and Politics in Africa (co-edited with Michael Bratton, 1992).Human, Rights and Governance in Africa (co-edited with Ronald Cohen and Winston Nagan 1993), andAgencies in Foreign Aid: China, Sweden and the United States in Tanzania 1961–95 (co-edited with Rwekaza Mukandala, forthcoming).     

Performing through Friday khutbas: re-instrumentalization of religion in the new Turkey

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between religion and politics in current Turkish society, particularly since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) consolidated its power over state institutions and replaced the Kemalist establishment in the early 2010s. It argues that the AKP has re-instrumentalized the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and used its mosques to enact a performance of nationalism, deviating from a Kemalist, laicist-national identity towards a more encompassing, Ottomanist, religious one. After discussing the unique understanding of laicism in Turkey and the transformation of Diyanet as a state apparatus, content and discourse analyses are used to examine the texts of 1,200 Friday khutbas, weekly prayers that are ordinarily prepared and distributed nationwide by Diyanet. These indicate how citizens perform their nation simply by participating in gatherings, composing the congregation, listening to imams, and being exposed to the reminders of their (re-)identified nationality. The content analysis of Friday khutbas over three distinct periods—1927, 1997–2010, and 2011–2018—illustrates that, as political power shifts over time, the repetition of certain banal reminders used in the khutbas has resulted in different performances of the nation and that, under the rule of the AKP, a new performance has already begun.     

The Invisibility and Centrality of Class After Communism

Just as the availability of new ideas can drive the development of new institutions, the unavailability of ideas also has powerful political effects. The article demonstrates the paradoxical absence of class discourse in postcommunist Polish political debates—paradoxical because the same actors who eschewed class discourse believed that postcommunist class formation and inequalities were the central problems shaping the country and driving the political agenda. The paper documents the early thinking about class and politics on the part of key political activists. It traces their fear of class discourse to their limited knowledge of postwar European capitalisms and the role played by strong labor movements in stabilizing those systems. Ironically, Poles understood capitalism in too Marxist a way, as a perennially raging struggle between classes. Knowing that workers would lose out in the new system, they feared that speaking about class would empower workers as a class and thus weaken the market economy they were determined to build. Not generally aware how class compromise in the post-World War II era worked to stabilize capitalism, Polish (and most other eastern European) oppositionists did their best to thwart the emergence of class identities on the part of those left behind, even at the cost, for liberals, of reconciling themselves to political defeat. The result of the refusal to countenance class discourse was not a block on the emergence of class anger, but a displacement of that anger from class “others” to identity-based others, and thus a weakening of the liberal politics that most postcommunist liberals had wished to reinforce. A final section explores recent Polish thinking about class in the context of reactions to the Polish edition of my Defeat of Solidarity book showing continued mainstream reluctance to talk about class but new interest in this category among youth.     

Trust and the politics of postcommunism

The citizens of postcommunist states have relatively low levels of trust in their basic political institutions. This paper argues that to consolidate the advances towards civil society and democracy particular attention must be paid to strengthening trust. Trust requires not just the institutional framework appropriate to democracy and the rule of law — already substantially in place — but also an appreciation of politics and civil society as spheres of continuing diversity, competition and conflict. The deficit of trust can be addressed by a leadership exemplary in its service to the public interest, and by an acceptance of the new, adversarial politics.     

Debating demonization: in defence of politics,politicians and political science

In a previous edition of this journal, an argument concerning the demonization of politicians and the changing nature of democracy was raised. This, in turn, raised previously unconsidered questions about (inter alia): the discourse, language and symbolism surrounding politicians; the limits of democratic politics; the politics of public expectations; and whether political scientists have a professional duty to the public in terms of promoting the public understanding of politics. The aim of making this provocative argument – framed as it was around a reinterpretation of the MPs expenses scandal in the UK – was to provoke a debate about the existence of certain ‘self-evident’ truths, the fragility of democratic politics and the future of political science as an academic discipline. Phrased in these terms the initial article was successful as six respondents – Domonic Bearfield, Alastair Campbell, Martin Gainsborough, Peter Riddell, Klaus Segbers and Gerry Stoker – immediately entered the fray and sought to either finesse and develop my arguments or to offer a considered critique. This article discusses ‘debating demonization’ in the form of a reply to each respondent and a focus on (in turn): the politics of demonization; the politics of the media; the politics of social class; the politics of monitory mechanisms; the politics of performance; and the politics of political science.     

Comparative political corruption: Issues of operationalization and measurement

As with other areas of comparative political inquiry, analyses of political corruption must carefully negotiate around numerous methodological issues. In this article, we focus primarily on problems of operationalization and measurement of corruption. We evaluate the major examples of cross-country measures of corruption that have recently emerged and review research that has incorporated the new measures. We end with a discussion of an alternative method for the cross-national measurement and analysis of corruption, one that might also facilitate the goal of establishing universal principles and causal claims about political corruption. Thomas D. Lancaster is associate professor of political science at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. His research and teaching interests include comparative politics, with a specialization in western and southern European politics, and the logic of comparative political inquiry. Gabriella R. Montinola is assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Davis. Her current research focuses on economic development, interest representation, and the causes and consequences of political corruption. She is the author or co-author of articles in various journals, includingWorld Politics, Journal of Democracy, andBritish Journal of Political Science. The authors would like to thank Richard Doner, Robert Jackman, and the editor and referees ofSCID for their helpful comments.     

Municipality size,political efficacy and political participation: a systematic review

ABSTRACT

It is an old adage that local government is a training ground for democracy. Its human scale means that political amateurs can contribute effectively and meaningfully to the politics of a state. But in a political climate seemingly driven to consolidate local government into ever larger units, can a not so local local government still elicit an efficacious and participatory citizenry? This paper explores the effect of municipality population size on two important aspects of democratic culture: political efficacy and political participation. Via a two-part systematic review, the paper examines how extant empirical literature bears on the relationship between size and both of these aspects, hypothesising that political efficacy plays a mediating role between size and participation. The findings are unequivocal: citizens of smaller municipalities feel a greater sense of political efficacy and participate to a greater degree in local politics.     

International assistance and democracy: Assessing efforts to assist post-communist development

This article surveys political development frameworks for analyzing the post-Communist transition to political democracy. Parallels with postcolonial events in Third World countries should caution against overoptimism about the prospects for mutually reinforcing economic and political development. In general, the study of Third World political development suggest that rapid regime transition with low mass participation is unlikely to result in sustainable democratic politics, especially where severe economic dislocations are present. High rates of participation during regime change may lead to rapid disillusionment with the performance of postrevolutionary government. It is thus argued that states wishing, for various reasons, to assist in smoothing the transition from communism should pay heed to the cautionary experience of Third World development assistance and monitor the political dimensions of the transformation, such as the stability of coalition governments, electoral turnout, ethnonationalism, as well as the orthodox economic indicators like inflation and rates of domestic investment. With respect to international assistance to the former Communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the article shows that the capacity of the Group of Twenty Four (G-24) donors to aid economic recovery is well below what is requested, or needed. Despite hosting a donor summit, the United States is taking a far less prominent role in the post-Cold War donor community than was the case in the analogous program for post-World War II recovery. This is having an impact on both volume and coordination of assistance. Finally, a strong, possibly ideological, preference among donors for finding private sector recipients for the bulk of assistance may erode the capacity of the post-Communist states to provide both infrastructure and political stability needed for investor confidence. Those making decisions about levels and modes of Western assistance should look beyond economic indicators of privatization as criteria for continued support and retain, where possible, political development objectives in both financial and project assistance. While we must not assume that the record of supporting democracy in Central and Eastern Europe will prove to be any better than in many Third World regimes, the greater security salience of Eastern Europe’s stability adds urgency to the task of applying political development lessons to the post-Communist experience. Malcolm J. Grieve specializes in political development and international political economy and in his current research is exploring the connections between the two fields with regard to analysis of the post-Communist transition. Recent publications include “Economic Imperialism”, in D. Haglund and M. Hawes, eds.,World Politics: Power, Interdependence and Dependence (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990) and “Debt and Imperialism: Perspectives on the Debt Crisis,” in S. Riley ed.,The politics of global debt (Macmillan 1993). ...in Central and eastern Europe, we are seeking to demonstrate in practice the idea that free government can mean good and stable government, and that free enterprise can mean economic opportunity for all.U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 27 February 1991. There is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through, than to initiate a new order of things.Machiavelli, The Prince     

Terrorism,Crime, and Transformation

This article argues that some of today's terrorist groups have transformed into transnational criminal organization (TCO) who are more interested in profits than politics. This dynamic has important implications for policymakers as some traditional, politically motivated terrorist groups further profit-minded agencies under a political banner. The author argues that there are different degrees of transformation; some terrorists commit criminal acts to support political operations, while others view profit-driven criminal acts as their end game. The articles further argues that unlike some observers suggest, TCOs and terrorist groups will not cooperate with each other to advance aims and interests, instead utilizing their "in-house" capabilities to undertake criminal or political acts.