Does it Matter Who Works at the Center? A Comparative Policy Analysis of Executive Styles

This article develops the concept of executive style to explore how variations in the relationships between politicians, career civil servants, and political appointees affect the types of policy outputs. A comparative analysis of home care policies in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia finds that the former’s civil service executive style – where professional civil servants work in close partnership with politicians in all phases of the policy process – led to the development of an innovative home care program with a long-term vision, whereas the latter’s politicized executive style – where politicians marginalize the role of civil servants in favor of political appointees – led to frequent changes in policy largely driven by short-term considerations.     

How responsible is 'responsive' government?

The work of John Rohr focuses primarily upon the constitutional dimension of the work of public servants, most particularly, but not exclusively, career civil servants employed in central government. In stressing public service ethics as a form of constitutional practice Rohr's aim is to help reinforce the legitimate role of career public servants in government and to remind practising public bureaucrats (and academics and politicians) of the nobility of the 'administrative vocation' of state service, a somewhat daunting task in today's political climate. In this article I examine Rohr's work to see what ethical light it might throw upon recent and ongoing political attempts to make the British public administration more 'responsive'. I do so, first, by outlining the main themes of Rohr's work and their location within the US constitutional tradition. I then proceed to discuss the extent to which they translate into other constitutional contexts. Finally, I attempt to put Rohr's work to use in discussing aspects of civil service reform in Britain under recent Conservative administrations and that of the present New Labour government.     

PUBLIC SERVANTS AND THE BRIEFING OF PARTY COMMITTEES

Abstract: Politicians need information. In recent years the practice of public servants briefing party committees has been expanded to help fill that need. In part this was due to the increased influence of caucus committees under the Labor government, but the practice has continued. Public servants provide information and explanations of policy to government and opposition members, although in the latter case public servants have to tread carefully. In December 1976 the Prime Minister tabled guidelines to govern these briefings. This innovation has implications for the doctrines of public service neutrality, for ministerial responsibility and for the capacity of the opposition to develop workable policy. Despite the potential problems that may arise, it is a practice that, if used effectively, can only assist in the improvement of political debate.     

Sliding doors in Brussels: A career path analysis of EU affairs managers

This article investigates the revolving doors phenomenon in the European Union (EU). It proposes a management approach that treats this phenomenon as a form of corporate political activity through which companies try to gain access to decision makers. By using sequence analysis to examine the career paths of almost 300 EU affairs managers based in public and private companies across 26 countries, three different ideal‐typical managers are identified: those EU affairs managers coming from EU institutions and public affairs; those who make a career through the private sector; and those who establish themselves in national political institutions. This identification confirms that EU institutions need different types of information and companies need EU affairs managers with different professional backgrounds able to provide it. Rather than observing a revolving door of EU officials into EU government affairs, what the authors term ‘sliding doors’ – namely the separation of careers, especially between the public and private sectors – is discerned.     

Civil Servants, Economic Ideas, and Economic Policies: Lessons from Italy

Building on theoretically oriented and empirically grounded research on two key macroeconomic institutions in Italy, this article explains how and why civil servants can engineer major policy changes, making a difference in a country's trajectory. Italy provides a challenging testing ground for this kind of analysis, as it is generally portrayed as a highly politicized system in which political parties and politicians fully control public policies. Three general lessons can be learned, the first being that the role of civil servants in changing modes of economic governance depends on the resources that they master in the system in which they operate. "Intangible assets" are of primary importance in complex and perceived technical policies, such as monetary and exchange rate policy, which have high potential for "technocratic capture." Second, in these policies, certain intangible assets, such as specific bodies of economic knowledge or policy paradigms, have a considerable impact on policy making. Third, besides interactions in international fora, the professional training of civil servants is a mainstream way through which economic policy beliefs circulate and gain currency, laying the foundations for policy shifts. By highlighting the importance of the intangible assets of macroeconomic institutions, this research makes an unorthodox contribution to the primarily economic literature on central bank independence.     

How Much Responsiveness is Too Much or Too Little?

This article analyses the main principles underlying public service responsiveness, illustrating them with examples drawn largely from recent experience in the Australian Commonwealth government. The final section attempts to identify some general international trends which are placing new strains on the relationships between politicians and public servants.     

POLITICIANS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC POLICIES

Policy scientists can make important contributions to the study of policy distribution, a question that is likely to be among the most crucial national issues to be discussed throughout this decade. One aspect of this question that has been neglected is the theoretical assumption associated with public choice theory that politicians, once elected, will reward their supporters through the distribution of policy benefits. However, empirical research indicates that policy benefits seldom are distributed in this way. Instead, politicians follow the principle of universalism. In league with bureaucracies and policy communities, politicians define need and then ask bureaucracies to allocate benefits. This makes politicians roles as distributors of policy very different than simplistic models suggest.     

Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions

Campaign finance contributions may influence policy by affecting elections or influencing the choices of politicians once in office. To study the trade‐offs between these two paths to influence, we use a game in which contributions may affect electoral outcomes and signal policy‐relevant information to politicians. In the model, a campaign donor and two politicians each possess private information correlated with a policy‐relevant state of the world. The donor may allocate his or her budget to either an ally candidate who has relatively similar preferences or a moderate candidate whose preferences are relatively divergent from the donor's preferred policy. Contributions that increase the likelihood of the moderate being elected can signal good news about the donor's preferred policy and influence the moderate's policy choice. However, when the electoral effect of contributions is too small to demand sufficiently high costs to deter imitation by groups with negative information, this informational effect breaks down.     

Towards a professional civil service in post‐transition Romania

To what degree and under what conditions can a young democracy build a competent, politically neutral public bureaucracy? A crucial component of the transition from communist party rule to democracy is the creation of a professional civil service. Success along this dimension of state‐building generates administrative capacity: non‐elected public officials ensure the implementation of reforms initiated by political leaders. In the communist party‐led regimes of Eastern Europe, forging this new administrative class from its highly politicised predecessor took place as new democracies sought to overcome historical legacies and integrate with the European Union. A case study of administrative reform in Romania during the post‐1989 period suggests the importance of external influences in forming a civil service more closely adhering to the Weberian ideal of an expert, rules‐based bureaucracy. Through analysis of survey data from a nationally representative sample of the Romanian civil servants, the public bureaucracy has professionalised insofar as educational and training credentials rather than political affiliation are significant predictors of salary levels. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Promiscuously Partisan? Public Service Impartiality and Responsiveness in Westminster Systems

Public servants in Westminster countries are being drawn into the limelight by demands from their political masters that they publicly defend policies. Critics suggest these conditions undermine the capacity and willingness of senior public servants to manage the enduring Westminster tension between serving elected governments and remaining nonpartisan. Interviews with senior officials from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom challenge this pessimistic view, showing that officials consistently stress the importance of not “crossing the line” when dealing with their elected masters. Two exploratory case studies are presented—one of an Australian ministerial department (Treasury) and another of a Canadian quasi‐autonomous agency (Statistics Canada)—in which public servants faced pressure to defend controversial government policies. These cases show how contemporary public servants actively interpret, establish, and defend the line between appropriate responsiveness and inappropriate partisanship in Westminster systems.     

THE IMAGE OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR: AN MP's PERSPECTIVE*

In Australia the only professional group less understood or more subject to abuse than the public service is politicians. Rightly or wrongly public servants as a group are pictured as being lazy, "never having worked a hard day in their lives", totally inflexible, out of touch with the public, not really concerned about people's needs or wants, incompassionate, and concerned only about their seniority status and their superannuation fund.     

Ministerial Leadership and Endorsement of Bureaucrats: Experimental Evidence from Presidential Governments

Scholars have debated what constitutes effective ministerial leadership with respect to administrative competence versus political influence. The authors contribute experimental evidence to this debate through a unique survey design of endorsement experiments. Using original data from 949 national civil servants in South Korea, this article examines civil servants’ assessments of ministerial leadership in three central dimensions of public management: internal management, interbranch coordination, and policy formulation/implementation. Further, existing variation in the characteristics of agencies is used to test whether such variation induces systematic differences in civil servants’ responses. Findings show that that civil servants’ attitudes toward ministerial leadership are asymmetric in nature. Ministers with civil service backgrounds are endorsed in all three dimensions, whereas ministers with legislative backgrounds receive increased support only for interbranch coordination skills. The levels of support for ministers with different backgrounds also vary across agency types. This analysis has implications for public management practice and agency control in presidential governments.     

Craft and Capacity in the Public Service

Over the past 8 years, debates about Australia's public service have evolved from being focused mainly on skills and capacities to being now increasingly concerned about the operating environment for career officials, their ability to fulfil their stewardship obligations, and to practice their ‘craft’. In this article, I track those changes and ask what is the craft of public administration? How should we understand it? Are concerns it is imperilled or has been lost valid or overblown? I draw on the observations of current and former senior officials, and the findings of recent Capability Reviews. My primary focus is on the Australian Public Service, because here is where the debate has been most public and direct. I note that the focus of concern has shifted from public servants towards ministers, who have been largely absent from public sector reform initiatives of the past 40 years.     

Motivation of politicians and long-term policies

We analyze the motivation of politicians in democracies when long-term policies are socially desirable. Politicians receive utility from holding office and from the success of their projects. We refer to the two extreme types of politicians as “populists” and “policy success-seekers”. One result is that inefficiencies in the political process are smaller when a politician is of the populist type. When politicians offer incentive contracts, the problem of inefficient decision-making may be solved. The amount of money necessary to induce the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal project decreases with the degree of populism he displays.     

The Public Service: Independence, Responsibility and Responsiveness

In recent years there has been controversy surrounding the issues of the independence, responsibility and responsiveness of our public services. Critics come from two opposing directions: (i) there have been charges of politicisation of the public service, with the implication that it has lost its independence and become dominated by the government; (ii) Pusey (1991) has accused 'economic rationalists' in the public service of pursuing their own neo-classical agenda and dominating government policy. Both criticisms reveal a misunderstanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of ministers and public servants and the proper relations between them. In our system of democratic government, it is the prerogative of ministers to decide and the role of departments to propose and advise and then implement the decisions of ministers. This contribution begins by considering the respective responsibilities of ministers and officials, before canvassing the charges of politicisation and what should be expected from public servants in contributing to policy development. Finally there is consideration of the ethical values of public servants and what responsibility they might have for the 'public interest'.     

Approaches to the Merit Principle in Queensland Public Service Recruitment 1859–2000. From rich and dumb to gender discrimination to politicisation?

The traditional career service model of public employment was ostensibly based on the merit principle, designed to ensure employment on what you knew rather than who you knew, and to remove patronage. However, the image of public servants is often poor, and many are perceived as having little real merit. This article reviews approaches to merit in the Queensland state public service. It finds that, in earlier times, the merit principle was often enshrined in primary and subordinate legislation, but was subsequently moderated by social values including gender and class discrimination, and by circumstances such as wars. This had implications for the skill levels and quality of public employees, and therefore for public policy and public services. In recent decades, the merit principle has been subjected to extensive redefinition and has been subordinated to the desire for greater political control of public services, and pursuit of ‘responsiveness’.     

The structure of foreign policy attitudes in transatlantic perspective: Comparing the United States,United Kingdom,France and Germany

While public opinion about foreign policy has been studied extensively in the United States, there is less systematic research of foreign policy opinions in other countries. Given that public opinion about international affairs affects who gets elected in democracies and then constrains the foreign policies available to leaders once elected, both comparative politics and international relations scholarship benefit from more systematic investigation of foreign policy attitudes outside the United States. Using new data, this article presents a common set of core constructs structuring both American and European attitudes about foreign policy. Surveys conducted in four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) provide an expanded set of foreign policy‐related survey items that are analysed using exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM). Measurement equivalence is specifically tested and a common four‐factor structure that fits the data in all four countries is found. Consequently, valid, direct comparisons of the foreign policy preferences of four world powers are made. In the process, the four‐factor model confirms and expands previous work on the structure of foreign policy attitudes. The article also demonstrates the capability of ESEM in testing the dimensionality and cross‐national equivalence of social science concepts.     

Businessman Candidates

Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that “businessman candidacy” and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for office. When such institutions are weak, businessmen can subvert policy irrespective of whether they hold office, but they may run for office to avoid the cost of lobbying elected officials. Evidence from Russian gubernatorial elections supports the model's predictions. Businessman candidates emerge in regions with low media freedom and government transparency, institutions that raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises. Among regions with weaker institutions, professional politicians crowd out businessmen when the rents from office are especially large.     

Politics and Administration: A Trichotomy?

This article compares changes in the education and career paths of senior federal civil servants in Canada between 1967 and 1987. It shows that there has been a marked trend toward managers with less formal education than had previously been the case and also a shift toward managers with less experience in the policy areas within which they are responsible for providing policy advice and program management. This finding is consistent with Osbaldeston's study of Canadian deputy ministers, and with studies of bureaucratic elites in other Western democracies. In an increasingly complex environment, problems facing government decision-makers require high levels of technical expertise. This requirement is central to Weber's concept of bureaucracy, and it has been used as an explanation for the increasing prominence of bureaucrats in the policy-making process. In recent decades, however, bureaucratic reforms have emphasized the administrative functions of senior managers at the expense of their technical roles. In Canada, at least, this process appears to have gone so far that it may have seriously compromised the capacity of senior civil servants to give informed advice and to make knowledgeable decisions about the policies and programs of their departments.