Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators

Why do interest groups lobby allied legislators if they already agree? One possibility is that allies are intermediaries who help persuade unconvinced legislators. To study the role and value of intermediaries, I develop a formal model of persuasive lobbying where interest groups use public cheap talk and provide verifiable information to a strategically selected coalition of legislators. Interest groups face a trade-off: Lobbying aligned legislators is advantageous as they are more willing to endorse the group's preferred policy, but those who are too aligned cannot persuade a majority of their peers. The model illustrates how intermediaries are especially valuable if interest groups cannot persuade a majority themselves. Counter to previous work, the results demonstrate how a legislature's ideological composition determines the use of intermediaries. Groups may lobby intermediaries even if access to legislators is free and unrestricted.     

Interstate Communication Among State Legislators Regarding Energy Policy Innovation

This study, using survey data of legislators in six states,examines the prevalence of cross-state cue-taking. The findingsregarding the sources of policy ideas are similar to those reportedin studies of agency officials. Regionalism is most important,although a few states are recognized as national leaders. Supportfor innovative energy policies among state legislators was positivelyrelated to two variables: the extent to which one engaged incue-taking and the degree to which the respondents were supportiveof external communication. A comparison of the six states showsthat extensive interstate communication is not a necessary conditionfor legislative support of innovative policies; an orientationsupportive of external cue-taking is sufficient.     

Comparing Legislators and Legislatures: The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock Reconsidered

Lawrence S. Rothenberg Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627 e-mail: lrot{at}mail.rochester.edu (corresponding author) Although political methodologists are well aware of measurementissues and the problems that can be created, such concerns arenot always front and center when we are doing substantive research.Here, we show how choices in measuring legislative preferenceshave influenced our understanding of what determines legislativeoutputs. Specifically, we replicate and extend Binder's highlyinfluential analysis (Binder, Sarah A. 1999. The dynamics oflegislative gridlock, 1947–96. American Political ScienceReview 93:519–33; see also Binder, Sarah A. 2003. Stalemate:Causes and consequences of legislative gridlock. Washington,DC: Brookings Institution) of legislative gridlock, which emphasizeshow partisan, electoral, and institutional characteristics generatemajor legislative initiatives. Binder purports to show thatexamining the proportion, rather than the absolute number, ofkey policy proposals passed leads to the inference that thesefeatures, rather than divided government, are crucial for explaininggridlock. However, we demonstrate that this finding is underminedby flaws in preference measurement. Binder's results are a functionof using W-NOMINATE scores never designed for comparing Senateto House members or for analyzing multiple Congresses jointly.When preferences are more appropriately measured with commonspace scores (Poole, Keith T. 1998. Recovering a basic spacefrom a set of issue scales. American Journal of Political Science42:964–93), there is no evidence that the factors thatshe highlights matter. Authors' note: Thanks to Sarah Binder and Keith Poole for furnishingdata used in our analysis and to Chris Achen and Kevin Clarkefor advice. All errors remain our own. Online appendix is availableon the Political Analysis Web site.     

Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators

This article examines the effect of gender on legislators' attitudes and bill initiation behavior in three Latin American countries—Argentina, Colombia, and Costa Rica. I argue that sex role changes in Latin America over the past 35 years have led to changes in how female legislators perceive their political roles, and consequently, changes in their attitudes and behavior. Specifically, female legislators will place higher priority than male legislators on women's issues and children/family concerns, but their attitudes in other areas, such as education, health, the economy, agriculture, and employment, will be similar. However, I expect that gender dynamics in the legislative arena lead to marginalization of women such that gender differences will emerge for bill initiation behavior where they did not appear for attitudes. I test this using a survey of legislators' issue preferences and archival data on the bills that legislators sponsor and find statistical support for the hypotheses.     

Explaining Explanations: How Legislators Explain their Policy Positions and How Citizens React

Legislators claim that how they explain their votes matters as much as or more than the roll calls themselves. However, few studies have systematically examined legislators’ explanations and citizen attitudes in response to these explanations. We theorize that legislators strategically tailor explanations to constituents in order to compensate for policy choices that are incongruent with constituent preferences, and to reinforce policy choices that are congruent. We conduct a within‐subjects field experiment using U.S. senators as subjects to test this hypothesis. We then conduct a between‐subjects survey experiment of ordinary people to see how they react to the explanatory strategies used by senators in the field experiment. We find that most senators tailor their explanations to their audiences, and that these tailored explanations are effective at currying support—especially among people who disagree with the legislators’ roll‐call positions.     

Keeping them Honest: Public and Elite Perceptions of Ethical Conduct among Australian Legislators

Public confidence in politicians across all democratic countries has fallen to historic lows in recent years. In Australia, around one in three voters believe that legislators use their public office for financial gain, and only one in four believe that legislators have a high moral code. Governments in many countries have attempted to deal with this problem by establishing codes of ethical conduct for legislators. This paper examines what standards citizens expect from their politicians and, in turn, what standards politicians themselves regard as important. The data come from the 1996 Australian Election Study survey which asked voters and elected representatives what importance they attributed to the eight principles laid out in the federal parliament's own ethical guide. The results show that voters expect higher standards from legislators than do legislators themselves, particularly with regard to the proper use of public resources and rejecting favouritism. A range of hypotheses are tested to account for citizen and elite beliefs about legislators' ethical conduct. The results show that stronger democratic culture and political skills are important for the public, and lengthy exposure to political parties and democratic institutions for the elite.     

State Legislators and State Auditors: Is There an Inherent Role Conflict?

Traditionally, one of the functions of state legislatures has been that of oversight. However, because it is the least rewarding, legislatures have paid it the least attention. This has led to increased responsibilities for state auditors. In many cases, their role has expanded from an examination of financial transactions and internal control to include the oversight functions previously performed by the legislatures. The result has been considerable auditor-legislative tensions. This study surveyed state auditors to determine potential areas of conflict between auditors and legislatures. It found the major areas of conflict include inaction by legislators on the findings and recommendations of auditors and attempts at inappropriate control over the audit function by legislatures.     

Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation

Proportional representation systems affect the extent to which elected legislators exhibit various attributes that allow them to earn a personal vote. The sources of variation in personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) lie in informational shortcuts voters use under different electoral rules. List type (closed or open) and district magnitude (the number of legislators elected from a district) affect the types of shortcuts voters employ. When lists are closed, legislators' PVEA are of decreasing usefulness to voters as magnitude (and hence the number of candidates on a list) increases. When lists are open, legislators' PVEA are increasingly useful to voters as magnitude increases, because the number of candidates from which voters must choose whom to give a preference vote increases. As predicted by the theory, the probability that a legislator will exhibit PVEA—operationalized as local birthplace or lower-level electoral experience—declines with magnitude when lists are closed, but rises with magnitude when lists are open .     

The Effect of Fact‐Checking on Elites: A Field Experiment on U.S. State Legislators

Does external monitoring improve democratic performance? Fact‐checking has come to play an increasingly important role in political coverage in the United States, but some research suggests it may be ineffective at reducing public misperceptions about controversial issues. However, fact‐checking might instead help improve political discourse by increasing the reputational costs or risks of spreading misinformation for political elites. To evaluate this deterrent hypothesis, we conducted a field experiment on a diverse group of state legislators from nine U.S. states in the months before the November 2012 election. In the experiment, a randomly assigned subset of state legislators was sent a series of letters about the risks to their reputation and electoral security if they were caught making questionable statements. The legislators who were sent these letters were substantially less likely to receive a negative fact‐checking rating or to have their accuracy questioned publicly, suggesting that fact‐checking can reduce inaccuracy when it poses a salient threat.     

Spatial Models of Legislative Effectiveness

Spatial models of policymaking have evolved from the median voter theorem to the inclusion of institutional considerations such as committees, political parties, and various voting and amendment rules. Such models, however, implicitly assume that no policy is better than another at solving public policy problems and that all policy makers are equally effective at advancing proposals. We relax these assumptions, allowing some legislators to be more effective than others at creating high‐quality proposals. The resulting Legislative Effectiveness Model (LEM) offers three main benefits. First, it can better account for policy changes based on the quality of the status quo, changing our understanding of how to overcome gridlock in polarized legislatures. Second, it generalizes canonical models of legislative politics, such as median voter, setter, and pivotal politics models, all of which emerge as special cases within the LEM. Third, the LEM offers significant new empirical predictions, some of which we test (and find support for) within the U.S. Congress.     

The Effectiveness of a Racialized Counterstrategy

Our article examines whether a politician charging a political candidate's implicit racial campaign appeal as racist is an effective political strategy. According to the racial priming theory, this racialized counterstrategy should deactivate racism, thereby decreasing racially conservative whites’ support for the candidate engaged in race baiting. We propose an alternative theory in which racial liberals, and not racially conservative whites, are persuaded by this strategy. To test our theory, we focused on the 2016 presidential election. We ran an experiment varying the politician (by party and race) calling an implicit racial appeal by Donald Trump racist. We find that charging Trump's campaign appeal as racist does not persuade racially conservative whites to decrease support for Trump. Rather, it causes racially liberal whites to evaluate Trump more unfavorably. Our results hold up when attentiveness, old‐fashioned racism, and partisanship are taken into account. We also reproduce our findings in two replication studies.     

高职英语口语教学效果探究

在国际交流日益频繁的今天,英语教学的地位在高职的教育、教学中越显其突出作用。社会对学生口头交际能力的需求日益迫切。但由于受学生的心理素质、英语教学方法过于传统等因素的影响,高职英语口语课没有受到充分的重视。针对这个问题,介绍了高职学生英语口语的学习现状以及分析了当前高职英语口语教学中存在的问题并提出了相应的对策。     

我国经济改革效应分析

我国经济改革的效应明显,在国内外都产生了较大影响。经济改革首先激活了经济社会系统的内在潜质和内在要素,其主要表现为改革的动力效应、竞争效应、机制效应和制度效应。经济改革实践的推进不仅深刻地改变了我国社会发展的现实,也极大地改变了当今世界的格局,其主要表现为改革的经济效应、政治效应、文化效应和社会效应。由经济改革引发的激活效应和实践效应已经被现实充分证明,但经济改革的影响并没有至此结束,其"中国特色"效应和国际效应的存在,表现出极大的后发效应。     

高校辅导员管理行为有效性的调查分析

高校辅导员作为高校学生日常思想政治教育和管理工作的组织者、实施者和指导者,辅导员管理行为的有效性对大学生健康成长有着重要影响,通过问卷、访谈方法,对目前高校辅导员管理行为有效性的现状进行了调查。通过分析试图为辅导员提高管理行为有效性提供有价值的启示和建议。