Dealing with the Ambivalent Dragon: Can Engagement Moderate China’s Strategic Competition with America?

Can US engagement moderate China’s strategic competition with America? This study indicates that the answer is a qualified yes. Under unipolarity, a rising state may face both incentives to reach an accommodation with the hegemon and to expand its own stature and influence against the hegemonic dominance. The ambivalence of its intentions is structurally induced and reflects its uncertain stake in the hegemonic order. Consequently, a strategy of engagement may help the hegemon to promote cooperation over competition in dealing with an ascending power, but it does not necessarily eliminate the structural incentives for the competition. Against this theoretical backdrop, this study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative research to demonstrate that China’s reaction to American preeminence has long been marked by a profound ambivalence. Specifically, the findings suggest that while US engagement has some restraining impact on China’s competitive propensity, Beijing will continue to hedge against American hegemony, as its capabilities grow, by solidifying its diplomatic and strategic association with the developing world.     

The mix that makes unipolarity: hegemonic purpose and international constraints

The nature of a global arena dominated by one great power remains a critical subject for understanding international relations. Brooks and Wohlforth's recent book makes an important contribution by arguing that unipolarity poses few constraints to the hegemon and that the United States today should pursue a policy of primacy. The puzzle is that the United States has mostly resisted a primacy policy since becoming the sole superpower, and when it has done so, has often been less successful than the promise of its power advantage. Explaining this puzzle requires building on ‘the no constraint’ approach to develop a positive theory based on hegemonic purpose, a reformulated notion of constraints, and how purpose and constraints interact to shape outcomes. This reformulation suggests that any American strategy that looks like ‘primacy’ is unlikely to succeed.     

The future is uncertain and the end is always near

The standard view of contemporary unipolar politics is that systemic constraints impede the translation of American power capabilities into influence over security outcomes, rendering the United States (US) much less capable than its material capabilities imply. Challenging this logic, William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks argue that systemic constraints under unipolarity are largely inoperative with respect to the security policies of the unipolar power. Indeed, the US is uniquely positioned in today's world to convert its enormous capability advantages into influence and usable power. While World out of balance is a masterwork of logical and rigorous argumentation, Brooks and Wohlforth, in their exclusive focus on the hegemon and its policies, do not attempt to offer a general theory of unipolarity. Thus, they do not consider the possibility that unipolarity does not constrain any actors or the issue of system change. This essay advances two routes out of unipolarity: (1) a ‘delegitimation’ phase followed by regular balancing behavior and (2) a sudden and dramatic shift from unipolarity to multipolarity brought on by an unforeseen US collapse.     

Soft Power and the Currency of Sports: (Re)imagining South Africa’s Rising Hegemony in Africa

Commenting on the utility of sports as a development facilitating instrument, Nelson Mandela, in 2000, remarked that it “has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire. It has the power to unite people in a way that little else can. Sport can awaken hope where there was previously only despair”. Madiba’s iconic statement captures the changing reality of the international system wherein states appreciate the soft power potential of sports as a subtle alternative for gaining political advantage in the international arena. This also lends credence to the argument that politics permeates all elements of social existence, including sports. In view of the preceding, this paper interrogates the rising attractiveness of South Africa in Africa and perhaps globally through the lens of its sporting engagements. From the last decade of the 20th century, South Africa’s status in the sporting world has attracted much international and scholarly attention. The article examines how South Africa negotiates the overlapping arena of politics, sports and foreign policy to normatively secure a regional hegemonic posture through a blend of strategies. These include successful bidding and hosting of sporting mega-events; involvement in the development of sporting codes and local sports content across Africa and a positive cumulative ranking in international competitions vis-à-vis other contenders for regional powerhood. The analysis takes the position that South Africa’s strategy of sports diplomacy masks its aspiration for regional hegemony and this pattern is uniquely relevant for shaping empirical understanding of power politics in Africa as well as appreciating the ideational potency of soft power as a constitutive element of what makes a regional hegemon.     

Systematic Leadership and Trade Openness

Studies of hegemonic stability tend to specify periods when hegemony is present or absent in the world system. Periods in which hegemony is present are expected to exhibit openness for trade. Periods in which hegemony is absent should be associated with trade closure. Partially as a consequence of this nominal measurement strategy, scholars continue to be unsure whether hegemony and systemic leadership are linked to the openness of the world's trading system. We contend that analysts need to devote more attention to the sources of preponderance and less to its arbitrary presence or absence. Focusing on the U.S. from 1870 to 1990, we first articulate a theory linking certain political-economic systemic leadership variables to trade openness, in terms of the directions, signs, and diffusion speed of the causal links. We then estimate Granger causality and distributed lag models to test our predictions empirically. The empirical results support our theoretical interpretation. The Granger causalities between world trade openness and the systemic leadership variables are found to be reciprocal, with the effects of systemic leadership on world trade openness working faster than those of world trade openness on the hegemon. World trade openness exerts a negative effect on systemic leadership, while systemic leadership promotes world trade openness.     

Can we identify a benevolent hegemon?

Analysts frequently assess the underlying character of the state with the largest concentration of material capabilities in the system—the hegemon. Scholars typically differentiate a hegemon that is benevolent from one that is predatory. In the current era, many have wondered about how to best characterise the United States. Scholars became particularly interested in this question during the George W Bush administration and reached strikingly different answers. This article aims to provide greater clarity regarding how we reach a judgment about the underlying character of a hegemon, in general, and the United States, in particular. The first section analyses the policies that the hegemon adopts towards the global economic system. The second section considers the hegemon's policies in the security realm, focusing on the key issue of how unilateralism should be conceptualised. The final section discusses the potential significance the ‘hegemonic reference point’—that is, the comparison that is made between the hegemon and the leading alternative leader of the global system.     

The comparative analysis of international organizations

This study challenges the notion that the United States is a declining hegemon, or that the Western regime is in peril. Comparisons of economic output, trade, and power statistics indicate that the United States continues to hold a more favorable position than previous hegemons did at comparable periods in the trajectory of their rule in relation to both its allies and opponents. Most important, indicators of power (unlike economic indicators) suggest the power distribution in the world order has varied little since World War II and continues to insure American dominance. The preception of a withering American hegemony is a trendy but inaccurate assessment of our time.     

Virtue Unrestrained: Herbert Butterfield and the Problem of American Power

In the late 1950s, the British historian Sir Herbert Butterfield observed that we should not welcome the prospect of even a virtuous hegemon but should seek, rather, a balance of power. He did so because his understanding of history suggested that aspirant hegemons succeed principally in precipitating costly wars against them, while his sense of Christian ethics suggested that even a successful virtuous hegemon would become self-righteous and, by imposing its values on others, would curtail the scope of human freedom. I argue that current United States (U.S.) policy and the world's response to it to date confirm Butterfield's position, but that this presents a new set of practical and moral questions centered on the problem of advocating a balance against a country that one regards as broadly virtuous, and certainly more virtuous than many of the other powers in the world, but that no longer wants to pursue its interests through the post-Cold War concert of putative great powers. The best answer to these problems, I conclude, lies not in a crude balance, but the re-institutionalization of the idea of the balance of power. This requires advocating restraint and self-restraint, the first practical manifestation of which being that the U.S. should not attack either of the surviving members of the "Axis of Evil."     

Global Governance Reform

President Barack Obama has trumpeted a ＂new era of engagement＂ for the United States. The central components of his strategy include a world order characterized by peaceful accommodation between established and rising powers; the collective management of transnational problems; and the overhaul of international institutions to reflect these shifting power dynamics and the new global agenda. Placing less emphasis than his predecessor on the pursuit of American primacy, Obama envisions--indeed, insists-that other global powers assume new responsibilities. Notwithstanding its multilateral instincts, though, the Obama administration is limited in its practical ability to promote and embrace sweeping reforms to global governance. Therefore, rather than casting its lot entirely with universal organizations like the United Nations, the United States will adopt a pragmatic approach to international cooperation that combines formal institutions with more flexible partnerships to achieve US national interests. The balance sheet for Obama＇s first year in office underscores both the opportunities for and the constraints on global governance reform in the current geopolitical environment.     

Globalisation

The term ‘globalisation’ is widely used to describe a variety of economic, cultural, social, and political changes that have shaped the world over the past 50-odd years. Because it is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, globalisation has been credited with a wide range of powers and effects. Its proponents claim that it is both ‘natural’ and an inevitable outcome of technological progress, and creates positive economic and political convergences. Critics argue that globalisation is hegemonic and antagonistic to local and national economies. This article argues that globalisation is a form of capitalist expansion that entails the integration of local and national economies into a global, unregulated market economy. Although economic in its structure, globalisation is equally a political phenomenon, shaped by negotiations and interactions between institutions of transnational capital, nation states, and international institutions. Its main driving forces are institutions of global capitalism – especially transnational corporations – but it also needs the firm hand of states to create enabling environments for it to take root. Globalisation is always accompanied by liberal democracy, which facilitates the establishment of a neo-liberal state and policies that permit globalisation to flourish. The article discusses the relationship between globalisation and development and points out that some of the most common assumptions promoted by its proponents are contradictory to the reality of globalisation; and that globalisation is resisted by more than half of the globe's population because it is not capable of delivering on its promises of economic well being and progress for all.     

Hegemonic Authority and Domestic Legitimation: Japan and Korea under Chinese Hegemonic Order in Early Modern East Asia

Some argue a powerful China will likely reestablish a Sinocentric tribute system in pursuit of hegemony in Asia. This line of argument, however, rests on misleading images of the Chinese empire while assuming hegemony is a product of a single agent and its activities. But, why do actors comply with, defy, or challenge hegemonic authority? I argue hegemony is not just an outcome of the material power of the preponderant state, but is constructed in interaction with other actors’ pursuit of domestic legitimation. The tribute system and Chinese hegemony in early modern East Asia were built on symbolic domination—Chinese views of how international politics should work determined what was socially acceptable and legitimate while regulating the range of choices other actors could make due to domestic consequences. It shows that crafty political leaders engaged in a form of symbolic politics that manipulated external recognition from the hegemon, but in ways that strengthened their positions against domestic opponents.     

Diversity Management: Regionalism and the Future of the International Order

Abstract

The ongoing redistribution of power on the international stage points to a more decentred international system featuring a multiplication of governance arrangements. A larger range of pivotal countries have the capacity and the confidence to pursue different priorities, a development that questions the prevalent post-Cold War expectation that the liberal international order would grow both wider and deeper. The central challenge for the future of the international order is managing diversity in ways that minimise conflict and leverage the benefits of interdependence. The evolution of regionalism and regional orders will be a critical dimension of the realignment of power, interests and normative agendas at the global level. Both more competition and more cooperation are likely to take place at the regional level, with the mix changing in different parts of the world. Provided that it is not merely a cover for coercive hegemonic aspirations and that it is designed to complement other levels of cooperation, regionalism can play an important role in preventing a more polycentric world from becoming a more fragmented and unstable one.     

The Paradox of Anti-Americanism: Reflection on the Shallow Concept of Soft Power

This article deals with the seeming paradox of lasting American power and global anti-Americanism, which brings into question the relevance of the concept of soft power. Indeed, discontent over the current hegemon does not affect the consumption of its goods and the diffusion of its symbols. The contradiction results from the state-centric perspective of traditional scholars which does not shed light on the diverse aspects of American supremacy. In addition, Nye's notion of soft power does not stress the shaping of foreign societies by non-state actors and thus their important role in American predominance. As a consequence, the concept of soft power will be revised in order to reduce its “shallowness” and highlight the constraining aspect of today's prominent power.     

FIFA’s Hegemony: Examples from World Cup Hosting Countries

The hegemonic power of FIFA over countries hosting its capstone World Cup tournament is worth examining in the context of hegemony theory in International Relations literature. To understand FIFA’s hegemonic role on the global stage, it is best to place it within the context of two major shifts in the international system—power transition and diffusion. This study provides an insight into the dispute between transnational and national law in sports, which FIFA has used to strengthen its hegemony. This has empirical support as seen in four World Cup cases: previous Cups in Brazil (2014) and South Africa (2010) and the forthcoming tournaments in Russia (2018) and Qatar (2022). These cases reveal FIFA’s hegemonic power both through the overruling of national law in favour of transnational law, and by the questionable bidding processes to host the games in Qatar and the Russian Federation. In addition, this study examines whether Switzerland is capable of regulating or restricting FIFA’s hegemonic power. While removing FIFA’s legal status as a non-profit organisation seems not to be an option, the executed amendment of the Swiss anti-corruption law is a step forward. Furthermore, FIFA needs to continue its recently initiated internal reforms.     

The leadership deficit in Europe

The emerging global order is challenging multilateralism in the sense that power is becoming situational: centres of gravity are overlapping and transient, and the transnational interdependence that characterises this ‘polypolar’ world challenges small and great powers alike. Emerging powers are forming a ‘new middle', straddling the North-South divide with dynamic new multilateral formations, and prioritising economic self-interest. South Africa is at risk of being relegated to a new global periphery if it gives priority to political solidarity with the global South rather than economic pragmatism in its multilateral strategies. Its comparative advantage in the diplomatic arena is its middle power credentials. If it rationalizes its multilateralism to focus on diplomatic niche areas it can enhance its political influence in global governance institutions, despite its small economic stature.     

Hegemonic order, September 11, and the consequences of the Bush revolution

The striking feature of contemporary world politics continuesto be the disproportionate power position of the United States.U.S. officials consider stability in East Asia to be of vitalimportance, and they have adopted a hegemonic strategy to promoteregional order and serve U.S. interests. U.S. officials arelikely to find the management and completion of hegemony moreproblematic in the years ahead. U.S. power, particularly military,will remain unchallenged. But changes in U.S. foreign policyafter September 11, developments in the world economy, and developmentsin East Asia suggest that the exercise of U.S. power and U.S.relations with states in this all-important region will becomeincreasingly complex and will demand more creative diplomaticefforts.     

Global power shifts and world order: the contestation of ‘western’ discursive hegemony

Given growing awareness for ‘global power shifts’ and the ‘Western’-centrism of International Relations (IR), this article re-conceptualizes the phenomena subsumed under these two labels. By understanding ‘global power shifts’ and ‘world order’ as discursive phenomena, the article argues that discourses by fixing particular meanings and identities constitute the objects and subjects of which they speak. The discourses on ‘Global power shifts’ and ‘Post-Western IR’ are an expression of a hegemonic struggle over meanings and identities, resulting from the dislocation of existing meaning-systems and identities and enabling ‘new’ agents to assert particular representations of the world as universal. Drawing on the notion of discursive hegemony, developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, the article develops an analytical framework for conceptualizing the evolution and implications of this shift in representational power in the field of IR.     

Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity,Threat Perception,and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War

This paper engages the ongoing soft balancing debate by suggesting a new analytical framework for states’ countervailing strategies—a negative balancing model—to explain why states do not form alliances and conduct arms races to balance against power or threats as they previously did. Negative balancing refers to a state's strategies or diplomatic efforts aiming to undermine a rival's power. By contrast, positive balancing means to strengthen a state's own power in world politics. I argue that a state's balancing strategies are shaped by the level of threat perception regarding its rival. The higher the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose positive balancing. The lower the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose negative balancing. I suggest that the hegemon provides security as a public good to the international system in a unipolar world in which the relatively low-threat propensity of the system renders positive balancing strategies incompatible with state interests after the Cold War. Instead, states have employed various negative balancing strategies to undermine each other's power, especially when dealing with us primacy. China's negative balancing strategy against the United States and the us negative balancing strategy against Russia are two case studies that test the validity of the negative balancing model.     

American Views of Europe

America’s diplomacy towards Europe has passed through two broad historic phases. A first, isolationist phase, determined in part by America’s need to maintain its domestic multinational consensus, was replaced, after World War II and under the Soviet threat, by a policy of hegemonic engagement. The Soviet collapse opened a new era forcing a reinterpretation of America’s role in Europe and the world. Four different narratives have emerged: triumphalist, declinist, chaotic or pluralist. If a unipolar American role seems unlikely to persist, American decline is all too possible. A new hegemonic replacement seems unlikely, which makes the pluralist narrative plausible and desirable. This multipolar world will require an adaptation of the Western alliance and a new way of thinking about interstate relations. Confederal Europe, for its experience in bargaining and conciliation, might have much to offer to the new plural world order.     

Managing the Hegemon: nato under Unipolarity

The shift to unipolarity has introduced new dilemmas for America's allies. Their level of strategic uncertainty has increased, largely because under unipolarity, allies' threat perceptions are more likely to diverge across time or issue areas and are not shaped as much by structural systemic factors. Although they want to maintain the pre-existing security arrangements as a means of managing the rising uncertainty, allies need to deal with the dual concern of either being trapped into the hegemonic partner's policies, or being abandoned by the hegemon. These two concerns—the alliance security dilemma—may become more or less prominent given the nature of the divergence in threat perceptions on different issues and at different times. To deal with this dual threat, allies employ two strategies: using the pre-existing alliance as a pact of restraint, and developing a division of labor with the hegemon. Both the dilemmas and the strategies used to mitigate them are examined here in the context of the European behavior within nato following the Gulf War, the nato involvement in Kosovo, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq.