全球安全治理视域下的自主武器军备控制

随着人工智能的飞速进展，不断智能化的自主武器日益显现出伦理和安全风险，使得限制或禁止自主武器成为全球安全治理领域的新兴议题。相比其他军控对象，自主武器军控进程在过去几年中获得较快推进，其中《特定常规武器公约》会议已决定设立政府专家组专门探讨自主武器问题。文章系统梳理了自主武器军备控制的概念、伦理和安全争议，旨在通过这种梳理更好地理解自主武器军控进程发展的动因，并对这一进程的未来走向做出预测。当前，自主武器军备控制的主要动因集中在道德层面，特别是让机器自主决策杀伤引发的伦理忧虑。而从安全层面看，自主武器蕴涵的安全风险在其他新兴技术领域同样存在，而发展和使用自主武器带来的战略红利依然显著，这使得主要国家推动自主武器军控的意愿并不强烈。在权力政治与道德政治的博弈下，自主武器军控在可预见的时期内将难以形成实质性成果，稍有可能的是通过“软法”等非约束性方式塑造一定的国际规范。在这个过程中，中国可以发挥更加积极主动的作用，在确保战略利益的同时营造有利的大国形象。     

The Geography of the International System: The CShapes Dataset

Sceptics of globalization attribute the proliferation of light weapons to economic openness. Increasing globalization apparently weakens public authority, leading to social disarray, anomic violence, and general conditions that make handgun ownership and use more likely. Pro-globalists might argue contrarily that trade openness can raise the premium on peace as violence is bad for business. Moreover, greater interdependence allows the diffusion of anti-proliferation norms and facilitates cooperative behavior among trading partners for stemming the demand for and proliferation of small arms. Using a unique dataset on small arms imports, we find that greater openness to trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) lowers small arms imports per capita. A policy measure of economic freedom is associated with higher small arms imports, but this association seems to be explained entirely by the association between economic freedom and strong bureaucracies. States that are de facto more open to the global trading system are less likely to be inundated with these weapons, but richer, better-governed countries import more small arms. Global policy should pay closer attention to the seepage of these weapons from the relatively wealthy, who manufacture and buy them in larger quantities, to the poor, among whom the ‘problems’ associated with small arms are often manifested. Curbing those factors that encourage globalization, however, would be counterproductive to reducing the trade in small arms and light weapons.     

Rethinking small arms control in Africa: it is time to set an armed violence reduction agenda

Policy-makers and practitioners concerned with small arms control have traditionally focused narrowly on ‘supply-side’ forms of regulation and containment. Concerned that excessive arms availability might destabilise fragile and post-war countries, they typically advance a host of activities such as weapons embargoes, export and import controls, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and weapons collection schemes. These initiatives often achieve fewer dividends than expected. This article argues for a broader conceptualisation of ‘availability’ that accounts for both supply and demand dimensions. Availability would thus extend from arms production and diverse forms of weapons circulation to the manifold factors shaping acquisition and the multiple ways arms are used and misused. A broad spectrum treatment directly acknowledges the many faces of armed violence and allows for more sophisticated diagnosis, treatment and cure. This article considers how a host of ‘second generation’ armed violence prevention and reduction activities might enhance efforts to promote security in the aftermath of Africa's wars.     

The enemy within: rethinking arms availability in sub-Saharan Africa

Over the past decade small arms and light weapons availability has been singled out as one of sub-Saharan Africa's highest profile challenges. Yet the construction of the threat of arms availability as one of authorised trade and illicit trafficking across international borders has resulted in a narrow focus on regulating lawful exports and imports and brokers. While these are real and legitimate concerns, the authors contend that small arms and light weapons availability should be re-evaluated as a complex social phenomenon involving dynamic supply and demand dimensions. A limited emphasis on controlling authorised transfers to war zones glosses over the challenges of illegal markets, the gradual emergence of national arms production capacities across Africa and the systematic diversion of weapons and ammunition surplus from the domestic stocks of security services into civilian hands. It also obscures a more dynamic landscape of armed violence across the continent which extends beyond war zones. Whilst the conventional interpretation of arms availability is favoured by African diplomats and international arms control experts, such a reading potentially obscures the weaknesses of security governance and the myriad motivations and means shaping small arms and light weapons acquisition and misuse amongst armed groups and civilians.     

日本化学武器军控政策研究

日本自上世纪初形成生产、使用化学武器,并在侵华战争中大量使用了化学武器.1945年日本战败后,大量化学武器遗弃在中国境内,对我国居民造成了直接伤害.战后,日本政府热衷国际化学武器军控事业,积极寻找、销毁本国老化学武器,但在处理遗弃在华化学武器问题上推诿拖沓.这种鲜明的反差,受到国际和国内多重因素的影响.除非日本的外交战略、防务政策发生重大变化,近期内日本的化学武器军控政策不会轻易改变.     

Selling to Both Sides: The Effects of Major Conventional Weapons Transfers on Civil War Severity and Duration

Civil wars are primarily fought with small and light arms, but the availability of major conventional weapons to states and rebels can alter the nature of the war being fought. This study explores the impact of major conventional weapons transfers on civil war severity and duration. By using a recipient based approach to arms transfers, I find rebel acquisition of major conventional weapons from international sources leads to conflict escalation and deadlier conflicts. State importation of major conventional weapons is associated with longer conflicts. These findings provide researchers a means to account for rebel capabilities in civil war research and policy makers insight to limit the destructiveness of civil wars.     

Weapons Transfers as a Soft Security Issue in Eastern Europe: Legal and Illicit Aspects

The article looks into the problem of weapons transfers in Europe from the perspective of soft security. While the military security dimension of the issue has traditionally received sufficient coverage, weapons transfers also have important implications for soft security of the European states, both in terms of the issues they are linked to, and policy measures designed to control the proliferation of weapons. The soft security aspects of arms transfers are outlined in the introduction, while the subsequent sections look into the trends of both legal and illegal movement of weapons in and from Europe, and policy measures controlling the spread of both major conventional weapons, and light weapons and small arms at the global, regional (European), and national levels. The conclusion assesses the effectiveness of these measures, and implications thereof for European security.     

A Review of: “Devin R. Springer,James L. Regens,and David N. Edger. Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. Stephen Vertigans (with contributions from Donncha Marron and Philip W. Sutton). Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics,Causes, and Consequences. David Aaron. In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad.”

Chinese arms sales to Africa have increased in recent years. In a region beset by conflict and unstable regimes, and where arms sales are a significant and positive predictor of an increased probability of political violence, this is inherently problematic. The sale of weaponry to a regime in Khartoum caught up in an alleged “genocide” in Darfur, the awkward appearance in 2008 of a Chinese ship loaded with weapons bound for Mugabe's Zimbabwe off the coast of eastern Africa, and the recent exposure in 2011 that Chinese arms companies offered to sell around $200 million worth of arms to Muammar Gaddafi's regime are emblematic of an issue in Africa's political violence that needs analysis. This article seeks to discuss the rationale behind China's arms sales to Africa and the effect that they have had on political violence in recipient countries. It also provides an analysis of the supply-and-demand circumstances of Chinese arms transfers to Africa, Beijing's attempts to control such transfers, and evidence that Chinese policies on proliferation are (slowly) evolving.     

Arms Acquisition Patterns and the Dynamics of Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Niger Delta

Arms acquisition is a crucial venture for armed insurgency groups for carrying out their militant activities. I argue that the specific manner in which these groups obtain weapons may have important consequences for the dynamics of violent intrastate conflict. While most previous studies of the relationship between arms acquisition and armed conflict have focused solely on the impact of arms availability, in this article I analyze the impact of two specific aspects of arms acquisition patterns—the methods and the degree of leadership control—on the dynamics and nature of armed conflict in a qualitative case study of the armed conflict in the Niger Delta (Nigeria) between 1995 and 2005. I conclude that the specific arms acquisition method and the degree of leadership control over this process have strongly affected the dynamics of the conflict.     

Promoting Stability or Instability? Arms Transfers and Regional Rivalries,1950–1991

There has not been much formal or empirical research on the impact of ColdWar–era arms transfers on regional subsystems, and the work that has been undertaken is inconclusive: arms transfers appear, in some cases, to promote stability, but in other situations they are shown to be destabilizing. This study confronts the issue directly by developing and testing both stability and instability models of Superpower (U.S. and USSR) and third-country arms transfers. The models examine the effects of exported arms on the political and military relationships between three sets of rival importers—India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, and Ethiopia-Somalia—during the 1950–1991 period. Tests of the models with recently released arms trade data reveal that the weapons shipments of the U.S. and USSR were profoundly destabilizing, while those of third parties generally had little impact on subsystem political and military relationships. An intriguing exception to these patterns is the weaponstransfers of the PRC, specifically to Pakistan: these are found to have lessened the military imbalance between Pakistan and India, suggesting that the PRC's reputation as an irresponsible exporter deserves further review.     

Do nuclear weapons affect the guns-butter trade-off? Evidence on nuclear substitution from Pakistan and beyond

Scholars have argued that acquiring nuclear weapons should allow states the luxury of exiting conventional arms races. In turn, a decreased budgetary focus on conventional arms should make possible greater spending on social welfare. I contest this logic of nuclear substitution by examining its most likely exponent, Pakistan. As a poor, under-developed state, a nuclear Pakistan should have welcomed the opportunity to cease its arms race with India, and spend greater sums on its population's welfare. Instead, I show Pakistan has doubled down on its pre-nuclear conventional posture, mainly because of its revisionism over Kashmir. More generally, I show nuclear substitution should happen only rarely: when a state is satisfied with the territorial status-quo, and its security challenges are amenable to pure nuclear deterrence. An empirical overview of conventional postures in Britain, China, France, India, Israel, the Soviet Union and the United States shows these conditions are met rarely, and never sustained. The argument has implications concerning the marginal welfare effects of nuclear weapons, the stability-instability paradox in South Asia and the standoff between Iran and the West.     

Democracy and Nuclear Arms Control—Destiny or Ambiguity?

Is there a particularly democratic way of dealing with nuclear arms control? Against the background of democratic peace (DP) theory, and using Immanuel Kant's writing as a starting point, this article argues that democracies should indeed develop a preference for arms control, but that Liberalism as well as the nature of nuclear weapons opens the possibility for contingent developments within a DP framework. While DP theory can thus account for the existence of variance, we maintain that a social constructivist complement based on role, identity, and enemy perception can best explain why a given democracy follows a specific path. Case studies of six Western democracies reveal a considerable variance in their nuclear arms control policies, which can indeed be traced back to the countries' respective roles, identities, and images of the Kantian “unjust enemy.”     

Eisenhower's disarmament dilemma: From chance for peace to open skies proposal

President Eisenhower's image as a promoter of ‘peace and nuclear disarmament’ was established through speeches he made such as ‘Atoms for Peace’ (December 1953) and ‘Open Skies’ proposal (July 1955). However, Eisenhower's approach to the subject cannot be grasped without an understanding of his attitude towards the relationship between arms, war and disarmament. As he saw it, not only would the mere existence of nuclear weapons not trigger a war, they were actually the best guarantee against the eruption of a global conflagration. The real threat to world security was the repressive, closed, totalitarian and expansionist Soviet regime. War could be prevented only by a dramatic change in the competing ‐ and threatening ‐ ideology and social structure embedded in the Soviet system. Until then, the existence of nuclear weapons would ensure the free world's safety.     

International Convention for the Peaceful Use of Cyberspace

Cyber weapons now are an extension of state power. In hopes of gaining a strategic advantage, many countries including the United States, Russia and China are developing offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt political, economic, and social institutions in competitor nations. These activities have led to a cyber arms race that is spiraling out of control. This imminent global threat challenges the international community to be proactive. The purpose of this article is to propose an international convention to throttle the development, proliferation and use of cyber weapons before they cause electronic Armageddon. We begin by examining three successful efforts in arms control and use the lessons learned to draft a convention that can serve as a starting point for formal multilateral negotiations.     

Arms production in the third tier: An analysis of opportunity and willingness

Major determinants of third world military industrialization operate at the domestic, regional, and global levels. I summarize these and then examine their relative importance by analyzing time‐series cross‐section data for twelve arms producers from 1968 to 1990. Overall, there is considerable support for the various factors identified in the literature. However, my findings do highlight the importance of opportunity, perhaps more than willingness, as an explanation for changing levels of third tier arms production. Resolution of the tensions that drive regional militarization and the eruption of military conflict should have some positive effects ‐on restraining the expansion of arms production capacity. But there also seems to be a certain inevitability to the process, a process that is limited primarily by states' resources, industrial capacities, and access to weapons‐production technologies.     

The effects of uncertainty and sex in a crisis simulation game

We conducted an experimental test of spiraling behavior, sex differences, and uncertainty in a simulated crisis situation. We investigated the relationship between weapons acquisition and the likelihood of engaging in aggressive behavior, such as going to war. The sample included 100 male and female subjects who participated in a crisis simulation in same‐sex dyads; each student was instructed to role play the leader of a country in conflict with another leader over a nearby island replete with newly discovered oil resources. Participants were randomly assigned to stimulus materials that manipulated the certainty of the information they received about their partner's force structure. In four cycles of decision‐making, each participant made procurement decisions, took an action related to the conflict, including decisions about going to war, completed questionnaires on characteristics such as the hostility and trustworthiness of themselves and their opponents, and wrote messages to the other member of the pair. The results of the study demonstrate a strong relationship between weapons acquisition and hostility. In addition, we found large and robust sex differences, showing that men are much more likely than women to acquire weapons and engage in aggressive behavior at every stage. There was no effect of uncertainty on either arms procurement or aggression.     

Arms Negotiation,War Exhaustion,and the Credibility of Preventive War

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate.     

Eisenhower's disarmament dilemma: From chance for peace to open skies proposal

President Eisenhower's image as a promoter of 'peace and nuclear disarmament' was established through speeches he made such as 'Atoms for Peace' (December 1953) and 'Open Skies' proposal (July 1955). However, Eisenhower's approach to the subject cannot be grasped without an understanding of his attitude towards the relationship between arms, war and disarmament. As he saw it, not only would the mere existence of nuclear weapons not trigger a war, they were actually the best guarantee against the eruption of a global conflagration. The real threat to world security was the repressive, closed, totalitarian and expansionist Soviet regime. War could be prevented only by a dramatic change in the competing - and threatening - ideology and social structure embedded in the Soviet system. Until then, the existence of nuclear weapons would ensure the free world's safety.     

Beyond the Blank Cheque: Arming Iran during the Ford Administration

When President Gerald Ford decided to maintain and deepen arms relations with Iran, he cemented a momentum that became near impossible for a successor to break by continuing the policy of his predecessor Richard Nixon. Nixon had given the Shah of Iran a “blank cheque” to purchase whatever American arms he desired—short of nuclear weapons. Although Ford’s authority would be challenged by members of his own Administration and a Congress seeking to claw back some of its authority, the need to support allies in the Middle East against the threat of the Soviet Union, even during a time of détente, remained paramount.     

Forever young: START and aftermath

Abstract

The New Strategic arms reduction treaty nuclear arms control agreement signed by US President, Barack Obama, and Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 is likely to achieve ratification in both Washington and Moscow, but it is too early to break out the champagne or vodka. Even successful ratification of this agreement is, at best, an important but incremental part of the US–Russian policy ‘reset’ and the larger agenda for both states with respect to arms reduction and nonproliferation. Further reductions in both states’ inventories of strategic nuclear weapons are a necessary preface toward credible leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear arms – especially in the looming test cases of Iran and North Korea. In addition, both states have to decipher a policy-strategy nexus for emerging missile defense technologies: in particular, whether missile defenses should be seen as possible means of cooperative security, as between NATO and Russia, or whether they are firewalls in the way of further progress in offensive nuclear arms reductions.